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his book was born as a treatise on what is often termed schizophrenic
speech, but, increasingly, it has become clear that such speech also
can occur in manics and other patients. Therefore, it is more accurate to
speak of psychotic speech. This does not mean that there is no difference
between schizophrenic and other psychotic speech. As this book shows,
there is, but it is a difference in degree rather than one in kind. The
argumentation over terminology that so delights scholars will be addressed
in the body of this book, so I shall leave it now and briefly discuss my
own role in the field as a linguist, one versed in scienta linguarum, the
science of language.
What special value does a linguistic analysis have? For one thing, the
linguist focuses on language itself, on interpreting data in light of what
we know of how people learn and use language, spoken or written. Then
those analyses are compared to the situations which evoke them. Unlike
those of other fields who simply take language as a given, without
examining it in its own right, the linguist always takes language as
something to be analyzed in its own right.
Much of the argumentation in the literature over whether or not
schizophrenics suffer from thought disorder or whether or not their
speech is ungrammatical, whether or not it is deliberate, and certainly,
disagreements over what it means are artifacts of not understanding what
language is and how it is normally produced and understood. Every
psychological test in some way depends upon language, even when it
doesn’t purport to. For instance, directions are given and understood —or
misunderstood —via the medium of language. All psychoanalysis, all
therapeutic situations, in fact, are mediated by language, but, often, the
therapist has not looked at language in its own right, has never asked
questions like, “How do I know X is implying that?” “Why do I feel that
this speech is strange?” “What exactly is it to be tangential?” “What does
it mean to keep to a topic? What is telling me that this person is or is not
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keeping to one?” “Why am I so sure that this patient is using a metaphor,
and really means something quite different from what he says?”
That, then, is the business of this book. In it, I show what the features
of schizophrenic speech are, how they deviate from normal speech, and
what accounts for our feeling that it is, after all, crazy talk. I distinguish
between speech of schizophrenics which is structurally deviant and that
which is not. The relation of speech to thought is also explored. It is vital
that those concerned with the mentally ill understand the differences
between language and thought and understand as well how languages
are structured. To some degree, this can be described as a quickie course
in linguistic concepts, but, at no time is any concept of linguistics presented
unless it is immediately applied to psychotic speech.
This is true as well of the chapters of discourse analysis presented
here. What is metaphor, how do we know when one has been made and
how do we know how to interpret it so as to garner the meaning intended?
What is intention and how is it signalled in speech? What are the laws, so
to speak, of implication. What is the difference between poesy and
schizophrenic speech? What constitutes a valid experimental procedure
to uncover any deficits in linguistic production? How is speech made
relevant?
This book is not only about a linguist’s contribution to schizophrenia,
however. Linguists are as contentious a lot as scholars in any other field
are, and I have to admit that my 17 year career studying psychotic
language has certainly shaped my own views about normal language and
linguistic theory itself. To be most accurate, this is a book by one
linguist, one who falls into the camps of those who believe in a contextdependent model of language, not a context-free one. There is a reason
that this is called “Beyond Chomsky” as well as “Beyond Freud.”
I have avoided technical talk as much as possible, but one matter must
be touched upon: the matter of phonetic symbols. The only ones used in
this book are
[j ] for the <j> in judge
[c], for the < ch > in child
[D] for the < tt> in betting and the < d d > in bedding
[0 ] for the < th > in thing
[ U], for the vowel in talk as pronounced in British and New York City
English (and a few other places as well).
[ae] for the vowel in cat
[I ] for the vowel in is
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[u] for the vowel in put
[e] for last vowel in sofa
Brackets with special meaning are:
[ ] = phonetic symbol for actually pronounced sound
/ / = phoneme, sound hearer thinks has been made
< > = conventional spelling
Additionally, first mention of any technical term is in small caps and
is included in the index so that the reader can easily go back to its first
mention in the text.
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UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOTIC SPEECH:
BEYOND FREUD AND CHOMSKY

Chapter One

T H E F E A T U R E S O F P S Y C H O T IC S P E E C H

The strange speech of some psychotics has baffled clinicians
and laypersons alike, exciting all kinds of extraordinary interpre
tations. Some even have assumed that there is nothing wrong
with schizophrenic speech, claiming that it is deliberate. An
analysis of the linguistic forms of such speech demonstrate that
it is definably different from normal speech, and the many kinds
of deviations evinced are all disruptions of normal speech
processes. This chapter demonstrates the kinds of disruptions
responsible for psychotic speech.

[1] T he Value of a Linguistic Analysis.
aplan (1980, p. 235) sums up the value of linguistic analysis of
aberrant speech production:

C

. . . it u tiliz e s p s y c h o l i n g u is t i c a n d lin g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t s d e r i v e d fr o m
scien tific stu d ies o f la n g u a g e stru ctu re an d

p ro cessin g ra th e r than

i n t u i t i v e t a x o n o m i e s a n d a n a l y s e s . A s a r e s u l t , it a c h i e v e s . . . s p e c i f i c i t y
in

the

d escrip tion

of

the

lin g u istic

and

psy ch olo gical

d e fic its. ..

Such an analysis bears heavily on the question of whether or not
schizophrenic speech shows structural deviation, as well as the nature of
any deviation. It can be shown that such speech can be deviant although
not all is. Furthermore, the kinds of deviation manifested in schizo
phrenic speech must be taken in account in any interpretation of it.

[2] T he Cyclic Nature of Schizophrenic Speech.
One of the most baffling characteristics of the kinds of speech that is
associated with schizophrenia (henceforth SD) is that it is intermittent.
Not all schizophrenics speak this way, and those who do, do so at some
times and not at others. It is not only schizophrenics who are likely to
speak this way. Manics do, and so do some with schizoaffective disorders.
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For this reason, the term psychotic speech is more accurate than schizophrenic.
Unless findings show that only schizophrenics manifest certain features
of speech, and there are some that do, the form er term will be used.
Because some psychotics show no structural deviations in their speech,
those who do will be termed SD, speech disordered speakers, as opposed
to NSD, nonspeech disordered. A m ajor problem in research has been
that investigators have not ensured that they were testing only SD psychotics so that, often, studies seem to contradict each other because like
populations have not been compared with each other.
Because of its interm ittent character, many observers have assumed
that it is deliberate and that the patient can speak differently if he or she
so wishes. Laffal (1965), for instance, assumes that one of his patients
resorted to deviant speech because he wished to avoid the therapeutic
situation. Forrest (1965, 1976) maintains that SD patients are trying to say
what it is to be schizophrenic, but that ordinary language is not sufficient
for this task. It will subsequently be argued that as attractive as these
positions are, they are untenable.
Bateson (1972, pp. 202-217) advanced the interesting theory that schizo
phrenics were caught in a double bind as children because they had
unloving parents. When the child accused the parent of being unloving,
he or she was punished and the parent denied lack of love. H ence,
Bateson posited, the child did not learn to communicate properly.1
Bateson offered no observational proof of this theory, nor has anybody
else done so. T h ere is no case history proof that all schizophrenics or
even most schizophrenics were ever caught in such a bind. Nor is there
any evidence that normals have not been caught in such a double bind.
T h e interm ittent character of SD speech negates the double-bind theory.
It cannot be the case that schizophrenics haven’t learned how to com
municate, because there are times when th eir com m unication is norm al
in structure. A nother point of inform ation relevant to the double-bind
theory is that children learn language as much from peers and other
adults as from their parents. In fact, sociolinguistic studies have deter
mined again and again that the peer group is the prim ary source of a
child’s language, not the parent. Peer learning is one reason that lan
guage changes in every generation. In contrast, even when schizophrenic
speech is displayed, it coincides with psychotic bouts. Most likely, then,
it is psychosis which causes the speech, not failures in early language
learning.
T h e cyclic character of SD speech must be explained, as well as the
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particular deviations. SD patients might evince difficulty in a different
stratum of linguistic production at different times, even in the same
discourse. That is, at one time, a patient might have intact syntax but
evince word-creation difficulty; yet, at another time, might show disor
dered syntax although words used seem to be usual words in the lan
guage (Chaika 1974; Rochester and Martin, 1979, pp. 177-178).
That I here and earlier (Chaika 1974, 1977, 1982a) present a list of
the kinds of speech disruptions associated with schizophrenics does
not mean that these are a “checklist” of symptoms as Herbert and
Waltensperger (1982, p. 244) claim. No one patient may display all of the
deviations reported in conjunction with a diagnosis of schizophrenia,
nor will any particular deviation occur in all patients, both circum
stances that I have always stressed. Even though no one patient may have
evinced them all, many patients have evinced some of them, some
patients have evinced them all, and, of course, some patients have
evinced none of them, all circumstances which must be accounted for in
any discussion of psychotic speech. All of the deviations presented here
have been reported again and again as occurring in some schizophrenic
patients at least some of the time. These are the deviations that have long
excited comment, and those who evaluate psychotic patients rely on
these symptoms for diagnostic purposes.
Still, researchers like Maher (1972), Fromkin (1975), Cohen (1978), and
H erbert and Waltensperger (1980, 1982) claim that there is nothing
structurally wrong with schizophrenic speech. Maher (1972, p. 13) says,
“What seems to be most clear is th a t. . . perhaps most of the disturbances
of language found amongst schizophrenic patients do not involve syntac
tic errors . . . ” With the exception of Fromkin, none of these are linguists
so that their evaluations are essentially lay evaluations. Fromkin asserts
that schizophrenic speech is normal creative language, and Cohen (1978,
p. 1) stated that “ . . . as cryptic or disorganized as schizophrenic speech
may sound, it rarely (if ever) includes hard instances of agrammatism or
word-finding deficits.” Yet word salads, outright gibberish, and other
severe syntactic errors have long been reported in the literature. Hard
instances of agrammatism have long been noted in the literature and are
quite easy to find, as we shall see.
Lecours and Vanier-Clement (1976) assert that schizophrenics do not
suffer from semantic errors or word-finding differences, although they
do admit that schizophrenics make unusual, abstract, and bizarre word
choices. T his in itself, as they note, is not a sign of linguistic dysfunction.
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Unusual word choices abound in witticisms, good prose, and artistic
language, but these are quite different from schizophrenic unusual word
choices. Witticisms, good prose, and artistic language in some way eluci
date a message in a memorable or aesthetic manner. In contrast, schizo
phrenic “unusual” word choices rarely have any such relevance. Similarly,
the “abstract speech” of schizophrenics differs from normal abstract speech.
Any scholar indulges in the latter, but the abstraction is in aid of presen
tation of intellectual constructs and the abstract language in which such
presentation is embedded is relevant to the points being made. Moreover,
the scholars can bring it up again, discuss its import, rephrase it. In
contrast, schizophrenic abstractions show no coherence to any point,
nor can they usually be discussed, much less rephrased and refined.
Paraphrasability is a hallmark of normal speech production. It is part of
the essential character of language. Every normal utterance can be
paraphrased. The paraphrase may not be as beautiful as the original or
as succint, but it can convey the same meaning. All psychotic utterances
cannot be paraphrased. Here, and in subsequent chapters, we will see
distinct definable and testable differences between the most creative of
normal speech and psychotic speech itself.
Lecours and Vaniers-Clement do acknowledge schizophrenic gibber
ish but attempt to distinguish it from those in aphasic productions by
claiming that schizophrenics reemploy their nonwords. However, there
is no support in the literature to substantiate such a claim beyond the fact
that, occasionally, within one stretch of speech, the same nonword might
be repeated. There is presently no hard evidence that such reemployments
last beyond that one interaction. My own study of psychotic narrative,
The Ice Cream Stories, henceforth referred to as ICS (Chaika 1982e, 1983b;
Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8), did yield some gibberish, but,
the next week when patients were asked to recall their stories, they never
reemployed the gibberish, nor did they even in the first telling. In
addition, as the next chapter shows, apart from repetitions of a given
word or nonword in one speech situation, there may be many other kinds
of perseveration (Chaika 1982a; Manschrek, Maher, Hoover, and Ames
1985). It is the sum of repetitions and perseverations which must be
accounted for.
Gibberish and neologisms are clear instances of word-finding deficits,
and they, too, are easy to find. ICS yielded both syntactic and lexical
deficits as well as deviations in global narrative structure. These lexical
deficits included circumlocution reminiscent of mild anomic aphasia in
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which the meaning is inappropriately spread over too many words
(Chapter 8).
Schizophrenic utterances have been likened to poetry, sleeptalking,
and the aphasias (e.g., Forrest 1965, 1976; Sullivan 1964 [originally
published 1944]; Brown 1977; Chapman 1966; Benson 1963; Chaika 1974a,
1977; Buckingham 1974 [personal communication]). These comparisons
are apt, and that they can be made at all is, in itself, revealing. There
may well not be any single deviation which can’t be found in other
speech pathologies, or even in normal creativity and error. What charac
terizes speech as being particularly schizophrenic is some combination of
errors depicted below, occurring cyclically, intermittently, but, in a
given interaction, persistently.
[3] T h e Features of Psychotic Speech.
Clinicians themselves have long considered the speech disruptions
illustrated below as pathognomic of positive symptom schizophrenia.
Andreasen’s (1979a, 1979b) widely used diagnostic guidelines actually
center on these kinds of speech disruptions although her terminology
differs from mine (Chapters 2, 10, and 11) reflecting our mutually differ
ent backgrounds, but the characteristics she cites seem to accord with
m ine—or mine accord with hers.
Viewed in comparison with the levels of normal language, the features
of schizophrenic speech are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

gibberish
neologisms
opposite speech and other erroneous retrievals of words
glossomania
rhyme and alliteration inappropriate for the context
intrusive errors
word salad and other syntactic disruptions
perseveration and other repetitions.

Any interpretation of schizophrenic speech and any hypothesis of its
provenance must take these into account.
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[4] Gibberish and Neologizing.

T h e first kinds of speech disruption are perhaps the most disruptive
of all and seem to occur more rarely than the others
[I] Gibberish:
1A.
. . . gao, itiv are. . . ovede (Forrest 1976)
1B. [speaking about a pet] He still had fooch [fUc] with taykrimez
[the ikraimz] I ’ll be willin’ to betcha.
(Chaika 1974)
Assuming that Forrest spelled his examples of nonwords as accurately
as the orthographic system of English allows, then his examples of
gibberish conform to the phonetic rules of English. Naive spellings,
spellings which are used by those unversed in phonetic transcription,
are frequently an accurate index to pronunciation. Most of our inform a
tion about Colonial American English, for instance, derives from the
study of semiliterate spelling errors. Of course, I am not calling Forrest
semiliterate. Forrest is a sensitive psychiatrist, but the principle is the
same. If one does not know a standard spelling for a word, then one will
substitute letters from the ordinary orthography that would usually spell
the sounds in question.
Fortunately, I was able to transcribe the gibberish I present, so I can
attest to the fact that both the sounds used and their combinations are
allowable in English. This is both interesting and significant as it suggests,
but of course does not prove, that the speaker intended to utter an actual
word in the language. T h e patient who uttered taykrimez above, for
instance, aspirated the initial [t] as is required by English phonetic rules.
Although these productions are gibberish, they seem to be gibberish in
English. Phonologically and phonotactically, the only things wrong with
any of these nonwords is that they do not happen to be words in the
language, and a perusal of the venerable O ED reveals that they never
were.
[II]. Neologizing
2A . . . you have to have a plausity of amendments to go through for the
children’s code, and it’s no mental disturbance of puterience, it is an
amorition law. (Vetter 1968, p. 189)
2 B . . with syndicates organized and subsicates in the way that look
for a civil w ar. . . (H erbert and Waltensperger 1982)
2C. I ’m don’t like the way I ’m p u p ed today in th ou g h t. . . because of
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the slash of my wrist like I’m was puped to do. I ’m be puped tall
letter I ’m write to you . . . (Herbert and Waltensperger 1980)
As with the gibberish, all of this neologizing forms distinctly English
nonwords, using unremarkable English roots and morphemes. Plausity
has what appears to be the same root as the plaus in plausible, and the
-erience in puterience occurs in words like experience. Similarly, subsicates
is formed out of the common morphemes sub- and -icate. Since neither
Vetter nor Herbert and Waltensperger provide IPA transcription, we
can’t know whether or not the put- is pronounced like putrid or like
the verb put. For the same reason, we can not determine how the < u > in
puped was pronounced. I would assume that it was not the < o o > in
pooped or they would have spelled it that way. I also have to assume that
the other morphemes were pronounced as American speakers usually
pronounce syllables spelled that way, for untrained ears typically adhere
to spellings commonly used for given syllables. That is, if the patient
pronounced -ity, -erience, and -ition normally, then the naive transcriber
is most likely to spell those as he always does. In contrast, a linguist
would use IPA and spell plaus- with a [z] not an < s > , -erience with an [s],
not a < c > , and -ition with an [s] rather than a < ti> . Vetter and Herbert
and Waltensperger also do not indicate meaning, presumably because
the patient did not, and the context did not provide clues.
The gibberish and neologizing above are two halves of the same coin.
Their only substantive difference is that gibberish is composed of sounds
that do not form any recognizable word or morpheme. Neologisms, on
the other hand, while still not forming words now in the language, do
contain recognizable morphemes or other nonmorphemic parts of words.
They are alike, however, in that neither results in recognizable lexical
items in the language, nonwords.2 Furthermore, the patient who utters
either does not or cannot say what it is that they have said. Robertson
and Shamsie (1958) claim that the gibberish they observed in a multilin
gual belonged to different languages although they don’t say how they
determined this and, of course, they provide no phonetic transcription
as a check. They admit that although the patient uttered a great deal of
such gibberish, he wasn’t “prepared” to explain what he said.
There are two logical reasons for this circumstance. One is the one
Robertson and Shamsie presuppose: that the patient simply did not want
to explain it. The other is that the schizophrenic intended to say something,
but it would only come out as gibberish. In point of fact, if SD patients
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do not explain what their gibberish means, there is no basis for the
assumption that their gibberish is intentional. Gibberish is gibberish
because no meaning can be extracted from it, just as neologisms are
discerned as such because they convey no meaning.3 Therefore, all we
can do is compare it to normal language and to other features of SD
productions; thereby finding a consistent, rational and verifiable analy
sis for all of them.
[5] Explaining Gibberish and Neologisms.
Chapman (1966) and Chaika (1974a, 1977, 1982a), albeit on somewhat
different grounds, argue that gibberish and neologizing are indicative of
word finding difficulties. Considering that human languages are so
constructed that new words can be made up and old words can be used in
new ways to effect new meaning, it is not likely that neologizing and
gibberish are a sign of creativity (LaFerriere 1977; Forrest 1976; Fromkin
1975). That is, there is usually a recognizable difference between normal
creativity and unusual schizophrenic usages, although some find that
link tenuous at best. For instance, Nancy Andreasen (1973), a psychiatrist
with the rare qualification of also having earned a Ph.D. in literature,
questions the artistry in James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, claiming that
much of it is merely schizophrenic speech, and that portions of this were
rated as schizophrenic by raters, a claim sure to be contested by some
Joyce scholars.
T h e gibberish and neologizing noted above occur within sentences
with otherwise recognizable words, lending credence to the belief that
the patient is trying to convey an actual message, but is undergoing
problems in retrieval of words. Because anybody can use a new word in
such a way that another can understand it, we have to count this as a real
deficit since the patients seem not to be able to provide enough context
for this to happen.
Over the years, those who would explain psychotic speech have imputed
intention to such incomprehensible speech, claiming that it is deliberate.
However, it is the very production of gibberish and neologizing which
must be explained, not what it means, for it may mean nothing and even
if the patient intended a meaning, we cannot always derive it. Trying to
derive intent from grossly disordered speech is akin to an English
speaker’s making an interpretation of a Populucan sentence if she were
dropped into the remote corner of Mexico in which that language is
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spoken. If natives used graphic enough gestures, she might get some
meaning and determine intention from them, but on the basis of their
words, she could not impute intention because she can’t understand the
meaning of their utterances. It is true that we derive meaning partially—
indeed largely—on the basis of what we perceive the intent of the
speaker to be, but this is done by matching the words and syntax to the
context of utterance and to the conventions of the social group in which
it was uttered (Chaika 1989, pp. 114-115, and Chapter 7).
Moreover, we can never get away from the incontrovertible fact that a
person who is having difficulty explaining an experience does not sud
denly launch into gibberish or spout unexplained neologisms to do this.
That is why schizophrenic speech has been labeled as schizophrenic and
it is why psychiatrists and other researchers have devoted so much time
and effort to explain it.
This does not mean that I think all psychotic speech is uninterpretable,
as Hoffman and Sledge (1984, p. 153) strangely claim. They assert that I
have said that “schizophrenic irregularity is identified according to its
nondecodability.” Chaika (1974, 1977, 1981, 1982a,c,d,e, 1983a,b) has shown
the contrary. One can’t decode gibberish. That’s why it has been called
gibberish. Nor, frequently, can one decode word salads. That’s why they
have been called word salads. But many other less disrupted utterances
of schizophrenics can be decoded very sensibly by reference to what we
know of normal linguistic production and normal decoding strategies.
By using such tactics, I have even been able to show that some schizo
phrenic discourse can be understood by our usual strategies, and, in fact,
is quite normal (Chaika 1981). It is part of the beauty of our natural
linguistic abilities that we can decode imperfect speech. If we couldn’t,
then we would never be able to understand toddlers, foreign speakers,
and those with various speech impediments. It is only the most highly
disrupted speech which we cannot understand by usual means. Some
schizophrenic speech is comprehensible. Some is not. Some comprehen
sible schizophrenic speech may still be definably bizarre or “schizophrenic”
in the sense that term has long been used.
[6] Slips of the Tongue, Neologizing and Gibberish.
The relationship between neologisms and gibberish is that both may
be caused by a failure in retrieving an intended word from the mental
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lexicon. They appear to be severe instances of what in normals are called
slips of the tongue.
Fromkin (1975) asserted that such schizophrenic errors were no more
abnormal than normal slips of the tongue, providing as instances of
normal slips:
3A. Soul hecond path
3B Slee throwed sloth
She says that if one did not know the context or the reference . . . “soul
hecond path” for “whole second half,” or “slee throwed toth” for “three
toed sloth,” these would seem to be gibberish as much as the schizo
phrenic “H e still had fooch with teykrimez.” (X reported in Chaika 1974).
In this evaluation Fromkin ignores a crucial difference between normal
slips and psychotic ones. Normal slips show distinct patterns and are in a
sense orderly as one can retrieve the speaker’s intended words quite
easily. For instance, one need only isolate the consonant phonemes in
each phrase Fromkin mentions and move them to corresponding posi
tions in other items in the phrase until the apparently intended words
appear. For “soul hecond,” only the initial consonants need be transposed.
Path can be explained easily on the grounds of similarity of phonetic
features. Both the intended lexical item and its substitute contain acousti
cally similar consonants initially and finally,4 and have the same vowel
sound. Furthermore, confusion of /0/ for /f/ is a common cross-dialectal
and child language phenomenon as when mouth is pronounced “mouf.”
“Slee throwed toth” is correctable by moving the initial consonants to
their proper places. This is a typical anticipatory slip in which the /sl/ of
sloth replaced the initial consonant cluster of three; then the initial
cluster of three replaced the initial cluster of toed; finally, the initial
consonant of toed replaced the initial cluster of sloth, so that the error
constitutes a retrievable round robin.
This is not possible with the gibberish reported in Chaika (1974a). Trans
position of phonemes does not correct “[fUc] ’fooch’ with [thekraimz]
’teykrimez’ ” or [sUwendan] ’sawendon’ saw [th3 rc]’turch’ [fU ]’faw’ [jue
ri] ’j uerie” (Chaika 1974a, p. 260). These schizophrenic errors are not
orderly as are those presented by Fromkin (1971, 1975). Like a child’s
errors or a foreigner’s, a normal slip can usually be understood by
regular human decoding ability. Psychotic gibberish can’t be.
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[7] Synonyms and Glossomania.
also known as ASSOCIATIONAL CHAINING, is often cited
as a particularly schizophrenic verbal display (Werner et al. 1975; Lecours
and Vanier-Clement 1976). It is related to s y n o n y m y . It seems to me that
glossomania is related to the fact that synonyms are never complete.
Even when two or more words share some meaning, typically they do
not share them all, and even when they do share meaning, they often
cannot be used in the same contexts. That is, synonyms typically have
different COLLOCATIONS, words they may co-occur with. They are syno
nyms only to the extent that they share a common meaning.
For instance, note the differences in the semantically almost identical
words roast and bake:
GLOSSOMANIA,

• Roast the peppers and the beef.
• Roast the pork.
• Bake the ham.
• Bake the cake or the cookies.
• Bake the potatoes.
• Roast the potatoes.
The kind of potatoes referred to changes according to the verb selected.
Although both roast and bake refer to cooking in an oven, roast potatoes
are peeled and cooked with a roasted meat, but baked potatoes are cooked
with jackets on, often apart from any other foodstuffs in the oven.
Synonyms, even very close ones, can allude to quite different things in
certain contexts. Despite their shared semantic features, they often don’t
easily substitute for each other.
Glossomania is a chaining in which shared meanings of words prog
ress linearly, so to speak, from one phrase to another, getting progressively
further and further away from whatever meaning was apparently intended
as in the following excerpts:
4A. Did that show up on the X-rays?
You’ll see it tonight
I’ve been drinking phosphate.
You’ll see it in the dark (inaudible)
Glows.
We all glow as we’re glowworms. (Patient X reported on in Chaika
1974.)
Here, the mention of X-rays appears to have triggered the mention of
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phosphate, which triggered the statement that something will be seen in
the dark, which triggered the word glows, which triggered the statement
about glowworms.
4B. My mother’s name was Bill.
(low pitch, as in an aside, but with marked rising question intonation)
. . . And coo?
St. Valentine’s Day is the official startin’ of the breedin’ season of the
birds.
All buzzards can coo.
I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly.
They work hard.
So do parakeets. (Patient X reported on in Chaika 1974)
In the above, the name Bill reminded X of the now almost archaic
expression bill and coo, which is a reference to lovebirds. Hence, St.
Valentine’s Day, the holiday of love, is mentioned, followed by com
ments about birds, including another repetition of coo, this time attributed
to buzzards. Expressions like “they work hard” are common short phrases
of the sort that are often spoken in full almost as automatic responses. In
fact, it is such bizarre couplings, here of buzzards and working hard, that
are especially indicative of the automatic nature of glossomanic chaining.
Phrases and words related to each other in some way elicit each other,
although they are inappropriate.
The following samples of glossomania were elicited by Bertram Cohen
(1978) from first admission acute schizophrenic males describing
Farnsworth-Munsell color disc #2, a salmon pink:5
5A. A fish swims. You call it a salmon. You cook it. You put it in a
can. You open the can. You look at it in this color. Salmon fish.
Here, the color reminds the speaker of the color of a fish, a salmon.
Salmon is typically eaten after it has been cooked and canned, hence the
allusions to this process. What is especially interesting in this response is
that the very first statement of identification is the generic “a fish swims,”
even before the color is identified. T h e swimming has nothing to do with
the color naming task, but fish swim and the color reminded him of a
fish.
5B. Pancake make-up. You put it on your face and they think guys
run after you. Wait a second! I don’t put them on my face and guys
don’t run after me. Girls put it on them. (Cohen 1978, p. 29)
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In this, Cohen’s subject apparently correctly identified the discourse
as being the color of pancake make-up which goes on the face and which
is something identified with girls who want to attract guys. This leads to
the comment that the speaker doesn’t use it, so that guys don’t run after
him which is followed by the avowal that girls use pancake make-up.
The following were all elicited from Disc #35
5C. How blue I am (singing). If I were blue, I ’d like to be this green
instead, I really like it. You could put it in a salad and eat. (Cohen,
p. 28)
Here the green color chip apparently reminds the patient of a com
monly sung or spoken phrase involving the color blue which is related to
green, and like green has a special metaphorical sense. Blue is associated
with melancholy in English, and green with youth or innocence.6 Both
can appear syntactically after the verb be to indicate the state mentioned,
as in “I am blue/green” or “She is blue/green.” The mention of the target
word green triggers the food that is usually green, salads, and that, in
turn, elicits eat.
5D. Green (SHOUTS) Hold on, the other is too! In the garden
such a green is unlikely. Too synthetic! The other is more gardenreal
[Cohen’s spelling as one word], piecemeal, oatmeal green, greenreal,
filmreal, greenreal. (Cohen, p. 28)
This shows still other kinds of associations. Green is evocative of
gardens, but the speaker feels that this particular green is not the green
of gardens. It is synthetic. Synthetic is the opposite of real, so the speaker
combines into one word repetitions of both garden and real. This evokes
the rhyming association of piecemeal, which leads to another compound
word with meal, then the green is picked up again, this time wholly
inappropriately as oatmeal is not really green. Then both green and real
are triggered, this time in a new compounding. Cohen gives the spelling
of real in filmreal, but the association could very well have been reel of
film. The homophony of real and reel could have triggered the word film.
As will be shown shortly, glossomanic chaining may also occur because
of other kinds of similarity between words such as their rhyming or
alliteration, and then we have to see the differences caused by antonymy.
In all of the above passages, chains of utterances are related to each
other on the basis of partial semantic similarity of immediately prior
statements. As Vonnegut (1976) wrote of his own schizophrenic episode,
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the schizophrenic pays too much attention to everything at once. Irrele
vant associations which are n orm ally suppressed com e to the fore
inappropriately, leading the SD speaker to hop from one to the next
without relating them to a topic. M any of these synonymous chains also
have common expressions like “they work hard,” “I am blue,” and
“picnic on the green” interlarded with the semantically triggered retrievals.
Such output indicates a lack of control of norm al speech processes in
which such phrases and lexical associations do not usually figure. T h at
this can happen even in relatively constrained environm ents is amply
shown in Cohen’s study.
[8] M orphem ic Glossomania.
Glossom ania can also be triggered by chance repetition of m orphem es
with or without shared meanings:
6 . . . . Das ist vom Kaiserhaus, sie haben es von dem Voreltern, von
der Vorwelt, von der Urwelt, Frankfurt-am -M ain, das sind die
Franken, die Frankfurter Wurschtchen, Frankenthal, Frankenstein . . .
(M aher 1972, p. 9)
Besides the semantic connection of the Kaiserhaus with the Voreltern,
ancestors, there is the repetition of the m orphem e Vor- in Vorwelt, and
the -welt in Urwelt, and, of course, the Urwelt is literally the Vorwelt as
well. Since the Kaisers were descended from the Franks, there is a
semantic connection between Kaiserhaus and Franken. T h e city Frankfurtam -M ain was named for the Franks, therefore eliciting m ention of die
Franken. Frankfurter Wurschtchen, little sausages made in Frankfurt, repeats
the m orpheme Frank, as does the name of the city Frankenthal and, of
course, Frankenstein. We certainly have no difficulty seeing the connec
tions between the phrases in 6 above, but we still feel its bizarreness. In
addition to the repetition of morphemes, this passage also displays
alliteration. In Germ an, a word initial V as in Vorwelt and von and the F
in Frank are both pronounced as [f]. T h is chance alliteration m ight also
have prompted the m ention of these words.
T h is passage consists of words that are especially tightly related both
m orphem ically and semantically in certain features. It is, nevertheless,
incoherent and recognizably schizophrenic because it is not subordi
nated to a topic. Each phrase is glued to others by inherent features in the
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lexicon of German. The phrases in which some of the words are embedded
are themselves trite phrasing serving as a vehicle to present the words.
[9] Rhyming and Alliterating.
Glossomania may also be triggered by chance phonological features of
words, resulting in rhymes and alliterative strings inappropriate to the
topic or occasion of discourse, as in:
7. [in response to Farnsworth-Munsell disc #2]: Looks like clay.
Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the hay. Hay day. May day.
Help! I just can’t. Need help. May day.
(Cohen 1978, p. 29)
8. [in response to statement “Hello, anyone here want some coffee?”]:
Head, heart, hands, health. (Chaika, 1974a)
The alliterative chain “head, heart, hands, health” appeared to have
been prompted by an exceptionally strong aspiration on “Hello . . . here
. . . ” the h ’s elicited the “four H ’s” (of the young farmers’ organization).
This is virtually a clang response. Clark (1970) comments that this kind
of response occurs in word association testing, especially if subjects are
forced to respond rapidly, although 8 did not result from any limit on
response time.
The following two were produced in the ICS:
9A. Little girl in candy store. Mommy and Daddy away [pause] that
day.. . .
9B. Little girl in candy store. [pause] Runnin’ free. Her parents did
not really care. So she just gets up and takes to the air.
The last two, 9A and B, were produced by the same person one week
apart. In both instances, the patient uttered these with a strong repetitive
beat, and paused before the rhyming line just as if he were reciting
poems in grade school.
[10] Intrusive Matters.
At times, psychotics may start talking on a topic and suddenly slip into
another. This differs from glossomania because there is no chaining on
the basis of morphemic or phonological similarity. Rather while speak
ing of one thing, the patient suddenly starts to recount another. The
following narrative was elicited by asking a patient to describe the ICS
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videotaped sequence. The videotape showed no boys, nor did it have
anything to do with anybody looking out for anybody else, or anybody
getting blamed for anything or anything about men using other people.
T h e narrator here did mention that the video brought back memories,
but there was no elucidation of “that area” or what it is that people will
do every time. There seems to be a general mixing up of various ideas
and memories of actual events:
10 . . . I was watching a film of a girl and um s bring back memories
of things that happened to people around me that affected me
during the time I was living in that area and she just went to the
store for a candy bar and by the time oooh of course her brother
who was supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much attention he
was blamed for and I did not think that was fair the way the way they
did that either so that’s why I ’m just asking yah could we just get
together and try to work it out all together for one big party or
something ezz hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve been here
so why you just now discovering it. You know they they’ve been
men will try to use you every time for everything he wants so ain’t
no need and you trying to get upset for it. T h at’s all. T h at’s all.
Harrow, Lanin-Kettering, Prosen, and M iller (1983) employ the termi
nology “intermingling and loss of set” for such speech. They use this
terminology for glossomanic chaining as well (Chaika and Lambe 1985).
T h eir terminology just labels the behavior. It does not explain it in any
way. In what ways does it intermingle? How is this different from normal
recollection of the “Oh, that reminds me . . . ” variety? As we shall see,
changes of topic, hence “loss of set” is a normal and usual phenomenon.
Yet, 10 above is typical of psychotic speech. How does it differ from
normal changes of topic and what can have caused it?
[11] Automatic and Controlled Processes.
Comparing psychotic glossomanic productions to normal ones subor
dinated to the topic or nature of the social interaction makes manifest the
difference between controlled and automatic retrieval of linguistic forms.
Glossomania sets off a round of synonyms, rhymes, alliterations, or
personal memories not germane to the matter at hand. This seems to be
an automatic process. Normal speech is controlled, subordinated to both
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the social situation and the intent of the speaker. There is no such control
in glossomanic chaining and related intrusions.
[12] Antonomy, Opposite Speech, and Semantic Feature.

Schizophrenics also have been reported to use an antonym of an
appropriate word or to otherwise select the wrong word for what apparently
would be the correct meaning.
11A. Dr. Dean, come here.
Pt. What, you said go already.
Dr. No, I didn’t say go. I wanted to sit down near you Dean.
(Patient leaves room, and doctor follows)
Dr. Mr. Redfield, come on, I want to talk to you.
Pt. You want to talk to him? (pointing to another patient)
Dr. No, I want to talk to you. Laffal (1965, P. 84)
11B. [the patient said] yes for no, always for never, I do know for I
don’t know. (Laffal, 1965, pp. 31-35).
11C. I seen a little girl lookin’ in the window ’n ah say wan’
some ice cream so but didn’t have money to get it so she asked
her mother ’n her mother said not now because it’s near
suppertime uh the kid was put down so he goes to the father ’n
the father say ch-told where to go gave him the money so she
could buy ice cream . . . she was sittin’ there . . .
Laffal believes that the patient used opposite speech in order to avoid
the therapeutic situation. It is entirely possible, however, that the patient
was having difficulties in discriminating between words which share
semantic features. 11A, for instance, was produced after a stretch of
gibberish. The patient who produced 11C was telling me what he had
seen in a video I had presented the week before. He confused masculine
and feminine pronouns, and the sittin’ there referred to the girl’s standing
there. It is surely not without significance that the substitutions seen
here parallel the kinds of error prevalent in normal slips of the tongue.
Fromkin (1971, p. 46) says
The literature and my own data attest the fact that, besides the
phonological similarity in substituted words, errors often involve
semantic features in common or substitution of antonyms, i.e., words
having the same features with opposite values.
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She gives as examples of antonymous slips:
•
•
•
•

I really like to—hate to get up in the morning
It’s at the bottom—I mean—top of the stack of books
This room is too damn hot—cold
The oral—written part of the exam.

Normal slips of the tongue commonly consist of antonyms or other
words in sets so that people say up for down, more for less, big for little, or
stove for refrigerator. Children typically use one-half of an antonymous
set to stand for each, for instance saying up when they are in your lap and
want to go down. Additionally, in word association testing, antonyms are
the most common response, even more likely than synonyms. The rea
son for this is that antonyms are actually more alike than synonyms are.
They typically can appear in the same linguistic environments and
share all features of meaning save the one that distinguishes between
them. For instance,
•
•
•
•

This elevator goes u p / This elevator goes down.
I want m ore/ I want less.
He’s so big/ He’s so little.
Put it in the stove/Put it in the refrigerator.

Antonyms and related words in sets, unlike synonyms, are easily
substitutable for each other, which explains why they are more likely
to be given in word association tests than synonyms are. This is true
of words that belong in the same semantic sets, such as color words.
Such responses are called paradigmatic associations (Clark and Clark 1977,
pp. 477-483). It is generally conceded that testing of word associations
gives us a picture of the probable organization of the mental lexicon. It
is important, therefore, to note that schizophrenic errors implicate word
sets that are common responses in word association testing.
There is corroborating evidence for the position that opposite speech
and other confusions of semantic features on words are not deliberate. A
patient, here called Y, presented me with what appeared to be some
interesting confounding of closely related words. Consequently, I devised
a simple test to see if he could distinguish whether or not certain
sentences and words meant the same thing or not (Chaika 1977). During
our first interview, Y commented:
12. I think you can [help me]. You’re an open system.
I’m an open system.
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Knowing that the verbs have and be (Chapter 5 ) have the same
meaning in certain paraphrases, I suspected that he might have meant
’You have an open system. I have an open system.’ In 12, the verb be is
inappropriate. Humans usually can’t be systems. However, in certain
sentences, those involving locations, have and be alternate depending
upon the subject of the sentence. If a location is the subject of a sentence,
a form of the verb have must be used, but a synonymous sentence with
the location postponed to the end of the sentence would require be, as in
• The box has toys.
• The garden has roses.
Here, the box is the location of the toys, and the garden is the location of
the roses. Because the locative noun is in subject position, it does not
take a preposition, although speakers know that the subject is the location.
If the location appears at the end of the sentence, then the preposition
must be stated and the verb is a form of be,7 as in
• Toys are in the box.
• Roses are in the garden.
One can’t say T oys have in the box.
Because Y told me that he was a cookware salesman, in the same
conversation I asked whether he gave discounts. He replied
13. Yes, I’m 75%, 50%.
This makes sense only if one assumes that Y meant ’Yes, I give 75%,
50%. This again appears to be a confusion between two words with shared
semantic features.
As Bendix (1966) showed, a componential analysis of English verbs
reveals that there is a large set of verbs which share a great many
semantic features, and, like antonymous pairs, differ from each other
only by one value. Although the verb take is not the issue here, it will be
used to illustrate componential analysis of semantic features. Give and
take share the meaning of “be in possession of.” These are reciprocal
verbs, indicating the same action. They differ in that the source of one
action is the object of the other. If Jack gives me something, then I took it
from him. There is also a feature of time involved. To take is to be in
possession at the time one is speaking of; that is, it is to have possession.
To give is not to be in possession at that time; that is, it is not to have
possession. Give (and its reciprocal take) contain both the features of be
and of have. Notice the four-way synonymy of the following:
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•
•
•
•

I gave him arms.
He took arms.
He was armed.
He had arms.

If Y had a disruption in his ability to assign semantic features to
lexical items, he could easily confuse have, give, and be. The disruption
need not be permanent. It coincided with his psychosis at the time of the
interviews. To test this hypothesis, I devised a simple test. After receiv
ing informed consent, Y was asked to tell whether two short sentences
differentiated only by antonyms were alike or different. These were
presented orally with the verbs in different persons and tenses and the
order of presentation was randomized. Typical sentence pairs were:
• I have an open system/I am an open system.
• You are 75%/ You give 75%.
• John brought books/John took books.
• Henry lost his watch/Henry found his watch.
He said that each pair above was the same. His incorrect judgment on
the first two pairs coincided with his incorrect production of 12 and 13
above. He did confuse the pairs of verbs have and be, and be and give,
saying they meant the same thing in contexts in which they didn’t. Thus,
as Fromkin noted in slips of the tongue, he substituted words with
semantic features in common. He also substituted antonyms, words
having the same features with opposite values, such as brought and took,
and lost and found.
Y did not have complete inability to judge antonyms8 for he correctly
identified the following pairs as being different.
• I became 40/1 am 40.
• Jack is tall/Jack is short.
• I take 75%/I give 75%.
He was then tested on sets of words, some of which differ in their
morphological structure, notably affixes, and some of which are antonyms.
He had no difficulty in distinguishing the following pairs as being
different.
•
•
•
•

lie-liar
lie-truth
tall-short
trap-trapper
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• hypnotize-hypnotist
• tall-taller-tallest
However, again, he judged the following as being the same when
given as individual words.
• is-has
He also rated as being alike:
• getting into-getting off.
Both the opposite speech presented by Laffal and patient H ’s twin
difficulties with antonymy and synonymy match Fromkin’s slip of the
tongue data.
Kaplan (1957) claimed that “opposite speech,” the use of the antonym
of a target word, comes from “a relatively lower stratum in the develop
ment of linguistic thought organization.” That is, it represents a step
prior to the selection of an intended word. Jason Brown (1977), speaking
more broadly, says, “Even pathological speech forms can be thought of as
a preliminary level in normal language that pathology has brought to
the fore.” That is, the word actually uttered is not the one intended, but
one related to it in one or more different ways. Such a view explains the
correlation of opposite speech with slips of the tongue and responses in
word association testing, as noted above. It also explains the occurrence
of opposite speech in schizophrenia. That, too, can be seen as an instance
of retrieval of words semantically related to target words. In a sense,
opposite speech and other such retrievals are severe and persistent
examples of the slip of the tongue phenomena.
Although he interprets these data differently from me, Laffal (1965)
demonstrates that the words in opposite speech are antonymous to those
appropriate for the context. “I do know” vs “I don’t know” is an antonymy
at the level of syntax as well as of semantics, as the language encodes that
meaning onto a grammar rule operating at the level of the clause.
[13] Effects of Synonymy, Antonomy, and Phonology on Schizo
phrenic Speech.

Interestingly, errors caused by retrieval of antonyms of apparently
target words do not seem to be implicated in the kinds of verbal chaining
that are strongly associated with psychotic speech. The reason for this
might be that the antonymic set is completed with two words or phrases,
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the two opposites, whereas synonyms, rhymes, and alliterative sets are
far longer and more complex. T here are typically several synonyms and
paraphrases for any given word or phrase, there are potentially many
rhymes, and, of course, many words start with the same sound. Therefore,
once a synonymic, rhyming, or alliterative chain is accessed, it can
literally go further than an antonymic set. There is not so much of a
natural brake for these as there is for antonyms which can be considered
chains with only two links.

[14] W ord Salad and O ther Disruptions in Syntax.

T h e picturesque term WORD SALAD was coined to describe an odd
jum ble of words which sound like connected discourse, but are lacking
the syntactic markers to subordinate them to syntactic structures. This, of
course, leads to incomprehensibility even when the words themselves
are quite ordinary and usual, as we see in:
14. After John Black has recovered in special neutral form of life
the honest bring back to doctor’s agents must take John Black out
through making up design meaning straight neutral underworld
shadow tunnel. (Lorenz, 1961)
Allied to word salads are stretches of discourse which, for the most
part, conform to normal sentence structures but in which some syntactic
markings are, nevertheless, missing. As in the following, it is often
possible to decode these simply by adding the missing syntactic cues. In
15A, for instance, the verb and noun suffices -ing and -ion are missing,
and in 15B, verb tense and possessive endings are missing as indicated in
the boldfaced words, as is -ize on memory. Also, such syntactic markers as
the use of the auxiliary do in “I still not have . . . ” is omitted:
15A . . . succeeded in the pull of a perfect crime . . . framed by the
artificial inseminate Detroit Michigan is in danger of have of World
War I I I site Russia and Israel is try to drive me to approve of war
against Canada. (Herbert and Waltensperger, 1980, p. 85)
15B. I am being help with the food and the m edicate. . . to speak
and think in a lord tongue . . . the memory knowledge . . . I still not
have the thought pattern. . . . (courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)
T h e above show clear instances of errors in sentence syntax and
certainly falls into the category of agrammatism. Syntactic markers such as
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the -ing morpheme to indicate gerunds, the -ion morpheme to change a
verb to a noun, and the -ing indicating the present progressive of try are
all missing.

[15] Perseverations.

Besides missing syntactic markers, the larger discourse in which 15B
was embedded also showed perseveration beyond the requirements of
the discourse (Chapter 7, 9, 10, 11), resulting in the repetition of words
and phrases such as the food and the medicate. The pathological nature of
this perseveration can be appreciated only by seeing the entire. There
can be no explanation for psychotic speech without also taking into
account such perseverations
16. well I want to work for god9 in the mission and to work for god
in the mission you have to be able to speak and think in a lord
tongue in my opinion now to speak and think in a lord tongue you
have to be able to memory the process memory the parle- the
process in the bible the thought pattern the brain wave and your
thought process must be healthy enough and your legs must be
healthy enough to when you want to study and and from when you
want to study and progress in the way of the lord you should you
should read the bible and as you read the bible you should if you
are in good shape physical and mental and mental good shape and
physical good shape you should be able to with your thought process
your mental process and your brain wave you should be able to
acquire the memory knowledge necessary as to study the bible to
speak and think in a lord tongue you should be able to memory all
the knowledge down on down on the page in the bible book to work
for god in the mission now in the position I am in now with the
medicate andwith the hospital program I am being helped but at
the same time that I am being help with the food and the medicate
and the the food and medicate and the ah same process that I am
being help by the food and medicate and the and the ah rest I feel
that I still do not have this I still not have the thought pattern and
the mental process and the brain wave necessary top open up a page
open up the old testament and start to memory it the old te- the old
new testament page of the bible start to have me-memory knowledge
necessary to speak to think in the lo- speak and think in the lord’s
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tongue while you study while you study the bible while you study
the bible the memory the knowledge necessary to go to work for god
in the mission so when your thought problem your brain wave and
your mental process is quick enough you will be able to memory the
knowledge in in the old testament and new testament bible and
from memory knowledge in the old testament and new testament
bible you are able to memory the knowledge necessary to to mem
ory the knowledge necessary necessary to think and speak in the
lord’s tongue and go to work for god in the mission. (Data courtesy
of Dr. Bonnie Spring)10
Rutter (1985) claims that psychotic speech emanates from a social
dysfunction, that the speaker fails to take into account the needs of the
listener. The kinds of anomaly laid out in this chapter make manifest
the difficulty with such an interpretation. We have seen disruption at
every level of language, from word formation to discourse.
We all at least sometimes fail to take into account the needs of our
listeners. Bores frequently do, as do the overly taciturn, but such failure
does not take the form of gibberish, word salads and the kinds of circular
discourse we have just seen. These all indicate a larger problem.
The next chapter will attempt to give a unified explanation of this
almost bewildering variety of linguistic dysfunction, exploring as well
what schizophrenics have said about their own condition.

Notes
lUsing participant observations, researchers can devise a wide variety of tasks,
e.g. asking for directions, both during an SD patient’s psychotic bout and when in
remission.
2Robertson and Shamsie (1958) do claim that a multilingual patient was speaking
different languages in gibberish, but they offer no proof that this was actually so and
none of the gibberish I have ever heard or seen mentioned in the literature supports
their conclusion.
3When new words are coined, they typically are not heard as neologisms, but as
slang or metaphor. For instance, whoever coined the metaphor uptight in the 1960s
would not have been perceived as uttering a neologism as it was understandable by
normal means of decoding.
4For the uninitiated, both [f] and [0] (th ) are made by forcing air between the lips
and upper teeth (for the [f]) and the tongue held behind the teeth (for [0]). Because
friction is produced, these are both called fricatives. Additionally, both are produced
with the vocal cords spread apart so that a hissing sound is produced. This results in
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sounds. Both are voiceless fricatives. When sounds are so similar they often
are involved in slips of the tongue. (Voiced sounds occur when the vocal cords are
relaxed and air pushed through them vibrates, as in making a [v]).
5Cohen’s interpretation of these data did not agree with mine, however, and he is
in no way responsible for my interpretation.
6Notice that other primary colors like red, orange, or white cannot be used alone
to indicate some other state.
7Actually, other verbs could also be substituted for be with slight differences in
connotation, such as “The toys are lying in the box" and “Roses are growing in the
garden.” This does not affect the analysis here, however, since the alternation
between have and be still holds, so that a confusion between them still can occur.
8The reader may disagree that be and become are true antonyms. They pattern
with antonyms because they can be inserted in the same environments in most
instances.
9The transcript of this monologue capitalized the first person pronoun and
nothing else. I have adhered to this practice.
10Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these data, however.
voiceless

Chapter Two

THE NATURE OF DEVIATION
IN PSYCHOTIC SPEECH
The variety of deviations associated with schizophrenic speech
can be seen to arise from a deficit in speech production, one
probably related to other known deficits in schizophrenics and
their relatives, such as those revealed in studies of eyetracking.
Viewing schizophrenic deviations in terms of path control allows
us to see an underlying unity in what appears to be a bewildering
variety of deviations. The kinds of deviations long classified
as being schizophrenic differ from normal errors. Even such
matters as cliches arise from different conditions in the two
populations.
[1] Out of M any One.

s one looks at the apparently bewildering variety of SD productions,
it is easy to see the reasons for the many conflicting theories about
what causes it and what it can mean. It is also easy to see why so many
different kinds of experimental protocols have been attempted, each
designed to test for some apparent feature of such speech. Insofar as
these rested upon simplistic views about what language is, their results
were flawed. A corollary problem has been an incomplete understanding
of what psychotic language is. This, too, has foiled attempts at an adequate
understanding of the problem.
It bears repeating that any explanation also must account for the
variability in the degree of deviance manifested in the speech of
schizophrenics, especially in terms of linguistic structure (e.g., Brown
1973; Cohen 1978; Rochester, Martin, and Thurston 1977; Cromwell
1984; Fraser, King, Thomas, and Kendell 1986; Andreasen and Grove
1986). It must also explain why only a subset of patients diagnosed
“schizophrenic” produce structurally deviant speech, and why those that
do produce it do so intermittently (e.g., Maher, McKeon, & McLaughlin
1966; Reilley, Harrow, & Tucker 1973; Benson 1973; Chaika 1974a,b,
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1977; Lecours & Vanier-Clement 1976). In evaluating any study, we must
ensure that the researchers have selected their subjects from among
those who are SD (Chapter 8). DiSimone, D’arley, and Aronson (1977),
for instance, say that schizophrenics did not perform like aphasics on an
aphasia test battery, but they nowhere indicate that they have selected an
SD population. Even if they had, it is entirely possible that SD psychotic
speech proceeds from different underlying sources than does aphasic
speech.
The explanation offered here uses as its empirical base all of the kinds
of speech data that have been reported as pathognomic to schizophrenics.
Most important, perhaps, the power of the explanation presented here is
that it takes a set of ostensibly confusing data and shows that they make
sense when looked at in a certain way. In the words of Morton (1979, p. 109)
“Inasmuch a s . . . the model accounts for data and generates further
understanding, it fulfills its purpose as a psychological model.”
As disparate as the features of schizophrenic speech seem on the
surface, closer inspection suggests that all of these deviations may actu
ally be different manifestations of two underlying dysfunctions: lack of
control over selection of linguistic material combined with inappropriate
perseverations (Chaika 1982a). Actually, even inappropriate perseverations
can be seen as a process of getting stuck, which is also a problem in
controlling one’s speech.
As we have seen, the lack of control leads to the word finding difficul
ties revealed by gibberish, neologizing, opposite speech, and other erro
neous word retrieval. It also manifests itself by morphological and syntactic
errors ranging from relatively transparent failures to attach noun or verb
morphemes appropriately to speech so disordered that it creates a word
salad in which individual words are recognizable but their syntactic
frames are not. Then there are problems at the discourse level, such as
intrusive material not germane to the task at hand or the general context.
These are so called because the resultant output is as if incidental or
unintentionally produced material has intruded. Intrusions actually
occur on the level of word selection as well as that of discourse itself.
Glossomanic chaining is as much an intrusion as the wandering narra
tive in which someone starts talking about events or ideas having no
relevance to the matter at hand. Lack of control leads to intrusions
because unwanted or unintended material has intruded into target utter
ances as a byproduct of problems in speech production.
There is evidence to suggest strongly that at least some SD speakers
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themselves are aware that they are not controlling their speech processes.
Chapman (1966) interviewed schizophrenics after they recovered from a
psychotic episode. They told him that they were trying to talk but what
was coming out of their mouths was not what they intended to say, and
they could not correct themselves. Similarly, in my own studies, many
patients apologized for their speech, saying, for instance, that they stuttered
or couldn’t speak correctly. One patient I observed whose speech was
larded with gibberish, after seeing himself in a videotaped interview,
commented “No wonder people don’t understand me. I heard myself on
tape before but I thought the tape was distorted.”
This same patient said a chipmunk brought him his special language
in seeds. As is well known, other patients complain that a spirit or some
other being has taken over their minds or supplied them with a new
language. Such delusions can possibly arise from their feelings of lack of
control, of not being able to control what they want to say. People are
always trying to explain their behavior, especially if they feel that it is
inappropriate or outlandish. I am not offering this suggestion as God’s
Truth, but as a hypothesis which explains both the weird language of
some psychotics, and their own consequent belief that they can no longer
control their speech and other mental activities, including perceptions.
Such feelings may also be the origin of the intense interest in religion
evinced so many schizophrenics. They may ascribe the auditory and
visual hallucinations to their being inhabited by spirits or to special
messages brought to them by Jesus or a saint or other spirit. In support
of my speculation here there is independent corroboration of the
psychotic’s awareness. Chapman (1966) also showed that schizophrenics
reported distorted vision as well as a lack of control over their speech.1
Therefore, they assume that they are being controlled by other spirits,
and that their inability to control their speech is because spirits, good
or bad, have taken it over. They know that strange things had happened
to their very perceptions as well as to their ability to speak. Maher
(1983, p. 154) gives a number of first person accounts of schizophrenics.
In these, they say they cannot control what they notice. This suggestion
as to the genesis of schizophrenic claims of being possessed may very well
also explain paranoia. If one no longer can control what’s coming out
of one’s mouth—or what one hears as in auditory hallucination—it
must be very frightening, and the sufferer might well suspect that some
ones or some things have taken adverse possession or want to do
that.
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[2] T h e Cycle of Speech as a Symptom.

The analysis presented here not only accounts for all of the kinds of
deviant speech data reported in the literature, but for the cyclicity of
their occurrence. Schizophrenic speech disruption is frequently cyclic in
that a given patient might evince difficulty in a different stratum of
linguistic production at different times, even in the same discourse. That
is, at one time, a patient might have intact syntax but evince wordcreation difficulty; yet, at another time, might show disordered syntax
although words used seem to be usual words in the language (Chaika
1974; Rochester and Martin 1979, pp. 177-178).
As Brown (1977, p. 4) noted, “a symptom is a scientific datum no less
than a sine wave or a synaptic cleft.” Structurally deviant speech is a
symptom in and of itself and, as such, must be analyzed in its own right.
This necessarily entails examining speech without reference to the thought
behind it. The relationship between language and thought will be discussed
in Chapter 3. Even if one’s scientific or philosophic principles, or both,
allow one to deduce thought disorder from speech disorder, the exact
nature of the speech disorder still must be characterized in and of itself.
If one is basing an assumption of thought disorder on speech disorder,
then the disordered thought still has to be related to the disordered
speech.
Often, patients have deviations interspersed between otherwise nor
mal discourse. This circumstance also must be taken into account in any
explanation. As Kean (1980, p. 242) emphasizes, “deviant linguistic behav
ior arises as a consequence of an interaction between impaired and intact
components of the language faculty.” In all that follows, this must not be
forgotten.
[3] Punning.

There are, to be sure, occasions for producing normal speech accord
ing to chance associations as in a punning situation. This occurs if there
is some way that both meanings of a word can be forced into the topic at
hand, e.g., read vs red, as in “What’s black and white and read all over?”
Even here, topic and social situation constrain whether or not the chance
association is appropriate. In recent years, American advertising has
been characterized by a fit of punning. These puns have to be carefully
constructed so that readers or viewers will stop a millisecond or so to
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decode the double meaning. Such puns have got to be clever enough to
catch the ear and eye and to imply good things about the product. For
example, a face lotion advertising that it is pH balanced, advertised “A
balancing act for your skin.”
In contrast, Maher (1972) gives an example of what appears to be
punning gone wild. Phonological shapes of words cause the puns, which
seem clever enough at the outset, but degenerate into a punning
glossomania:
1. To Wise and Company,
If you think that you are being wise to send me a bill for money I
have already paid, I am in nowise going to do so unless I get the
whys and wherefores from you to me. But where fours have been
then fives will be and other numbers and calculations and accounts
to your no-account no-bill noble nothing.
We see here intricate puns on wise and whys, including nowise, and the
association of the common expression whys and wherefores all of which
seem related to the complaint to the company, but the pun on -fores and
fours, like other kinds of glossomania start veering off the topic. The
number word five seems to be an intrusion of the number after four, just
as the words calculations and accounts seem to have been triggered by the
mention of numbers and of bills. Since accounts are bills, the writer then
makes another pun, this one on the negative evaluation of a person, a
no-count, which leads to no-bill which reminds the person of noble. Given
the tightness of these associations and our love for puns, this passage
seems enormously clever, but the irrelevant punning and the chaining
character of each successive pun puts it squarely in the camp of glossomanic
chaining. Once in a while, such chaining can be felicitous. Usually it is
just baffling and strange.
Note that none of these perseverations involve unusual or “strong”
association per use, contrary to Chapman et al. (1964) and Chapman et
al. (1976). For instance, the relationship between wise, nowise, no bill and
noble is quite unusual, so much so that the chaining is startling. Nor does
such glossomanic perseveration show “weakening of constructs” (Bannister
1960, 1962). Indeed, the bond of meaning that causes associational chaining
is, if anything, stronger than in normals since the chaining is based upon
accidental sharing of morphemes, accidental rhyming and alliterating,
and accidental sharing of partial meanings. In normal speech words and
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phrases are chosen to advance a topic, not because their structures are
similar.
[4] W ord Finding and Creativity.

Chapman (1966) and Chaika (1974), albeit on somewhat different
grounds, argue that errors like gibberish and neologizing are indicative
of a word finding difficulty. Considering that human languages are so
constructed that new words can be made up and old words can be used in
new ways to effect new meaning, it is not likely that incomprehensible
neologizing and gibberish are a sign of creativity (Forrest 1976; Fromkin
1975). When new words or new meanings on old words are created
normally, they are subordinated to a target meaning. Moreover, they can
be utilized again by speakers or writers, and admit of discussion by their
creators. None of these conditions seem to apply to psychotic neologizing.
There is usually a recognizable difference between normal creativity
and schizophrenic novel usages although, as we have seen, in instances
such as James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, there may be question (Andreasen,
1973). It is not without significance, however, that Joyce like other artists
of his day was experimenting with presenting the reader with the
protagonist’s stream of consciousness, that interior dialogue usually hid
den from public view. T his explanation does not depend upon the
question of whether or not Joyce or any other stream-of-consciousness
artists actually studied Freud, but psychoanalytic constructs were exhila
rating to the intelligentsia and the works of many artists were stimulated
by him whether or not they actually read him. Freud’s belief in the inner
reality of a well-developed unconscious had an undeniable effect on 20th
century artists who then tried to explore the unconscious in their works.
As opaque as many such artistic works may be, if the artist develops
them, refines them, works on them over and over, and can discuss his or
her productions, we can still count them as art, in the sense of deliberate
working of linguistic material. Joyce, for instance, is said to have worked
painstakingly on Finnegan’s Wake for 17 years. Joyce scholars claim that
he reworked older sections in accordance with newer ones. His highly
intricate verbal and mythic motifs definitely showed an artist’s control.
This is all in great contrast to the random output of psychotics, output
that is rarely repeated on two consecutive days, if even in two consecutive
conversations. All the evidence that I have been able to gam er from the
psychiatric literature and my own contacts with SD schizophrenics shows
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a random associational course usually dependent on what their first
sentence or phrase was, then in response to someone else or not. SD
nonce-productions, then, are random, show no development, and show
no working-over of material, nor do they show the relationship between
the parts of a discourse to the whole (see Chapter 9). Genius often
consists in being able to forge connections between new and dispa
rate phenomena, but this forging is controlled. In contrast, psychotic
slippage causes phrases, both usual and bizarre, to be juxtaposed with no
control and usually with no further development, and this is true even
when we can point to the presence of overtly stated cohesive devices (see
Chapter 6).
[5] Perseverations.

We have seen several kinds of perseveration: repetitions of morphemes
like -welt and Frank- or of phonological shapes like whys, wise, no-bill and
noble. Sometimes the perseverations simply repeat words, as in
2 A . . . Send it to me, Joseph Nemo, in care of Joseph Nemo, and me
who answers by the name of Joseph Nemo and will care for it
myself. Thanks everlasting and Merry New Year to Mentholatum
Company for my nose, for my nose, for my nose, for my nose, for my
nose. (Maher 1968, p. 30)
In word association testing, Clark and Clark (1977, pp. 477-483) also
speak of syntagmatic associations, words that commonly precede or
follow another word. These figure in responses in word association tests,
such as whistle eliciting stop or long eliciting fellow. In schizophrenics,
syntagmatic responses also occur, but, besides such usual ones shared by
many speakers of a language, apparently idiosyncratic syntagmatic
responses may occur, as in the connections between the parts shown
below, such as the questions about Paradise or the comments about
liking the families on Mill Avenue:
2B. Mill Avenue is a house in between avenues U and avenue T I
live on Mill Avenue for a period of for now a period of maybe fifteen
year for around approximate fifteen years I like it the fam—I like
every family on Mill Avenue I like every family in the world I like
every family in The United State of America I like every family on on
Mill Avenue I like Mill Avenue is a is a block with that is busy
cars always pass by all the time I always look out the window of
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my front porch front porch at time when I s- when I ’m not sure if
it’s possible about the way I think I could read people mind about
people’s society attitude plot and spirit so I think I could read their
mind as they drive by in the car sh- will I see Paradise will I not
see Paradise should I answer should I not answer I not answer wtheir thought of how I read think I could read their mind about
when they pass by in the car in the house pass by in the car from
my house I just correct for them for having me feel better about
myself not answer will I should I answer should I not answer will I see
Paradise will I not see Paradise I just correct them to have me feel
better about myself about the way I think I can hear their mind rabout the way I think I could read their mind as they pass by the house
Mill Avenue is also Mill Avenue is also a place of great event for
all the families that live on Mill Avenue always eht- receive world
wide attention and I am o- I am just one of the families live on
M ill Avenue that always receive world wide attention so therefore
[unintelligible] to receive world wide attention is receive world wide
attention is some some you should be proud of you should be
proud of world wide attention (unintelligible) there’s the family
are just too out in the open not to have world wide attention so
they all have world wide attention by the cars pa—that pass in
the front cars that pass by all the time so therefore Mill Avenue
is also a a I like a quiet residential n- block like a quiet residential
block with a Italian people talk outside by the fence discuss their
feelings their attitudes their opinions opinion about any story feeling
concept idea or sentence that they may have and once again when I
look outside the window because I think I could read people’s minds
about people’s society attitude plot and spirit w- should I answer
should I not answer will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise I not
answer correct them have me feel about better about myself like I
said before I ’m not sure if it’s possible about the way I think I
could read people mind about people’s society attitude plot and spirit so
I not answer them I just correct them have me feel better about
myself Mill Avenue is also a place where people gather in back yards
to have people gather in back yards to have a barbecue in the back
yard to have relative over to have friend over to talk in the back yard
to be merry with each other. (data courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)2
Even where phrases are repeated such as the “should I answer should I
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not answer. . . Will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise . . . ” the repeti
tions serve none of the usual purposes. They are reminiscent of refrains,
but they fail as true refrains for four reasons. First, they do not come at
predictable points as a true refrain does. Second, they do not function to
strengthen some message or to create cohesion. Third, all the repetitious
phrases in this passage are not repeated entirely and in the exact way as
true refrains are. Rather, they seem to be randomly accessed sometimes
after the start of a word which is then broken off. Fourth, the repetitions
often seem to be broken off willy-nilly again in the middle of a phrase.
T he effect is that of a broken record in which the needle keeps getting
stuck at certain points as well as skitters over tracks, accessing parts of
refrains.
Both the glossomanic chaining and the pseudo-refrains are perse
verations. In the case of the chaining, accidental similarities of mor
phemes or of meanings of words cause the chaining. It is as if the patient
accesses one word or morpheme, and then, instead of ignoring its affiliates,
so to speak, simply continues accessing other words connected to the first
in some structural manner. In contrast, one normally accesses the word
or phrase one wishes in order to express an idea or to otherwise give
information, but then one goes to the next item which will advance one’s
topic, all the while avoiding those which do not do that regardless of
whether or not they show some structural similarity to a word just
expressed. To do otherwise is to lose what Werner et al. (1975) termed
“path control” in fashioning utterances.
T he inappropriate rhyming and alliterating associated with psychotic
speech are also manifestations of inappropriate perseverative chaining.
In these instances, chaining is on the basis of repeated final syllables
(rhymes) or first sounds (alliteration), or both. Perseverations may be on
several planes all at once, not simply one of rhymes or of morphemes.
The intricacy and intertwining of perseveration is beautifully illus
trated in the sequence mentioned earlier “Looks like clay. Sounds like
gray. Take you for a roll in the hay. Hay day. May Day. H elp!” Cohen
(1978, p. 29). This started out as an appropriate response to the color
naming task which evoked this sequence. Besides the perseverating of
the -ay in making the rhyme of ‘’clay and gray, the two first sentences
share the paradigmatic “looks like” and “sounds like,” both part of the set
of two-part verbs used for describing the senses. Since “sounds like” is
wholly inappropriate here, it can be seen both as an intrusion of a
member of a set, but also as a perseveration of the construction [verb of
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sense] + like. Additionally, the color gray seems to have been mentioned
because it is a color and this was a color-naming task, as well as because of
its chance phonological association with clay.
Although clearly the initial motivation for saying “mayday” may have
been the rhyme, the end of the sequence, “Mayday. . . Help! I just
cannot. Need help.” are semantically related. Even without positing that
the patient really wanted help, which is entirely possible, the roundabout way of asking for it is peculiarly schizophrenic, arising as it does at
the end of a rhyming sequence. This passage, so notable for its rhyming
and its ultimate semantic chaining, also shows syntactic chaining. Its first
three sentences are all [Verb + Object] without overt subjects. That is,
“Looks like clay,” “Sounds like gray,” and “Take you for a roll in the hay”
and, later “Need help” all show the same basic syntactic frame. Then,
too, looks like and sounds like are part of a paradigm of verbs + like that
are used for describing experiences of the senses. Intrusions, then, are
irrelevant but structurally similar items, and perseverations continue
down what may have originated as an intrusive pathway.
The richness of the possible perseverations and intrusions in psy
chotic speech is matched by the richness of the associations of words in
our brains which range from phonological, syntactic, semantic, cultural,
and personal connections (M iller 1978; Forster, 1978; Morton 1979; Clark
1970; Deese 1965; Clark and Clark 1977, pp. 411-414; Foss and Hakes
1978, pp. 105-110, 122-124. Lieberman (1984, p. 47), for instance, lays out
the way words in memory form associational networks in which phonetic
representations serve as addresses to semantic readings. For his purposes,
he considers initial sounds, positing a dictionary-like mental lexicon.
The data from SD speech suggests that these phonetic addresses are even
more complex, including final syllables, for instance, so that words are
also connected to those that rhyme with them. Lieberman’s model of
“associative distributive neural models” is certainly consistent with the
interpretation presented here for glossomania. Every word in the lexicon
is associated with many others. Further, each word is associated in many
ways: according to shared sounds, number of syllables, shared meanings,
shared registers, shared derivations, shared topics likely to elicit them,
and the like (M iller 1978). Given this richness, the apparent diversity of
psychotic speech is explicable. The underlying process of impaired
retrieval itself can be quite simple, but because this process can tap into
an intricate and extensive set of networks, the output seems bafflingly
varied.

38

Understanding Psychotic Speech

Whatever factors that lead normals to screen out irrelevant associa
tions and to control their output somehow fail for SD schizophrenics. As
Rose (1976) said of free associating
Once the brain has “chanced upon” a particular state, perhaps as a
result of random or spontaneous firing, as in dreaming, the ensuing
states will follow almost by necessity. (p. 262)

[6] Failures in Subord in atin g.

T h ere is an alternate way of looking at the same data, that of failing to
subordinate at different levels of linguistic processing. Neologisms and
gibberish can also be seen as failure to subordinate sounds to appropriated
word shapes, just as word salads show a failure to subordinate words to
sentences. Failure to use appropriate inflectional markers is also a failure
in subordination, as is failing to use appropriate syntactic markers like
-ize, -tion, or -s’ Intrusive matters not pertaining to any discernible topic,
as in glossomania, are also failure of subordination.
Topic is to discourse what sentence is to word and what word is to
sound. T h e question of topic itself and its role both in producing dis
course and understanding it m erits a chapter in itself (Chapter 10). For
now we note that language forms a hierarchy of subordinating structures.
Failing to subordinate any level in this hierarchy into its appropriate
higher structures leads to deviations.
These failures are m ajor disruptions in speech production. In normal
discourse, sounds and morphemes (such as Vor- or p u p ) are always
subordinated to word shapes. Words have to be subordinated both to the
syntactic requirements of the sentence and to the topic at hand. If a given
word reminds the normal speaker/hearer of another topic, a signal is
given announcing that. For instance, one says, “Ooh-that reminds m e,”
or “not to change the topic, b u t . . . ” In some way, change of topic is
announced, and subsequent utterances become subordinated to the new
topic. By contrast, SD schizophrenics flit from one associated word or
phrase to another, often with far fewer and shorter pauses than normal
speakers (Rochester et al. 1977b; Silverm an 1973). T h is last suggests a
lack of planning in their productions.
Speech often considered most pathognomic of schizophrenia typically
is not controlled by any discernible topic (Lecours and Vanier-Clement
1975; W erner et al. 1975). As already noted, even if the utterance starts
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out with a phrase relevant to the context and topic at hand, it quickly
veers away from it. Grice (1975, pp. 51-55) and Van Dijk (1977, p. 109)
consider mention of matters extraneous to the topic at hand a far more
serious failure in discourse than omissions of what might be considered
relevant. Part of our normal decoding strategy is to figure out what has
been left out. Adding too much detail actually makes discourse less
interpretable for two reasons. One is obviously the load of remembering
so much. The other is that if someone does mention something that can
be figured out, the hearer assumes that there has been a special reason
for doing so and then has to try to figure out that reason. If the point of
the discourse is not germane to the overdetailed presentation, its entire
point is soon lost.
VanDijk (1980, pp. 29-50) convincingly shows that meaning and coher
ence are dependent on the macrostructure of discourse and the sub
ordination of microstructures, such as phrases and sentences, to that
macrostructure. Furthermore, he emphasizes that normal discourse has
a discernible macrostructure, what is often idiomatically called “the
point” and “the gist,” as well as “the theme” or “the topic.” It is this
macrostructure that seems to be missing from much of the discourse
presented in the literature as “schizophrenic,” even that in which the
individual words and syntax are not deviant. The importance of a topic
as a determinant of meaning will be explored later (Chapter 10).
It is the schizophrenic’s failure to subordinate to macrostructure that
leads to the impairment of communicability found by researchers like
Salzinger et al. (1978). They used the Cloze procedure on schizophrenic
discourse. That procedure asks subjects to guess what deletions have
been made in a given discourse. When decoding normal speech, one
guesses at parts left out or not heard by referring to what is being talked
about. Since SD schizophrenics veer off the topic erratically, it is much
more difficult to guess what they have left out. All the Cloze procedure
does is show the result of such veering. It is another way of saying that
SD speech is not controlled and subordinated to a topic. There is a
similar difference between schizophrenic rhyme and alliteration and that
of artists. The former is random, caused by intrusions and perseverations
whereas the latter adheres to a larger topic (Chaika 1977; LaFerriere,
1977).
Like normal discourse SD schizophrenic output often seems to start
out motivated by context and purpose. However, subsequent utterances
may not be so motivated. Rather, unlike normal production, the rest of
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the SD production may travel through associated words, cycling through
them with no checking back to context or purpose, resulting in a cycling
through associated words, referring back to syntax to put those words
into a syntactic frame. In the case of complete word salads there is no
reference back to syntax. In other instances, in fact, in glossomanic
strings very frequently the syntactic frame of a previous utterance is
perseverated.
Neologizing, gibberish, and wrong word, including opposite speech,
are explained by the same circumstance. In these instances, the target
word is not hit. Rather, as when normals are fatigued or excited, a word
related to the target is retrieved. With neologizing and gibberish, the
purposeless course of speech production interferes with the process of
matching lexicon to proper phonology. If at least some morphemes are
matched up, then neologisms result. If not, then gibberish does.
Punning, rhyming, alliterating, or other kinds of repeated words are
also perseverations. If the perseveration cycles through the same syntax
and words, then repeated phrases or sentences will occur, sometimes but
not always as a refrain. All perseverations may be interspersed with
apparently uninhibited “firings” of associated words.
This explanation accounts for one phenomenon that Reilly, Harrow,
Tucker, Quinlan, and Siegel’s (1975) describe in schizophrenic speech.
They believe that
. . . a certain portion of schizophrenics who show marked looseness
during the acute phase may have always been somewhat vague. . .
tend[ing] to grasp at the jargon of the m om ent. . . by virtue of the fact
that this form of speaking does not give away. . . the speaker’s funda
mental disorganization, confusion, vagueness, or lack of comprehension.

A more likely explanation, and one which has the merit of referring to
observable data, is that cliches are accessed just as individual words are
accessed. In Chapter 8, we will see such accessing of cliches interspersed
throughout psychotic narratives.
[7] T h e Relative R arity of A gram m atism .

There are two possible reasons that there seems to be less agrammatism
than associative chaining. First, as Bradley et al. (1980) point out, gram
matical function words are treated differently psychologically than the
far larger class of lexical words with referential meaning. Disruption in
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grammar, then, is not necessarily mirrored by disruption in word usage,
and vice versa.
Second, there are fewer possible choices in syntax than in lexicon.
This suggestion is borne out by the observation of Maher et al. (1966)
that speech disruption in schizophrenics most frequently occurs at the
ends of sentences. Under conditions of relatively free speech, speech
unconstrained by experimental tasks, for instance, in English and most
European languages, new information typically comes at the end of
sentences. New information requires the most heavily modified phrases.
Hence, there are more choices to be made at the ends of sentences, so
that more mistakes can be made.
Because of the many ways words can be associated in the mental
lexicon, and because of the complexity of language in general, the
surface results of such firing appear to be great, resulting in deviations
such as those presented in deviations 1-8 above.
[8] T h e Explanatory Value of T his Explanation.

It should be noted that the explanation given here accounts for all
data and does not posit steps in speech production for which we have no
evidence, e.g., Cohen’s (1978) model. He, for instance, explains glossomanic
chaining in terms of sampling responses and rejecting them for fear of
punishment. Yet, in all of his examples, it is clear that the first response
is almost always correct, with each subsequent utterance becoming more
and more “punishable,” in behavioral terms because it becomes more
and more bizarre for the context. Furthermore, there is no proof that
such sampling for punishable responses takes place in production of
speech, normal or not. Nor does the explanation tendered here ascribe
putative motivations to the speakers, motivations which cannot be checked.
One does not get very far asking an SD psychotic what he or she meant
by what was just said.
The explanation offered here accounts for all of the aberrations consid
ered typical of SD psychotic speech, including the differing degrees of
incoherence. The intensity of the inhibitory dysfunction in each patient
at varying times determines the degree of speech disorder, accounting
for relatively minor intrusions as well as the most severe.
It also explains the often noted similarity between schizophrenic speech
and poetic speech. What the poet does deliberately, subordinating to
intended meaning, is to find new and unusual connections between
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words. The schizophrenic chances upon such connections, although he/she
cannot control them (LaFerriere, 1977, pp. 33-37). Some claim that
schizophrenics are being creative, noticing new connections when they
utter strings as in 5(a) above (Forrest 1976). Sometimes patients may even
claim that they are noticing new relation between words. Other patients
complain, however, that what got uttered is not what they intended to say
(Chapman 1966). While I was doing an experiment at Butler Hospital,
one SD patient listened to a tape recording of his speech made during a
psychotic episode. He wonderingly commented that it was no wonder
that no one understood him, and that he had heard himself on tape
before, but he assumed that the tape was distorted.
Even if the patient feels as if he or she is noticing new connections, as
noted above, the kinds of rhymes one finds in schizophrenic associative
chaining are usually quite ordinary, about the level one hears from
young children first experimenting with end rhyme.
Finally, the explanation offered here also shows why speech during
psychotic episodes is more disorganized than at other times. Our inhibitory
mechanisms do vary according to our mental states. During excitement
and times of stress, for instance, “path control” is often lessened even for
normals, and intrusions and slips increase. At these times, but to a lesser
degree than SD schizophrenics, normals produce some of the same kinds
of errors.
[9] Confirm ation From O ther R esearch.

Shimkunas (1978, p. 211) claims that schizophrenics show excessive
verbal-temporal activation as compared with normal controls. Studies
have shown that “Heightened general arousal, as indicated by skinconductance levels, appears to be primarily mediated by the left hemi
spheres of acute . . . schizophrenics.” That is, the language hemisphere
shows the kinds of overactivation that could lead to the kinds of intru
sions discussed above. Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 192-193) agree
that “it is necessary to suppose some impairment in the left-hemisphere
processes of schizophrenic patients.”
[10] A utom atic and Controlled Processes.

Comparing psychotic glossomanic productions to normal speech sub
ordinated to the topic or nature of the social interaction makes manifest
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the difference between controlled and automatic retrieval of linguistic
forms. Glossomania sets off a round of synonyms, rhymes, alliterations,
or personal memories not germane to the matter at hand. This seems to
be an automatic process. Normal speech is controlled, subordinated to
both the social situation and the intent of the speaker. There is no such
control in glossomanic chaining.
Stilling, Feinstein, Garfield, Rissland, Rosenbaum, Weisler, and BakerWard (1987, pp. 55-60) in quite a different context discuss several studies
of automated processes and how they can interfere with controlled
processes, the latter being any goal-directed behavior. Typically, in such
studies subjects first are trained to learn an automatic procedure. Once
they have, they then are asked to do the controlled tasks. Researchers
have found that the automatic processes can interfere with the task at
hand if they they redirect attention from it. Although none of these
studies seem to have dealt with a psychotic population, they nevertheless
predict incoherence arising from a state in which automatic processes
dominate conscious controlled behavior.
Optimal skilled performance seems to balance the speed and high
capacity of automatic processes with the goal-directedness and flexibil
ity of controlled processes. A system that acted only by allowing the
currently most active automatic procedure to carry through to comple
tion without any influence by goals would be incoherently impulsive
without consciousness as we know it. [boldface mine] (Stillings et al.
pp. 59-60)
Glossomania in any of its forms provides perfect examples of the
takeover of automatic processes, as do word salads and even gibberish.3
The lack of control seen in these productions is certainly as if word and
syntactic selection has gone on automatic pilot, so to speak. This is
probably why gibberish seems to conform to the phonotactics of the
language, but doesn’t happen to form words. Wandering narratives in
which personal memories are interspersed, memories which are not
subordinated to what the patient is supposed to be narrating are also
examples of automatic processes.
[11] Eyetracking Dysfunction.

That the above analysis is essentially correct is suggested by a quite
different study by Holzman et al. (1978). This research provides some
interesting parallels to SD verbal output. Briefly, Holzman et al. found
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that 65 to 85 percent of schizophrenic patients, in contrast to only 6
percent of normals, show disordered eye pursuit movements. In order to
pay attention to the swinging pendulum in such studies, subjects must be
willing participants, but once they look at the pendulum, the pursuit
system is triggered, so that the eyes follow the pendulum. This kind of
eyetracking is involuntary attention, unaffected by motivation (Holzman
et al. 1978, p. 297).
There are two kinds of eyetracking dysfunction. T he first character
ized by short, fast movements, sacades, of the type used to focus, repre
sents failure to turn on the pursuit system. In the second, “spiky” type,
the pursuit movement starts, but is interrupted by brief, frequent eye
arrests. It is as if other interferences do not switch off (Holzman et al.
1978, p. 300). Not surprisingly, the latter seems to be prevalent in schizo
phrenics and their relatives.
T he speech data presented here are consistent with such spiky-type
eye movements. The perseverations of syntactic frames or words and
phrases are like the arrests in spiky-type pursuit. Random travel along
associative networks of linguistic material is like the spikes. The triggering
of associated words not relevant to the context seems to be another
instance of interferences, here previously uttered words, not switching
off.
It must be emphasized, however, that even if the eyetracking studies
did not exist, the speech data would still admit of the explanation given
above, of random triggering of linguistic material (i.e., intrusions) com
bined with unmotivated perseverations along any of the language networks.
Both phenomena suggest problems in neurotransmissions affecting the
speech production capability of some schizophrenics.
[12] Parallels to O ther Populations.

Holzman et al. (1978, p. 304) note that eyetracking dysfunction is not
specific to schizophrenia. Nonspecificity is a help in the understanding
of dysfunction in schizophrenia. When we see similar effects with known
or better understood causes, we may extrapolate to the less well known.
For this reason, with speech data, reference is often made to those normal
states which most approximate the SD states. Eyetracking becomes impaired
with age. T he older the person, the greater number of eye arrests.
Besides that found in old age, spiky-type tracking has been described in
patients who have Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, brain stem and
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hemispheric lesions, as well as alcohol or barbiturate intoxication, all
indicative of CNS involvement.
Holzman et al. (1978) point out that the movements in spiky-type
tracking suggests that random, asynchronous neural firing is occurring.
So do the linguistic data from SD patients. Since the tracking dysfunc
tion occurs
. . . in degenerating conditions, including aging, it would be likely that
the high speed, asynchronous firing reflects not an increased activity of
some parts of the nervous system, but a failure of inhibiting, modulating,
or integrating co n tro l. . . to assume that failure of such central nervous
system inhibitory activities also accompanies schizophrenic conditions.
(p. 305)

T h is explanation holds for the language data as well. T h e m ention of
words inappropriate to the speech situation, but related phonologically,
morphologically, semantically, or syntactically, seems to represent lack
of inhibition of matters extraneous to the context. M aher (1972) made a
sim ilar observation, positing some sort of attentional dysfunction in
schizophrenia. Inability to “pay attention” and to subordinate speech
output may be caused by failure of inhibitory mechanisms. Indeed, since
normals do not evince inattention by uttering gibberish, random alliter
ating and rhyming, or making gross syntactic errors, the special quality
of schizophrenic inattention must be delineated. Dysfunction in inhibitory
mechanisms seems to discriminate between normal and SD schizophrenic
inattention.
Brown (1980, p. 294) notes that neologistic jargons are a disorder of
elderly aphasics. Recalling that the aged also show the kind of eyetracking
abnormality of schizophrenics, it is reasonable to assume that the degen
eration of CNS of inhibitory function might also be responsible here, as
well as for the neologistic jargon of SD schizophrenics.
Green (1985) as a result of dichotic listening testing shows that acute
schizophrenics could not focus attention on one ear in the presence of
competing stimulus to another. This, too, is evidence of CNS dysfunction.
[1 3] W hy Som e Schizophrenics A re N ot SD.

Viewing SD psychotic speech production in this light may help explain
why all schizophrenics do not evince structurally impaired speech.
Traditionally, those who do have been termed “thought disordered,”
whereas those who do not are termed “nonthought disordered.” T his
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terminology implies that some who are diagnosed as schizophrenic have
unimpaired thinking (Chapter 3).
If schizophrenia causes a dysfunction in neurotransmission however,
then the SD patient can be viewed as one in which the difficulty has
affected the speech production areas of the brain. Those who do not
evince SD symptoms, but do have other schizophrenic symptoms, includ
ing hallucinations and systematic delusions, are affected in other areas of
the brain, including those that store visual imagery. Some patients may
be affected in different areas at the same time, or at different times. Note
that this explanation, although not identical, is accordance to Shimkunas
(1978, pp. 225, 227-228), for both assume CNS involvement and both
assume that the schizophrenic is affected by internal stimuli more than
normal.
Allen and Allen (1985) disagree that schizophrenics suffer from a
“general loss of control in producing speech” as outlined here. They do
not offer any actual samples of schizophrenic speech to verify their
position, nor do they analyze any of the disordered speech easily gathered
from the literature, including that presented here and in Chaika (1974,
1982a; Chaika and Alexander 1986) to show how and why such speech is
not disordered. If, indeed, their experiment did not yield evidence of
weakness in linguistic path control, such evidence is not lacking in other
studies and still must be accounted for. In other words, if they can refute
the long-standing assumption that schizophrenics do not suffer from
problems in path control, then they must show that the data presented in
defense of that position can be explained in another way. This is espe
cially important since glossomanic speech has so long been considered
particularly pathognomic of this illness. How do they explain the speech
in 2B above, for instance?
T he task upon which Allen and Allen base their conclusions, the
Thematic Apperception Test gave each patient only 2 minutes to describe
each of 4 pictures. It has repeatedly been shown that the more bounded
the task, the less psychotic speech disintegrates. This was one of the
earliest points made by Maher, for instance. As we saw above, glossomanic
chaining often starts out fine, but as the speech event continues it
becomes more and more bizarre (also see Cozzolino 1983, p. 121). Within
the confines of a 2-minute output constrained by a picture, we would not
expect loss of path control. It is vital that researchers use comparable
tasks to compare results. Allen and Allen also consistently interchange
the word ideas with words for linguistic structures, as in:
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At a local level this involves connecting elements in the previous or
immediately following part of the discourse. It is this which distinguishes
meaningfully integrated ideas from collections of unrelated ideas. (p. 75)
As the next chapter shows, terms like ideas are poorly defined. What is
an idea? How does it correspond to speech? To date there is no firm
correlation between any linguistic structure and ideas or thoughts. T h e
very polysemy of language makes it unlikely that there ever will be. T he
most we can do is to correlate speech structures with meanings, and
meanings with possible speech structures. That is how languages work.
[14] W h a t T h is E xp lan atio n Explains.

T h is has attempted to explain the diverse speech phenom ena long
associated with those schizophrenics who evince structurally abnormal
verbalizations. In words of Shimkunas (1978):
Given the complex psychobiological problem that schizophrenia repre
sents, broad, structurally oriented theorizing appears to be a necessary
step in the ultimate construct validation of the phenomenon. (p. 228)
T h e analysis presented here is also consistent with a wide variety of
findings of attentional and filtering deficits in schizophrenia (e.g., Hemsley
1976, 1977; Oltmanns 1978; M aher 1972; Schwartz 1978) but goes further
in offering an explanation for all of the peculiarities of “schizophrenic”
speech, especially in the combinations in which it is manifested.
It also accords with findings of hemispheric asymmetry in schizo
phrenics (e.g., Flor-H enry 1976; Shimkunas 1978. Rochester and M artin
1979, p. 192) as well as with first person accounts of schizophrenic experi
ences (Chapman 1966; Vonnegut 1976).
It also correlates with at least one other aspect of schizophrenic behavior:
the eyetracking studies. Furtherm ore, it does not seem to be inconsistent
with studies explaining the effects of antipsychotic medication on schizo
phrenics (Snyder 1978; Sachar et al. 1978; Davis 1978; Matthysse 1978).
These claim that such m edication inhibits the action of biochemicals
associated with facilitated neurotransmission. In other words, they slow
down mental functions. T h e speech data indicate that SD psychotics can
use such slowing down.
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[15] A cadem ic Disciplines and Point of View.

One problem in studies of psychotic populations is that researchers
come from diverse academic backgrounds, each with his or her own set
of constructs into which any data are fit. We are all creatures of our
training. Linguists have been trained to view language objectively as a
system of interrelated levels; hence, they are often struck by the disrup
tion in levels of language evinced by schizophrenic patients. My earliest
papers had noticed that speech pathognomic of this population could be
described in terms of disintegration in each of these levels. T he wellknown linguistic scholar Eugene Nida, after listening to one of my
papers, independently observed to me about a schizophrenic friend:
Observation of pathology is first evident in discourse, second in syntax,
third in morphology, and lastly in phonology. I could almost predict
the number of days he had refused to take his medication by the degree
of disintegration.
Clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, more used to thinking of
language holistically, and, furthermore, used to equating language with
the thought behind it rather than as a structure in and of itself, have
come to different conclusions. For instance, Lanin-Kettering and Harrow
(1985, p. 3) cite the well-known characteristic of schizophrenic speech, its
failure to maintain a topic. They refer to this as “an intermingling of
personal material into speech when it does not fit neatly with the exter
nal context of the conversation.” They see this as a “mixing of ideas
related to conflicts and issues of personal concern to the patient.”
This same phenomenon, as we have just seen, can more simply be
explained by random triggering of interlocking semantic networks. The
latter explanation requires no assumptions about the patient’s inner
conflicts, conflicts for which we often have no evidence. This is not to say
that such conflicts don’t lead to intrusions. They can and do, but that is
not the same thing as saying that all digressions represent a patient’s
inner conflicts. For instance, the following excerpt from a monologue by
X, reported on in Chaika (1974) shows such a digression:
3. Did that show up on the X-rays?
You’ll see it tonight.
I ’ve been drinking phosphate.
You’ll see it in the dark (inaudible)
Glows.
We all glow as we’re glowworms.
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Aside from the veracity of the claim that she was drinking phosphate,
a claim prompted apparently because of the mention of X-rays, not out of
any conflict over phosphate, there is the peculiar statement that “we all
glow as we’re glowworms.” This is semantically related to phosphate,
which has the property of glowing. In order to validate Lanin-Kettering
and Harrow’s claim about schizophrenic digressions, we would have to
try to find some personal conflict related to glowworms. Since X fails to
mention glowworms elsewhere and her psychiatrist could report no
other evidence of a concern with glowworms, we can only validate the
semantic connection between the lexical items in the monologue. That
is, we can’t correlate it with the speaker’s “conflicts and issues of personal
concern.” In short, we can explain the digression in terms of the lexical
structure of English, but we ourselves have to digress from the data in
order to explain them in terms of thought. The entire question of the
allowable degree of creativity in extrapolating meaning will be deferred
until Chapter 11.
Notes
1T h e schizophrenic preoccupation with religion has frequently been commented
upon. Many samples of schizophrenic speech over the years have religious material
in them. Many, many patients whom I interviewed easily derailed onto all sorts of
religious matters: a concern with salvation, interest in Hinduism, Buddhism, and
other Eastern religions, claims of communicating with Jesus or Mary or the like.
Why this should be so has never been explained in the literature, at least so far as I
can determine.
2I repeat that Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these
data.
3Some Pentecostals and Charismatic Catholics are insulted by terming such
gibberish “glossolalia” as that term refers also to “speaking in tongues” in a religious
setting. For that reason, I have chosen the lay term gibberish to indicate this behavior.
However, it is not surprising that the output of both states, schizophrenic and
religious, are so alike since both proceed from rising above ego constraints.

Chapter Three

LANGUAGE AND TH O UGH T
Because language is used to encode thoughts, many believe
that thought and language are the same. Frequently, this is
an unexamined assumption, one held by scholars, clinicians
and laypersons alike. There are many problems with such an
assumption, however. The position defended here, a position
dependent upon language data, is that thought and language
are separate entities. Although we often convey thought by
language, this does not mean that language and thought are the
same.
[1] T h e In terface between T h o u g h t an d L an g u ag e.

ntil we are forced to examine their relationship, we assume that
language and thought are one and the same. Before embarking on
any discussion of psychotic speech, it is essential to separate the concept
of language as opposed to thought. As a linguist, one oriented to prag
matics and discourse analysis, my position has been and still is that one
analyzes discourse according to verifiable constructs and, from those
analyses, one proceeds to the thoughts behind the discourse (Chaika
1974, 1981, 1982a, d, e; Chaika and Lambe 1985). Such an insistence on
the separation of language from thought has excited much debate, but it
has been gratifying to see that others have begun to see the value of such
an approach (Andreasen 1982a; Neale, Oltmanns, and Harvey 1985).
Harvey and Neale (1983, p. 165) remind us that Bleuler (1950) himself
made the point that thought and language are not one and the same.
Still, the issue is clouded for many.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow (1985, p. 1) claim that my position is that
“we often see disordered speech in patients who have adequate underly
ing thoughts and ideas.” Not only have I never made any such claim, I
do not even see how such a claim can be made at all at this time or in the
foreseeable future. Not only are there as yet no infallible instruments for
measuring the adequacy of underlying thoughts, but there has certainly
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been no widespread cognitive testing of speech disordered patients.
What I have said is that we must first consider in what ways schizo
phrenic speech is disordered and then determine what mechanisms must
have gone awry to produce such speech. Then, perhaps, speech data can
be correlated with thinking.
I have also insisted that any explanation for schizophrenic speech
must be based upon all the data as elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2.
Certainly, some schizophrenics show no structural deviation in their
speech and even those who do, do not necessarily do so all of the time. If
we do not insist upon the separation of thought and language, then we
would be in the odd position of claiming that schizophrenics with
structurally intact speech have no thought disorder. Thought disorder is
not necessarily accompanied by any of the speech disorders discussed in
the previous chapters, nor, so far as we know, does it necessarily indicate
disordered thought (sec. 5).
Andreasen and Scott (1982) and Andreasen (1982b) have revived the
concept of negative versus positive schizophrenia with the latter includ
ing hallucinations, delusions, and T D but the former showing flattened
affect and paucity of speech. T h eir specification of negative and positive
symptoms provides a welcome distinction between the terms T D and
SD, and yet unites them on a scale. As the last chapter showed, hallucina
tions and delusions are related to speech dysfunction even if they are not
one and the same. As with SD, not all patients have hallucinations and
delusions and those who do, do not always have them.2
[2] Schizophrenic Speech or Language?

Holzman, Shenton, and Solovay (1986, p. 361) argue that the term
thought disorder (TD) should be retained rather than adopting speech
disorder (SD), because schizophrenics do not share a language or even a
dialect. This, of course, is very true. In some measure, I myself may have
contributed to their criticism of the term SD. Chaika (1974) made the
tactical error of referring to “schizophrenic” language. All language is
polysemous. The word language can mean either the system that is a
separate language or it can refer to a specific kind of language within one
language. For instance, if we hear profanity, we could say, “such language,”
or strong language as in movie ratings. Neither of these is referred to
as speech. More recently, in his impressive review of the subject, Cozzolino
(1983) many times speaks of schizophrenic language as I did, as in enti-
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tling a section The Importance o f Language Analysis fo r Diagnosis (p. 105.)
Since I erred in that 1974 article by referring to an intermittent aphasia,
many scholars devoted themselves to arguing about whether or not
schizophrenics were aphasic in the sense of the term meaning organic
impairment. I had used aphasia in its generic sense of speech dysfunction.
T he position here is that there is schizophrenic speech, but not a
schizophrenic language. As already demonstrated, there is a constella
tion of errors in speaking performance which is associated with some
schizophrenics, but, to date, there is no solid proof that the underlying
language system is impaired. To the contrary, Grove and Andreasen
(1983) have shown that psychotics can process speech, but that their
output is dysfunctional1 (p. 32). T he fact that their processing shows no
deficit certainly argues for an intact underlying system.
T he most compelling evidence that SD psychotics are suffering from a
speech disorder is that they manifest the same symptoms whether or not
they have ever even been in contact with other schizophrenics. Non SD
patients do not necessarily themselves become SD even if they are
hospitalized together.2 There are many kinds of speech dysfunction,
ranging from childhood aphasics to stutterers to severe pathologies
preventing clear pronunciation to that caused by physical damage to
parts of the brain. Disordered psychotic speech is another of those
pathologies.
In support of this contention, it has often been reported that there is
high interrater reliability in discriminating between normal and schizo
phrenic speech and that lay judges can discriminate between such speech
and that of normals as well as psychiatrists can (Andreasen 1979a; Kertesz
1982; Maher, McKeon, & McLaughlin 1966; Rochester, Martin, & Thurston
1977). Andreasen’s Scale fo r the Assessment o f Thought, Language, and
Communication, henceforth TLC, is a widely used scale which engenders
high interjudge rater reliability. Allen (1985) shows that “a clinician’s
acumen” can reliably discriminate between SD schizophrenic speech and
normal speech. This concurs both with previous studies and with the
contention by linguists that, by and large, native speakers of a language
can judge if it is being used deviantly without any particular training.
Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley (1972) found that young children
could make such judgements.
Allen (1985) also makes the interesting claim that “the speech of all
schizophrenics does indeed differ from that of normals but in as yet
unspecified ways.” Given the large literature on the characteristics of
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schizophrenic speech, this is a startling conclusion. In contrast to Allen,
Fraser, King, Thomas, and Kendell (1986) made a linguistic analysis of
schizophrenic speech and found that schizophrenics did produce syntacti
cally simpler sentences with more errors than did manic and control
populations. The judgements of deviance have to proceed from actual
deviations in the message given.

[3] T h ou gh t Disorder or Speech Disorder?

Some clinicians characterize the population of schizophrenics as being
either T D (thought disordered) or NTD (non-thought disordered).
Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 4-6, 169) argue convincingly that the
diagnosis of TD is circular since it depends on the patient’s speech. In
their words, “The clinician proceeds from a personal experience of
confusion to infer that the patient is confused.” Despite the fact that they
see the circularity of this concept, still they use the terminology through
out their work, a study of cohesive ties in narratives.
Several investigations have shown that thought disorder, or what is
called thought disorder does not distinguish between patient populations.
Simpson and Davis (1985) found that manics were more likely to be TD
than were schizophrenics. Harvey, Earle-Boyer, and Wielgus (1984) using
the TLC found it reliable for discriminating schizophrenics from manics,
but they also found that the concept of TD was not useful for discriminat
ing between the groups. Although TD was present at the outset, “the
majority of the differences between the two groups were apparently due
to verbal productivity and not other aspects of “thought disorder (p. 462).”
T heir results vis a vis manic and schizophrenic T D were different
from Simpson and Davis.” Harvey et al. found that T D somewhat was
more stable in schizophrenics than in manics.
Andreasen (1982) herself makes some compelling arguments that the
term thought disorder should be revised, also noting its circularity, by
virtue of its being inferred from speech. She also comments on the
vagueness of that term. She (p. 296) demonstrates that
Thought is a philosophical term rather than a medical or scientific one
and therefore should probably be avoided in scientific writing. When
the concept of thought is invoked, thought process should be distin
guished from thought content.

She suggests that either the term dysphasia or dyslogia be substituted, a
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suggestion apparently not followed. Some investigators have adopted
SD, a nomenclature I suggested as it is parallel to the already entrenched
T D (Chaika 1982d) Andreasen and Grove (1986), revive thought disorder
in a discussion of the reliability of the TLC. However, they do reiterate
that a diagnosis of thought disorder is inferred from speech; thus, is
circular. It is undeniable that the TLC does work as a diagnostic tool.
Notice that this doesn’t mean that it reliably measures thought or speech.
What it does is to allow clinicians to diagnose schizophrenics and manics
reliably. Andreasen and Grove (p. 356) conclude that “ ‘thought disorder’
should not be considered to be pathognomic of schizophrenia or diagnos
tic of it.” They found that mild abnormalities in language behavior even
occur in normals, as did Rochester and Martin (1979) and Chaika ( 1982e,
1983b; Chaika and Alexander 1986. See Chapter 8).
Harvey and Neale (1983, p. 175) maintain that “ . . . the term thought
disorder in its present use is misleading and should be split into two
categories. . . discourse failure . . . deviant cognitive processes that relate
to discourse failure. They (p. 160) show that “ . . . a simple designation of
a patient as thought disordered or not on the basis of a clinical evalua
tion of speech is not a useful diagnostic sign.”
[4] Is Lan guage Is Based on T hou ght?

Simpson and Davis (1985) say that “Disordered thought structure
results. . . from abnormalities in the pattern of speech such as . . . word
salad. . . ” (boldface mine). It is not clear how word salad, which is a
collection of words lacking syntactic markers, causes thought disorder.
T he term word salad refers to an agrammatical collection of words. It is
not clear how these can change the structure of thought, especially since
all humans have collections of words in their mental lexicons, but few are
psychotic.
More likely, syntactic rules have been violated in word salad, or
haven’t been brought into play, but anthropological and cognitive lin
guistics have repeatedly shown that syntax itself does not affect thoughts
(Kay and Kempton 1984; Scribner 1977; Macnamara 1977; Bickhard
1987). Rosch (1977, p. 519) insists: . . . it has not been established that the
categorizations provided by the grammar of the language actually corre
spond to the linguistic units.” Macnamara (1977) says that it is not likely
that we will find a physical resemblance between language and thought.
McNeill (1979, p. 294) puts it well when he says that grammars describe a

Language and Thought

55

language, but do not describe “ . . . (however ideally or abstractly) the
cognitive functioning of individual users.” Kreckel (1981, pp. 37-38)
emphasizes “the predom inance of cognitive categories over linguistic
expressions. . . the predominance of principles of organizing knowledge. . . over the way of expressing this knowlege. In other words, thought
and language are not the same, and it is thought that motivates language,
not the reverse.
Aha! I can almost see the scholarly thrust to the jugular. If thought
does direct language, then doesn’t that mean that disordered thought
produces disordered speech? No. T here is no evidence at all from
cognitive or social science studies that there is such an equation. T h e one
thing we can say with assurance is that language does not control thought,
but we cannot say that thought always controls speech. Commonsensically,
we can think one thing and say another. We need not say anything at all
about what we are really thinking. Casual chit-chat and other forms of
phatic communication often has little to do with conveying thoughts.

[5] T h e D isjunction B etw een T h o u g h t an d L an g u ag e.

Although it is thought that determines what language forms we select,
there is still no one-to-one correspondence between the two. Many scholars
disagree. Holzman (1978, p. 373) declares “Speech is, after all, spoken
thought,” an idea reiterated in Holzman et al. (1986). Even though
speech is often spoken thought, it does not follow that all speech directly
reflects an individual’s thoughts, nor that all thought is accompanied by
speech, nor that all deviant speech proceeds from deviant thought
processes. People can be crazy in quite ordinary speech (sec 6).
Chaika (1974, 1982d) and Chaika and Lambe (1985) have consistently
maintained that there is a fatal circularity in claim ing that speech is
thought because thought is encoded in speech. In response, LaninKettering and Harrow disclaim that
. . . the inference that strange speech suggests strange thinking is not
circular since the schizophrenic patient’s strange speech can fit into a
construct about his disordered thinking that is grounded in a larger
nomological n e t . . .

In other words, strange speech is caused by strange thinking because
the strange thinking is grounded in the net of nomology (the laws of the
mind). Not only does this fail to prove causation, it fails to prove correla-
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tion between strange speech and disordered thinking. Thought is expressed
through the medium of language, but it does not follow that language is
a direct expression of thought. That is a logical fallacy. Structurally
deviant speech can contain logical thoughts that are appropriate for the
matter at hand. For instance,
In temperance due I don’t see any reason why two men can’t proceed as
popular as ever both in themselves as a duocratic and as a democratic
premise. I mean the God-given greatness of this country, and I hope
there are no more triangular conflicts in a two-party government.
(reported in Laffal, 1965, p. 133)

As one raised on the premise that two-party systems are essential to our
democracy, but that a three-party one would weaken it, I find this
patient’s plea for temperance, the ideation expressed, far from bizarre,
although the deviations in expression are evident as they are in the
following from the nonproficient writing of aostensibly normal college
freshman.
Generalizations have no place in terms of different opinions insofar as
the discussions of heroes or any other topic.

Again the ideation here is perfectly normal. T he student was simply
trying to say that we cannot make generalizations about heroes or related
topics. As I was the professor for whom this was written, I was able to
verify what it was the student meant. This kind of fractured writing is
not at all unusual from the pens of incompetent writers. T he point is that
the kinds of deviance we see in incompetent normal writers may occur as
well in psychotic speech and writing. T he incompetence in deviant
sentences in each group arises from different underlying causes. What
ever causes the incompetence, however, the result is the same. In neither
instance, is it possible to correlate thought structures with language
structures.
Another kind of evidence for the separation of language and thought
comes from Curtiss (1977). She studied the tragic case of Genie, a girl
tied to a bedpost with no human companionship until she was pubescent.
Despite intensive training, and a willingness and enthusiasm on her
part, Genie’s speech remained syntactically like a two year old’s but her
cognitive processes, including solving problems, were far beyond that of
a child whose syntax was as rudimentary as hers.
Kuczaj (1983) has also studied the child’s self-learning strategies. As a
result, he affirms that children are far more sophisticated in language
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learning than in any other cognitive sphere at the same age, pointing out
that children have to deduce such things as abstract form classes and
rules for manipulating them. T he enormous literature on first language
acquisition has demonstrated time and again that nobody could teach
children to do what they do when learning to speak (e.g., Menyuk 1971;
Brown 1983; Bickerton 1981; Wanner and Gleitman 1982). They analyze
language and show evidence of abstraction and logical deductions from
their analysis before their second year. There is a great disjunction
between speech and other cognitive processes in childhood. This argues
that speech and thought are separate and develop separately.
[6] W h a t Is a T h ou ght?

The very concept “thought” is ill-defined. Cummins (1983) has sum
marized the difficulty psychology has had in defining thought in any
general way. Thought remains an undefined entity. How then can we
correlate speech with a concept so nebulous as thought? If we cannot
make such a correlation, then we cannot define thought in terms of
speech or vice versa. Nor can we readily determine the interface between
them.
Is a thought equivalent to a word, a phrase, or a sentence? Traditional
grammar equates thoughts with sentences, as in the well-known defini
tion of a sentence as a complete thought. There are many problems with
this formulation. The first deals with the problem of subordinate clauses.
Since sentences with subordinate clauses can be broken down into several
sentences, does each clause contain one thought, or does the entire
structure punctuated as a sentence represent the thought? Consider the
following:
1. The boy who dated Griselda before he dated Maria went to his
prom with Zelda who used to date Oscar.
This can broken down into four sentences: (1) the boy went to his prom
with Zelda, (2) the boy dated Griselda before, (3) the boy dated Maria, (4)
Zelda used to date Oscar. How many thoughts are contained in 1 then?
One or four? If one claims that language and thought are identical and
that disruption in speech is the same as disruption in thought, then one
must be able to correlate thought with speech structures.
A second problem concerns the ubiquity of ambiguity and paraphrases.
In themselves, these show that language and thought are not identical.
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One statement such as “exciting women can be dangerous” can mean two
very different things like:
2A. Women who are exciting are dangerous.
2B. If you excite women, that is dangerous
If one can get two entirely different thoughts from an identical sentence,
then language and thought cannot be the same. Similarly, if one can give
the same thought in divergent ways, then, too, language and thought
cannot be the same, as in
3A. Despite years of trying, nobody has ever been able to prove that
language and thought are the same.
3B. Scholars have not demonstrated that linguistic functioning and
cognitive activities are identical although they have tried to do so
for a long stretch of time, years, in fact.
Other problems with assuming an identity of thought and language
structure is that normals frequently make slips of the tongue and other
errors in speech production. If speech and thought were one and the
same, these would always indicate disruptions in thought processes, a
conclusion few would care to make. Rather, it is usually assumed that
such errors proceed from momentary lapses in retrieving correct words
or sounds, or lapses in self-monitoring (Fromkin 1971.)
Those patients who do produce abnormal speech during psychotic
bouts may themselves verify that such speech does not reflect their actual
thoughts. Chapman (1966) presents several such comments from patients,
and the patient mentioned in Chapter 2 who was surprised at his speech
when he saw himself on video is another.
Thoughts cannot be directly observed although speech can (Chaika
1982d; Chaika and Lambe 1985). If speech shows structural deviance,
that does not constitute proof that thought does. It is possible for nor
mals to create nonsense words and sentences although their thinking
processes may be intact. The classic example is Lewis Carroll’s Jabberwocky,
which is structurally normal but has words which do not happen to
appear in the language. So far as we know, the ability to produce this
kind of nonsense is part of one’s natural linguistic ability. Conversely,
one can create structurally abnormal sentences from known words such
as “am girl yesterday went come boy.” One can produce total gibberish as
Sid Caesar and Danny Kaye did in their comedy routines. They went
one better. They produced gibberish that sounded like different languages.
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None of these kinds of deviant productions, not even the gibberish,
derives from any dysfunction in thought. There is also religious GLOSSOlalia in which people utter concatenations of sounds and others in the
congregation interpret these as meaning something. Lee (1982) reports
on two intellectual (his term) glossolalists who claim to remember their
glossolalic utterances and what they meant. Upon observation, “ . . . it
was observed that the form of their utterance changed and did not
correspond to the given interpretation in a consistent way” (p. 552). As
much as one might disagree with Pentecostal Christianity’s belief in
speaking in tongues, one certainly cannot say that those who do this are
necessarily demented in any way. Many very brilliant people, highly
intellectual and productive, who seem normal in every way, engage in
this activity. No researcher into this population has ever found evidence
that they are thought disordered.
The opposite may also be true. A patient might utter structurally
normal sentences which indicate impaired cognition. One complained to
me, “That tape recorder is reaching out and destroying my brain cells.”
Another asked me if I was still talking. When I said, “no?” He said,
“That’s not you talking?” He was having auditory hallucinations and we
were in a private room alone with no person in earshot. I had not said a
word. Such comments and questions indicate either hallucinations, grossly
impaired ability to deduce cause and effect, or failure to discriminate
between animate and inanimate objects, all of which impinge directly on
thought. Yet there was no disruption of language itself.
[7] Language-less T h ou gh t.

Most telling, perhaps, is that there are several cognitive tasks for
which language is of little or no value, although they certainly seem to
demand thinking. Language is notoriously poor for describing how to
use tools or how to construct something. For this reason, descriptions of
mechanical devices typically contain copious diagrams. T he best way to
teach someone how to sew or to use any kind of tool is to demonstrate it
physically. No language is needed at all. Anyone who has to put together
a complicated toy from verbal directions knows how little good verbosity
is for a guide in this sphere. It is with good reason that trade schools
emphasize hands-on experience. Yet, certainly, figuring out what one
needs to do to achieve certain ends with tools involves problem-solving
skills as well as other thought processes.
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One sees this disjunction in academic pursuits. Richard Lambe pro
vides the example of teaching statistics. Many concepts in the text become
comprehensible to the student only after he or she has begun to put the
techniques to practice when solving statistical problems. Similarly, many
teachers have had the experience of difficulty in verbalizing abstract
material when they have had to teach it, although they were able to solve
complex problems using the same principles when they were students
themselves.
Neisser (1976) cites the complex mental imagery involved in the
orienteering of the Puluwat as they travel hundreds of miles over the
open seas in their canoes. He shows that their orienting schemata accept
visual information and direct action with no necessary interface of
verbalization. Similarly, city dwellers have recursive cognitive maps
upon which they act daily, but do not necessarily—indeed, frequently
cannot—verbalize the landmarks upon which they base their actions.
Note that all of the above disjunctions between language and cognition
involve very different kinds of thinking: verbal, mechanical, mathematical,
concrete, abstract, orienteering. What constitutes “thoughtness” of all
these kinds of thinking?
[8] Confusion Between Language and T hou ght.

There is an essential distinction between speech, an overt behavior,
and thought, a cognitive process inferred on the basis of many different
overt behaviors including speech. T he fundamental importance of this
distinction requires the fullest possible analysis of psychotic speech qua
speech since no inference can be more secure than its base in observation.
We have first to explain the observable linguistic behavior and not
confuse the issue by talking about thought disordered (TD) vs nonthought disordered (NTD) speakers. Indeed, if one is using structural
deviation as the basis of dividing schizophrenic patients into T D vs.
NTD, then one is in the peculiar position of claiming that some schizo
phrenic patients, those with structurally normal speech, are not thought
disordered. Why then do we consider them schizophrenic? One would
assume that all psychotic patients suffer from an impairment in thinking,
but structural deviations in speech in and of themselves are not the proof
of that nor are they proof of the nature of the impairment.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow (1985, p. 4) provide an example of the
problems attending undifferentiated constructs of language and thought.
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They argue that “a flexible boundary should be maintained concerning
what is considered a problem in thought versus what is considered a
problem in language.” Such a procedure obviates all science. One cannot
push the boundaries of analysis around willy-nilly. One needs princi
pled reasons for establishing, changing, and maintaining boundaries.
The alternative is to advance ad hoc explanations. By definition, this is
the stuff of fable and prejudice, not medicine or science.
They ask, “When we discover stretches of discourse that show prob
lems in cohesion, should we attribute them simply to a speech-language
dysfunction independent of and subsequent to thought?” As Chapter 6
shows, cohesion in discourse is effected by syntactic means. It is not at all
unusual for speakers to fail to apply the appropriate means in speech or
in writing. Effecting cohesion for one’s listeners/readers is an ongoing
problem even in the most ordinary of interactions. Hence, comments
like, “I don’t follow” or “Run that by me again” or even “Huh?” If
language were one with thought, such promptings would not be necessary.
Following Chaika and Lambe (1985), the position here is that we must
first unearth the nature of schizophrenic speech behaviors in and of
themselves, and then we must correlate those with other cognitive and
problem-solving tasks. We are in a poor position to use speech as an
inferential base for claims about thought until we understand more
clearly the interface between speech and thought in normal as well as
well as nonnormal populations.
If we seek to explain speech in terms of cognition, then the underlying
cognitive skills for which we are testing must be those known to figure in
speech production. This, of course, forms the basis to my objections
about word association testing as a way to determine dysfunction in
speech. Since speech is never normally produced on the basis of associa
tions between semantically or phonologically-related words, results of
word association tests do not explain production. Even if people give
weird word associations to words given in isolation, that doesn’t explain
weird sentences or discourses because sentences aren’t formed on the
basis of word associations. Similarly, theories like faulty pigeonholing
do not explain speech dysfunction because speech is not produced on
the basis of pigeonholing.
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[9] Inference from Perform ance Versus Evidence.

There is a difference between what we infer or suppose or imagine and
what we observe. For instance, Lanin-Kettering and Harrow say that we
may justifiably deduce from the outward facial expression of a frown that
someone is depressed. However, such an inference is justifiable only
after specific neuromuscular pathology has been ruled out such as tardive
dyskinesia. Moreover, a frown does not only indicate depression. It may
indicate intense concentration or it may be only a pretended frown
assumed for purposes of discipline or humor.
In defense of their equation of thought with language, Lanin-Kettering
and Harrow (1985, p. 2) make the interesting claim that “we do not
understand all of the details about many of our best constructs. . . [but]
they can still be useful and valuable even before we have gained com
plete understanding of them” and then “prove” this by saying that
intelligence is one such construct, “e.g., highly intelligent people per
form better on intellectual tasks than less intelligent people.” This is a
classic example of circular reasoning. If you define intelligence as what
is measured by certain tests, then obviously those who do well on those
tests are intelligent, but that doesn’t mean that intelligence is a valid
construct, or a construct at all, or that people who do well on those tests
are genuinely more intelligent than those who do not.
T heir second example of a poorly understood construct is that of the
“concept of the gene which was at the level of construct for many years
until recent advances provided strong evidence for the physical existence
of genes.” T he problem here, counters Richard Lambe, is that as these
advances were made, in observation as well as inference, the entire
concept of what a gene is itself changed as well, so that the original
constructs were modified or altogether abandoned. In sum, utilizing the
construct of thought in the absence of hard data about it is as likely to
yield fallacious correlations with speech as it is to yield valid ones.
[10] Discrim inating Between Com petence and Perform ance.

Lanin-Kettering and Harrow argue for discriminating between compe
tence and performance, what deSaussure long ago termed la langue
versus la parole. Although Chaika (1974) did assume a deficit in compe
tence, subsequent research has indicated that this was putting the cart
before the horse. Chaika, like previous authors, was attempting a charac-
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terization of performance, extrapolating from that a characterization of
competence.
T he entire question of competence vs performance when applied to
research in a linguistically impaired population is a can of worms.
Neither de Saussure nor Chomsky derived their theories from mucking
about with real people. Chomsky himself has repeatedly warned that his
theories are not necessarily applicable to the real world. He has on
several occasions specifically disavowed any practical applications of
transformational grammars to teaching or psychology. This is not to say
that they cannot be so used. It is just that he claims no necessary
psychological or pedagogical validity for them.
The problem with questions of underlying competence rests largely
on the problem of deciding what constitutes competence in the first
place. For instance, some aphasics with known lesions do know that their
utterances are faulty. Does this mean that their competence is all right,
but their performance is not? Recall also that Chapman (1966) interviewed
schizophrenic patients after psychotic episodes. He reports that they
complained that while they were psychotic they were not able to say what
they intended. They recognized the deviation in their speech but at that
time were not able to correct it. Can we say that their competence is
diminished because they can’t say what they want? Or do we say that it is
only a performance error? If they recognized the deviation, then that
argues for intact competence, but if they cannot produce structurally
nondeviant speech, is not that a matter of competence as well? Or is it
performance?
If upon release, a patient evinces surprise at a tape recording of his
disrupted speech during a psychotic bout, does that mean that he was not
linguistically competent before the viewing, but he was after? Or did he
simply have performance problems before? In a subsequent hospitalization,
should we consider his performance but not his competence impaired
just because he was able to judge his speech as deviant during a prior
hospitalization?
Consider also patients who claim to be possessed by spirits or other
outside agencies and that this accounts for their garbled speech. What
does this mean in terms of competence vs performance? It may be that
such an explanation derives from the patient’s desire to explain what he
or she perceives as deviant speech. If so, does this argue that the patient
suffers only from a deficit in performance? Given a patient whose speech
is so disintegrated that he or she descends into uninterpretable gibberish,
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can we really say that competence is not affected at least during the time
of the disordered performance? It is incumbent on any scholar to describe
how they distinguish between competence and performance if they wish
to use that distinction in their explanations.
[11] T h e Lexicon H as F
i x e d Concepts.

The strange associational chaining seen in schizophrenia is evidence
of lexical storage with interlocking networks between lexical items. As
Chaika (1982a; Chapter 2) observes, the triggering in these chains often
seems to be “thought-less” although the individual lexical items in other
contexts would communicate thoughts. What makes these chains so strange
is that although we can figure out why one lexical item is triggered by
another on the basis of semantic or phonological features, there is no
meaningful connection in terms of the communicative situation. That is,
we know why the chaining occurred but we can’t derive meaning from it.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow employ a static conception of language.
They assume that “language provides an intricate system of concepts
that is the foundation and instrument of conceptual activity.” For lan
guage itself to be the foundation of concepts, the meaning of lexical
items would have to be fixed. However, a crash course in the Oxford
English Dictionary quickly reveals just how drastically meanings change
over time, and they do because lexical items do not have fixed meanings,
constructs, or concepts. Nor do speakers and writers have to redefine a
word used in a somewhat new context. They need only be skillful
enough to use it so that a hearer can figure out its meaning in a given
context. Hence, some years ago, an innovative use of rip off resulted in a
meaning of “steal” added to the original one of “tearing something off
of something” and gay has pretty much lost its earlier meaning of
“lighthearted fun.”
Meanings of words are the most changeable part of a language. Unless
we assume that our “foundation . . . of conceptual activity” changes every
time someone uses a word in a new way, then there must be some
differences between the words and the thoughts behind their selection.
Also, the very fact that any concept may be conveyed by many different
words and sentences, that is, can be paraphrased, indicates that language
may be the instrument of thoughts, but words are hardly a static system of
concepts.
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[12] Strange Speech Is an U ndifferentiated Given.

Unfortunately, many of Lanin-Kettering and Harrow’s arguments are
weakened by imprecise terminology. For instance, they repeatedly refer
to “strange speech.” Do they mean “strange in the sense of structural
strangeness,” or “strange in the sense of bizarre imagery or claims?”
Content and form in speech are two very different things, constituting
situations that may well take very different explanations. Paraphrases
often take very different forms even when they mean the same thing. By
definition, paraphrase must be in a different structure and use different
words than the item paraphrased. As the next chapter will show, the very
selection of a synonymous verb may result in a very different sentence
form. It would be difficult to the point of impossible to figure how many
possible paraphrases any given sentence might engender, even one quite
semantically simple. T he problem is that any speaker can be skillful
enough to employ an old word in a new sense. Therefore, even though
one person might finally hit a point beyond which his or her ingenuity
can think up a new paraphrase, another person might be able to come up
new ones. T here is no fixedness of form in language.

[13] E xp lan ation of the D ata.

Any explanation for schizophrenic speech must account for all of the
data observed. We cannot sweep data embarrassing to our personal
scientific constructs under the rug. In addition, any explanation must
accord with what we know of the structure of normal language and
speech, how it is acquired, how perceived, and how performed. We know
that speakers do make slips of the tongue and have other temporary,
even transient, problems with encoding their thoughts, such as not being
able to explain to another exactly what one means in a given instance.
Whether in writing or in speech, “the right words” may be a long time
coming.
A behavioral explanation for schizophrenic speech would have to
show how one class of people was stimulated to respond linguistically
with the peculiar combination of features of SD speech, and, at that, only
during psychotic bouts. Even in a family with a history of schizophrenia,
all children do not become schizophrenic and even of those that do, not
all evince archetypal schizophrenic speech. Berenbaum, Oltmanns and
Gottesman (1985) showed that twins do not necessarily both evince
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formal thought disorder. Berenbaum et al are careful to say (p. 4) that by
thought disorder they mean speech disorder, “—such as derailment,
incoherent speech, and non sequitor responses to questions—and not as
an inference of underlying pathology in cognitive processes.” Moreover,
there are also SD patients who do come from families with no other
schizophrenics surrounding them, SD or not. How could they have
“trained” to speak this way?
Behavioral explanations for schizophrenic speech have been advanced
since Bleuler (1950) because of the “associational” character of glossomanic
chaining. Behavioral psychologists study the ways that one event is
associated with another. The problem in schizophrenic speech is that
normal speech is never produced by chance associations of shared semantic,
phonological, or syntactic relations of one word with another. What
makes such speech deviant is the fact of the chaining itself.
Rutter’s (1985) theory that schizophrenics fail in communication because
they don’t take into concern the needs of the listener fails on similar
grounds. He is correct. However, it is a usual thing in discourse for
people to fail to take into account the needs of listeners. These include
bores, nags, long-winded pests, professors whose lectures are “over the
heads” of their students. However, none of these break into word salads,
gibberish, neologizing, and glossomanic strings. What requires explana
tion is why one class of people, psychotics, behave linguistically in a
manner perceived to be bizarre by laypersons and scholars alike. Rutter’s
theory begs the question.
[14] Vygotsky.

Vygotsky’s ( 1934a,b3) Thought and Language has taken on fresh impor
tance in recent years partly because of his early insistence on the cultural
origins of language learning (Hickman 1986; Lee 1987; Paprotte and
Sinha 1987; Lucy and Wertsch 1987; Holzman and Newman 1987), and
partly because of his discussions of word associations and, as we shall see,
of his formulation of the concept of INNER sp e ec h , a form of speech
completely unlike overt speech. T he latter two domains of inquiry have
been attractive to clinicians as well (Harrow and Quinlan 1985; Kozulin
1986).
By inner speech, Vygotsky does not mean the internal dialogues
and monologues which we all regularly indulge in. These are in our
normal everyday tongue, using our regular vocabulary and syntax.
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These differ from outer speech only in that we utter these inaudibly or
not at all. However, if we did utter them, we would be using our normal
pronunciations. Grumet (1985, p. 185) quotes research which shows that
such internal dialogues are accompanied by sensorimotor excitation in
the larynx, tongue, and lower lip measurable by electromyographic
impulses. It is not unusual to notice normal people moving their lips
and tongue while actively engaging themselves in such self-speech.
However, this kind of internal speech is subauditory normal speech, not
the kind of speech which has its own laws.
We can pay tribute to Vygotsky’s brilliance, but still acknowledge that
many of his ideas have been superceded in the half century since his
death. Vygotsky’s theorizing about schizophrenia forms a very small part
of his work. H e believed (1934b, p. 129) that schizophrenics can only
think concretely, a position with which Kozulin (1986, p. xxxiii) and
Harrow and Quinlan (1985, p. 159) concur. Vygotsky bases this belief on
the erroneous one that prim itive people think concretely, a view no
longer held. We have come to realize that such judgments derived from
the inability of anthropologists to come up with tests that elicited the
mental operations being investigated. We still don’t know how to test
unerringly for cognitive skills. As Scribner (1977) pointed out, in her
studies of the Kpelle in Liberia, she regularly saw them using cognitive
skills in daily life although in formal testing they couldn’t seem to use
them. Similarly, many of Vygotsky’s pronouncements on how children
think have to be modified in view of more recent research.
Perhaps Vygotsky’s greatest appeal to clinicians is because of his
conception of inner speech. He4 (1934b, p. 30-32) posited that children
first accompany their activities with EGOCENTRIC speech (pp. 30-34) and
that this develops into inner speech (pp. 225-235). He conceives of this
inner speech as originating in truncated external speech. In time, it
develops into everything preceding speaking, except thought itself (p. 249).
Moreover,
. . . it is a specific formation with its own laws and complex relations to
the other forms of speech activity . . . the opposite of external speech.
T h e latter is the turning of thoughts into words . . . With inner speech,
the process is reversed, going from outside to inside. Overt speech
sublimates into thoughts. (p. 225-230)

Nowhere does Vygotsky describe this formation, give us any of its
laws, nor tell us how he knows what these relations are. He also ( 1934a,
P. 135; 1934b, p. 230) claims that his formulation of inner speech unfolding
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inwards, so to speak from egocentric speech, is “ . . . a fact and facts are
notoriously hard to refute.” Kozulin (1986) sums up Vygotsky’s position
as
. . . the predominance of sense over meaning, of sentence over word,
and of context over sentence are rules of inner speech. While meaning
stands for socialized discourse, sense represents an interface between
one’s individual (and thus incommunicable) [italics mine] thinking and
verbal thought comprehensible to others. . . in inner speech words
must sublimate in order to bring forth a thought. In inner speech, two
important processes are interwoven: the transition from external com
munication to inner dialogue and the expression of intimate thoughts
in linguistic form, thus making them communicative. (p. xxxviii)

Kozulin says that inner speech is incommunicable. If it can’t be conveyed
to someone else then we know neither what it is nor how it relates to
outer speech. If it is incommunicable, then we can’t know anything about
it. Nobody can observe it. Nobody can communicate it. What, then, is
inner speech? Vygotsky (1934b, p. 225) denies Kurt Goldstein’s formula
tion of it as the preverbal stage, the stage in which ordinary language
does not figure, that shadowy area of motive and “the whole interior
aspect of any speech activity.” Vygotsky especially descries such “inartic
ulate inner experience” because it “dissolves” separate structural planes.
T he construct of inner speech can be tempting. Psychiatrically, for
instance, one could assume that the strange verbalizations of SD schizo
phrenics is inner speech breaking through. T he problem is that, despite
Vygotsky’s claims, what he describes, the very development of inner
speech in the child and the existence of inner speech itself, are not facts.
By his own definition, Vygotsky’s definition of inner speech is unobserv
able, unknowable, and untestable, hence, unscientific. Even so uncritical
a pair of reviewers as Lucy and Wertsch (1987, p. 81) demur that Vygotsky
“did not sufficiently account for the differentiation of the egocentric
function from the social function of speech.” Vygotsky died long before
the significant research into linguistics, cognition, and language acquisi
tion that we have today. Research methodology has become more
sophisticated, as has the uses of statistical measures. None of my argu
ments mean that there is no inner speech. I cannot prove that it does not
exist any more than Vygotsky proved that it does. Like Freudian and
Chomskyan interpretation, this one aspect of Vygotsky’s work remains a
matter of faith.
Because they impinge on questions of schizophrenia, Vygotsky’s views
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on language learning also require some mention. Vygotsky died long
before the explosion of research into language acquisition and linguis
tics that we can draw upon today. In part, his conceptions rested
unavoidably upon an inadequate view of the complexity of the task. For
instance, he (1934b, p. 219) thinks that children start out expressing
single words because their thought is “an amorphous whole” and that as
they develop inner speech, they learn to map their thoughts onto larger
structures.
Intensive study into language acquisition has confirmed that the map
ping actually goes in the other direction. The toddler frequently uses
single words to indicate sentential communication before he or she has
had a chance to learn syntactic rules. We now know that the reason that
children start out with one word utterances is that it is not possible
simply to imitate language (Ervin 1964; Chaika 19895, pp. 17-18). At the
time of the one-word stage, children haven’t figured out the complexity
of rules for word formation, much less for syntax and discourse, but this
doesn’t mean that their thinking is so limited. Gleitman, Gleitman, and
Shipley (1972) showed that children under the age of 4 use adult stan
dards to make grammatical judgments about the well-formedness of
speech, even though the children themselves are still making the errors
in their own productions that they detect in others.
T heir knowledge is in advance of their actual linguistic skills. For
instance, children confuse most sets of antonyms and other words in sets,
such as wife, mother, and sister (Donaldson and Wales 1970; Clark 1971,
1972, 1973)6 for the same reasons that adults have so many slips-of-thetongue involving them (Chaika 1974, 1977). Antonyms are used in the
same syntactic environments and share a good many semantic features
with each other. T he child may confuse the words big and small, but this
does not mean that he or she doesn’t distinguish between a big piece of
cake and a small one.
More recently, Slobin (1982), who has studied language acquisition in
children learning languages as diverse as Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, and
Italian, warns against assuming that a child’s immature syntax mirrors
similarly immature thinking. He suggests the metaphor of a waiting
room. Children make use of the linguistic means at their disposal to
express what they wish “while ‘waiting’ to master the adult forms
(p. 168).” Lois Bloom (1970) even earlier made the point that even when the
child was limited to a two-word utterance, like “Mommy sock,” he or she
would use that utterance for a variety of meanings, such as “this is
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Mommy’s sock,” “Mommy, put on the sock,” “the doll has on Mommy’s
sock,” or “let’s find Mommy’s sock.” T he child certainly knows the
difference between these meanings, but has to use what is at his or her
disposal, depending on the adult to match the utterance to the context to
get the right meaning.
Vygotsky’s conclusion (1934b, p. 231) is unwarranted that a child’s
egocentric speech derives from “insufficient individualization of pri
mary social speech,” such that children do not separate it from social
speech and is “a correlate of the insufficient isolation of the child’s
individual consciousness from the social whole” (p. 232).
To the contrary, study after study on child language acquisition has
given us a picture of the child as an active investigator, controlling his or
her input, setting up his or her own practice drills, deciding what he or
she will learn (e.g., Brown 1973; Menyuk 1969; Kuczaj 1983). A particu
larly American experience illustrates. Children of European immigrants
have regularly failed to learn their parents’ native language despite
being raised in homes in which it was spoken regularly. T he United
States provides us with a virtual laboratory of the baby’s sense of auton
omy from social speech as represented by the languages spoken in its
home. A very common occurrence in immigrant homes was—and is—that
children as young as 2 years old make no attempt to imitate or practice a
language spoken by grandparents, or even parents.7 The fate of bilingual
ism in America shows clearly that toddlers have already separated their
individual goals from their families’. T he family language constitutes
the first social speech of the child.
In quite a different context, Cook-Gumperz and Green (1984) show the
dangers in assuming that egocentricity8 in speech causes a child’s speech
productions, such as narrating a story in what appears to be a highly
idiosyncratic way. What they found was that apparent deviations in such
narrations actually represented a first step, so to speak, in relating
stories. They examined books written for young children to see what
effect these books might have on narration, finding that children include
in their verbalizations representations of the pictures which accompa
nied the stories. Stories by children which researchers thought had no
form actually do have the form of the books read to them including the
graphic forms and their pictorial representations.
How Vygotsky’s formulations would have changed had he lived we do
not know. His conception of inner speech depended upon his beliefs
about how children learn language and he claimed that these were based
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upon experiments. Unfortunately, he did not describe them in any
detail, nor did he show explicitly how his conclusions related to his
results. In fact, he considered poems and passages from novels adequate
proof and it is these which he specifically cites in defense of his opinions.
Vygotsky (p. 213) does remain fresh in his conception of the cultural
origins of learning and how these are mediated by language learning.
That is, as the child learns language, he or she does learn strategies for
understanding as well as for speaking. For instance, Scollon and Scollon
(1981) show how Athabaskan children learn how to abstract themes from
stories as part of the child rearing practices in their culture. Ochs (1987),
based on her study of Samoan children, demonstrates that even when
one understands words in nonnative culture, one may not understand
the point of those words. She claims that even though children may
display egocentric speech, it means different things in different cultures,
going so far as to suggest that Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s sharply differing
views on egocentricity of early speech may have been because of the
differences between Russian and Swiss societies.
[15] Com m on Sense and the T h ou gh t-L an gu age Distinction.

Finally, common sense must prevail. If thought does not exist prior to
language, then how does the speaker or writer know which l e x i c a l i t e m s
(what are commonly called “words)” to choose? If, indeed, thought and
language are one and the same, we have no way to account for the words
and syntax that are selected by the speaker. Since the speaker has many
choices for any given thought or thoughts, it cannot be that the language
is prior. There has to be a step previous to selection of language forms.
Notes
1They attribute this deficit to a short term memory loss.
2 h is is actually a question of some interest. There are tales of people learning to
T
"speak schizophrenic" either because of being hospitalized for long periods with
them, or because they were nurses or orderlies. However, I can find no longitudinal
studies which confirm this. Nowadays, few patients remain in a hospital setting for
very long, so the opportunities for observing such a phenomenon may no longer be
present.
3Rather than entering these by the dates of the translations, I have opted for
this perhaps unconventional dating for the two versions. Kozulin’s translation is
substantively different from Hanfmann and Vakar’s; he has revised the text; and has
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provided his own extensive notes and preface. This preface, “Vygotsky in Context,”
and the endnotes constitute another interpretation of Vygotsky’s work. What I have
done is listed Kozulin’s lengthy prefatory essay as a separate work, which indeed it is.
This was done in order to lessen confusion between the Kozulin preface and notes
and the Vygotsky translations themselves.
4Actually, Vygotsky and Piaget both dealt with this issue. Vygotsky disagreed
with Piaget’s formulations of inner speech.
5The literature is literally loaded with examples of children’s inability even to
know what an adult is getting at. One of my favorites provided by Fromkin and
Rodman (1983, p. 333) is:
Child: Want other one spoon, Daddy.
Father: You mean, you want the other spoon?
Child: Yes, I want other one spoon, please, Daddy.
Father: Can you say “the other spoon”?
Child: Other . . . one . . . spoon.
Father: Say . . . other.
Child: Other.
Father: Spoon.
Child: Spoon.
Father: Other. . . spoon.
Child: Other. . . spoon. Now give me other one spoon?
6It is often said that autistic children do not distinguish their ego boundaries
because they confuse the words you and me. All children confuse words used in sets
like these. How they ever learn you and me correctly is a wonder. The children are
always referred to as you and the other person always refers to him or herself as I.
The child somehow has to learn to reverse these references despite the fact that they
never hear them that way. Autistic children notoriously have language learning
difficulties. We should expect that their problem with the words for first and second
reference persist longer than in other children.
7A friend of mine recently told me that he and his twin visited their grandmother
every single day of their childhood, but, since she spoke no English, they never had
any conversations with her and they really know nothing about her except for her
baking prowess. They never learned her language at all. Similarly, a Cuban emigre
acquaintance told me of the problems his son had with his father, the child’s
grandfather. It seems that the father speaks no English, and the child knows no
Spanish. When I asked why the child never learned Spanish which is spoken in the
home, the answer I got was classic, “He’s American.”
8They do not discuss this in the Vygotsian context, nor do they speak specifically
of egocentric speech. However, the deviant narrations they are investigating seem to
qualify.

Chapter Four

T H E LEVELS OF LANGUAGE
Laypersons typically confuse the written and spoken language,
assuming that the former is true language. This is a fallacy.
Spoken language is both prior to and different from writing.
Language is actually composed of interrelated levels, each with
its own rules, but each of which leaks into the other, so to speak.
Language has fuzzy borders between levels, a fact that has to be
considered in all explanations for how we use it. Here we shall
see the unsuspected complexity of even the simplest part of
language, the sound system. The problems of defining what a
word is has relevance for a great deal of research which depends
upon its results by assuming that words are self-evident entities.
Although we know a good deal about how words are created, a
definition of what a word actually is, has proven to be elusive.
[1 ] M essage an d M ean in g.

uman language is not an isomorphic system. T hat is, there is no
one-to-one correspondence between meaning and message. A human
message can equal more or less than its meaning. A speaker need overtly
say only enough for a hearer to deduce the message. In addition, any
meaning can be given in a variety of ways. T hat is, all language is
paraphrasable. T o illustrate, the preceding sentences can be paraphrased
by

H

Human language is not isomorphic, lacking any necessary exact
conjunction between the linguistic signals given and the meaning
of those signals. T h is allows a plurality of paraphrases for any one
m eaning intended.
or
T h e communication system of humans is not isomorphic resulting
in meanings not equalling the sum of the parts of the linguistic
items actually spoken as well as paraphrasability for any particular
meaning.
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In the first paraphrase, lacking any necessary. . . means “human lan
guage lacks. . . ” Here, we see that the message delivered is less than
meaning expressed in actual words and syntax. In the second paraphrase,
note that resulting actually means “the lack of isomorphism results in”
and the linguistic items actually spoken means “the linguistic items that
somebody actually speaks.”
It is because language is not an isomorphic system that linguists find
behaviorism an insufficient model for language. One cannot explain
such a system in terms of responses to stimuli. There is no way to ensure
that any given utterance will result from any particular stimulus. There
is no way to ensure that one paraphrase will be chosen over another, or,
for that matter, is there any way to predict what new combination of
words and syntax that someone can come up with to express a meaning.
[2] Language is Spoken.

This title seems like a bad pun. Of course, language is spoken, as in
“French is spoken here.” The problem is that literate people assume that
language is what resides on the printed page. Language does not reside
on the printed page. What is on the page is only an evocation of language.
Language itself is in the brain, or, if you will, in the mind.
Throughout all but the past 4000 or so years, humans have not had
written language. What they needed to remember, they remembered by
linguistic mnemonic devices. These, in short, comprise what we think of
as poetry: rhyme, assonance, alliteration, melody, strong beat, unusual
imagery. All of these can be seen to have an origin in the need for
remembering, a need especially necessary for the essentially weak,
defenseless creature homo sapiens is and was.
All of these devices aid memory by promoting an overabundance of
connections in the brain. If one forgets a line, one can access it by
recalling something that rhymed with a word in it. If one forgets one
word in an alliterative string, then recalling the others helps one fill in
the blank, so to speak. Beating out a rhythm or beginning to hum a tune
allows one to access the words that were learned to it. This is a common
occurrence when one tries to remember the words to a song which one
thinks one has forgotten. As one hums it, however, the words unfold in
snatches.
There are two reasons for mentioning this matter. T he first is to
underscore the primacy of speech. In this text, we are talking about
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speech, not writing. This is not to say that schizophrenic writing is not
germane. It is, and much that we say of speech is true mutatis mutandi of
writing, and, where appropriate, may be taken as applying to the latter.
T he second reason is that we do find schizophrenic deviations in the
use of poetic devices such as inappropriate rhyming or what seems to be
a creation of a metaphor. These can be seen as a true dysfunction in
linguistic abilities. Poetry and other figurative speech are part and
parcel of what it means to possess a language.
[3 ] Sounds and Letters.

The sounds of language are not letters. Literacy causes people to think
that real language is on the printed page, not in the head and certainly
not in the ephemeral evanescence of sound. The reverse is actually true.
Letters on a page are merely reminders of the sounds in a language. For
most of human existence, there was no writing. As with technologically
primitive peoples today, language resided in the head and in the waves
of sound produced by speakers.
Throughout this work, when we speak of sound, we refer only to oral
production. Even this disclaimer is not sufficient, because the orthogra
phy for English is a mess. T he same sound in English can be represented
by different letters. T he same letters can represent different sounds.
Sometimes two sounds are represented by one letter, such as the usual
use of < x > to stand for the sounds [ks] or [gz] as in exercise and example,
respectively. The opposite situation holds as well. One sound can be
represented by two letters, such as the digraph < sh > .
Worse yet, letter-to-sound correspondences are as close to chaos as
they can be and still function. For instance, the same sound occurs in
each of the following words represented by the boldfaced letters: should,
sugar, Cheryl, fashion, tissue, and nation. In contrast, the same letters
stand for very different sounds in head, meat, great, ear, teat, and heart.
[4] T h e Perils of the Literacy Fallacy.

It is not merely scholarly intransigence, a pedantic insistence on
details that leads me to expound on the problem of confusing language
with writing. The ramifications for research can be very great. For
instance, Brendan Maher’s (1983) analysis of schizophrenic utterances
suffers because he confounds the conventions of writing with the produc-
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tion of speech. It is important to note that, in general, M aher’s work
stands out both in breadth and depth as careful, objective, well-reasoned,
insightful, and inclusive of all relevant data. In my opinion, any explana
tion for the etiology of schizophrenic speech has to consider the evidence
Maher has presented over the past quarter century. T he experimental
protocol in Maher (1983) is a very promising one. Still his basic miscon
ceptions severely compromise his conclusions regarding schizophrenic
speech. There could be no more compelling evidence of the necessity of
understanding language as an entity in itself before discussing schizo
phrenic speech than to look at this article. It shows that nobody is
immune to erroneous preconceived notions about language.
Basically, what Maher has done is what most naive literate people do.
They treat the written language as if it were the only real language. In
this instance, he seemed unaware that commas and other punctuation
marks are an artifact of writing. Such things don’t occur in speech. They
are not pronounced. Yes, we’ve all had English teachers who have said
things like, “Put the commas in where you pronounce them” in sentences
like
1A. My oldest brother, who is a doctor, just won the lottery.
1B. After the ball was over, Lizzie took out her false teeth.
It is true that if we are actually reading these aloud before an audience,
we may drop our voices at the commas, but in normal speech no such
drop necessarily occurs. Actually, even in reading, the commas are a cue
for the reader to adopt a downward intonation contour, so that such
contours are an artifact of the writing system, not of speech practices.
There are not any comparable commas marking all of the syntactic
junctures in the sentences, even the most important.
Maher (1983) even reports a famous study by Fodor and Bever (1965)
as having committed the same fallacy, although it did not. Maher under
took a modification of this study in order to investigate his long-held
theory of an attentional deficit in schizophrenia (Maher 1972; Maher
1983, pp. 24-26).
Fodor and Bever developed an ingenious test in which subjects listened
to sentences. At various junctures within the sentences, these researchers
inserted a click. They found that subjects displaced the clicks, reporting
them as having occurred at syntactic boundaries when, in fact, they had
not. For instance, if a click was within in the middle of a clause, subjects
reported that it as having occurred instead at the boundaries of two
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constituents, such as that between the subject and predicate. For instance,
in a sentence like
2. That he was happy was evident from the way he smiled.
subjects reported the click to have occurred after happy even if, in fact, it
actually occurred on evident. This showed that people process language
by syntactic structures, not word by word. That is, in 2, listeners grouped
“That he was happy” together and then “was evident from the way he
smiled.” They reported the click to have occurred at the boundary of the
subject and the predicate, the major constituents of the sentence.
Maher reports the Fodor and Bever experiment erroneously, saying
that a click moved to “a nearby comma or period.” Commas and periods
are not in speech. They cannot be heard. Furthermore, they do not
invariantly mark out syntactic structures. No comma or period can occur
anywhere in 2 above, except at the end of the entire sentence. Certainly,
there is no comma or other punctuation allowed at the juncture at which
the click was perceived.
In fact, commas cannot be used to separate any of the major constituents
of the core sentence: subjects may not be separated from their predicates,
and verbs may not be separated from their complements, whether these
be direct and indirect objects or predicate nominatives or adjectives. In
the following, a forward (/) slash indicates the major constituent break
between the subject and predicate, a backwards slash (\) indicates the
break between a transitive verb and object, and an asterisk (*) separates
an intransitive verb and its complement. Notice that no commas or other
punctuation can be used where constituent breaks occur:
3A. T he little old man over there/has become*senile.
3B. The little old man over there/broke\his leg
No matter how long we make the subject or the predicate, still no
internal punctuation can occur. For instance
3C. T he little old man over there whom I was telling you about the
other day while we were at lunch/finally became*senile which was
evidenced by his forgetting to let the cat out or the dog in all week.
3D. The little old man over there whom you met last Tuesday and
thought was so wonderful/unfortunately broke\the leg which had
already been injured in the Battle of the Bulge during World War II.
Another consequence of the confusion between speech and writing
causes Maher (1983, p. 25) to make a corollary error, saying that “Ordinary
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speech does not, of course, include explicit utterance of syntax markers.”
Actually, it does. All human language relies on syntax. It is syntax that
allows us to signal and comprehend the relationships between the words
in a sentence and between sentences themselves. For instance, in “John
loves Mary” we know that John has the emotion and Mary is its object
because of the word order. This relationship can be signalled in other
ways as well, as by the paraphrase, “Mary is loved by John.” In this
instance, the markers of the passive (a form of the verb be followed by a
verb plus the participial ending -ed) tells us that Mary is the recipient.
In some languages special prefixes or suffixes on nouns indicate such
relations. In Latin, for instance, if Mary is the one loved, then she would
be referred to as Mariam, but if she did the loving, her name would be
stated as Maria.
Any analysis of spoken or written language must rest upon syntax, and
for that, punctuation is not a reliable guide. Nor is the written language.
T he unsuitability of orthographic conventions for analyzing syntax is
well illustrated by the fragment above. During my high school years in
the 1950s, the proscription against punctuating a phrase like this was so
strong that we received an automatic F for writing fragments of this sort.
Nowadays, this is considered a justifiable fragment. In terms of modern
syntactic theory, we can say that this is justifiable because any native
speaker would recognize that it represents “T he written language is not a
reliable guide to syntax.” By omitting the repeated material, and signal
ling that fact with nor, we have actually effected superior cohesion, as
demonstrated in a subsequent chapter. The corollary to this proposition
is that any analysis which does not recognize the syntactic origins of
language production is suspect.
For instance, in the same work, Maher presents a model of speech
based upon word associations. This is a shaky base for an analysis,
because word associations have little to do with ordinary speech produc
tion (Chaika 1974, 1981, 1982a,c; Chapter 5,6,7). Word associations have a
great deal to do with slips of the tongue, as when one substitutes refrigerator
for stove or up for down, and we can show a correlations between these
and some schizophrenic errors in word selection. What is deviant about
much schizophrenic speech is the fact of associating. Normal speech is
not produced according to word associations.
One can find passages in normal speech in which a word association
seems to have produced a subsequent word. Maher provides several
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examples of normals involuntarily punning in this way. For instance
(1983, p. 32) he gives
4. A stable economy requires continual reinvestment in industrial
plant. Tax reductions now are a case of locking the stable door after

the horse has gone.
In contrast to schizophrenic associational chaining, the repetition of
stable is not simply the case of uttering the word once and then having
that instigate the next use of it. The second occurrence lies several words
away from the first in its own separate grammatical sentence. Moreover,
the second occurrence is embedded in an aphorism, and is subordinated
to and increases the sense of the former.
Speech is not produced one word at a time. We have known that since
Lashley (1951). Fromkin (1973) showed conclusively that we plan our
utterances before producing them. Although we are not conscious of it,
we select our syntactic vehicle and the words which we are going to use in
advance of our saying them. In Chapter 5 we shall see that there is no
sharp dividing line between syntax and semantics, but at the same time,
relations between them are arbitrary. For instance, we can and do have
two words which share meaning, words which might elicit each other in
word association testing, but which cannot appear in the same kinds of
syntactic structures. An example is the syntactic difference allowed by
the verbs diminish and deplete
Our water supplies are diminishing.
We are depleting our water supplies.
Our water supplies are being depleted.
*Our water supplies are depleting.
An asterisk indicates that the sentence is not grammatical in the sense
that speakers feel that it is wrong in some way involving sentence structure.
The verb deplete is transitive. It must have a direct object either after it
or as the subject of the passive are being depleted. Testing for associations
between individual words does not truly reflect the entire language
process. Except for slips of the tongue, it does not give us adequate
information upon which to explain errors in speech impaired populations.
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[5] W h at is a Rule?

Language is not a unitary phenomenon. It is actually a set of interrelated
systems, each with its own logic and each with its own rules. Salzinger et
al. (1978) suggest alternative words like principles or concepts, but these do
not sufficiently capture the regularity of innumerable processes in lan
guage on any of its levels. Then, too, they lend unwanted connotations,
connotations which I feel would obscure the conclusions of this study.
In some quarters there is a real stigma attached to the word rule. It
touches a raw nerve, especially in behavioral psychologists (Mowrer
1980). Mowrer (1980, pp. x-xi) speaks of a “strange revolution instigated
by Chomsky” (boldface mine). T he very word instigate shows Mowrer’s
ad hominem approach to Chomsky’s argumentation, as does his speaking
of Chomsky’s theorizing “as a strange revolution.” When a word becomes
so loaded with far-reaching connotations that it bars reasoned argument,
avoiding it is preferable. Nevertheless, it will be used in the subsequent
discussion, but only because we are lacking a better term. Certainly,
Chomsky’s own bitter sarcasm towards behaviorists has elicited such
responses, but Chomsky’s arguments are intellectually serious. One need
not concur with Chomsky to acknowledge the multitude of empirical
studies which have effectively demonstrated that behaviorism is not a
viable explanation of even the most ordinary language behavior.
T he important thing to remember here is that this work is not an
apologia for Chomsky or for his followers. It is strictly empirical, and
one to which Occam’s razor has been applied. On the one hand, it is not
oriented towards behaviorism in the Skinnerian sense, because that
doesn’t explain the linguistic data that I have gathered or that is in the
literature. On the other hand, Chomsky’s works have never explained
naturalistic linguistic data, normal or not.
In this discussion, rule is used in a weak sense, referring to whatever
processes we use to encode and decode words, sentences, and discourses.
It also may refer to whatever it is that makes us feel that a certain
utterance is wrong in the sense of “abnormal” or “deviant.” This inter
sects with what Chomsky called the internalized linguistic competency of
native speakers of a language. In short, we are faced with the paradox
that we can’t necessarily define what a rule is and what its form is, but,
empirically, we know that there have to be rules. I make no claim as to
the form or forms of such knowledge, either that used to create, to
understand, or to “feel” that something is deviant. I am not talking about
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quasimathematical rules which account for all of the grammatical sen
tences of the language nor am I talking about Chomsky’s distinction
between c o m pe t e n c e and p e r f o r m a n c e , which, as we have seen, is
fraught with complications.
I am mindful that the very mention of the word rule or of competence
versus performance in language causes scholars to derail, to get into
squabbles over what is or isn’t a rule, if there are rules, what is or isn’t
competence and whether it relates to performance. It would be too
disruptive of our central concern to get caught up into such arguments,
so the terms rule, competence and performance are used here only in the
vaguest sense that a layperson would have of them: THE SOMETHING
THAT ACCOUNTS FOR OUR LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR AND THAT CAUSES US
TO EVALUATE LINGUISTIC PRODUCTIONS AS BEING PATHOLOGICALLY
DEVIANT OR AS BEING NORMAL ERROR, On this even the most diehard
behaviorists have to agree: that they have been attracted to the study of
psychotic speech because of its weirdness which even they feel requires
special interpretation. Something is distinctly wrong with that speech. If
it weren’t, they wouldn’t be trying to explain it. T h e dissection of the
kinds of deviance that occur in psychotic speech im plicitly rests upon
inner rules.
We certainly know when we hear or read sentences incorrect for our
language. By this, I am not referring only to correctness in terms of
politeness, such as not using double negatives in English but to sentences
like
5A. I am here since six years.
5B. T hat dog all the time here comes.
In the absence of their being language-specific rules, there is no way to
account for our judgm ent that such sentences are incorrect. If language
is not governed by rules, how can we say that a language does or does not
allow certain phrasings? How can we say that these sentences are not
correct in English?
A clear example of a syntactic rule is what is often called the “dummy
do” or “dosupport” rule in English. In order to make a question or
negative in these tenses, one must use an empty auxiliary do. For instance,
6A. John goes every day. (present goes)
6B. Does John go every day?
6C. John does not go every day.
6D. John went every day. (preterit went)
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6E. Did John go every day?
6F. John did not go every day.
T he d o ’s and d id ’s here add no meaning. T h eir sole function is to fill
the slot that an auxiliary verb would occupy if there was one in the
sentence, as in
7A. Has John gone every day?
7B. John has not gone every day.
Examples such as these show clearly that language is governed by
rules, many of which laypersons are not even aware of using. Language
rules can be flexible, but can still be rules. J.R . Martin (1987, pp. 65-76)
argues against this idea. His argument centers on the definition of the
word rule itself. Since he has to admit that language contains regularities
which must be obeyed if one is to be understood, he says that language is
governed by co n v en tio n s (pp. 77-82) which people abide by in order to
get their messages across. These work because “the speaker wants to
signal the audience and the audience wants to be signaled” (p. 82).
Surely, this is not necessarily the case. People do talk to themselves for
a variety of reasons, and when they do, they don’t usually utter gibberish
or deformed sentences. Those who do are considered to have a pathologi
cal condition. Then, too, in social situations, how often does one find
oneself listening without really wanting to? Or even speaking when one
wishes not to? In lexicon, sound system, sentence patterns, and discourses,
certain words and structures must be used, others may be, and yet others
cannot be used at all. For instance, Kreckel (1981, p. 204) found that, in
assigning stress in a sentence, there is enough agreement between speakers
to show that “ . . . there exist phonological regularities which are part of
the linguistic knowledge of naive, native speakers,” but, within those
rules, “ . . . the speaker has more than one option . . . ” in stress placement,
according to the pragmatic function or for “ . . . distributing semantic
weight.”
Native speakers of a language know ill-formed sentences when they
meet them. They can tell if a speaker has made a mistake in the structure
of a sentence or, even, a discourse. Mistake, here, does not mean “solecism,”
but the sort of error which is made in speech pathologies like aphasia or
schizophrenia. T he following errors in applying do-support were made
by an aphasic and a schizophrenic, respectively:
8A. [aphasic patient] I know you’re talking, but I not talking you
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like I can talk you ’bout. (Buckingham , Whitaker, and Whitaker,
1979, p. 344)
8B. I still not have the thought pattern. . . . (courtesy of Dr. Bonnie
Spring)
Notice that both of these violate the do-support ru le seen in section 6
above. Laypersons, even illiterate ones, readily apprehend slips of the
tongue, errors made by foreign speakers and children. All such recogni
tion rest upon a rule-governed basis in language production. People also
readily discrim inate between well-formed and deviant discourse. Every
day terms for evaluating discourse, such as saying it is rambling, incoherent,
or irrational presume violation of rules for m aking sentences cohere into
a discourse (Chapter 6).
As early as the 1920s, T h e Prague School linguists presented by
Vachek (1964) exam ined the mutual dependence of semantics and syntax
as well as correlations between phonology and the other levels of language,
and, as a result, realized that discourse requirem ents determ ined the
gram mar of the individual sentence. In effect, they showed that the
discourse itself has a gram m ar (Chapters 7 and 11).

[6 ] R u les a n d S trategies.

It is never the case that only one rule can be chosen to deliver a given
message. T h e m eaning of any given utterance usually cannot be shown
to inhere only in the actual syntactic rules of its sentences, even when we
try to com bine those with the m eanings of the words used. Rules exist at
all the levels of language, including the discourse level, but com prehen
sion also depends heavily on the interaction between syntactic and
lexical choice, the discourse itself and nonlinguistic strategies. T h ese can
be isolated and can be shown to be orderly. In essence, cospeakers both
rely upon and control strategies along with linguistic rules in order to
convey or yield m eaning.
Speaking only of nondeviant, norm al speech, Sanders (1987, p. 26)
explains that speech production is INTELLIGENT ACTIVITY. By this he
means that there are elem ents which one can fashion in different ways to
achieve one’s goal. T h ere are always alternatives. Also, there is no guar
antee that one will get the results one wants by any given organization of
such elem ents although there are connections between what one wants,
what one has chosen, and the result one gets. T herefore, despite the lack
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of a sure result, one can calculate the possibilities of what can happen.
Sanders includes one other characteristic of intelligent action: there are
elements which must be arranged according to constraints.
He avoids calling these constraints “rules,” possibly to avoid a possible
linkage with Chomsky’s insistence on the rule-governed nature of language,
an insistence which limited the linguist’s domain to a very narrow
domain of inquiry, one dominated by mathematical formulations of
rules divined by syntacticians dipping into their own intuitions about
language. This method necessarily entailed context-free interpretations
of sentences. Chomsky originally insisted that the task of the linguist was
to find context-free rules that would generate all and only the sentences
possible in a given language. In practice, this has proven impossible.
Chomsky’s conception of transformational grammars is still not dead,
having been revised to provide for the context-sensitivity of language
(p. 123) while still affirming its context-free nature (Berwick and Weinberg
1986). In my opinion, this is an untenable position. All language is
context-dependent. There is no way to achieve meaning in speech or
writing without reference to context. That is the nature of the beast.
[7] Syntax and Context.

Quirk and Svartvik (1966) investigated the degree to which native
speakers of English agreed upon their judgments of what is grammatical
in the Chomskyan sense. They found that there was more disagreement
than one would expect given the claims of transformational grammars.
However, they pointed out (p. 101) that such lack of agreement on
sentences was partially an artifact of the test itself. Had they provided a
context for the sentences, their results might have been different. They
quote Dwight Bolinger’s dictum that “stripping a sentence to its minimum
. . . is a risky test of grammaticality; it often falsifies the potentialities
of the construction.”
More recently, Fauconnier (1985) lays the blame for ambiguity on
uncertainties in the discourse situation itself, not in the syntax or lexicon.
Wisely, studies of the accuracy of judgments of schizophrenic speech
have been based upon transcripts of connected speech. T his explains the
high interjudge reliability. Context-free grammars based upon individ
ual decisions of grammaticality rest on shaky foundations. Context is the
key word. That is what was missing in T -G theory. More recently some
attempts have been made to make rules context-sensitive, but even so, we
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are still faced with the abstract set of transformations—only now they
include the context-sensitive rules, which are also both abstract and
unproven.
[8] T h e G ram m ar of the Discourse.

Discourse itself has its own grammar, one that is partially autonomous,
separate from sentence grammars, with its own phonological, lexical,
and syntactic rules (Carlson 1983, p. 150; Sanders and Wirth 1985; Seuren
1985; Fillmore 1985; Halliday 1985; Ferrara 1985). Different kinds of
discourses have their own rules of well-formedness. Gerald Prince (1982),
for instance, has written a grammar of narrative structure and Livia
Polanyi (1985) shows that conversational storytelling is constrained by
culture-specific rules which are comparable to dialect differences in
syntax. Phonologically, intonation contours mark out syntactic structures,
prominent focus, and such paralinguistic messages as surprise, anger,
and disgust (Carlson 1983, pp. 151), a point elaborated on as well by
Kreckel (1981), Sanders (1987), and Lyons (1977). Sanders (1987, p. 11)
likens the speaker’s choice of what to say next in a discourse to “ . . . the
selection of lexical entries” in the sentence. Just as one chooses a word in
a sentence according to sentential constraints, so one chooses the syntax
of the sentence in the discourse.
Therefore, even if individual sentences taken out of context are wellformed, the discourse within which they are embedded may not be.
VanDijk (1977) calls the level of phrases and sentences the MICROSTRUCTURE, as opposed to the discourse or text, which is the MACROSTRUCTURE. In the circumstance that microstructures by themselves
show no deviance, but the discourse does, one would have to conclude
that such sentences are deviantly produced because they do not properly
form a macrostructure. Just as the meaning of a sentence is ultimately
a function of the discourse within which it is embedded, so is the
appropriateness of a sentence.
In actual usage, there is no way to separate sentences from their
context and no way to judge well-formedness without considering both.
Deviance at the macrostructural level comprises disruption of linguistic
abilities. For instance, each of the sentences in example 9 below is
well-formed, yet the entire is bizarre. In the original presentation of
these data (Chaika 1974; Chapter 1), there were three utterances com
posed of gibberish interspersed throughout this monologue. Here, they
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have been omitted in order to prevent a contamination effect. Thus, the
following monologue has actually been normalized to mitigate the effect
of deviance, but the entire remains as deviant as before.
9. Good mornin’ everybody.
I don’t know what that is
Oh! It’s that thorazine. I forgot I had it.
T h at’s Lulubelle.
T his one’s Jean. J-E -A -N
I’ll write that down.
Speeds up the metabolism.
Makes your heart bong.
Tranquilizes you if you’ve got the metabolism I have.
I have distemper just like cats do ’cause that’s what we all are,
felines.
Siamese cat balls.
They stand out.
I had a cat, a Manx, still around somewhere.
You’ll know him when you see him.
His name is G I Joe, he’s black and white.
I had a little goldfish too like a clown.
On the microlinguistic level, the above phrases and sentences are
well-formed, but they fail on the macrolinguistic level, and that alone
establishes their deviance. Judgments of deviance depend as much on
the fit of the sentence to the discourse as they do on the fit of phrases and
words to sentences.
Each genre of discourse has its own set of rules. Constraints on narra
tives in our culture, for instance, may not operate on sermons, lectures,
making small-talk, or communication of factual information (e.g., Goffman
1981; Chafe 1980; Chaika 1989, pp. 98-192). Narratives are governed by
temporal ordering whereas sermons are not. Sermons require an overt
moral whereas narratives do not. Such constraints on the macrostructure
operate analogously to the rules for micro-structures like phrases and
sentences. Additionally, there is cross-cultural variation in what is allow
able in a genre and even in what is necessary, what must be included and
what may not be (Labov 1969, 1972; Scollon and Scollon 1981; Tannen
1984; Jarrett 1984; Chaika 1989, pp. 98-192.) Violation of such crosscultural constraints are more likely to be perceived as rude or pointless
than as bizarre.
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[9] R ules to C reate.

Rules on each level of language aid in our ability to be creative. Every
language has within it perm issible sound combinations, some that have
not yet been used, hence can be used to create new words. For instance, I
could invent a game called “Bilotec” or a product called “M arfem.”
T here could even be a new theory of psychiatry, called “Logology” (the
science of words). Sentence and discourse-forming rules allow even
greater creativity, albeit creativity constrained by rules. Frequently, if
not most always, speakers eith er use old words in new contexts to force
new meanings rather than make up brand-new words, although that, too,
does happen. Alternatively, compounding is used, as occurred when the
first person referred to stealing as ripping off. A third avenue of creativity
is to borrow words from another language. T h is is typically done because
of admiration for another culture, as when Latin and Greek words were
adopted for the budding sciences of the 17th and 18th centuries. Native
words could have been created, but the Classical languages were associated
with scholarship. Neologisms and gibberish don’t fail because they’re
creative. Language is structured to foster creativity. T hey fail because
they are not used so that cospeakers can apply rules or strategies for
decoding. T h is is a direct result of language’s not being an isomorphic
system.

[1 0] N o tatio n al V ariations.

Why insist on the word rule? Why not use M artin’s term and simply
call them conventions, or, as Sanders does, call them constraints? Why not
refer to expectations in discourse? These are n o ta tio n a l v a r ia t io n s ,
different words for the same phenomena. T h e problem is that these
three terms, although referring to the same phenomena, imply that
adherence is not necessary, when it clearly is. Is it mere constraint,
expectation, or convention that prevents
9. A: Where did you go last night?
B: No
9C. A: Are you coming?
D: I wore a yellow tulip.
Such matters as adverb placement not using the progressive form with
stative verbs or the use of do when negating verbs are obligatory. In
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verbs are obligatory. In the same way, one can’t answer a question asking
where by either a yes or no. T he where demands a location or an “I don’t
know.” These are grammatical error on the level of the discourse itself.
These aren’t just conventions, expectations, or constraints. Native
speakers know that 9 A -D are wrong, and can be righted by following the
rules for adverb placement or verb conjugation. T he errors in 9 A -D are
discourse errors, and anyone, even a quite young child would be likely to
say of 9B, something like “You can’t answer that question with ‘no’ ” or of
9D “You can’t answer that with ‘I wore a yellow tulip.’ ” One might,
instead, say something like, “What kind of an answer is that?” to either
9B or 9D. This is another way of saying, “You can’t answer that question
with . . . ” T he very normal and usual choice of can’t indicates the exis
tence of tacit rules. It takes no particular training or expertise for people
to recognize and be able to correct a wide variety of linguistic errors.
[11] T h e Levels of Language.

As part of its lack of isomorphism, language consists of layers of
interrelated rules. Each layer has its own rules, and rules which connect
it to the others. ph o n e tic rules, those indicating pronunciation of
individual sounds, form ph o n o lo g ic a l rules. These in turn form
MORPHEMES which form le x ic a l ITEMS which form sen ten ces which in
turn form d isco u rses .
[12] Phonetics, Phonem es, and M orphem es.

A brief consideration of the intricacies of the sounds of language
illuminates both the rule governed nature of language and the FUZZY
bo rd ers that are also its nature. Beyond such enlightenment, phonol
ogy illuminates for us what must be accounted for in any theory of
psycholinguistics. T he level of phonetics is the most describable, most
limited part of language, but its complexity is nevertheless boggling. In
fact, even such apparently simple matters as articulating specific sounds
is loaded with intricacies unsuspected by the novice in linguistics.
One would expect that schizophrenics suffering from severe speech
disruption would show difficulties even at this level. Unfortunately, our
phonetic record of schizophrenic articulations is almost nil. Over the
years, the few researchers who have discussed gibberish have not been
equipped to make phonetic transcriptions so that their discussions have
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been little more than vague impressionistic descriptions. Laffal (1965,
p. 85), for instance, speaks of a patient who “launched into gibberish that
sounded like a mixture of Chinese and Polish, with a distinct conversa
tional prosody.” Why Laffal attributed the gibberish to these quite differ
ent languages is not clear, nor does he tell us if the patient was a
bilingual in these or any other languages. Robertson and Shamsie (1958)
also attributed the gibberish their patient produced as belonging to
different languages. If gibberish has sounds that occur in a language not
native to the speaker, or one not known by the speaker, then that would
indicate a deficit in the phonetic and phonemic systems. These are the
lowest levels of linguistic structure, those most automatic; still they are
highly sophisticated and intricately rule-governed phenomena. It is not
inconceivable that severely SD patients would make errors at this level.
No two languages share the same phonetic and phonemic systems; errors
can be made in these systems.
Unfortunately, except for my own transcriptions of gibberish (Chaika
1974; Chaika and Alexander 1986), there are no transcriptions of reported
gibberish. My own transcriptions do not reveal disruption at these levels.
Holzman et al. (1986, p. 361) claim that “It is noteworthy that as the
exemplar group of psychotic patients, schizophrenic patients do not
violate these phonotactic rules.” They do not cite corroborating studies.
Looking at the pattern of linguistic disintegration, one would expect
very little disruption at this level, but it is possible that some patients
could regress to the point of phonetic and phonemic error. Laffal’s and
Robertson and Shamsie’s impressions that they were hearing foreign
language gibberish might arise from such regression unless the patients
in question were m ultilingual and their gibberish could be traced to
their other languages. T here has not been sufficient transcription of
gibberish and neologisms by trained phoneticians to verify whether or
not disruption occurs at this level. If and when such studies are under
taken and even if it is found that schizophrenics do not ever make
phonotactic errors, there is still plenty of evidence at the other levels of
language that structural disruption does occur in schizophrenia. T he
rest of this chapter is devoted to showing these disruptions. In addition,
it will be argued that analysis in terms of linguistic disruption does not
posit factors that we cannot observe and does not demand adherence to
any particular psychodynamic theory.
T he above discussion shows the importance of having a basic under
standing of how phonetic and phonemic systems work. Even when lan-
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guages share a sound, it won’t necessarily be pronounced the same way in
each language. This occurs for two reasons. T he first is that any sound
can be articulated somewhat differently. For instance, in English, we
pronounce a [t] by placing our tongue tip on the alveolar ridge behind
the top teeth, but many European languages do so by placing the tongue
tip behind the spot where the upper and lower teeth meet which is where
English places the tongue to make a [0], th in thing. Different languages
also hold each sound for a different length of time. American English
does not hold consonsants as long as some other languages.
Another reason for the impression that gibberish might be in a foreign
language has to do with another complexity in sound systems: the
PHONEME. Each sound we think we hear is actually a group of sounds. In
American English, for instance, the PHONEMES /p/, /t/, and /k/ are
actually a spir a ted before stressed vowels as in pill, till and kill. T his can
be felt by pronouncing these words holding a finger in front of the lips.
A puff of air will be felt. No puff, or a much weaker one, will be felt when
pronouncing spill, still and skill, as they are not aspirated if they follow an
/s/ or occur at the end of a word, as in spill, still, skill, rap, rat, and rack.
Additionally, in American English (but not British), intervocalic /t/ and
/d/ are both pronounced alike, as a [D], the medial consonants heard in
both betting and b ed d in g which are pronounced alike. Disparity in pho
netic rules across languages accounts for misperception of sounds in the
foreign language. This, of course, is what causes us all to have foreign
accents in our nonnative languages.
What this all means is that if a patient who is a monolingual native
speaker produces neologisms and gibberish that sound like a foreign
language, their speech may be so disrupted that they are misapplying
phonetic and phonemic rules of their language. So far, there is no hard
evidence of this occurring, but, so far, to my knowledge, no phonetician
or linguist has transcribed large amounts of gibberish. Harry Whitaker, a
neurolinguist, says that there are aphasics with what he calls the foreign
accent syndrome as they misapply phonemic rules so that they sound
foreign. It may also be that modem practices of medication for psychotics forestall such a complete disruption of speech that even the
phonetic and phonemic systems disintegrate. If a patient is found whose
gibberish shows such disintegration, not only is it caused by the most
profound disruption of speech possible, it is not the sort of thing one can
control. People are unaware of the intricacies of phonetic and phonemic
rules until they are introduced to them by courses in linguistics, and the
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rules are so below the level of awareness, that such matters are very
difficult to learn and next to impossible to manipulate.
To complicate matters, what we hear as separate sounds on the phone
mic level may become one sound during certain word-forming processes
known as m o r p h o p h o n e m ic s . For instance, /s/ and /t/ are different
sounds as in sat and tat. T hey are phonemically distinct. However, in sets
of words like idiot -idiocy, the [t] alternates with [s] T h e < c > in idiocy is
pronounced as an [s], but we still perceive idiocy as being formed from
idiot with a suffix that indicates “state of being an idiot” (Chomsky and
H alle 1968). Examples of morphophonemic regularity can be multiplied
logarithmically. T hink of alternations of the actual sounds in criticcriticize, m usic-m usician, persuade-persuasive, and acquire-acquisition. Some
times, as in the latter two examples, the sound change is indicated in the
spelling. At others, as in the previous examples, it is not indicated. Still,
we have no particular trouble alternating the final [k] in critic with the [s]
in criticize. All languages are subject to such alternations in their word
creation systems. T h e miracle is not that some patients with disrupted
speech do produce gibberish but that there is not more disruption at
these levels as they are fraught with complexities.
These examples alone show that language is neither perceived nor
created by any simple equation of stimulus and response. They also
show that we do not have a list of forms in our heads from which we draw
when we speak. T here is probably a good evolutionary reason for this.
Com m unication would be hindered greatly if speakers had to scan
through the enormous lists of words in their lexicons every time they
wanted to say something, conversation would be considerably slowed. It
would be slowed even more when, in the heat of talk, they first selected
one word, say an adjective, and then decided to recast their sentence so
that the same meaning has to be achieved by the related form of a verb,
as in
• He gets red —u hh—reddens when Lola says, “h i!”
• Try to make it prettier —uhh—beautify it
• I hate to be critic . . . u hh—criticize.
If language were not rule-governed, such switching of morphologicallyrelated words would entail scanning the lexicon until one came upon the
related word. Furthermore, it would be highly inefficient to store each
form with a common root word separately. That would take a great deal
more “brain space” than does applying rules to sets of words. Also, if we
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store critic-criticize holistically as two separate forms, why do we have
entire sets of words which follow the same rule? If there were no rules,
that would be the most inefficient system of all.
Certain schizophrenic errors can be explained as failure to apply
morphophonemic rules. In fact, the schizophrenic data show that such
rules exist. T he following response came from one patient:
10A. I am being help with the food and the medicate . . .
10B. You have to be able to memory the process. . .
10C. . . . to open up the old testament and start to memory it.
Each of these errors was repeated in the monologue. Each boldfaced
word fails morphologically by failing to add the appropriate derivational
m o r ph em es , those which change words from one part of speech to the
other. T he patient has not added the -ion morpheme to turn the verb to
its corresponding noun. He has failed to convert medicate into medication.
Note that the final [t] sound in medicate turns to the sound represented
by < s h > in our orthography in medication, so that this failure represents
a morphophonemic one as well as a morphological one, and in 10B and
C, he failed to change m em ory to memorize. It is not the case that the
patient has had a general failure in syntactic rules because his word
order and marking of syntax like the noun determiner the correctly. We
can explain the deviation in 10 A-C only by referring to the morphonemic rules of noun formation from Latinate verbs. This argument is
bolstered by the fact that his syntactic failures devolve upon in flec tio n a l
m o r ph em es : failure to put the preterit ending of help in 10A and the
possessive in
10D . . . to speak and think in the lord tongue
These inflectional morphemes are also governed by morphophonemic rules. The preterit ending is variably pronounced as [t], [d], or [Id]
depending on the last sound of the verb. Consider the pronunciation of
this morpheme in “picked, played, and lifted.” They are all spelled the
same, but pronounced differently. The possessive is variably pronounced
as [z], [s], and [Iz], as in “lord’s, patient’s, and Tess’s.” Again, the spelling
gives no clue. The patient fluctuated between omitting verb and noun
morphemes and not. Given the fact that these rules are among the most
every-day ordinary ones in the language, this argues for a generally
impaired ability to apply morphemic rules.

The Levels of Language

93

In other instances, as we have seen, a patient forms recognizable
morphemes into neologisms like puterience and plausity.
[13] W ords.

Many researchers have attempted to find a schizophrenic deficit on
the level of the word, basing their research completely upon their con
ception of what a word is. This is natural, but it can also lead to invalid
experiments and fallacious conclusions. In order to illustrate this, we
must consider the question, “What is a word?”
We all know that we form speech from words, that we give our word,
and that we have words for things. In practice, however, it has proven
remarkably difficult to come up with an all-encompassing definition of
word. Phonetically, the distinction between the level of the word and the
sentence is frequently obscured because inter-word phonological rules
do get applied to phrases, as when we speak of “coffee to go.” Typically,
we pronounce the /t/ in to as a [D] in this expression. T he opposite also
occurs: sentence intonation may be applied to a word, as in “Coffee?”
The rising intonation gives this the force of a full sentence, such as “Does
anybody want some coffee?” Actually, if the full syntactic form of the
question is given, the intonation is usually like that of a statement with
the voice dropping at the end of the sentence.
Orthographically, for the European languages at least, we frequently
think of a word as a group of letters surrounded by a space. T his was not
ever thus. Medieval manuscripts, for instance, crowded as many letters
as possible onto a page. Consequently, such niceties as spaces between
words were not provided. So ingrained is this concept that one some
researchers have simply assumed that this is how a word is defined. For
instance, Hart and Payne (1973) taped interviews with schizophrenics,
aiming for 500 word discourse. These researchers counted as a word “a
group of letters not containing a space which is preceded by and followed
by a space which corresponds to a word listed in a dictionary.” Dictionaries
vary greatly in their listings of words, so they are hardly a foolproof
source (p. 645). They say that they excluded “letter groups” such as “uh.”
These are not letter groups. They don’t even appear in writing, unless
the writing purports to be a representation of speech.
Hart and Payne report that they had to prompt most patients to get
the quota of 500 words, leading one to question how natural the resulting
data were. In any event, eliciting a 500-word corpus from each subject is
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an impossible task, even if one has a foolproof definition for word which
as the next section shows, we do not. In any event, the researchers had a
typist transcribe the tapes so that the Type-Token Ratio (T T R ) could be
ascertained. This is the ratio of the number of different words used to the
total number of words in the sample. T T R has been used as a measure of
cohesion, but it fails because one need not repeat the same word to effect
cohesion. One can use its synonym or a phrase which means the same
thing. In fact, in Chapter 6 we shall see that repetitions of a word or even
its synonyms can impair cohesion drastically.
In order to get the T T R , there has to be an accurate word count, of
course. As is true of every other study that I have ever seen utilizing a
T T R , Hart and Payne do not seem aware of any of the difficulties in
their procedure. For instance, does one count the sequences like have to
or want to as two words or one? These are certainly pronounced as one,
e.g., “hafta” and “wanna.” They certainly function as one as well, being
verb auxiliaries, part of a large system known as CATENATIVE auxiliaries.
Should we count contractions like can’t, won’t, th ey ’ve, or they’ll as one
word or two? Is won’tcha two words or three? Given misspellings like
< should of > for should have, we certainly know that some even highly
educated native speakers aren’t sure of what the elements in a contrac
tion actually consist of. This, too, is part of the fuzzy border phenomena.
Worse yet for T T R data, consider pronouns which refer to long noun
phrases, such as the it in
11. Max bought the big old Victorian house on the corner. It
needed a lot of work.
Does this it count as one word? Or does it count for the entire phrase
which it replaces, “the big old Victorian house on the comer.” There’s
another problem in 11: is a lot o f three words or one? Phonologically, it is
usually counted as one: “alotta.”
Even as a definition for the written word the “space surrounding the
word” test doesn’t work. For example, consider words like hardhearted,
hard-hitting, hard hit, and hardihood. T he English orthographic system is
notoriously inconsistent in applying hyphens to some compounds, writing
others as one word, and still others as two. How, then, does one reliably
count what a word is simply by counting those surrounded by a space the
typist has inserted?
Regardless of the written conventions, we can tell that words are
compounded by the fact that there is a special stress pattern in com-
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pound words. This is realized by the rise and fall of the voice, as well as
the length of the vowel. Try saying the pairs greenhouse vs green house,
blackboard vs black board. Notice that if you say safe house in the sense of a
hideaway operated by the police for the protection of witnesses, you get
the same rise and fall that you do for greenhouse and blackbird. If, instead
you are speaking of a house which has been well-constructed, it is
pronounced with the same patterns as green house and black bird, but the
same spelling is used whether safe and house are being used as a com
pound or as two separate words. T he writing is not as good a guide to
compounding as the spoken sound patterns.
In English (and many but not all languages), part of our feeling of
what constitutes a word derives from our grammatical morphemes such
as plurals and tense markers. The thing that we put these morphemes on
is what we consider a word, so that in roses and played, we feel that the
words involved are rose and play, both of which can stand alone with no
endings. In contrast, the vagaries of the English possessive play havoc
with this concept of a word. Notice the way English allows a possessive to
be put upon an entire phrase, such as
T he woman next door’s sister . . .
T he guy who I dated last year’s car.. . .
As awkward as these are in writing, they are commonly used in
speech. Some are used even in formal writing, such as
T he Queen of England’s jewels.
Therefore, the definition of a word as the formation which can take
inflectional endings fails.
Cross-linguistically, the problem of what a word is is even more
vexatious. In some languages, however, there are few “stand-alones.” For
instance, note the Swahili-English equivalences:
•
•
•
•

atanipenda “he will like me”
atatupenda “he will like us”
tutampenda “we will like him”
unamsumbua “you are annoying him” (data from Gleason 1955)

Most English speakers would agree that each of the above glosses is
composed of four words, the pronoun subject, auxiliary, verb, and pro
noun object. T he pronouns and the auxiliary are g r a m m a tica l w ords ,
also known as fu n ctio n w ords , and the verbs are full le x ic a l item s
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have to be placed on lexical items according to the rules of that particular
language.
T he corresponding forms to our four-word sentences look strangely
like one word in Swahili. Whoever collected these data wrote the Swahili
forms so that they appear as one word. In fact, anthropologists who
collected languages which to us are exotic have reported that there are
languages in which there are no words as we know them. Rather, what we
would think of as a phrase or sentence, those languages treated as a word.
In languages which are declined like Russian, there are far fewer
words that stand alone than in a language like English. Russian, being a
highly inflected language, requires words to have endings on them
which tell how they are being used in a sentence. English conveys such
messages largely by word order. Therefore, English speakers think of
Russian words, nouns, for instance, as roots to which inflectional mor
phemes are bound.
An even more fallacious concept of words is that they are some kind of
fixed entity. Bleuler’s belief that the glossomanic chaining of schizo
phrenics results from associative loosening rests upon such an assumption,
as does Bannister’s (1960, 1962) theory that schizophrenics fail to use
constructs as fixed points. By “constructs” Bannister (1960, p. 135)
apparently means “words.” Bleuler’s, Bannister’s and Chapman, Chapman,
and Daut’s (1976) explanations based upon word association testing
depend upon static constructs, but words have no fixed meanings. By
their very essence, they are fluid. Lieberman criticizes those who equate
words with tokens, pointing out that
. . . one of the most salient characteristics o f. . . words . . . [is that]. . . they
are not tokens for things; they instead convey concepts. The meaning
of a word never is precisely equivalent to a thing, a set of things, or
even a property of a set of things. (Lieberman 1984, p. 80)
An even more salient characteristic of words is their inherent flexibility.
By their very nature, they change according to the ingenuity of speakers
in employing them in different contexts. Such change is the heart of
metaphor, the ability to take a word or words from one domain and apply
it to another. Without such flexibility in word usage, language wouldn’t
be so immediately accessible for swift encoding of messages in response
to new contexts. Given the context of an utterance hearers usually can
ascertain the intended meaning. In the course of a day, we all may use,
hear or read new usages of old words. Zippy writing in car magazines,
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news weeklies, and ads attest to our abilities both to produce and
comprehend. It must be emphasized, however, that I am not here refer
ring only to artistic or professional word usage, but to an everyday
capability of everyday people in everyday circumstances.
Looking at words historically shows us how pervasive the plasticity of
words are, resulting over time in drastic changes in intension, all the
meanings of a word. Take the word bulb. It originally referred to an
onion, then to any plant with a bulb-like root with fleshy long, narrow
leaves, then to any round bulb-like swelling as in the bottom of a
thermometer, then to the round glass vehicle for the incandescent light.
Now it can also mean tube-shaped lights such as fluorescent bulbs. There
is even a nautical meaning referring to a cylindrical shape at the forefoot
of certain ships. Bulb seems to have extended its original referents.
Sometimes words lose their original meanings entirely. Hackney was
originally a fine riding horse, then a horse for hire, then a worn-out
horse, then, in the 17th century, a prostitute, and now a trite expression.
It is easy to see how these meanings became extended with ordinary use.
Perusing any historical dictionary reveals the omnipresence of changes
in word meaning.
There is nothing remarkable in schizophrenic failure to maintain
“fixed constructs.” What is remarkable, in its original sense of “worthy of
remark,” is that in some way, the normal flexibility in word usage goes
awry so that schizophrenic creations are perceived as being abnormal
and difficult to follow.

Chapter Five

SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND METAPHOR:
BEYOND CHOMSKY
Although many laypersons assume that the Chomskyan para
digm for language reigns supreme, here it is shown that other
models of syntax, specifically context-bound ones, have far
greater explanatory power. Syntax and semantics are intertwined
and must be understood as such in order to analyze language
data including that from psychotics. This examines the ways
that semantics determines syntax and the ways that syntax can
be manipulated for implications and direct meaning. The nature
of metaphor, how it works, and what constitutes reasonable
exegeses of it are also elaborated upon. It is shown that meta
phor is not random nor can metaphorical meaning be claimed
without basing it on the processes by which all metaphor is
created and understood.
[1] T h e Im p o rtan ce of Syntactic T heory.

A

ny theory of human behavior implicitly or explicitly rests upon
language. Faulty notions of the ways language works have consistently
resulted in fallacious interpretations of psychotic speech. So complex is
language that even when clinicans have paid some heed to linguistic
theory, they have embraced too readily or rejected too summarily. A
prime example is Edelson’s (1978) desire to develop a psychoanalytic
model based upon Chomskyan grammar. Unfortunately, formulating a
theory of syntax which will explain the ways that humans speak has not
proven easy. So rich are language data that a variety of explanations
serve to explain at least parts of the ways grammars work. Over the years,
indeed the centuries, scholars have been content to stop at the data their
theories account for, seeking no further.
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[2] T h e Chom skyan P arad ig m .

Many scholars continue to equate linguistics with Chomsky. Ju lia’s
(19831) Explanatory M odels in Linguistics argues solely against the earlier
Chomskyan grammars. One facet of the Chomskyan paradigm that has
been seductive to linguists as well as to psychoanalysts was the quasimathematical derivation of each sentence discussed, starting from an
abstract deep structure which, by a succession of stages upon which
certain transformations were applied, yielded a perfect surface structure,
complete with undeniable meaning. Such analysis held out the promise
of our being able to prove exactly what each sentence means. T his would
have been an ultimate triumph of mathematics over language since the
latter clearly has much fuzzier rules and boundaries between levels. Of
course, T -G grammarians did not recognize that borders are fuzzy and
all cannot be explained by rules.
Edelson (1978, p. 162) unabashedly looked toward the day that psychoanalysis would achieve the degree of theoretical sophistication that
Chomsky had provided for linguistics. Edelson spoke of psychoanalysis
as being in the state that linguistics was in before Chomsky, implying a
primitive state. It is not hard to see why Edelson was so ready to embrace
Chomskyan analysis with its apparent precision and abstraction utilizing
the symbols and equations of mathematical logic. He (p. 159), for example,
showed that the generalization “All dreams are hallucinatory wishfulfillments” could be formulated by the Chomskyan-inspired:
No matter what value of x is chosen, if x is a dream, then x is a
hallucination of the fulfillment of a wish.
Edelson then points out that even this requires more explication, as:
Whatever x is chosen, there is at least one y, and there is at least one z,
such that: if x is a dream, and if y is a wish, and if z is a condition, and
if F is a relation “fulfills” which holds between a condition z and a wish
y, then x is a hallucination of F(z,y)-or G(x,Fzy). (Edelson, p. 160)
Aside from the fact that one gains no new insights by subjecting this
sentence to such an elaborate rephrasing, there is the other fact that
the statement is no more valid than when it was stated in ordinary
language. As one who was originally caught up in the T -G fervor of the
late sixties, however, I can attest to the seductiveness of trying to bend
language into such precision. To use the very term Chomsky coined,
c o u n t e r e x a m p l e upon counterexample has already shown that T -G
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sentence-based grammars could not explain how people produced or
understood even quite simple sentences. T he pragmatists among us,
sociolinguists, psycholinguists, neurolinguists, any of us mucking about
with real data have found other models more felicitous.
It has turned out to be exceedingly difficult to find deep structures
and transformational rules which unerringly explain very many surface
sentences at all, much less to explain all possible ones. As counterexamples
to Chomsky’s original formulations cropped up with disturbing regularity,
T -G grammars have had to be revised again and again. This has been
done both in and out of the Chomsky circles (e.g., Montague 1973;
Berwick and Weinberg 1984; Jacobson and Pullum 1982.). New forms of
grammars multiplied, each resembling classical Chomsky to a greater or
lesser degree, and each supposed to take care of data the others couldn’t:
generative semanticist grammars, Montague grammars, relational and
arc pair grammars, grammars of the extended standard theory, and of
government-binding.
Even a cursory glance at the literature debating these different schools
of syntax shows how unlikely it is that any of them are to shed much light
on the speech of psychosis or even of normal conversation. T h eir pages
are filled with discussions of it-raising, node pruning, constraints on
deep structure movement out of NP, “shunting” c-command domains
(Radford 1981; Berwick and Weinberg 1984, p. 181), all of which are
operations during different stages of the derivation of a sentence, stages
which are nonobservable, devoid of words, and below the level of the
speaker’s awareness. That any of these post-hoc deep operations actually
figure in speech production,2 normal or not, has never been proven. Of
course, I speak here as a pragmatist, but, as we shall see, hardly a lone
one.
There are far more useful constructs in linguistics today, powerful
models of conversation and comprehension. T he meaning-free sentence
grammars of traditional, structural, and transformational grammars have
been replaced by semantico-syntactic grammatical models sensitive to
the requirements of the discourse. We now know that the particular
grammatical form of any sentence is dependent upon the requirements
of the entire discourse, and that there is no meaning without context.
Moreover, we know that the very verb one chooses will constrain the
forms of the sentence in which it appears. There is, in fact, no syntax
separate from the discourse, no phonology separate from the word, and
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no discourse the unconstrained by the social situation or the text. There
are levels in language, but they are all interrelated and work in concert.
All meaning derives from context. We compare an utterance or other
snatch of language to its context. That is how old words come to take on
new meanings. The appropriateness of the syntax used and the words
chosen depend ultimately on the context in which they appear (Lyons
1968; Seuren 1985). Lauri Carlson (1983, p. 152) maintains that we can
find a context for any juxtaposition of sentences, but he does not discuss
SD psychotic discourse or that from any linguistically impaired population.
Truly, for some such discourse, we could provide connecting links, but
these are always pure conjecture. We are justified in supplying such links
only on principled grounds such as we have will see in our discussion of
implication.
There is no context-free meaning. There is no context-free syntax.
There is no meaningless generative cycle which produces an infinity of
sentences. Actually, I should amend that last sentence. It seems to me
that psychotic glossomania is the archetypal meaningless generative
cycle which can be uttered as an infinite number of sentences.
[3] Case G ram m ars.

The Chomskyan “revolution” had barely gotten off ground before
troublesome data started to pile up. There were too many data from even
quite simple sentences that could not be explained by the use of Chomskyan
deep structures upon which transformations operated to produce surface
structures.
Fillmore, in what he originally called CASE gram m ars (1966; 1968) and
now calls fram e sem a n tics pointed out that syntactico-semantic rules
are intertwined rules in all languages. For instance, the verb selected
in a sentence determines which sentence slots can or must be filled.
In English, a word order language, there are three basic slots: subject,
indirect object, direct object. Which gets filled depends upon the verb
chosen. For instance, 1A allows an indirect object position to be filled with
the dative but 1B does not. (An * indicates an ungrammatical sentence.)
1A. Max gave the church money.
1B. * Max donated the church money.
However, both verbs allow the indirect object to be used with a preposi
tion at the end of the sentence.
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1C. Max gave the money to the church.
1D. Max donated the money to the church.
There are even more complex examples of this phenomena:
2A.
2B.
2C.
2D.

Oscar planted peas in the garden.
Oscar planted the garden with peas.
The garden was planted with peas (by Oscar).
Peas were planted in the garden (by Oscar).

Fillmore and others (Chafe 1970) that the very positions that can be
filled in a sentence depends wholly on the verb chosen, independently of
semantic content. Synonyms do not necessarily allow the same grammar.
For example, put can be chosen as a paraphrase of plant, but with
different consequences:
2E. Oscar put peas in the garden
but not
2F *Oscar put the garden with peas.
Although 2E is paraphrasable by 2A, the selection of the verb put in
2E prevents the locative garden from appearing without a preposition. It
also prevents the object, peas, from appearing with the preposition with.
Bresnan (1978) in her aptly named article “A realistic transformational
grammar” recognizes that verbs have markings on them in the lexicon
that indicate whether or not they take objects, datives, and the like.3
Similarly, Montague (1973) starts his derivations with words which are
then mapped onto phrases as a corresponding semantics is simultaneously
developed. Dowty (1982, p. 100) virtually takes it as a given that verbs
govern whether or not transformations such as Dative Shift4 can occur.
Seuren (1985, p. 61) flatly avows that “There is no semantics without
grammar.” Halliday (1985, p. xix) insists “ . . . there is no clear line
between semantics and grammar, and a functional grammar is one that is
pushed in the direction of semantics.” McNeill and Levy (1982) maintain
that language is generated directly from patterns of meaning, not through
grammatical representation, a view now shared by many syntacticians
(Halliday 1967, 1968; Chafe 1970; Lyons 1968; 1977).
Originally, Fillmore (1982, pp. 114-115) called these noun positions
relative to verb cases, but later he employed the concept of VALENCY, also
employed by Lyons (1977, pp. 488-489). Valency, a term originally used
in chemistry, refers to the capacity of an entity to affect or interact with
another in some special way. Thus, to use Lyons’ (1977, pp. 488-490)
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exam ples kill is b iv a len t , requiring an agent and an object, and has a
CAUSATIVE relationship to die which is MONOVALENT. Give is TRIVALENT,
requiring that agent, object, and dative be specified.
[4] Im plication, L exical Choice, and Syntax.

Why would a mental health professional care about the differences in
syntactic theories? Of what utility is a knowledge of case grammars or
frame semantics, however it is called? One answer is that patients make
syntactic errors explicable only in terms of such syntactico-semantic
rules. The second reason is that recognition of these processes enlarges
our awareness of what is grammatical and what not, surely an important
issue in a scholarly field in which the thrust of much debate is whether
or not the population under investigation does or does not evince
deviant syntax. Another reason is that our interpretations are rendered
more precise by such recognition. The last is that much implication is
achieved by manipulation of syntax, and this is done according to regu
lar syntactic rules of the language.
At times, implication is achieved by using one paraphrase or the
other. There are two ways that speakers can manage such implication: by
selecting one verb over another and by choosing one paraphrase of over
another. We saw the latter condition with plant above. When peas were
made the subject or object an implication was made that other items were
planted as well; when garden was made subject or object, the implication
was that peas were all that were planted.
A somewhat less benign example also illustrates the possibility of
paraphrase. When a speaker selects one verb rather than its synonym,
different implications become possible. For instance, selecting die rather
than kill limits implication considerably.
3A. Jack died.
3B. Jack was killed.
The two can be synonymous in many instances, but 3B implies that
someone or something caused Jack to die. 3A carries no such implication.
Therefore, if a speaker wishes a hearer to be suspicious of Jack’s death,
but does not want to make a bald statement to that effect, the choice of 3B
serves that purpose because English speakers know that the verb kill
takes an a g en t or a CAUSE as well as an object. There is no way to avoid
the object if kill is chosen, but by placing that object, here Jack, in the
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subject position as in 3B, one avoids naming the agent or cause. T h e use
of the passive implies that there was an agent or cause. In 3A, Jack is
merely the p a t ie n t , one who undergoes a process.
As noted above, there are errors in schizophrenic speech that can be
analyzed in terms of syntactico-semantic relations, some involving case
and some not. For instance, the error in 4A is caused by the inappropri
ate preposition by which seems to indicate that cars are the cause of the
attention. Even if that is what the patient meant, and even if it is true, the
prepositional phrase because o f is required to indicate cause here. With
the verb have, by usually is reserved for a temporal phrase, such as
having it by 10 o’clock:
4A. They have world wide attention by the ca rs. . .
In 4B, below, we see a different kind of syntactico-semantic error.
Here, the article a is used erroneously. T he problem is that people has a
plural meaning and is used with plural verbs, but its form is singular.
T he article a can only precede a singular noun. Some must be used with
people. There is an inevitable mismatch between form and plurality in
English, so it is not surprising that a psychotic would make an error even
in the face of fact that a phrase like “some Italian people” would be quite
common in the speech of a New York City resident. T he error itself is
not likely to have come about because of reinforced stimuli. As with the
mistakes of toddlers, the speaker says what he has probably not heard.
4B. Mill Avenue is also a a I like a quiet residential nquiet residential block with a Italian people talk.5

block like a

[5] T h e Sem antics of Syntax.

Actually, American linguists came late to a theory of grammar in
which it was recognized that the components of language are not strictly
separated. Chomsky actually inherited that view from the structuralist
grammarians before him. Oddly, the reason that they propounded a
strict separation of levels was because they were influenced by the very
behaviorism that Chomsky despised. Structuralists assumed that we sim
ply heard a message and that triggered a response. We have already seen
that this doesn’t even work for our processing of the sound system of
language, its simplest most automatic level. Once this last vestige of
Behaviorism dissolved, the way was open for powerful new meaning.
Eventually Fillmore came to think of lexical items as being in frames
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which evoke scenes (Fillmore 1982, pp. 116-117) that are to a great extent
culturally determined. He points out that a word like vegetarian is impor
tant only in a meat-eating culture and that our understanding of judge is
bound by our culture’s modes of judging.5 He also shows (p. 123) that
what appears to be a grammatical category such as verb tense shapes the
image of a given verb. His example is the pluperfect progressive in
5. She had been running.
T he lexical item run gives us one image, but the pluperfect progres
sive shapes the image of running given here, so that it may explain at the
narrative time why she is panting, sweating and tired. As a result of these
insights, Fillmore now speaks of f r a m e s e m a n t i c s .
McCawley (1986) also demonstrates the impossibility of segregating
different levels and processes of language, illustrating from other gram
matical constructions. He shows other syntactic ~ semantic configurations.
For instance, it is generally conceded that making a sentence negative is
a grammatical procedure according to the grammar of a given language.
Even so, negation is not completely a matter of grammar. There are
certain words and expressions which arbitrarily can not be used in the
negative and others that can only be used as positives. That is, it is word
choice itself and not grammar p e r se which forces the negative or positive
polarity. McCawley gives as arbitrarily positive polarity:
6A.
6B.
6C.
6D.
6E.
6F.

I would rather be in Philadelphia.
*I wouldn’t rather be in Philadelphia.
The meatloaf is delicious.
*This meatloaf isn’t delicious.
You could have just as well have rented a car.6
*You couldn’t have just as well as rented a car.

Examples of negative polarity [examples mine]:
7A.
7B.
7C.
7D.
7E.
7F.

It couldn’t be all that bad.
*It could be all that bad.
Max isn’t all that bright.
*Max is all that bright.
He didn’t do much for his family.
*He did do much for his family.

Patricia Strauss (personal communication) commented that many of
the starred (*) sentences can be used for emphasis, what linguists call
c o n tr a stiv e sit u a t io n . For instance, if someone demurs “Oh, things
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couldn’t be that bad.” T h e hearer, probably the complainer, retorts,
“Things could be that bad” (with stress on the co u ld ). As Strauss remarked,
the effect of playing with polarity works because the speaker is consciously
playing with the known grammar. In turn, the hearer understands the
emphasis conveyed also because he or she knows that the grammar
doesn’t allow this polarity on that expression.
It has occurred to me that the intertwining of lexical choice, semantics,
and syntax explains the reason that paraphrases can differ so radically in
their surface forms.
[6 ] Sem antic Features.

Some meaning is derived from factoring of features as in cub, p u p p y ,
child, calf which share the semantic features of [young] [offspring], but differ
in the features of [human], [wild], [ursine], and [canine], so that ch ild is
[+hum an, -w ild ], cub is [-h u m a n , +w ild, + ursine, + canine], and
p u p p y is [-h u m a n , -w ild , +canine]. T he very fact of being human
automatically negates being ursine or canine, so those features need not
be m entioned in a discussion of semantic features. However, being
[ -h u m an ] opens far more possibilities, so that features like [+ canin e] or
[ + ursine] have to be specified.
Certain features subsume others. Baby, for instance, is [ + human], so
that one need not specify species if that word is used for humans. If,
however, it is referring to other mammalian offspring, that must be
specified, as in “animal babies” or “baby Chow [a breed of dog].” Often,
when attempting to be colorful or witty, people indulge in these kinds of
violations of feature attachment onto words. Sometimes these can be
heard as insulting to humans, as when referring to someone as a “baby
whale.” T h e conditions fostering such a m eaning as opposed to one of
“offspring of a whale” are rooted in the communicative situation (Chapter
7).
Weinreich (1966) tabbed another way that semantic features can be
used. He noted that in expressions like pretty boy, the feature of [ + female]
that inheres in pretty becomes transferred to boy, thus giving an implica
tion to that word, implying that whoever he is, he is effeminate. Dylan
Thom as’ line, a g r i e f ago sim ilarly transfers the feature of [+ tim e] onto
grief, thus implying that, at least to Thom as, life is such woe that its times
can be measured in grief. Expressions like salty h u m o r or the bouquet o f
the wine are other instances of transfer features. Using words together
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that have semantic features that don’t quite jibe is a regular way of
achieving implication.
A good deal of meaning does reside in inherent semantic features of
lexical items, although any item can be used in novel ways. Still, there
are errors in lexical choice attributable to semantic features, such as
8. Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and wonder if my box
is broken and heart is beaten.7 (Maher, 1968 cited in Forrest 1986).
In the absence of strong contextualizing, box does not usually subsume
the features of a human’s chest. Moreover, hearts may be beating, but they
are not usually beaten. T he connection between chest and box is easily
seen if one considers semantic features. Boxes fall into the category of
chests in some usages. Both are concrete nouns which share the meaning
of [ + container, + rectangle, —animate]. However, the other meaning of
chest, that of human anatomy, is neither rectangular nor inanimate. This
error is like those of glossomania discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. First one
meaning is taken, one appropriate to the context. Then a synonym of
that word is evoked, the one inappropriate to the context, the [ - animate]
meaning. One result of linkages of words based upon shared lexical
features is glossomanic chaining (Chapter 1, 9).
[7] T h e M ental L exicon.

Over the years, in many models of grammar including the earliest
Chomsky formulations, it has been assumed that our internal vocabularies,
what is now usually called our m ental lex ico n consisted of a listing of
words out of which our syntactic operations plucked, so to speak, the
correct word for our intended meaning, and put it in its correct slot in
the phrase or sentence we were formulating. Early on, Chomsky noted
that there were syntactic constraints on some words which he termed
SELECTIONAL RESTRICTIONS. For instance, assassinate is restricted to a
human subject and a politically important human object, unless, of
course, we are talking of a cartoon world in which, perhaps, a penguin
could assassinate a polar bear. Even so, T -G grammars, like their
structuralist predecessor, considered lexical selection somewhat apart
from the purely syntactic generation of a sentence.
George M iller (1978, p. 61) emphasizes that items in our mental
lexicons have so many kinds of information attached to them that they
cannot be autonomous, that even the concept of selectional restrictions is
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too modest to portray their role in speech and thought. Each item carries
with it syntactic information such as its part of speech, inflections it may
or must carry, morphological information such as possible suffixes or
prefixes, variety of pronunciations possible (e.g., the variation in the
ending “-ing” as opposed to “-in’ ” as in singing, singin’), ways it can be
written or printed, what its synonyms are, common phrases it may be
embedded in, conceptual relations to other words or spheres of thought,
specific cultural information, general information about what it refers to,
mental pictures evoked by the word, and even etymologies. H e likens
our verbal storehouses to encyclopedias and affirms that the lexicon is
also tied up to “ . . . thoughts, m emories, percepts, desires, feelings,
intentions.” Kearns (1984, pp. 85-108) also speaks of experience as being
part of the language system.
M iller reminds us that “cognitive economy depends on the intelli
gible organization of what is learned,” so that it is not likely that our
mental lexicons are mere lists of words. In essence, we saw the complex
ity of the relations of words when we considered glossomania, showing
that it can be explained by involuntary out-of-control triggering of
lexical items, and all the forms that triggering can take are explicable by
the complicated networks of words and phrases in our mental lexicons.
Glossomanic chaining seems to be a trip through the mental lexicon,
leaping from synonyms to rhymes to phrases to subject matter related to
a word to emotional reactions. What it also indicates is that there is no
sharp, dividing line between syntax and semantics, or, for that matter,
the other components of a language. Yes, we can define separate levels of
phonology, morphology, sentential syntax, and discourse, but, no, there
is no sharp demarcation among categories. Language by its very nature
has fuzzy borders.
[8] M ean in g an d M etaphor.

Interpretations of psychotic speech rest heavily on metaphor, at least
on the assumption, and it is a reasonable one, that such speech is
metaphorical. In this discussion, the word metaphor is used in its broadest
sense to indicate all figurative uses of language, the tropes, including
metonymy, synonymy, irony, simile, and synecdoche.
Over the past several years more and more linguists have been acknowl
edging the metaphorical nature of meaning, claim ing that much of what
we say even in ordinary speech, is metaphorical and all our abstractions
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are rooted in and extended from words with originally concrete meanings,
with rooted here being a prime example of the process itself. T h e great
analysts have said all along that all language is metaphorical, but this
does not mean that analysts and linguists perceive metaphor the same
way.
Psychoanalytical exegeses of metaphor do not necessarily concur with
the kinds of interpretations offered by linguists and others currently
involved in unraveling the mysteries of metaphor. Of course, scholarship
being what it is, variation runs rampant even in a given field. The exact
nature of metaphor, its relationship to concrete language, its basis in
perceptual and cognitive structures, and the ways in which it is con
strued have been hot topics in linguistics, cognitive science, and philoso
phy for the past several years (e.g., Levin 1977; Rosch 1973, 1975, 1981;
Ortony 1979; Mac Cormac 1985; Lakoff 1987).
As indicated above, there are many theoretical questions about meta
phor and its nature, most of which are beyond the bounds of this book.
Although we cannot claim a consensus in all matters, there are already
significant insights into the relations between metaphors, the world, and
meaning. By examining fields of everyday metaphor, we get good insights
into the ways that metaphors are built and what should be the possible
bounds on our interpretations of them. Except for pathological language,
even highly metaphorical language is interpretable in terms of the words
and grammar their creator used. Metaphors and other figures of speech
operate according to certain principles.
Although figurative language has traditionally been considered to be
apart from literal meaning, and still is by many scholars (Levin 1977,
p. 31), it can be seen as well as part of ordinary, everyday meaning. Ortony
(1979) points out that metaphor, if taken literally, is false, but that there
are regular processes by which metaphors are given and received.
The specialized metaphors in the verbal arts are, by definition, more
difficult to understand. It is acknowledged that they are created to cause
readers and listeners to stop and ponder, to see new and unusual
connections, but they are but one end of a cline of figurative meanings.
Furthermore, no matter how difficult such metaphors may be to decipher,
still the author had in mind some meaning and he gives clues as to what
these are. It is not the case that any author creates a work of art such that
the language in it can mean anything a reader thinks it does. For
instance, consider Emily Dickinson’s metaphor about “Cambridge ladies.”
She said they had furnished souls. The almost oxymoronic juxtaposition
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between furnished and souls shows us what smug, closed-minded, insensi
tive women these were. T hey were as immutable as furnished rooms.8
Whether or not the reader instantly gets the same meaning as I did, he
or she is capable of concurring or dissenting on the basis of the words in
question. T his is in direct contradiction to Forrest’s interpretation of the
passage in example 9 below. H e has followed a long-standing practice in
psychiatry of giving a global and highly individual interpretation of the
entire passage rather than one based upon individual words within it.
Adrienne Lehrer (1983) shows that metaphor is achieved in expres
sions like velvety wine by ignoring the inherent features of velvet as a
fabric, transferring its meaning of “soft.” Literally, wine like velvet would
be disgusting.
A m ajor problem in schizophrenic speech has been whether or not
its characteristic bizarre or opaque utterances are instances of wildly
metaphoric language, and, if so, how may they be interpreted. This
entire question impinges on discourse analysis (Chapters 7 to 11) and
will be explored further then. T h e question we ask today is, “How do
metaphors relate to what it is that they mean?” For instance, looking at
the passage also discussed in sec. 6, Brendan Maher and David Forrest
have come up with dramatically different interpretations of 8 above, here
repeated:
9. Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and wonder if my box
is broken and heart is beaten for my soul and salvation and heaven,
Amen. (Maher, 1968 cited in Forrest 1986).
Maher, I believe correctly, interprets this as the patient’s complaint
about physical chest pains. Forrest, on the other hand, says that this is
metaphorical. “T h e listener is told if he has ears for it what it is like to be
schizophrenic. . . , but as no one who is not schizophrenic can fully
empathize with this experience, the message is redirected to God’s ear.”
Is this passage metaphorical or is it intended as a literal message, one
that has gone wrong because of a speech dysfunction?
We can compare this with passages presented by Hallowell and Smith
(1983) in which a patient describes himself as imprisoned, then speaks of
ebbing sand below him, and of plummeting downward towards corrosive
and sharp knife-like objects, such as acid, spikes, cobra spears, “tigerhunting forks,” and numerous blades. T he vivid imagery of ground that
is not firm and items which give horrendous pain seem to me to be a
description of what it is like to be schizophrenic. Those of us who have
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never had the experience of being schizophrenic certainly can feel the
horror that this patient is going through.
Forrest argues within a long established tradition. Levin (1977), for
instance, believes metaphor is rooted in deviance9 and is caused by a
desire to be vivid, striking, or colorful (p. 31). He also says that meta
phors are used to fill lexical gaps, giving as examples foot (of a mountain)
and neck (of a bottle). One cannot deny the former assertion. Clearly,
one reason for metaphorizing is to say something in a new way so that it
will command attention or become more memorable, and just as clearly,
sometimes, metaphors are used to fill lexical gaps. However, it is never
the case that a metaphor must be employed to fill lexical gaps. For
instance, a foot of a mountain can also be called its base or its bottom, or
some totally new word, like “ponge”10 could have been made up to
indicate the lowest points on a mountain. It is never the case that a
lexical gap has to be filled by a metaphorical meaning of an existing
word. It is the case, nevertheless, even across languages, that metaphors
are often used, that certain types of metaphors are made and that meta
phors show certain directions of semantic flow. To use Levin’s example
again, French piedmont is a metaphorical extension of foot. Metaphors
based upon the human body are legion: the leg of the table, the arm of
the law, the head on the beer.11
Levin (p. 31) gives as an example of deviant usage, one which calls for
special construal the term “devouring books,” in which a term for eating
transfers to reading. Actually, there is an entire set of metaphors correlat
ing cognitive and gustatory ingestion and excretion: juicy story, fo o d for
thought, consuming knowledge, gulping down facts, digesting information, indi
gestible news, regurgitating facts, spilled the beans and spewing words. Like
food, knowledge is assumed to enter the body, adding to whatever is
already there, and, eventually, to exit the body as well, in English by
metaphors evocative of vomiting. The very fact that we can find so many
metaphors analogous to Levin’s indicates that we are dealing with nor
mal aspects of language, not deviant usages.
This is confirmed by several studies. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and
Lakoff (1987) have dissected everyday metaphors, showing that metaphor
making is not simply a matter of creativity. They show that metaphors
refer to cognition, that there is “a coherent conceptual organization
underlying” metaphorical expression (Lakoff 1987, p. 381-405). Meta
phors for anger, for instance, relate to the actual physiological changes
wrought by anger: increased body temperature including a rise in the
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heat of blood, increased blood pressure, redness in the face, interference
with accurate perception, the body as a container for emotions, and
agitation. To give a very few examples of these, consider
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

get hot under the collar
a heated argument
letting off steam
blind with rage
burst a blood vessel
face red with anger
blood was boiling
shaking with anger
reach the boiling point
let him stew

T here are even metaphors for extreme anger which refer to exploding,
a combination of heat, agitation, and pressure rising to the point of
explosion, as in
•
•
•
•

she flipped her lid
blew his stack
hit the ceiling
went through the roof

Lakoff (p. 386) observes that certain otherwise inexplicable idioms for
anger actually are caused by these physiologically-based metaphors. For
instance, expressions like “she had kittens when I told her” are based
upon the model of “something that was inside causing pressure bursts
out.” T h is is related to metaphors like “he vented his anger.”
M iller (1982, p. 68) shows how deixis, actually pointing to something,
which is usually considered to be straightforward and literal, can also be
metaphorical. For instance, in a restaurant, a waiter can point to a ham
sandwich and say “the man in red” to mean “he ordered it” or “bring it to
him.” Sim ilar usages occur with “the hot fudge sundae practically licked
the plate clean” meaning “the person who ordered the hot fudge sun
dae . . . ” T here is an added metaphor here, that of a dog or other animal
who likes its food. Metaphor suffuses every aspect of language and any
utterance can contain several. Outside of D ick a n d Ja n e , it is hard to find
speech which is not suffused with metaphor.
Sternberg, Torangeau, and Nigro (1979) themselves using a metaphor
of a rubber band, point out that one can stretch a meaning of a word only
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up to a point, and then it snaps (pp. 334-335). The very metaphor they
use to delineate the limits of metaphor seems to be one of those
physiologically based metaphors which Lakoff and Johnson so aptly
showed to be at the foundation of human metaphorizing. Meaning is
elastic, we stretch the truth, we bend the meaning to our purpose, meaning is
flexible. All of these are based upon the tactile and visual experience of
bending and stretching materials to fit a purpose. It also occurs to me
that we bend and stretch our bodies for purposes, such as stretching to
reach something or bending to fit under something. T h eir metaphor
aside, Sternberg et al. make an important point, which is that there are
limits on metaphorical meaning. One cannot take a word and use it to
mean anything else. T he hearer has to be able to expand the meaning of
the word(s) used and it is part of our normal linguistic baggage both as
speakers and understanders that we recognize when the extension has
snapped. One has to question seriously interpretations so strained (another
metaphor of the stretch set) that normal decodings, even normal informed
decodings cannot be traced to the words used according to any of the
known strategies for producing or comprehending metaphors. By insisting
upon such a restriction on interpretation, I am not saying that unusual
metaphors are not interpretable. T he essence of wit, of comedy, of
drama, of the verbal arts in all their forms all depend upon novel
metaphorizing, and, as we all know, sometimes we have to have meta
phors explained to us. That is one function of the Talmudic scholar, the
preacher of the Gospels, and the English professor. What I am saying is
that those explanations must be based upon the kinds of extensions of
meaning discussed here. They are word based. They are context based.
One cannot claim a meaning for an entire discourse without referring it
to its parts, and relating them to regular processes of meaning.
Rumelhart (1979) claims that the same comprehension strategies are
used in interpreting figurative language as literal. He (p. 83) cites a study
in which a student of his found that it took no longer to assign a
figurative meaning to a sentence in context than it did to assign a
nonfigurative one. What did take longer was assigning a meaning to a
sentence out of context. This is not surprising since we get meaning in
context.
Clark and Lucy (1975) had somewhat different results in an ingenious
study. They provided subjects with pictures and asked them to deter
mine if the picture matched an indirect request that they were given. In
this study, indirect requests took longer to process if their underlying
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meaning was negative, so that “Must you open the door?” took slightly
longer to match to an appropriate picture than did “Can you open the
door?” Notice that “must you” is affirmative in syntactic form, but
negative in actual meaning. Since other testing has shown that negative
sentences can take longer to process than equivalent affirmative ones,
Clark and Lucy interpreted their results to mean that people first com
pute a literal meaning and then match it to the context to derive the
metaphorical one, a stage which Rum elhart denies. These are empirical
issues, resolvable in the laboratory. Many philosophers such as Grice
also assume that a literal reading is made first and then the figurative
sense is construed. It must be emphasized, however, that even in the
Clark and Lucy study, we are not talking about large time differences.
They speak of time differentials like 0.3 seconds and many of their
examples are confounded by another problem: in some of their exam
ples they have mixed registers of formality. For instance, they paired
“Can you open the door?” with “Must you open the door?” but the latter
is more formal than the former. T h e equivalent would be “Do you have
to open the door?” T h e specific outcome of questions like this is not an
issue. What is the issue is that metaphorical language is processed the
same way as literal language, using the same context-matching strategies,
and, in ordinary circumstances, if there is a time differential between
decoding literal and figurative speech, it is very tiny.
Since we can find pan-human metaphorizing, we can find it in the
simplest of speech amongst all peoples, we cannot in justice assume that
metaphorizing p e r se is deviance. Creating metaphors is normal. So is
understanding them. We have to expect that schizophrenics can suffer
disruption in this language activity as they do in others.
Fraser (1979, pp. 181-184) confirms again that context is as powerful a
shaper of what metaphorical meaning as it is in literal meaning. I would
go one step further and point out that metaphor is possible because of
the context-dependency of language. T hat is, all linguistic constructions
ultimately mean what the context allows them to mean. For this reason,
we can use phrases that are patently untrue, but still manage to convey a
real meaning. Fraser gave subjects 30 zero-context short metaphorical
sentences. He avoided culturally common ones like “he’s a dog” except
as an example. T he metaphors he crafted consisted of such things as
“He/she is a peanut butter and jelly sandwich/octopus/compass, and ripe
banana." Although there wasn’t necessarily one “most probable” inter
pretation, what he did find was that certain words definitely gave nega-
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tive or positive connotations and that the same words used with she were
interpreted quite differently from their use with he. This conforms to
more literal uses of language as well, as in “He/she is a tramp, or
professional or “He/she is loose. 12”
A distinction is commonly made between dead and “live” metaphors,
with expressions like the heart o f the matter being recognized as having
their origin in metaphor, but which are now so common that they are
virtually literal. I think that this is a false dichotomy. Virtually any
nonconcrete word can be seen to have as its origin a concrete one. It must
be that human language started out with words only for the palpable, the
visible, the smellable, and, by extension, these became more and more
abstract. It is impossible to conceive of a word so concrete that it couldn’t
be used metaphorically. Somebody might even find a new way to use
heart in yet another metaphorical sense. Perhaps we should view meta
phors as ranging from those which everybody would accept in a given
meaning to those which only a few would agree upon. Fraser’s examples
are proof of this. In American culture, what could be more concrete and
specific than a peanut butter and jelly sandwich? Yet, before Fraser, I
never heard of its being used to refer to a person. I daresay most of
Fraser’s subjects hadn’t either, but they did give metaphorical interpreta
tions of it, all different, to be sure, yet understandable to a member of
this culture.
The issue of metaphor can even be construed politically. Szasz’ (1976)
vehement insistence that schizophrenics are political prisoners is based
upon his faulty conception of metaphor. Like the psychiatrists he so
roundly condemns, he sees metaphor holistically, as chunks of language
to be analyzed as a whole, not in terms of the parts that comprise it, nor
does he bow to any psycholinguistic understanding of how people actually
use language. His interpretation of schizophrenia is that sufferers are
imprisoned in hospitals because they persist in talking in “metaphors
unacceptable to [their] audience, in particular to [their] psychiatrist”
(p. 14). That is, if you say things psychiatrists don’t like, don’t believe, or
don’t understand, you better watch out or they’ll imprison you in a
mental hospital.
Everyday metaphorizing requires no special talent, and examination
of the epics of primitive peoples reveal that it is not a product of special
cultural achievement. Artists, of course, may have special talents in
creating novel metaphors, but the ability itself is a general human one.
Technologically-primitive peoples have again and again been shown to
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have the very same language capabilities that technologically advanced
ones do. So-called primitives create poetry as brilliant and using the
same devices as those of us who are supposedly of an advanced culture.
Meaning is derived by regular strategies. It has to be or else language
would be ultimately meaningless. Anything that anyone said could mean
what anyone else says it does and that is patently untrue. One can’t even
imagine such a system evolving, and human language certainly has
taken a special evolution. Even in the most figurative of language, there
is meaning which can be rationally derived. When language is so devi
ant that none of our normal strategies for comprehending what is said,
we have to say that the fault lies in the speech itself. T h e speaker
has a dysfunction in verbal expression at that time.
[9] Im p lications for T heory.

T h e multileveled structure of language correlates with the almost
bewildering variety of deviations in schizophrenic speech seen in the
previous chapter. T his will be confirmed when we consider psychotic
deviations on the level of discourse. If these levels of language have any
psychological reality, we should expect that deviance occurs in each,
deviance which can be explained only by reference to each level.
Disruption proceeds from the top (discourse level) down, with the
lower levels of language becoming disrupted as the patient deteriorates.
T his is probably the reason that there is no evidence at this time that
phonological processes p er se are disrupted as their realization is the
most automated, whereas the higher the level of language, the more
choices there are, the more judgments must be made. H ence, gibberish
and neologizing which apparently arise from difficulties in word retrieval
seem to represent the most severe level of SD schizophrenia and the
fewest, albeit them most ill, patients have this difficulty.
Specifically, using the terminology of behavioral psychology—but not
to its purposes—in language, two or more stimuli can —and certainly
d o—evoke the same response, and the same stimulus can —and certainly
does—give two or more responses. Both processes seem universal, that
is, appear in all languages. These are not rare phenonema, but pervasive
in all languages. For instance, by their very nature, different allophones
are heard as one phoneme, so that all phonemes in a language are
instances of two or more stimuli evoking the same responses, and all
cases of neutralization involve the same stimulus being responded to as if
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they were different. Moreover, the same disjunction between stimulus
and response is observable on the levels of morphemes, words, and
higher structures like phrases and sentences. All cases of ambiguity, for
instance, are cases of the same stimuli being responded to as if they are
different. In fact, since all words typically have several meanings, under
standing them is clearly never a case of simple response to a stimulus.
There is no isomorphism between the given signals and the received
messages in any language.
At all levels of language, the processes used both to encode and
decode are not amenable to casual introspection, nor are they amenable
to deliberate manipulation. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that
psychotic gibberish, neologizing, word salads, and incoherent discourses
are deliberate.

Notes
1Julia does not even mention the newer Chomskyan constructs such as GovernmentBinding theory. Nor does he mention Montague grammars, or case and discourse
grammars. He dismisses generative semantics and functional grammars in footnotes
only, and he completely ignores pragmatics, systemic grammars, and the entire
body of work in text linguistics.
2Testing to see how long it takes subjects to process sentences with various kinds
of syntactic structures has been used to “prove” that one or another derivation is
real. The supposition is that if subjects take longer to process a sentence with one
kind of syntactic structure than another, the former has more complex derivation
than the latter.
3In my now hopelessly outmoded dissertation (Chaika 1972), I showed that a
grammar based upon such interrelationships can be used to explain deviant sen
tence production, whereas transformational grammar could not.
4This refers to putting the indirect object at the end of a sentence with the
preposition to, as in “Mary gave Kevin candy” and “Mary gave candy to Kevin.”
5Fillmore also shows that miscommunication can occur because of frame conflict,
as when laypersons understand one meaning of innocent but lawyers understand it
differently.
6These examples are not McCawley’s. Neither he nor I have even attempted a
complete listing. Readers should be able to supply more examples on their own.
7It has struck me that the patient might really have said beating using the
pronunciation “beatin’.”
8In Emily Dickinson’s day, people didn’t usually change their furniture every few
years as they do today. What was bought was bought for life. There is the added
meaning here of furnished rooms for rent, which certainly indicated that the
furniture was about as forever as the landlord could get away with.
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9By deviance, he does not mean “pathological,” but deviant in that the word is
not being used in its original sense which here he assumes is physical eating of
actual food.
10As one examines language change over centuries, be it in lexicon, syntax, even
some aspects of phonology, one cannot help but be struck by the degree to which
items already in the language are extended and eventually even changed to effect
new meanings brought about by technological or other changes in a culture. Although
it is possible to make up entirely new words, it is more usual to extend the meanings
of old ones.
11It has always struck me that heads on beer are based upon human heads rather
than those of other mammals because human heads are on top, but most other
mammals have heads in front of their bodies, but legs of a table or chair are more
easily construed on the picture of a four-legged animal.
12This is changing for younger speakers who are used to finding women in the
professions of law, medicine, and college professorships. When I was an adolescent,
however, “she’s a professional” was a metaphor for “she’s a prostitute.” This usage
still survives in the expression, “The world’s oldest profession.”

Chapter Six

COHESION AND COHERENCE
Cohesion and coherence are Siamese twins and one cannot be
discussed without the other. Overt cohesive ties do not necessar
ily create coherence, however. Some kinds of cohesive ties can
lead to incoherence. A study of schizophrenic, manic and nor
mal narrations showed differences between these populations
but these were not caused by incidence of cohesive ties. Rather
the number of ties were related to other factors.
[1] T h e Difference Between Coherence and Cohesion.

A

ll studies of discourse are really studies of cohesion and coherence,
of the ways that discourses are formed. T he meanings of the words
coherence and cohesion overlap. There are times when one is substitut
able for the other, but a distinction can be made between the two.
Typically, coherence refers to the logical macrostructure of discourses
and texts to which all must relate, whereas cohesion refers more specifi
cally to devices in the linguistic code which overtly mark what goes
together. T his last includes ellipsis, the omission of repeated material as
well as cohesive ties like and, but, or, however, if, after, and unless, any of the
words used to join two sentences together or to indicate how the parts of a
discourse are related. It is not necessary to use actual overt ties in the
linguistic code in order to produce coherent discourse. That is, discourse
can be coherent with or without overt linguistic devices. For instance,
1. S: Do you think dolphins can really talk the way people do?
H: We don’t know yet.
S: Better not eat tuna!
This is coherent provided both parties know that tuna fishermen are
killing over 100,000 dolphins each year. There is no other overt, thus
countable, cohesive tie linking H ’s comment with S’s admonishment.
VanDijk (1977, p. 46) demonstrated that “ . . . connection [of parts of a
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discourse] is not dependent on the presence of connectives” a proposi
tion echoed by researchers like Fauconnier (1985) and Sanders (1987).
If one is trying to determine coherence on the basis of cohesion, the
problem arises that much cohesion is effected by knowledge shared
because of mutual histories as well as by the cultural and perceptual
bonds usually referred to as common knowledge. A shared history is
highly idiosyncratic so that communications sometimes fail because S
has presumed that H knew about an event when, in fact, the H does not
remember it. Still people usually know how much to give in an interaction,
and, most of the time, if they err they can repair their contribution upon
receiving clues from cospeakers such as “Huh?” “What are you talking
about?” “Cycle me into a subject!1” or even a facial expression.
[2] Sentence, Discourse, and T e x t.

It is possible to create a set of sentences which remain just that: a set of
individual sentences. Although spoken and written discourses also con
tain sets of sentences, they are distinguished from collections of sen
tences in that they are perceived as belonging together: they cohere and
they are coherent. A major issue in determining whether or not schizo
phrenics manifest linguistic deviance has centered on the issue of
coherence. It is possible to produce a series of sentences, each of which is
structurally nondeviant, without producing a coherent or cohesive
discourse. T he whole simply may not hang together.
Meaning typically is achieved beyond the unit of the sentence. Each
sentence relates to others in the text or interaction so that the entire
forms a macro meaning such that each sentence is interpretable in terms
of the whole. Even on the relatively rare occasions when an individual
sentence comprises the entire vehicle of linguistic expression, the mean
ing is achieved by comparing it to the nonlinguistic context.2 Failure to
achieve a coherent discourse is a problem of linguistic deviance as much
so as is failure to produce a syntactically correct sentence. Just as people
have slips of the tongue in which they catch themselves and self-correct a
word, they have them in which they start a discourse, abandon it and
start over to self-correct their presentation of a discourse. These can be
signalled by messages like, “Wait a minute. Uhmmm. . . ” “Oops!” “Scratch
that. . . ” “Oh- hold up. I forgot to tell you that first. . . . ” and even “Let
me start over.. . . ” This is evidence of actual discourse structure analo
gous to sentence structure.
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The ICS (The Ice Cream Stories) was based loosely upon Wallace Chafe’s
(1980) The Pear Stories. In the latter, subjects were shown a movie, then
asked to narrate what it was that they had seen. Although it was only
about six minutes long, the movie was both too long and potentially too
disturbing to be shown to a psychotic population as it dealt with theft of
pears as well as a fall from a bicycle. Because Chafe wished to elicit
narratives from speakers of a wide variety of languages, there was no
dialogue in the movie. In terms of a psychotic population, a movie with
its attendant paraphernalia was potentially far too distracting.
A very simple 124-second videostory, henceforth called the ICS, was
prepared. The storyline was simple, but it related an incident familiar to
most Americans. The first scene pans a shopping center, closing in on
the figure of a little girl looking through the window of a Baskin
Robbins store. The next scene shows a woman setting a table, and the
same girl walking into the room asking, “Mommy, can I have some ice
cream?” whereupon the mother leans down, puts an arm around her and
says gently, “No, honey, it’s too close to suppertime.” Then a man is seen
walking into the house. The child walks up to him, touching her body to
his. He says, “Hello, Stefanie.” Then she asks, “Daddy, can I have ice
cream?” The father looks into the camera with a grin, and his hand
moves towards his pants pocket. The next scene shows the child walking
towards the Baskin Robbins store, entering, leaning against the counter
as she waits fidgeting. Then a clerk comes into view, asking it he can help
her. She responds inaudibly, but the man repeats clearly, “Double grape
ice. The child plays with coins, still leaning on the counter. The man
returns with a very large double-decker cone. The girl gives him the
money which he looks at, then rings up on the register. A bell chimes on
the register. The man gives her change, and says, “Thank you. Come
again.” The girl turns towards the camera with a triumphant smile,
pushes the door and goes out. A sound of “Oh wow” comes from outside
the door. The film ends there.
Dialogue was intentionally included in this video in order to test if
patients comprehended normal speech. The father is not actually shown
giving the child the money because I wanted to see if patients would
make the logical deduction that he must have given her the money. The
beauty of such a study is twofold. First, showing it on a small T V in a
lounge area emulated a common occurrence, one familiar to all partici
pants in the study. Second, it was easy to correlate what was said to what
it was the narrator was ostensibly trying to encode.
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categorized. T here are four4 subcategories of causal conjunctions, for
instance:
Simple causal: so, then, hence therefore.
Emphatic: consequently, because o f this
Reason fo r this reason
Result in consequence
and subcategories of temporal conjunctions:
Sequential then, next
Simultaneous just then, at the same time
Preceding previously, before that
Conclusive finally, at last
Note the overlap of form and function on even this brief sample of
their listing. T hat the same words do double and triple duty—or m ore—is
no surprise, but what it means is that we are not dealing with simple
unambiguous connectors. T hey have to be interpreted within the context
that they are used, a circumstance that renders counting with attendant
statistical verification dependent upon the researchers’ judgment.
Ellipsis, leaving out repeated words and structures, is a powerful
cohesive device (Halliday and Hasan 1976, pp. 144, 204-5; Halliday
1985, pp. 317), as it forces hearers or readers to fill in the blanks, so to
speak, by reference to a prior or, more rarely, following utterance, as in
(examples mine)
2A. Maxwell totaled his new car, his father’s, and his sister’s.
2B. Having totaled his new car, Maxwell left home.
In 2A, cohesion is effected by the hearer’s having to provide the
elements Maxwell totaled. . . car which have been left out after their first
appearance. T h e recipient of the message is forced to go backwards to fill
in the obviously missing constituents. In 2B, the hearer anticipates that
the subject of having totaled will be provided shortly.
Chomskyan grammar called such processes d e l e t i o n of repeated
material, implying that one has created the entire structure and then,
before uttering it, deleted repeated material. A more pragmatic view of
grammar assumes that one knows what one has just said, so one just
doesn’t repeat it. Rather, one utters only what is not repeated. Either way,
leaving out repeated elements is a prime way of indicating cohesion
between clauses and sentences. One must remember, however, that one
cannot just leave out repeated material. Cohesion is forced because the

136

Understanding Psychotic Speech

• Gibberish
He had [fUc] with [theykraimz]
• Glossomania, chaining of words or phrases which are not perti
nent to a governing macrostructure, such as a topic of a conversation,
as in:
. . . My mother’s name was B i l l . . . and coo? St. Valentine’s day is
the official startin’ of the breedin’ season of the birds. All buzzards
can coo. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly. They work
hard. So do parakeets. . . . ; (Chaika 1974, p. 260)
• Rhyming and alliterating inappropriate to the topic or occasion
of the discourse: I had a little goldfish like a clown. Happy Hallowe’en
down. (Chaika 1974, p. 261)
and, in response to “Hello, anyone here want some coffee?: “Head,
heart, hands, health.” (Chaika 1974, p. 269)
• Neologisms: " . . . you have to have a plausity of amendments to go
through for the children’s code, and it’s no mental disturbance of
puterience, it is an amorition law.” (Vetter, 1968)
• Word salads and other disturbances in syntax: " . . . you should be
able to acquire the memory knowledge down on down on the page
in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the position
I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital program.”
(Chaika 1982a)
• Inappropriate repetitions: “ . . . I am being helped but at the same
time that I am being help with the food and the medicate and the
food an medicate and the an the ah rest I feel that I still do not have
this I still not have the thought pattern . . . ” (Chaika 1982a)
It was not expected that any one would necessarily produce all or even
most of these, and, in fact, nobody did. As with other disrupted speech
most of each narrative was decodable, albeit not necessarily by the usual
strategies for comprehension. Of the original 24, 2 were dropped because
it was discovered that they probably had drug-induced psychoses. As a
result of the selection procedure, 22 patients completed the experimental
task. Of these, 14 had discharge diagnoses of schizophrenia and 8 had
discharge diagnoses of mania.
Butler Hospital is a mental hospital affiliated with Brown University
Medical School. Treatment and care is, and was at the time of this study,
a staff matter. All mental health workers met daily with other staff,
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that exophora is a less worthy category of reference than endophora
(Bernstein 1971; Schatzman and Strauss 1972). T h e reason for this appears
to be the assumption that the illiterate are more likely to use exophora
than the literate.7 Even Halliday and Hasan admit that exophora is a
cohesive device because it ties the utterance to the immediate context
even though it points out of the narrative itself. It seems to me that an
effective cohesive device is effective whether or not it points out of the
narrative. In fact, an argument could be made that use of anaphora when
exophora would be more direct and equally cohesive comprises faulty
utilization of cohesive resources. However, it is not the business of this
study or any other to decide a priori that some modes of cohesion are
more equal than others, much less superior.
More traditionally, in the sense of what scholars take as conventional
wisdom, Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 18) feel that “Exophoric reference
is not cohesive, since it does not bind the two elements together in a text.”
T h is conclusion is a natural one given their emphasis on cohesion as
opposed to coherence. Moreover, their position is clearly tied to written
language, in which exophoric reference is highly lim ited. In oral
communication, exophoric reference to the physical setting can be just as
cohesive as endophoric reference to prior verbiage.
Ehlich (1982, p. 327-329) suggests that anaphora and deixis actually do
different things. Anaphora binds, but deixis focuses. It includes terms
like over here or that one. If too much deixis occurs, he says that it is
tantamount to a constant request for focusing, which is confusing if you
are already focused. In other words, he sees frequent instructions like,
“the one over here” or “that one over there” as being confusing by asking
hearers to focus. Unfortunately, neither the Rochester and M artin study
nor my own elicited examples of such refocusing, so this contention
could not be re-examined. However, just as skill is required in using
anaphora so as not to confuse, there is skill in deixis. One is not necessar
ily inferior to the other in interaction. As we shall see, such apparently
trivial differences in how one views one type of cohesive tie as opposed
to another, can lead to quite different interpretations of results. Again, as
so often, linguistic analysis is tricky, fraught with innocent perils.
Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 10-11) and Halliday (1985) do recognize
that discourse is held together by covert as well as overt cohesive ties,
noting “Cohesion refers to the range of possibilities that exist for linking
something with what has gone before.” Cohesion includes relations in
meaning, a set of semantic resources. Since one can easily find some kind
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of semantic relationship between disparate sentences not occurring in a
discourse, Halliday and Hasan offer as a guide a useful heuristic, saying
a meaning relationship that is coherent is “ . . . one in which ONE
ELEM EN T IS IN T E R P R E T E D BY REFEREN CE TO A N O TH ER”
(Halliday 1985, p. 195) (caps Halliday’s). T he taxonomy of overt cohesive
ties presented by Halliday and Hasan produce overt messages telling
how one segment relates to others. In contrast, semantic ties are covert
features signalling relationships among parts of the whole discourse. My
criticism is that their taxonomy creates a confusing welter of terminology
without providing superior explanatory power.
Brown and Yule (1983, p. 24) explain that Halliday and Hasan’s
categories derive from a text-as-product view, which does not take into
account how a text is produced. Brown and Yule’s view is “best character
ized as a discourse-as-process view,” a view implicit in Kreckel (1981),
Levinson (1983), and Sanders (1987), as, of course, in my own work.
Halliday (1985) claims that cohesion itself is a property of text, but how it
is used makes the difference between something which is a text and
something which is not, as well as the difference between one kind of text
and another.
Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 7; Halliday 1985, p. 54) actually warn
that it is a mistake to use their categories of cohesion as a method of text
analysis. Why have they developed them, then? T h eir position is that
text itself is a semantic creation, so that, ultimately, all textual analysis
depends upon interpretation.
Strangely, Halliday (1985, p. 54) also perceives grammar as arising
from an “automatic realization of the semantic choices (p. 54).” It is true
that one is not aware of the grammatical choices one makes, but there is
never just one choice available to convey a meaning; therefore, choices
cannot be automatic. All meanings are paraphrasable. It is precisely the
automatic character of much SD speech which causes its deviance. This
poses an interesting paradox. By looking at other elements in the utterance,
we can explain glossomania because we can see how the words used are
related in terms of formal description of the lexicon. However, we cannot
interpret that same glossomania. There is never just one way to actuate
cohesion. Therefore, to gain insight into our sense that speech does or
does not cohere, it is fruitful to discuss the ways that language is made to
cohere in discourse. T he researcher is essentially working as a hearer,
first figuring out what someone is trying to say and then diagnosing the
locus of error.
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[4] Ellipsis an d Cohesion.

Ellipsis is a vital cohesive device, and must be included in any analysis
of cohesion in any linguistic production. Ellipsis works because missing
elements of sentence structure can be supplied. T hat is, the parts of
the sentence which have not been overtly produced are retrievable by
reference to prior utterances in the given situation. Occasionally, they
are retrievable by looking forward, warning the hearer that something is
on its way to elucidate. Participles commonly are placed at the start of a
sentence in writing so that one knows that the missing subject is coming
as in “Having totalled the car, M ax left home.”
Ellipsis can be seen to work across interactions so that one need not
state what is known from previous interactions. Kreckel (1981) found that
people who interact a great deal understand each other the most as they
have a shared history. In other words, the more people know each other,
the less they have to say to convey information.
With nouns, ellipsis omits the entire noun phrase, as
2A. T h e cat in the hat ate the mat and said his prayers.
2B. Mary, Kay, and Elizabeth went downtown, bought purple high
heels, and wore them to the prom, dancing all night and getting
terrible blisters on their toes.
H ere the cat in the hat is not repeated, nor is Mary, Kay, and Elizabeth.
With verbs, ellipsis involves leaving out the entire repeated construction
as in 3A and 3:
3. Max has been buying jun k bonds, Bartholomew has been buying
preferred stocks, and Andy, penny stocks.
In 3A, the entire verb phrase has been buying was omitted in “Andy,
penny stocks,” but we have no difficulty in supplying it. If a ques
tion “Who was buying junk bonds?” is asked, however, then the
answer would include only the auxiliary, as in “M ax has.” T his
option is also open in instances of exact repetition of the entire verb
phrase including the object, as in “Max has been buying junk bonds
and Bartholomew has, too.”
Ellipsis is not to be confused with unjustified omissions, items left out
that are not retrievable by the hearer. In my study of schizophrenic
narration (Chaika 1982e, 1983b; Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8)
schizophrenic narratives were found to contain aberrant omissions. These
were not ellipses because the omitted words did not refer to anything
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prior or subsequent in the narrative. These omissions were especially
notable because they cannot be made grammatically under any circum
stance, as seen in:
3A .... he was blamed for and I didn’t think that was fair. . .
3B . . . what are the and uh there was a scene
3C . . . and asks if she can have then goes to the ice cream place.
In 3A and B, we know that nouns were omitted because they were
preceded by a preposition and a noun determiner. In 3C, the have
requires a direct object which isn’t there. In 3C we know there has to be a
noun as direct object, but it, too, is missing. These omissions are the
equivalent of uttering an inflectional ending without uttering the root
word in a declined language like Russian. There is no circumstance in
English which allows such omissions.
These examples illustrate the dangers of mere counting in determin
ing cohesion. If we were simply counting items left out that could fill a
certain slot, we might easily accidentally confound these with ellipsis.
We know that he was blamed for it and that she wanted ice cream, but
these are as much in error as 3B in which the omission is not so readily
retrievable. T he problem inheres in the English rules for ellipses them
selves which do not allow ellipses to operate by omitting the noun after a
preposition, an article or a transitive verb. Pronouns are required in
these positions.
Although, in most instances, the intended word could be retrieved by
the listener since she had viewed the videotape with the patient, still
such omissions are not allowable ellipses in normal speech. This kind of
ellipsis is not cohesive. There is no reason to assume that the person who
makes such an erroneous ellipsis8 does so voluntarily. It seems truly
dysfunctional, a conclusion bolstered by the fact that only schizophrenics
did it. Rochester and Martin do not mention this kind of ellipsis, but it
certainly occurred in my own study and only in schizophrenics.
Given the generally strong evidence that the patients were trying to
cooperate in the task, and given their other genuine disruptions in
speaking ability, disruptions which occur in many patients diagnosed as
schizophrenic, and disruptions in speech competence not readily con
trolled by speakers, such as producing word salads, glossomanic strings,
and leaving out a vital element in a syntactic construction, it seems most
likely that these omissions are a product of deficit in speech production.
3A, B, and C illustrate. All occurred in patients with discharge diagnoses
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of schizophrenia. All were contained in narratives elicited by watching
the same videotape.
[5] A n ap h o ra an d Pro-w ords.

Anaphora is also achieved by systems of pronouns and equivalent
replacement forms for other parts of speech. For instance,
3A. Max had been looking at the sprawling bright green ramshackle
Victorian house on the com er that looks like a haunted house. H e bought
it the other day.
3B. I’d like a blue one myself.
T h e it, like all of the pronouns commonly referred to as the “personal”
ones, replaces the entire noun phrase starting with the determ iner the
and ending with the complete prepositional phrase ending in haunted
house. In 3B, we see the phenomenon of the pronoun one which replaces
every word in the noun phrase except for the one word which is different.
In this instance, the adjective green is replaced by blue. Although not
always recognized as such, one functions as an anaphoric pronoun which
allows modifiers to be used with it, giving the meaning of “one just like
the noun phrase just mentioned except for this one distinction.”
In the following, we see both personal pronouns and the verb replacers
do and so do. For the sake of convenience, I call these pro-verbs.
4A. Max and Alex steal cars for a living and so do Rob and Bob.
They will all go to prison someday.
4B. Max steals cars for a living and so does Alexis. She was influ
enced by him.
4C. Max stole cars for a living and so did Alex.
T here are other such replacement words like that way and like this
which replace adverbs of manner and such which replaces adjectives.
5. M arilyn bakes wonderful bread by kneading the dough with her
feet, so I always do it like that.
6. Heloise wears sexy, clingy, vinyl outfits I wish I could wear such
outfits.
If such cohesive devices are not used, the result can be near chaos, as
in
Well I want to work for god in the mission and to work for god in the
mission you have to be able to speak and think in a lord tongue in
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my opinion now to speak and think in a lord tongue you have to
have to be able to memory the process memory the parle—the
process in the bible9 the thought pattern the brain wave and your
thought process must be healthy enough and your legs must be
healthy enough to when you want to study and and from when you
want to study and progress in the way of the lord you should read
the bible and as you read the bible you should if you are in good
shape physical and mental and mental good shape and physical
good shape you should be able to acquire the memory knowledge
necessary as to study the bible to speak and think in a lord tongue
you should be able to memory all the knowledge down on down on
the page in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the
position I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital
program I am being helped but at the same time that I am being
help with the food and medicate the food and medicate and the the
food and medicate and the and the ah rest I feel that I still do not
have this I still not have the thought pattern and the mental process
and the brain wave necessary to open up a page open up the old
testament and start to m em ory.. . . (courtesy of Bonnie Spring).
Had the speaker used do that for all his expressions of wanting to be
able to study the bible and think in the lord’s tongue, this would be far
easier to follow, as it would be if he had employed pronouns and used
ellipsis for the repetitions of fo o d and medicate. In language, less is
definitely more.

[6] L exical Cohesion,

Another Hallidayan category, l e x i c a l c o h e s i o n , presents even greater
problems. Here, an apparent cohesive device turns out to be the antithe
sis of cohesion and coherence. Lexical cohesion consists of words which
are semantically related (Halliday and Hasan 1976, pp. 318-320; H alliday
1985, pp. 310-313; p. 317). For instance, if I am speaking of my house,
and then say “the d oo r . . . , ” lexical cohesion is effected, provided that
I am speaking of the door to my house. Even if words in adjacent
sentences or within a sentence can be shown to have a semantic con
nection, they may not cohere. Consider this segment produced by
patient X, a segment abounding with lexical cohesion. She is discussing
her medication:
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. . . Speeds up the metabolism. Makes your life shorter. Makes your
heart bong. Tranquilizes you if you’ve got the metabolism I have. I
have distemper just like cats do, ’cause that’s what we all are. Felines.
[pause]. Siamese cat balls. T hey stand out. I had a cat, a manx, still
around somewhere. You’ll know him when you see him. His name
is G I Joe he’s black and white. I had a little goldfish too like a clown.
[pause] Happy Halloween Down.. . . ” (Chaika 1974, p. 261).

It is precisely the fact of lexical cohesion that makes this narrative
deviant, giving it its schizophrenic flavor (Lecours and Vanier-Clement
1976; Werner, Lewis-Matichek, Evans and Litowitz 1975; Maher, 1972;
Chaika 1982a). Glossomania is lexical cohesion, although lexical cohe
sion is not always glossomania.
Ragin and Oltmanns (1986) found that in an acute phase of illness,
schizophrenics, manics, and schizoaffectives manifested the same amount
of within clause lexical cohesion, but, during remission, manics and
schizoaffectives showed a significant decrease which coincided in improve
ment in clinical ratings of their speech. Schizophrenics, however, showed
no such decrease in within clause lexical cohesion. Unfortunately, these
authors, like so many psychologists, failed to give speech samples, so I
am assuming, and I may be wrong, that the lexical cohesion they speak
of is the same as that described here.
Lexical cohesion in itself does not advance the topic of a discourse, so
that a string of lexically tied sentences can form an incoherent passage
(Fahnestock 1983). Discussing the general proposition that cohesive ties
as a whole do not guarantee what H alliday and Hasan call texture,
e.g., ’textness’, Enkvist gives an apparently made-up example of lexical
cohesion which does not cohere. Comparing this with schizophrenic
glossomania, we see the similarities:
7. I bought a Ford. A car in which President Wilson rode down the
Champs-Elysees was black. Black English has been widely discussed.
T h e discussions between the Presidents ended last week.. . . (quoted
in Brown and Yule 1983, p. 197)
8. My mother’s name was B i l l . . . and coo? St. Valentine’s Day was
the start of the breedin’ season of the birds. I like birds . . .
To my knowledge, Enkvist has done no work on the problem of
psychotic speech; however, his reductio ad absurdem to illustrate the
noncohesiveness of lexical items hits the mark. What he predicted would
happen does happen with one population, SD psychotics.
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T he deviation in 8 is not caused by the untrue or bizarre semantic
message. Enkvist’s example contains only true (or potentially true)
information, but it is as deviant as the schizoid passage about the
mother’s name and birds. It is possible to have fantastic and even
absurd imagery in coherent language. Alice in Wonderland is a case
in point. Coherence (and competence) in discourse is not a question
of beliefs or cognition or of potentially true or untrue images and
events. It is a matter of handling language competently. The essence
of language is that it is tied neither to truth nor reality. Bizarreness
in psychotic speech occurs because of incompetent handling.
Fauconnier (1985, pp. 14-15) shows that pragmatic connectors map
what we have in our minds onto language so that a hearer can construct a
mental representation of that. Such mapping can be achieved by expres
sions like in reality, in L en’s painting, or the little red fox was dressed in a red
cape. Fauconnier demonstrates that truth or possibility of what is said is
not an issue. Fantasy is a mapping of imaginary worlds on to ordinary
language. Error is a mapping of a wrong mental representation. The
issue for cohesion is the link between mental representations and how
they are mapped onto language. In such a view, psychotic speech would
not be deviant because of what is represented, but because of how it is
represented. In SD speech incoherence is perceived when we cannot find
the representation of what the speaker believes because the output lacks
consistency or the language used is so remote that the hearer can’t build
up a mental representation. Fauconnier elaborates on a system by which
what is in one’s mind, mental spaces, are introduced by what he calls
space builders, pragmatic connectors to the mental space.
Until the ICS discussed here, the most systematic and thorough
study of cohesion in a schizophrenic population, indeed, the one which
inspired my own, was Rochester and Martin’s (1979) Crazy Talk. My
own study was inspired by theirs, but it differed in several respects
from it, accounting for differences in our results. However, the differ
ences were also caused by differences in orientation in our views on
Hasan and Halliday and on cohesion in general. T he number of cohe
sive ties in a discourse do not themselves account for coherence or
cohesion. Apparently, psychotic deficits proceed from larger cognitive
deficits at least at the time of psychotic bouts.
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[7] T h e R ochester and M artin Study.

Rochester and Martin (1979), relying on Halliday and Hasan (1976),
characterized schizophrenic narratives in terms of failures to employ
cohesive ties. They considered five categories: R E F E R E N C E , S U B S T I T U T I O N ,
E L L I P S I S , C O N JU N C T IO N , A N D L E X I C A L C O H E S IO N (pp. 76-77). They
further analyzed these cohesive ties in terms of whether or not they were
endophoric or exophoric (p. 146).
They gave subjects three tasks: a half-hour unstructured interview, a
summarizing of a short narrative, and a description of ten cartoons
accompanied by an explanation of why they were funny. T h eir study
had the merit of eliciting connected discourse in reasonably natural
situations and of providing a context against which to check verbal
output. T his last provided an indication of what the speaker was trying
to say. Thus any deviance between the psychotic speech and what it was
trying to encode could be measured.
Rochester and Martin found that the psychotic patients are capable of
creating complex syntactic structures although they relied more on
lexical cohesion and exophora than their normal controls did. These
researchers concluded that T D 10 schizophrenic patients “choose not to
[use complex structural elements] when the information to be encoded is
provided by the situational context” (p. 203). T his last conclusion is
based upon the fact that T D psychotics used more exophora based upon
the immediate surroundings than did others. However, the simple fact
that patients used exophora does not mean that they chose not to do
something else. It is as warranted to say that psychotics are not as able to
handle complex routines as nonpsychotics are; hence, they rely more
upon simpler kinds of cohesive devices if you believe that exophora is
simpler than anaphora. In sum, Rochester and M artin did not deter
mine that their results came from diminished linguistic capacity in T D
patients. However, an assumption of diminished capacity is also a reason
able interpretation of their data.

[8 ] N arrative Sam pling an d its Effect on Results.

Rochester and Martin (1979) utilized a random sampling of normal
narratives for their analysis, comparing these with non randomly selected
passages from schizophrenic narratives. T h e passages selected were those
rated most incoherent by their judges. Thus, Rochester and Martin are
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really talking about passages, not speakers, in their conclusions about the
differences between normal and schizophrenic speech. However, they
claim that their findings refer to TD schizophrenics.
They report that 10% of their normals did produce incoherent pas
sages (Rochester, Martin and Thurston, 1977), but these incoherent pas
sages were not included in the analyses unless they were randomly selected.
Thus, Rochester and Martin by design compared the most disrupted
schizophrenic passages with a random sampling of normal passages.
In contrast, this study compared entire narratives from each population,
so that results are based upon comparisons between the entire perform
ance of speakers. For this reason, the results reported here and those of
Rochester and Martin (1979) are not directly comparable. Also, since I
tested only for narrative ability but Rochester and Martin also tested for
description of cartoons and for performance in an unstructured interview,
again our results are not completely comparable.
[9] T h e Ice Cream Stories.
Because a characterization of psychotic failure in narrations did not
seem to be captured by the Halliday and Hasan view of cohesion, I made
an analogous study of psychotic narration (Chaika 1982e, 1983b; Chaika
and Alexander 1986). My own procedure was somewhat different from
Rochester and Martin’s. First, being somewhat more tolerant of exophora,
I devised the narrative task to be set up so that the stimulus materials
were not in view; hence, ordinary exophora would not be elicited. In the
Rochester and Martin study, the materials upon which patient dis
courses were based were in view. Hence, respondents could easily —and
cohesively—use exophora. By not keeping the stimulus materials in
view, I was successfully able to minimize normal effective exophora. To
put it another way, Rochester and Martin’s findings of increased exophora
amongst schizophrenics may not have been improper exophora. Of course,
it may have been. They do not present enough of their narrative samples
to determine this. They simply considered it undesirable. My methodol
ogy decreased the chances of normal, proper, effective exophora, so
when exophora did occur, it was not the most effective mode of reference.
Narrators could not just point to the stimulus as it was no longer in view.
Therefore, when exophora was used, it was improperly resorted to.
Under these circumstances, exophora is less competent than anaphora
by any standards.
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T he ICS (The Ice Cream Stories) was based loosely upon Wallace Chafe’s
(1980) The Pear Stories. In the latter, subjects were shown a movie, then
asked to narrate what it was that they had seen. Although it was only
about six minutes long, the movie was both too long and potentially too
disturbing to be shown to a psychotic population as it dealt with theft of
pears as well as a fall from a bicycle. Because Chafe wished to elicit
narratives from speakers of a wide variety of languages, there was no
dialogue in the movie. In terms of a psychotic population, a movie with
its attendant paraphernalia was potentially far too distracting.
A very simple 124-second videostory, henceforth called the ICS, was
prepared. T he storyline was simple, but it related an incident familiar to
most Americans. T he first scene pans a shopping center, closing in on
the figure of a little girl looking through the window of a Baskin
Robbins store. T he next scene shows a woman setting a table, and the
same girl walking into the room asking, “Mommy, can I have some ice
cream?” whereupon the mother leans down, puts an arm around her and
says gently, “No, honey, it’s too close to suppertime.” Then a man is seen
walking into the house. T he child walks up to him, touching her body to
his. He says, “Hello, Stefanie.” T h en she asks, “Daddy, can I have ice
cream?” T h e father looks into the camera with a grin, and his hand
moves towards his pants pocket. T h e next scene shows the child walking
towards the Baskin Robbins store, entering, leaning against the counter
as she waits fidgeting. Then a clerk comes into view, asking it he can help
her. She responds inaudibly, but the man repeats clearly, “Double grape
ice.” T h e child plays with coins, still leaning on the counter. T h e man
returns with a very large double-decker cone. T h e girl gives him the
money which he looks at, then rings up on the register. A bell chimes on
the register. T h e man gives her change, and says, “Thank you. Come
again.” T h e girl turns towards the camera with a triumphant smile,
pushes the door and goes out. A sound of “Oh wow” comes from outside
the door. T h e film ends there.
Dialogue was intentionally included in this video in order to test if
patients comprehended normal speech. T h e father is not actually shown
giving the child the money because I wanted to see if patients would
make the logical deduction that he must have given her the money. T he
beauty of such a study is twofold. First, showing it on a small T V in a
lounge area emulated a common occurrence, one familiar to all partici
pants in the study. Second, it was easy to correlate what was said to what
it was the narrator was ostensibly trying to encode.
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[10] Procedure.

The videostory was shown to all subjects individually. Immediately
upon its completion, each was asked to tell what it was he or she had just
seen. Psychotic subjects viewed The ICS on a 12" JVC monitor in a
lounge at Butler Hospital in Providence, R.I. All responses were recorded
on an Olympus Perlcorder which subjects themselves could hold. This
was done to make the situation as nonthreatening as possible. Normal
subjects viewed the tape individually in booths in the Providence Col
lege Audio-Visual Lab, and their narrations were then also immediately
recorded with the Perlcorder upon completion of viewing. As with the
hospitalized subjects, the normals were interviewed one at a time, not in
groups.
This procedure of interviewing each participant immediately upon
completing viewing ensured that the same amount of time had passed in
between viewing and narrating for each subject. In Chafe’s study, all
participants viewed the movie together, but then were taken one by one
to recount what they had seen. Thus, some of his subjects had more time
for the story to “cook” than others did.
[11] Selection of Psychotic Subjects.

As in Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 57-60), patients who had
received EC T treatments or whose psychoses were drug-induced or due
to brain lesions or tumors were excluded from this study, as were patients
who did not receive a discharge diagnosis of schizophrenia or mania.
Also, like Rochester and Martin’s study (1979, p. 58), diagnosis was
arrived at by consensus of the attending psychiatrist, Paul Alexander,
and other members of the treatment team. Diagnosis was according to
DSM I I and DSM III, and all diagnoses were blind as to whether or not
patients had been selected for this study. T he preselected patients were
then invited to participate in the study.
Because this study is concerned with structurally strange speech, not
necessarily strange content, mental health workers on the Intensive
Treatment Unit were briefed to note patients who evinced some of the
features associated with schizophrenic speech: glossomania, neologizing,
gibberish, opposite speech, inappropriate rhyming or punning, word
salads, perseverations, or faulty cohesion (Chaika 1974, 1982a,c). The
actual examples used were:
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• Gibberish
He had [fUc] with [theykra1mz]
• Glossomania, chaining of words or phrases which are not perti
nent to a governing macrostructure, such as a topic of a conversation,
as in:
. . . My m other’s name was B i l l . . . and coo? St. Valentine’s day is
the official startin’ of the breedin’ season of the birds. All buzzards
can coo. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly. T hey work
hard. So do parakeets.. . . ; (Chaika 1974, p. 260)
• Rhyming and alliterating inappropriate to the topic or occasion
of the discourse: I had a little goldfish like a clown. Happy Hallowe’en
down. (Chaika 1974, p. 261)
and, in response to “H ello, anyone here want some coffee?: “Head,
heart, hands, health.” (Chaika 1974, p. 269)
• Neologisms: “ . . . you have to have a plausity of amendments to go
through for the children’s code, and it’s no mental disturbance of
puterience, it is an amorition law.” (Vetter, 1968)
• Word salads and other disturbances in syntax: “ . . . you should be
able to acquire the memory knowledge down on down on the page
in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the position
I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital program.”
(Chaika 1982a)
• Inappropriate repetitions: “ . . . I am being helped but at the same
time that I am being help with the food and the medicate and the
food an medicate and the an the ah rest I feel that I still do not have
this I still not have the thought pattern . . . ” (Chaika 1982a)

It was not expected that any one would necessarily produce all or even
most of these, and, in fact, nobody did. As with other disrupted speech
most of each narrative was decodable, albeit not necessarily by the usual
strategies for comprehension. Of the original 24, 2 were dropped because
it was discovered that they probably had drug-induced psychoses. As a
result of the selection procedure, 22 patients completed the experimental
task. Of these, 14 had discharge diagnoses of schizophrenia and 8 had
discharge diagnoses of mania.
Butler Hospital is a mental hospital affiliated with Brown University
Medical School. Treatment and care is, and was at the time of this study,
a staff matter. All mental health workers met daily with other staff,
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including psychiatrists and psychologists, and with patients. T he workers,
then, were encouraged, as a matter of policy, to pay close attention to
patient behavior, and their observations were taken seriously. T h e team
approach at this hospital lent itself well to selection of appropriate
subjects by the mental health workers.
More importantly, confidence in their judgement was enhanced because
of the precision of the criteria for selection. T he workers and other staff
were briefed by the principal researcher on the structural deviations as
defined in the preceding section. These workers had no part in further
judging the narratives. Rather, two outside raters determined whether or
not each narrative was produced by a psychotic or a normal speaker.
These judgments were made while listening to each tape while reading
its transcript. Judges considered three narratives from normals to be
psychotic and one from a psychotic to be normal. These misjudgments
were not based upon any differences in use of cohesive ties; however,
they were clearly based upon other features of the narratives (Chapter 8).
To assess the reliability of the lay judges’ classification of the narratives,
a phi coefficient was calculated (phi = .91, N = 47). T his confirms the
high reliability of the two judges in making the classification of narra
tives as produced by normal or psychotic narrators. Of the 25 normal
narratives, 20 were judged normal by both judges, 3 were judged psy
chotic by both judges, and 2 were judged psychotic by one judge. Of the
22 psychotic, 21 were judged psychotic by both judges while I was judged
normal by both judges. T h e reasons for these incorrect judgments were
all related to features of the narratives as shown in Chapter 8.
Rochester and M artin (1979, pp. 58-60) used lay judges, asking them
to judge written transcripts and to “ . . . mark those segments which they
had difficulty in following. . . in which the flow of talk seemed disrupted
(p. 59).” On this basis, patients were subdivided into two groups: thought
disordered or nonthought disordered, a dichotomy which commented
on extensively elsewhere by me and my colleague, Richard Lambe
(Chaika 1974, 1981, 1982d; Chaika and Lambe 1985, see Chapter 3). In the
ICS, lay judges selected patients on the basis of disrupted speech.
T h e deviant speech behaviors constitute the operational definition of
the selection process. In short, since we wished to characterize differences
between speech identifiable as “schizophrenic” and normal speech, we
invited as participants only those patients whose speech was first judged
deviant by the attending staff and, upon the initial interview, by the
principal investigator. T h is particular study is concerned solely with
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ascertaining what it is in some schizophrenic speech that causes people to
call it “thought disordered” or “crazy.” T h is has been the thrust in most
of comparisons between normal and schizophrenic speech.
That the patients were preselected for deviance does not prejudice the
formal analysis in any way since the details of the analysis are not
evident in active listening, but required repeated reference to the written
transcripts of the patients’ narratives. T h e kinds of cohesive ties utilized
in this study and the fine grained analysis of the data are independent of
the selection criteria. T his was true also of Rochester and M artin’s study
(1979; p. 56).
[12] Schizophrenic Versus M an ic Speakers.

Several studies have shown that the performance of manics on some
tasks is like that of schizophrenics, so that what is usually thought of as
schizophrenic behavior, such as the constellation of speech disorders just
mentioned also occurs in manics (Chaika 1977; Simpson and Davis 1985;
Kufferle, Lenz, and Schanda 1985).
All psychotic subjects in this study, manics and schizophrenics, were
receiving neuroleptic medications, as well as Lithium and antiparkinson
medications (Alexander, VanKammer, and Bunney 1979). Since the effects
of these medications are to reduce psychotic symptoms, including deviant
speech, if anything they would mitigate deviation, not enhance it. Hence,
any observed differences between the normal and psychotic populations
may be taken to be very real.
T he average stay at the hospital during the time of this study ranged
from 11 to 14 days, and no subject had had previous long-term institu
tionalization. All appeared to understand what was required, and gave
every indication of cooperating in the experiment. All, of course, signed
consent forms and were free to withdraw at any time.
[13] C ooperation.

Since the question of cooperation is of prime importance in a study
such as this, perhaps it should be enlarged upon briefly here. It is
especially important to establish that the psychotic population was trying
to fulfill the experimental task. It may be argued, and has often been,
that such patients produce deviant discourse because they wish to, either
because they want to confound the investigator, or because they are
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especially creative, a stance with which I do not agree (Chaika 1974, 1977,
1981, 1982a). Alternatively, one might argue that the psychotic partici
pants in this study failed because they did not understand what was
expected of them. If, indeed, they were not cooperating or if they did not
understand the task, then our results would be meaningless, because
these rest wholly on the correlation of the narrative to the videostory.
There was every evidence that the psychotic subjects were cooperating
in the speech situation when they told their stories (Chaika 1982e, 1983b)
Briefly, cooperation can be assumed for the following reasons:
• All told narratives that had as their recognizable point of departure,
events from the story.
• Even when subjects digressed, the digressions had as their points
of departure the video story, and most cycled back to the story after
such a digression.
• Many commented on their own performances and/or remarked
that they could not remember something.
• There were attempts to make events and comments in the digres
sions cohere to the narrative as a whole.
• They frequently ended their narratives formally with such phrases
as “that’s the way it was,” “that’s all,” “it made me happy to see that
girl get her ice cream.”
Thus, there was no reason to assume that differences in performance
between normals and psychotics resulted from lack of cooperation. Since,
also, as noted above, none of the patients had had long-term institu
tionalization, and their average stay at the time of this study was two
weeks, institutionalization p er se could not be posited as a principal
cause of differences.
[14] T h e Nonpsychotic Participants.

T he normal subjects consisted of students at Providence College and
members of the community who volunteered after the project was described
to them. T he mean age of normals was 33 and of psychotics 28.2.
The psychotic population was selected on the basis of speech disorder
as described above, as this was what we were testing. Then, a population
of normals was matched as closely as possible in age, occupation, and
social class. Again, these procedures conform to those used by Rochester
and Martin (1979, pp. 57-61).

Understanding Psychotic Speech

140

It must be emphasized, however, that this is not a sociological study,
and the data were not analyzed with social class as a factor. Indeed, one
complicates an argument considerably if social class is used as the expla
nation for schizophrenic performance on a narrative task. For instance,
failures in narration such as using gibberish, or altering time sequences,
or relating incidents not appropriate to the task at hand have never been
correlated with social class, and these were the sorts of dysfluencies
which appeared in this study.
T he entire question of class-related deficiencies in narration is very
cloudy. Early studies by Bernstein (1971) and Schatzman and Strauss
(1972) found deficiencies in working class narrations, but later work,
such as the Labov ouevre, found differences in narrative techniques, but
no deficits (Chaika 1982b). More recent work indicates that the differ
ences lie more in the orality vs. the literacy of a culture than in social
class p e r se (Tannen 1984). Moreover, even though Rochester and Martin
found that schizophrenics perform like Bernstein’s working class youth,
they did not find that only working class schizophrenics performed this
way.

[15] Analysis.

The tapes of the narratives were transcribed by the principal investigator.
Two judges independently verified the transcriptions by comparing
them to the taped interviews. For the reasons discussed below, the cohe
sive ties calculated here were not identical with the categories in the
Rochester and Martin study. Those ties which were decided upon, below,
were isolated and counted by three independent judges from the written
transcription. Any discrepancies were resolved by consensus. Discrepan
cies were found in less than 5% of occurrences of cohesive ties. The
majority of these consisted of one judge missing an obvious tie, such as
inadvertently skipping over a conjunction.
• anaphora (Ap) e.g., he, she, it his, they, her, him, its, their, them.
• temporals (T) e.g., now, then, after, while
• and conjunction (&C) e.g., blue and yellow plaid
• and temporal (&T ) e.g., she went home and asked her mother
• other conjunctions (C) but, for, or, nor, yet
• exophora (Ex.) e.g., I, you, and instances of 3d person pronouns
not referring backwards in the narrative itself
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Given the multiplicity of cohesive devices in any language, neither
Rochester and Martin’s (1979) study nor this one attempted to count all
possible ties. They, however, did count lexical ties, whereas this study,
for two reasons, did not. First, as already shown, lexical cohesion in itself
does not advance the topic of a discourse so that a string of lexically tied
sentences may form an incoherent passage (Fahnestock, 1983). Second,
deciding whether usage of certain words in a discourse are instances of
lexical cohesion is highly subjective, and is even more so when we
consider that lexical cohesion gone awry has long been considered a
characteristic of what has for decades been called “schizophrenic speech.”
As has often been noted (Lecours and Vaniers-Clement 1976; Werner,
Lewis-Matichek, Evans and Litowitz 1975; Maher 1972; Chaika 1974,
1982a), one of the most salient characteristics of schizophrenic speech is
glossomania, which is lexical cohesion. To count lexical cohesion, then,
is to consider the very symptom we wish to explain. Therefore, this study
is confined to pronominalization and conjunctions.
Another difference between this study and Rochester and Martin’s
involves the crucial differences which may be covered by and. Because
and clearly has both a temporal and an additive sense (Levinson
1983:98-99), each of its senses was considered as a separate class. Those
that meant “plus” were counted as and-conjunction (&C), and those
paraphrasable by then were counted as and-temporal (&T), as in:
9A. Max bought poison and fertilizer.
9B. Max went to the store and he bought poison.
In 9A, M ax’s purchases were poison plus fertilizer (&C), and in 9B,
first he went to the store and then (&T) he bought the poison. Since the
videotape offered opportunities for both additive and temporal conjoining,
these were crucial for proper cohesion and for coherence as well.
T he number of instances of each category was divided by the total
number of words (narrative length) for each subject. T he percentages
thus formed were the data for the statistical analysis of cohesive ties.
[16] Results.

A one-way ANOVA with diagnostic type considered a fixed effect
between subjects revealed no overall differences in mean narrative length
(mean number of words per narrative) among schizophrenics, manics,
and normals (F = 0.23; df = 2,44; p > .50).
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T a b le 1. M ean percentages o f total num ber o f words
devoted to different categories of cohesive ties.

Category o f C ohesive Tie
AP

&T

EX

T

&C

C

Totals

13.4

5.0

2.3

2.1

1.4

0.9

25.2

11.6

3.9

4.5

2.4

2.1

1.4

26.9

M anic
N = 8

14.9

2.8

3.8

2.3

2.7

0.9

27.2

T otals

13.1

4.3

3.2

2.3

1.8

1.1

N orm als
N = 25
Schiz.
N = 14

T a b le 2. Sum m ary table o f the one-way, fixed-effects ANOVA
for narrative length com pared am ong the three diagnostic types.
Source
D iagnostic type

SUMSQ

df

M EANSQ

F(obt)

F(crit)

p

1440.82

2

720.41

0.23

E rro r

135508.44

44

3079.73

-

—

-

T otal

136948.85

46

-

-

-

-

-

>.50

A two-way ANOVA with diagnostic type as a fixed effect between
subjects and categories of cohesive ties as a fixed effect within subjects
revealed no overall differences among the three diagnostic types in the
mean percentage of total narrative devoted to cohesion (number of
category instances per narrative) (F = 0.31; df = 2,44; p > .50).
Considering the narratives as a whole, undifferentiated as to diagnos
tic type, there is an overall difference in the mean percentage use of the
six categories of cohesive ties (F = 135.5; df = 5,220; p < .01). Post hoc
comparisons (Hays 1981; Myers 1979) revealed the following pattern of
differences among the categories. Overall, the category with the highest
percentage is Ap (13.1%). This is significantly higher than any other
category. Next is &T (4.3%) which is significantly higher than all those
below except Ex (3.24%). Ex, in turn, is not significantly higher than
either T (2.25%) or &C (1.38%), but does exceed C (1.06%). T, &C and C
do not differ.
There is a significant interaction of the diagnostic types (normal,

143

Cohesion and Coherence
T a b le 3. Sum m ary table of the two-way ANOVA on percentage of total narrative
devoted to different categories of cohesive ties.
Diagnostic type (norm al, m anic, schizophrenic) is treated as a fixed effect

between subjects while category o f cohesive tie is treated as a sam pled effect within subjects.

Source
Betw een Ss
D iagnostic type
E rro r (b)
W ithin Ss
Category
Category X T y p e
E rro r (w)
Total

SUMSQ
292.19

df
46

MEANSQ
2.06
6.55

4.11
288.07

2
44

6333.03
4672.85
142.87

235
5

934.57

1517.31

10
220

14.29
6.90

6625.22

281

-

-

F(crit)

P

0.31

—

>.50

—

—

_

135.50

2.29
1.91

<.05
<.05

—

—

—

-

-

—

F(obt)

2.07

manic, and schizophrenic) with the categories of cohesive ties (F = 2.07;
df = 10,220; p < .05). T he Newman-Keuls procedure (Myers, 1979) was
used to further analyze the differences among the types within individ
ual categories. Within the category Ap the schizophrenics use significantly
less than either normals or manics who do not differ.
Within the category Ex, normals use significantly less than manics or
schizophrenics, who do not differ. When total Ex usage is further divided
into two categories on the basis of (a) personal reference (e.g., I saw.,
then we . . . ) as distinguished from (b) unprepared pronominal reference
(e.g., “she11 went home and asked her mother” with no referent for the
she), the following pattern obtains: the three diagnostic types show no
significant difference in personal reference, Ex(a), (F = 2.71; df = 2,44; p
> .05). No normal subject used any unprepared pronominal reference,
Ex(b), while 4 of the 14 schizophrenic subjects used such reference a total
of 20 times. One of 8 manic subjects used one such reference.
Within the category &T, normals use a significantly higher percentage
than manics, while the schizophrenics do not differ from either. In three
categories (T, &C, and C), the three types show no differences.
To refine the interaction by comparing the categories within each
type, the Bonferroni t-test was used (Myers, 1979). As noted above, there
is an overall difference such that Ap has a higher percentage of use than
any other category. This difference holds for all three types.
Overall, no difference was obtained between &T and Ex, and this
result is sustained among the schizophrenic and manic subjects. But
normal subjects did use a higher percentage of &T than Ex.
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T h e overall difference between Ex and C was reflected in significant
differences for both normal and manic subjects, but was not obtained for
the schizophrenics. T he remaining contrasts agreed with the main effects.

[17] Discussion: Cohesive T ies an d C oherence.

Rochester and Martin’s study concluded that schizophrenics chose not
to use cohesive ties, and that they were more likely than normals to make
exophoric reference, reference which does not refer to an antecedent
word within the sentence or discourse itself.
T his study did not confirm Rochester and M artin’s conclusion that
schizophrenics do not use cohesive ties as frequently as normals. It was
found that normals, schizophrenics, and manics produced narratives of
equal mean length in the ICS task, and used the same mean total percent
of cohesive ties. T hat is, schizophrenics, manics, and normals used the
same overall percentage of cohesive ties per narrative. Moreover, each
group showed significantly more anaphora than other cohesive ties.
T his is not unexpected, as anaphora is commonly used within sentences
as well as across them. Also, since anaphoric words can substitute for
virtually any lexical items, there are more opportunities to use them
than any other type of tie.
However, although each category of respondent used more anaphora
than any other kind of tie, schizophrenics did use significantly less
anaphora than either normals or manics. T h e relative paucity of anaph
ora in the schizophrenic stories appears to have been caused by another
fact of schizophrenic narration. Schizophrenics were more likely than the
others to include matters extraneous to T he ICS. They mentioned people
and occurrences that were not in the videotape, and entwined them with
those that were. Thus they produced more novel references, giving them
fewer opportunities for anaphora, as in:
10. I was watching a film of a little girl and um s bring back
memories of things that happened to uh people around me that
affected me during the time when I was living in that area and she
just went to the store for a candy bar and by the time ooh of course
her brother who was supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much
attention he was blamed for and I didn’t think that was fair . . .
Note that in the above, it is not a matter of deficit in referring
anaphorically. T h e schizophrenic speaker uses anaphoric pronouns
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correctly. If she had not mentioned intrusive matters (the memories that
were brought back, the candy bar and the brother), none of which
occurred in the videotape, she would have have had more opportunity to
produce anaphora which referred to the events of the tape. Instead, she
digresses to idiosyncratic associations which are, nonetheless, clearly
associated to the topic. T he digressions, however, produce new direct
reference rather than anaphora, thus contributing to the reduction in
anaphora.
T he ICS study does not support the conclusion that schizophrenics
and manics lack competence in using cohesive ties. Rather, their opportu
nity for using them is lessened because they did not adhere to a macrostructure in their narratives. Personal memories and other extraneous
factors interfered. As noted above, this seems to be a cognitive factor
associated with the conditions of the illness. There seems to be no
confirmed explanation or intervention for this condition.

[18] T h e Problem of E xophora.

This study found, as did Rochester and Martin’s, that normals use
significantly less exophora than psychotics, perhaps for different reasons.
As already noted, their result may have been task related in a way ours
was not. Rochester and Martin (1979) had subjects describe cartoons
which were in view, whereas ours described the videotape after it was
over, hence gone from view. If the picture being described is in full view,
then the simplest strategy for encoding is simply to refer to it. The
exophora produced by their subjects was, for the most part, referential
exophora. Although, as noted previously, some researchers consider this
inferior reference, this kind of exophora is not dysfunctional and, in
actual interaction, cannot be shown to be inherently less precise than
anaphora.
If, as in T he ICS task, the picture isn’t in view, then the competent
narrator will make the effort to establish who and what is being talked
about before referring to it by a pronoun. Increased exophora in Rochester
and Martin’s study may have been a simplification of the narrative task, a
simplification induced by the presence of the pictures. This is confirmed
by Rochester and Martin’s own finding that there was no difference
between normal and schizophrenic use of exophora in tree interviews.
The difference occurred only when subjects were asked “to describe and
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interpret pictures that are in the immediate situation, but [it d id ] . . . not
[occur] in other contexts” (Rochester and M artin 1979:157).
T h e factors in the Rochester and Martin study which elicited exophora
were successfully prevented in the ICS, but exophora nevertheless did
occur. When it did, it was dysfunctional as it appeared with no prior
referent. T his occurred in 5 out of the 22 psychotic narrations. No
normal used such Exophora at all. It occurred among those with the
most disrupted narratives so that their failing to establish a necessary
referent was part of a larger deficit in narrative construction as shown
below.
T he following boldface examples illustrate this nonreferential exophora
in:
11. um in an ice cream store she was looking in to see if she could
get any she went home. H e r12 mother said wait until dinner. Then
her father came home. She asked him. He said “I don’t know. You’re
going to ask your mother.” T hen she went down to the ice cream
store and bought her own.
T here was no introduction to 11 at all, a distinct deficit in narrative
production. Introductions are an integral part of narratives. Even
the other disrupted psychotic narratives had introductions and part of
the abnormality of this one was clearly its lack of one (Chaika 1982e).
Among other functions, introductions also provide opportunities for
later anaphora. T h e she probably referred to the girl in the video,
but the exophora was unprepared and the form of the narrative was
correspondingly degraded.
12 . . . and I didn’t think that was fair the way the way they did that
either, so that’s why I ’m kinda like asking could we just get together
for one big party or something ezz it hey if it we’d all in which is in
not they’ve been here, so why you jis now discovering it? . . .
Although 12 is a later portion of 10 above, there were no referents for
the boldfaced pronouns. T his narrative, on the sentence level, showed
verbal disruption even to the point of “word salads.”
[19] Conclusions.
T his study of narration has import both for linguistic and for psychiat
ric theory. For the former, the findings are clear. Countable cohesive ties
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are not the sole determinant of coherence and a sense of cohesion itself.
Apart from its usefulness in studying such phenomena as cross-cultural
differences in narrative and other discourse studies, this has ramifica
tions for rhetorical theory as well, an important factor in an increasingly
mechanistic and literate world.
In terms of the problems posed by psychosis, this study found that
overall use of cohesive ties does not distinguish between the populations
under study. This result differs from Rochester and Martin’s (1979:85)
which found that, according to their analysis, normals used more cohe
sive ties overall than schizophrenics. Certainly, we did find that schizo
phrenics used less Anaphora than did the manics and normals. This
seems to be caused by a general inability to suppress material irrelevant to
the situation.
[2 0 ] T h e Problem of N om enclature.

This inability to suppress has been noted often in the literature on
schizophrenia, and seems to be what is meant by such terms as derailment,
tangentiality, pigeonholing, loss o f set, intermingling and attentional deficits.
That is, several terms have been used over the years to describe the same
phenomenon. Perhaps because of the great amount of cross-disciplinary
research into psychotic speech, researchers describing the same phenom
ena give it different names, thereby thinking they have explained, when
all they have done is describe.
Commonly, these terms have been based upon anecdotal rather than
experimentally-gathered evidence. Where evidence has been gathered,
frequently, as noted above, the task has not elicited connected discourse.
Rochester and Martin (1979) corrected that problem in their study. They
asked subjects to recount their narratives while their stimuli, the cartoons,
were still visible, whereas we asked subjects to recount after the stimulus
videostory was no longer visible. This may have created the differences
in results between their study and ours, so that the differences in their
results and ours may be traced to differences both in the tasks and the
methods of analysis in the two studies.
This study shows that psychotics use cohesive devices as often as
normals, but the pattern of such usage differed, so that exophora without
establishing prior reference occurred only in highly disrupted narratives,
those which digressed from the matter of the videostory. This co-occurred
with other deviations in narration.

148

Understanding Psychotic Speech

T here was no general deficit in using cohesive ties in schizophrenics
or manics, nor was there any evidence of deliberate choices not to use
cohesive ties. Where differences occur between normal, schizophrenic,
and manic populations, they seem caused by other factors, such as
digressions which appeared to be genuinely uncontrollable by the patient.
Notes
1This is a favorite phrase of my husband’s.
2Humans naturally interpret speech by reference to the physical, cultural, and
linguistic context in which it occurs. I say “naturally” because even toddlers first
learning to speak clearly expect their utterances to be interpreted in context. If they
know only one word, they will use it in different contexts, expecting adults to
interpret the meaning in that context. If they don’t know the word for what they
want, then they choose the one they do know that can be interpreted in context to
give the message they want, like the toddler who uses button to mean “put on my
clothes,” “cover me with a blanket,” and, pointing at the dog’s face, “eyes.” Babies
and children cannot be taught to do with this language. They just know it.
3Interestingly, this derives from the Greek word for proof. When one points out,
one proves.
4Both these and the temporal subcategories are actually subcategorized even
further, so that, for instance, there is both Causal general and Causal specific. There
is Temporal simple (external only), Conclusive: Simple, and Correlative forms.
5All languages utilize the same processes to effect cohesion. We know of no
language which has no pronouns, for instance, nor do we know of any with no
ellipsis. What differs from language to language is the specific circumstances that
force speakers to use pronouns rather than ellipsis and vice versa.
6Rarely, for special emphasis, an interactant might repeat a known element, but
this is done for emphasis or humor.
7The studies which “proved” this show a clear class bias, as subjects were given a
task typical of middle-class education and then judged by middle-class standards.
When faced with narrating the action showed on cards, nonmiddle-class speakers
referred directly to the pictures, whereas middle-class ones were more likely to
narrate as if the pictures were not in view a (Labov, Robins, Lewis, and Cohen 1968;
Labov 1969; Chaika 1982; 1989J. The middle class has more experience with books
that tell stories independently of any pictures. To illustrate: if one of the pictures
given to subjects showed a boy standing with a bat in his hand before a house with a
broken window, the middle-class person would say, “The boy was playing baseball,
and he broke the window” whereas the nonmiddle-class subject would say, “He was
playing baseball and he broke the window” without first mentioning the noun “the
boy.”
8Given the generally strong evidence that the patients were trying to cooperate in
the task, and given their other genuine disruptions in speaking ability, disruptions
which occur in many patients diagnosed as schizophrenic, and disruptions in speech
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competence not readily controlled by speakers, such as producing word salads,
glossomanic strings, and leaving out a vital element in a syntactic construction, it
seems most likely to us that these omissions are a product of deficit in speech
production.
9The original from which this was taken does not use capitals except on I. I have
repeated that practice here.
10Rochester and Martin speak of TD, thought disordered, subjects. This corre
sponds to the SD, speech disordered, label used throughout this book and my
articles on this subject.
11Although this was technically improper because she was not in view, it did not
impair cohesion since I viewed the video with each patient; hence, it could be
assumed that I knew the referent.
12This and the subsequent examples of pronouns referring to the feminine
singular could be taken as anaphoric to the first mention(s) of she.

Chapter Seven

PRAGMATICS, INTENTION, AND IMPLICATION

Many linguists have tried to sweep pragmatics under the rug as
not being "true" linguistics, an attitude that is happily changing.
Language production and comprehension can be analyzed only
in the pragmatic usage. All analyses of language data have to
proceed from a consideration of the discourses that sentences,
both uttered and written, are embedded in. Realizing that all
language is discourse based empowers analyses of speech and
writing. Context-free explanations do not work. Pragmatic analy
ses include intention and implication, both of which impel
actual speech forms and also guide the hearer's interpretation of
meaning.
[1] P ra g m a tics.

hose aspects of meaning which cannot be explained by the break
down of words in relation to syntactic forms are often relegated to
p r a g m a t ic s . Gordon and Lakoff (1975, p. 83) succinctly characterize this
by noting “ . . . under certain circumstances, saying one thing may entail
the communication of another.” In practice, it has proven difficult to
the point of impossible to draw borders which delim it the scope of
semantics, semiotics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and pragmatics
itself (Levinson 1983, pp. 1-15; Fillm ore 1984). As Kearns (1984, p. 163)
avers “ . . . we do not begin with syntax and then add semantics; the
semantics is prior.”
Many linguistic scholars have labored long and hard to maintain a
boundary between language itself and the practical rules for its use
(Fromkin 1975). Nevertheless, it has been abundantly clear for a very
long time that there is no way to divide the two (Chaika 1977, 1981,
1982b; 1989). Fauconnier (1985) emphasizes that language is pragmatics
and is structured for pragmatic purposes. H e gives as an instance that
there is an assumption that there is a link between an author and his
works, so that “Plato is on the top shelf” typically means “the book by
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Plato. . . ” In Faucconier’s terms, a TRIGGER, the antecedent of the
statement, is linked to the t a r g e t , what is intended to be referred to.
These linkages are pragmatic functions. In disrupted psychotic speech
like word salads, it is precisely these kinds of triggers toward targets that
are lacking.
[2] M eaning and D irect Statem ent.

Because language is essentially pragmatic, meanings are not always
derivable by dissecting the words into their component features, nor by
matching the syntax used with actual meaning. For instance,
1A. S (in a friend’s kitchen): Mmm. Something smells good.
pragmatically means “I ’d like the food that smells so good.” Note here,
also, that although the speaker uses the indefinite something and there is
a universe of good-smelling nonfood items, in fact 1A will be understood
to mean “food.” The reason for this is that it is socially unacceptable to
ask for food in our society. Hence, typically we ask for food in language
which does not directly request, but which nevertheless is unambiguously
a request; therefore elicits a response as if it were a straightforward
request. Note, for instance, one possible response to 1A.
1B. H: I ’m sorry, but it’s for Mary’s birthday party.
This would appear to be a bizarre response to the actual message of 1A
in terms of a conventional semantic interpretation according to the
features of meaning of the component words. There has been nothing
overtly declared in LA that the speaker of IB could be apologizing for.
However, if one knows the social restriction on directly asking for food,
as well as the fact derived from experience (Kearns 1984, pp. 85-121) that
good smelling food tastes good, such an exchange quite ordinarily means
what it does. All that is needed for proper interpretation is reliance on
the discourse rule that one does not state what is known to all parties in
the context, unless one wishes to imply something else. In this instance,
the hearer usually infers that the speaker commented on the odor because
he or she wishes to eat (Sacks 1964-1972; Chaika 1989, p. 125).
Since we are talking about common, uneventful speech events, we
cannot exclude them from linguistic analysis by throwing them into a
wastebasket labelled pragmatics or semiotics. Language is pragmatic. It is
semiotic.
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[3] F orm al Rules of Syntax an d Sem antics.

We have already seen that languages contain orderly syntactic rules
that these rules in and of themselves describe how we produce our
language. T h e do-support rule demonstrated in Chapter 4 is a prime
exam ple. T h e rules for form ing questions seem quite evident and
unyielding:
in order to form questions in English invert the first member of the
verb auxiliary before the subject, but if there is no auxiliary substitute
do in the number and tense appropriate to the rest.
T h e problem is that many questions in social interaction do not
appear in question form, nor are all syntactically well formed questions
really questions. Syntactic rules exist, but without reference to motive,
context, and social rules of obligation, one cannot explain how syntactic
forms are actually interpreted in given interactions. For instance, it is
common to hear questions like:
2A. Is the Pope Catholic?
2B. Does a bear live in the woods?
These apparent questions aren’t questions at all. T hey are answers,
specifically the answer “yes.” Moreover, such answers also imply “the
answer should be obvious to you.” In order to know that, one must
• share cultural knowledge with the speaker.
• assess the context as appropriate for bantering
Although they are regarded as stringently rule-governed, overt syntac
tic forms such as questions and declarative statements may actually take
on different roles in actual discourse, roles not accounted for in their
rules. A statement can actually be a question, as in 2A and B above.
T here is nothing in the actual words and syntax used that would enable
the correct semantic interpretation. Rather, the two social conditions
explain the meaning. T he first condition is fulfilled because we know
who the Pope is and that he has to be a Catholic; therefore, the answer to
2A is “yes.” Instead of saying this, the speaker has offered an obvious
question to which “yes” is the answer. We will shortly see an analogous
situation in which a syntactically declarative sentence is a question.
T hen, too, a question can really be an imperative.
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[4] Speech Acts.
Although people usually think of speech as a way of stating proposi
tions and conveying information, it frequently fulfills neither of these
functions. Much speech serves the purpose of social bonding, just shootin’
the breeze and passin’ the time of day (Chaika 1989, pp. 43, 44, 61, 96,
117). These are out of the provenance of this discussion.
Austin (1962) delivered a now famous series of lectures entitled How to
Do Things with Words which introduced the idea of speech acts. This has
been refined and expanded by numerous scholars, notably Searle (1969),
Gordon and Lakoff (1975), Bach and Harnish (1979), and Kearns (1984),
drastically changing our minds about how meaning is given and gotten.
Austin claimed that much speech actually is a way of doing things like
betting, guaranteeing, in warning, describing, asserting, commanding,
ordering, requesting, criticizing, apologizing, censuring, welcoming,
promising, objecting, demanding, and arguing.1 These they called the
ILLOCUTIONARY FORCES of language.
Certain verbs known as p e r f o r m a t iv e s have been isolated as those
that explicitly state the illocutionary force. This does not mean that such
verbs have to precede or follow a statement for it to have an illocutionary
force. Typically, they don’t appear at all, but one way to test for
illocutionary force is to preface a utterance with “I hereby” + the appro
priate performative, as in “I hereby warn y o u . . . ” If the meaning and
force remain the same, then the original utterance is considered to have
had the illocutionary force denoted by the performative. For instance,
one can say
3A. Get out of here
This admits of the paraphrase
3B. I hereby command you to get out of here.
If, indeed, 3A means 3B, then we can say that 3A has the illocutionary
force of a command. This does not mean that “Get out of here” always
has that force, however. For instance, if my husband is teasing me, and I
laughingly say, “Get out of here,” that can’t be paraphrased by 3B;
therefore, in that instance, the “get out of here” is not a true command. It
has the force of a compliment on his bantering.
3C. Someone’s a little noisy.
3D. This place stinks.
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Both of these can mean 3B “get out of here,” in one of their possible
senses. T hat is, both are paraphrasable as “I hereby command you to
leave.”2 3C can also mean “I hereby warn you to keep quiet.” 3D can
mean “I hereby warn you to clean up.” Actually, these paraphrases are
almost absurdly strained, and many native speakers who can easily
understand the illocutionary force and can easily paraphrase it accu
rately would never think of the hereby-test. I would say a better one is to
paraphrase using the canonical syntactic form. 3C can be restated by, “get
out of here.” T his is the canonical form of an imperative. In another
circumstance, it could be “be quiet,” another imperative.
Recognition of the illocutionary force, expressed explicitly or
implicitly, explains the polysemy of any given utterance, and provides
us with a heuristic for determining which meaning is to be taken in
a given instance. For instance, if a friend, X, asks me to dinner, I
might reply “I ’m eating with Gwendolyn tonight.” What this actually
means depends on the relationship between X and Gwendolyn. If
Gwendolyn irritates X, then X will take my utterance as a warning.
If I say the same thing to another friend who is also friendly with
Gwendolyn and likes her, then the same utterance would have the force
of an invitation. To yet another who doesn’t know Gwendolyn, it becomes
merely an apology.
Additionally, as Silverstein (1987) demonstrates, there are illocutionary
functions in language which do not have a corresponding illocutionary
verb. One example is insult. There is no way to say “I hereby insult you that
. . . ” although one can clearly insult another by overt words or by such mat
ters as intonation and stress. Often insults are more indirect since insult
ing is an overt act of aggression. Still, one can speak of the act of insulting.
We can usually recognize an insult directed at others or ourselves.
Certainly, people sometimes fail to recognize a particular insult, just as
they sometimes think an insult was intended when it was not. Paranoids,
for instance, constantly misinterpret utterances as constituting threats or
insults, even though the speaker denies such intent and others present
do not find a judgment of insult to be warranted. It is true after all that
speakers pretend they didn’t mean to insult or threaten when, in fact,
they did. At some times in his or her life, the paranoid individual may
well have been justified in assuming insult in the face of the insulter’s
denial. T h e major difference between a person who is paranoid and one
who is not is that the former more readily judge remarks as being
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insulting or threatening. If speech acts were not essentially polysemous,
then perhaps people would not be paranoid.
Silverstein (1987, pp. 26-28) insightfully declares that explicit per
formative constructions can be used nonperformatively as well. When
this occurs, the performative “ . . . constitutes the way one can DISCOURSE
A BO U T [caps his]. . . events of social action . . . ” An instance is warn in
its illocutionary function as in “I hereby warn you . . . ” This has quite a
different force than when it is used in the preterit, as in “I warned you.
There are many details of Austin’s and Searle’s formulations which
have been validly questioned, but the basic premises hold. Language is
essentially social. It is not necessarily utilized to inform, although it can
be. Lecturing, for instance, is speech primarily to inform. As such,
lecturing typically occurs in settings like classrooms and auditoriums,
which exist for the function of informing. The degree to which society
restricts language in its informative function is illustrated by our avoid
ance of a person who habitually lectures, that is, informs us all of the
time. Such a person is a bore. Informing is a part-time function of
language.
Given the social purposes of language, one might well expect that
psychotic speech shows rather too little illocution. Johnston (1985, p. 81)
claims that developmentally disordered children, notably the autistic,
show an inability to handle illocutions effectively, a finding consonant
with the general social disability of such children. The disordered speech
most typically considered schizophrenic also lacks illocutionary force.
That is one of the problems with it. We can find no social purpose in
much of it. In other words, a measure of schizophrenic social disability is
seen in the infrequency of illocution in peculiarly schizophrenic language.
This does not mean that schizophrenics suffer only from a social disability,
as claimed by Rutter (1985).
Because speech act theory demonstrates that utterances can mean
something quite different from what a segmentation of words and syntax
would yield, some people have mistakenly assumed that one can willynilly supply “missing” phrases and sentences in highly deviant discourse
to make it all come out normal. The reasoning seems to be, “if speech
acts show us that much is not actually stated, then let us assume that
deviant schizophrenic speech is deviant only because they left out a bit
too much.” However, speech act theory allows one to fill in unspoken
items only by principled means.3

156

Understanding Psychotic Speech

[5] In ten tion and M otive.

Meaning is dependent on perceived intent. Sanders (1987, p. 75) goes
so far as to say that it is a truism that “uttering an expression of language
is always volitional and therefore purposeful.” Needless to say, he was
not talking of an impaired population, although, independently, psy
chiatry has traditionally operated on this presumption as well.
Searle (1983, p. 150) gives a pragmatic view of intention, showing that
rules become progressively irrelevant as one becomes proficient, so that
one’s rules become “progressively irrelevant” and one concentrates on
one’s intended goals. He was speaking directly about physical skills like
skiing, but this view can be applied to language skills as well. Many
linguistic processes do become internalized. Neural pathways get forged.
Lieberman (1984) says this had to have happened in order for language
to have evolved. Clearly much of our language expertise is automated.
We don’t have to think about the initial sound in a word we intend to
retrieve. If we intend to talk about a car, we don’t have to stop to think of
its first sound, then the second, and the last. Years of teaching phonetics
have shown me how difficult it is even to analyze the actual sounds one
uses in words. Similarly, for ordinary spoken sentences, we don’t have to
think about the grammar rules we have to apply. All we do is intend to
convey a message and our language processors take over. It is only when
encoding new or difficult things that conscious choices have to be made
once one knows one’s native language. Because speech is prim e, most
people experience difficulty when having to write their thoughts down
because that function is not so automated as speech.
Searle (1983 p. 29) declares:
It is the performance of the utterance act with a certain set of intentions
that converts the utterance act into an illocutionary act and thus imposes
Intentionality on the utterance.
Whereas it is true that speakers may announce their intent, typically they
do not. If one party does announce intent, they may use a performative,
as in
4A. Look, Mabel, I ’m telling you . . .
4B. I promise you that I ’ll go on a diet next week.
4C. I have to apologize to you for my behavior . . .
Besides the use of performative verbs, there are other devices to signal
intent overtly such as the [Look + NAME] construction in 4A above.
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Words like please announce a request. Expressions like let’s talk turkey
indicate an intent to get down to brass tacks, that is, to stop beating around
the bush and to get to the heart o f the matter. All of these indicate that the
speaker wishes to negotiate directly without polite indirection. T he
reason that they sound so blunt is that in most social circumstances
intention is deduced not overtly stated.
Our intention or motive shapes what we choose to say and how we are
going to say it. Speech acts include intention as part of their meaning
(Bach and Harnish 1979, pp. xiv-xv, 12; VanDijk 1980, p. 265; Searle
1983, pp. 26-29; 145-155). In fact, speech acts cannot be interpreted
unless one comprehends the intent behind them. T h e rejoinder, “What
did you mean by that?” challenges a speaker’s intention in saying what
he or she did. T his is never used to mean, “What was your m eaning?” It
always means “what was your m otive?” It is never a way of asking the
meaning of the words and syntax used. If hearers cannot ascertain that
kind of meaning the correct response is “H uh?,” “Excuse me, but I don’t
quite understand,” or a variety of other requests for a paraphrase or
repetition of what was said.
An example of genuinely misunderstood intent was one that I observed
in the faculty lounge. When a male professor said to a female one, “Lord,
this place is dirty.” T h e female then got up and started to clear the coffee
cups and napkins off the tables. T h e male then said, “I didn’t want you to
clean up. Where’s the janitor?”
A playful misinterpretation of intent occurs if I murmur, “It’s a little
noisy in here.” and my son responds, “Yes it is,” without doing anything
to make the noise abate. H e pretends that he has failed to perceive my
intent in commenting on the noise. Like so much humor, this works as a
play on ordinary pragmatic strategies which we share. He treats my
utterance as a statement of fact not as a command to lower the volume. A
good deal of humor depends on such misperceptions, as in the exchange:
[walking on street] S: Excuse me, sir. Do you know where the Palace
Hotel is?
H : Yes. [walks on]
Silverstein (1987) maintains that illocutionary acts “represent. . . intents
to perform effective, socially understood acts with speech” (p. 28).” Inten
tion has to be derived as part of the meaning of the utterance. As we have
just seen, the particular illocution that we understand depends on what
we perceive the speaker’s intention to be, so that “it’s noisy here” could
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be an excuse for my leaving the room, or it could be a command to be
quiet. The speech act itself is contained in the intention of its utterance.
Brown and Yule (1983, pp. 68-88; 77-78) contend that there is no way
to analyze the topic of another’s speech without knowing why something
was said; that is, its intent. Without knowing the speaker’s intent, there is
no way to evaluate his or her contribution to a conversation either. We
don’t even know if the person is cooperating and attempting to talk on
the same subject we are. If one assumes that a speaker is deliberately
being obscure, then one ascribes a lack of cooperation to him or her.
DeBeaugrande and Dressier (1981, p. 112) assert that the only way
utterances can be used to communicate is if the speaker intends them to
be communicated and the hearer accepts them as intended. Such accep
tance is a usual practice. Hearers almost always do accept utterances as
intended. Therein lies a problem. Intent is derived from what the speaker
has said and the general context of utterance, such context including the
relationship and mutual history of the interactors. SD productions do
not provide the normal cues necessary to determine intent, hence, to
determine meaning. If we misperceive intent we will misperceive meaning.
Notice my contention is not that the speech is purposeless. T he patient
might very well have intended something, but could not say it coherently
enough to be understood.
Our familiarity with the forms of speech acts also aids in our inter
pretation. With an SD population, utterances may not be evocative of
any particular speech acts and words may be mismatched to the context.
T he question then becomes not so much “What was the intent?” but “Can
we interpret this at all? Can we ascertain what the intent was? If so, how?”
For instance, what could possibly be the intent of
5. I had a little goldfish too like a clown. Happy Halloween down.
6. St. Valentine’s Day is the official breedin’ season of birds. All
buzzards can coo. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly. They
work hard. So do parakeets.
Sanders (1987, p. 76) attempts to show that it is possible to assign
meaning even when one can not determine what illocutionary force of a
sentence. His example is a sign:
We will be closed for inventory Sunday and Monday, June 12-13,
and will reopen at noon on Tuesday, June 14.
He maintains that we do not know whether or not this is an excuse, a
warning, advice, a promise, or an invitation to return. That is, we don’t
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know the intent, but we do know the meaning. It seems to me to be more
correct to say that we understand the event described, but we don’t
understand its meaning.
Sanders is correct that the same sentence could be used in all of those
illocutionary forces. It is, therefore, ambiguous. However, it would be
quite strange if the reader did not consider it first and foremost as an
invitation to return after those dates. If the sign were posted before those
dates, and if the store sold items that people could not readily purchase
elsewhere, or items that cost a great deal more elsewhere, then, most
likely, people would take it as a warning and an invitation to stock up
before those dates. In fact, the “what can it possibly mean in this context”
strategy (Chaika 1976), kicks in so that the reader matches the sentence
with the date and time, the probable intentions of the poster of the
sign, and other relevant knowledge to decide the illocutionary force.
The illocutionary force may be potentially ambiguous, but like other
ambiguities, it is resolvable by reference to the context. If it is not so
resolvable, then the recipient of the message can resort to overt question
ing like, “What did you mean by that?” or “What am I supposed to be
getting out of that?” SD psychotics rarely can answer such questions
relevantly.
An examination of discourse regarded as particularly schizophrenic
reveals a paucity in the very sorts of paraphrasing and metalinguistic
comments that show a stable intention or purpose in communication.
Much of the speech is not paraphrasable at all, but all normal speech
is. Nunberg (p. 204) says that we assume that “ . . . speakers have no
ulterior motive for behaving in a way that is irrational from a strictly
informational point of view.” Many of the interpretations of psychotic
speech we see (i.e., Forrest 1976; Searles 1967) proceeds from a basic
strategy of assuming that irrational speech can derive from rational
goals, and that the speech is merely suffering from oblique phrasing.
If impairment of speech processes is so degraded that normal decoding
processes do not work, we cannot assume a purpose in it.

[6] Preconditions.

Besides motive and intent, another vital pragmatic consideration fig
ures strongly in interpretation. Part of meaning lies in the social circum
stances in which a meaning is appropriate, the very p r e c o n d it io n for
its utterance. Austin’s term for these are f e l i c i t y -conditions (Lyons
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1972, pp. 604-606, 727-738). An example is the statement perceived as a
question:
7. You live in Providence.
T his evokes a reply appropriate to the question “Do you live in
Providence?” such as “Yes . . . ” or “No, I live in Foster.”
Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 78) explain that statements will be heard
as questions, commands, or other requests if the preconditions for uttering
them are met. In order to ask a question successfully, one must have the
right to ask that question, the hearer must have the knowledge to answer
it, and in some way must have an obligation to respond. If these three
conditions are met, then, as in 7 the hearer will act as if she had been
asked a question in canonical question form. Similarly, in order for a
command to be successful, the commander must have the right to com
mand and the hearer has the obligation to obey that command or is
willing to. If those conditions are met, then the hearer will respond as if
the command had been given in imperative form. For instance, if a boss
asks “Any more coffee?” the secretary might answer. “Oh, I’ll make
some right away.” Alternatively, she might say, “Oh, I ’m sorry, but I
didn’t get a chance to buy any beans.” An apology for noncompliance is
a socially proper response in our society to what we hear as commands,
even those not in overt imperative form. T h e essentially social rules
of preconditions behind utterances override the actual syntactic form
of messages.
Labov and Fanshel (1977) show how a mother manipulates her daugh
ter by playing with these preconditions. Rhoda is locked into a power
struggle with her mother. T h e mother goes to visit a sister, leaving
Rhoda to handle the domestic affairs at home. Rhoda does not want to
have to admit overtly that she needs the mother at home, so Rhoda asks,
“Well, when do you plan t’come home?” T h e mother responds with “Oh,
why?” in order to force Rhoda to admit that she needs help. T h e mother
clinches it by saying “Well, why don’t you tell Phyllis that [you need my
help at home]” Phyllis is Rhoda’s sister. Labov and Fanshel show that
Rhoda has been outmaneuvered on two counts. First, the m other has
forced the admission from Rhoda. Second, it is up to the mother to
decide when she is coming home. It is not Phyllis’ place to do that.
Considering this, the mother has also managed to tell Rhoda that Phyllis
is the favored daughter, and has done so simply by manipulation of the
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preconditions for questioning. Notice that the claim here is based upon
general rules for interaction.
The difference between a truth-conditional interpretation and a prag
matic one is illustrated by:
7. Max broke the crystal stemware.
If, indeed, Max has broken the item(s) referred to in 7, this would be
considered to be in the realm of semantics. However, if this is said as
a way of commenting on Max’s clumsiness or, alternatively, on his
vindictiveness, then we would be dealing with pragmatics. T he actual
meaning derived depends on the context of the utterance, including
what the speaker and hearer have already said, what their topic of
conversation is, what they know about Max from other encounters both
with and without him, and what their motives are or are presumed to be.
If one accepts a dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics such
that truth conditional statements alone belong in the former category,
then semantics can virtually never account for meaning in social inter
action. This applies mutatis mutandis to written sentences, except, of
course, those which have been deliberately fabricated to show a dichot
omy between semantics and pragmatics.
Meaning is actuated as much by implication as by direct statements.4
By definition, implication refers to meanings not directly encoded onto
syntactic structures or on the lexical items chosen in a given expression,
but this does not mean that an utterance means whatever we wish it to.
There are strategies and recognized conventions in a language that
constrain interpretation in any given instance.
Although the necessary processes in derivation of meaning in the
sorts of actual circumstances depicted above are more than passingly
embarrassing for those committed to context-free grammars or to the
establishment of algorithms to explain syntax and semantics, we cannot
simply relegate them to some convenient bin labelled “pragmatics” or
“semiotics.” Pragmatics explains the actual sentences and words that are
used in interactions. It is not peripheral to linguistics. In fact, any syntax
that doesn’t include pragmatics is trivial because it doesn’t explain how
people actually use grammar, nor does it explain how listeners derive
meaning. Thus, it can be seen that the semantic strategies frequently
relegated to pragmatics are part and parcel of how we produce and
interpret language.
Fillmore (1981, p. 147) sums up the pragmatic approach to meaning
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. . . an analysis [should be] carried out in sociolinguistic terms in which
the identity, location, and relative social statuses of the participants in
the communication act are taken into account, together with a descrip
tion of the social or institutional occasion within which the discourse
was observed or within which it could be produced. Of particular
interest, of course, is the correlation of these items with formal linguis
tic phenomena.
Fillmore (1984, p. 88) goes so far as to say that “there is probably no
need for a level of semantic representation. . . ” He argues (p. 89) that
one learns and understands words in contexts, and that words are used in
association with those contexts. H e gives as an example the term being on
land, saying that this evokes a context of comparison with being at sea,
whereas being on the ground evokes a contrast with being in the air. T he
truth conditional meaning, including the m eaning derivable from
dissecting each word into its component features cannot account for the
actual meaning of any of these phrases. For instance, all one gains from
such a dissection of being on land is that it refers to the physical state of
being on dry land. In practice, however, that is not its meaning. If asked
where S is phoning from, for instance, given the response “I ’m on land,”
H would be correct in assuming that the speaker had recently disembarked
even if H did not even know S5 much less S’s travel plans.
Fillmore (p. 91) offers yet another such example, this time the sentence:
8. T he menfolk returned at sundown.
He points out, rightly I think, this sentence wouldn’t occur in an all
male community of workers, as, in actual usage, the word menfolk implies
a contrast with females and children. Despite the fact that the word
literally means “m en,” it cannot be used to refer to men unless they are
in a heterogeneous community.
It is very important to take note of the kinds of arguments marshalled
above to justify interpretation. While it is true that the actual meaning of
an utterance may be different from what has ostensibly been said, there
are clear bounds on possible interpretations. Appeal is made to statable
rules of discourse interpretation, rules which include but are not limited
to cultural and social facts, rules which are empirically verifiable by
investigating what meanings native speakers derive from interactions
presented to them. Such interpretations do not depend on theoretical
constructs formulated in the absence of inquiry into actual speech
behavior.
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[7] Im plicature and Conversational M axim s.

Grice (1975; 1981) spoke of implicatures arising from the violation of
the four c o n v e r s a t io n a l m a x im s : quality, quantity, relation, and man
ner (p. 45). These maxims entail such principles of discourse as
•
•
•
•
•
•

Say what you believe to be true.
Do not say anything for which you lack adequate evidence.
Be as informative as required for the purpose of current exchange.
Don’t say more than required.
Say what is relevant to the matter at hand.
Be orderly, unambiguous, and not obscure.

It is certainly obvious that these maxims are regularly violated. People
do lie, do give opinions with no evidence for them, do hold back
information, are prolix, mislead intentionally or unintentionally by
ambiguity, poor phrasing, and poorly sequenced narration. Then, too,
what does Grice mean by required? How is one to know exactly how
much is required? What is too little, and what too much? What will a
hearer find relevant, and what is likely to strike a hearer as being not
relevant or ambiguous? T he partial answer to such questions is that
whatever satisfies a cospeaker is enough. It is unlikely that we will ever
have a firm measure which will tell us when “enough” has been achieved.
There are sufficient linguistic and paralinguistic resources for cospeakers
to indicate whether or not “enough” has been provided.
Grice did not say that conversants actually are cooperative, just that
they are presumed to be, and from this, important facets of meaning
derive. Grice (1975, p. 45) says that “Our talk exchanges do not normally
consist of a succession of disconnected remarks and would not be rational
if they did.” Of course, it is just such disconnected utterances which gives
us the feeling that certain speech is “schizophrenic.” T he question then is
whether psychotic speech flouts (Grice’s term) the maxims. Certainly
normal speakers do, but there is a qualitative difference between normal
flouting and psychotic SD productions. The term flout itself implies
volition and when we examine Grice’s examples of flouting we easily
understand the volition behind them. That is the flouting is a deliberate
way to give an implication.
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[8] Violating the M axim of Quality.

One violation of the maxim of quality is lying. Lies do not necessarily
violate language rules. T hey violate the larger conversational rules such
as Grice’s maxim of quality, Searle’s cooperation principle, and Gordon
and Lakoff’s sincerity principle (1975). Actually, the lie consists of falsify
ing intent, not necessarily of falsifying information. Of course, it can
consist of both.
T he stigma of lying inheres in its status as a violation of trust. With the
exception of “white lies,” lying is considered particularly despicable.6
T he white lie is represented as being intended to ameliorate the anguish
that would proceed from full disclosure. Notice that this type of lie is
representable as an innocent, hence not real, violation of the maxim of
quality because the intent of S is beneficent.
But what of the violation that has neither an intent to deceive nor to
ameliorate? If the S believes that the given utterance is true, then it is
error or delusion. If S knows that it is not true and is not offering it as
truth, then it is fantasy. A genuine lie occurs only if S knows that it is not
true and intends to offer it as truth.
Carlson (1983, pp. 103-104) denies that implicature is derivable from
violations, asserting that if true violations of conversation occur, then
incorrect implications result. It is true that people deliberately deceive,
but in that case, the speaker is banking on the hearer’s interpreting
according to usual premises. T h e lie works only if the hearer assumes
that the truth has been told.
[9] T h e M axim of Q uantity: Inference.

T here are always meanings left unsaid, indeed, which must be left
unsaid. To specify each and every meaning and connotation intended
would slow down interaction drastically. Because this would also lead
to tedious belaboring of point upon point, cospeakers would get so
mired in detail that they would lose the thread of organization in the
communication. A plethora of information makes it difficult to get the
point of what is being said. Moreover, as we have seen (Chapter 6),
cohesion is enhanced by having hearers match the utterance to the
context and fill in what has not been said.
Levinson (1983, p. 106) shows how the maxim of quantity adds “ . . . to
most utterances a pragmatic inference . . . to the effect that the statement
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presented is the strongest, or most informative that can be made in the
situation.” as in
9A. Nigel has fourteen children.
T he implicature here is that Nigel has no more and no less than
fourteen children. This is readily seen if one adds only to 9A, as in
9B. Nigel has only fourteen children.
9A and B are usually assumed to be synonymous. It would be more
than passingly odd, indeed irritating, if, the speaker of 9A at a later time
said, “Now, Nigel’s fifteenth chi l d. . . . ” An appropriate response to that
would be “I thought you said that Nigel has only fourteen children!”
This response proves the implication that has been given when using the
nonmodified term of quantification, as in 9A above.
The bizarreness of some psychotic speech is explicable in terms of a
violation of quantity. T he following response is to a request to identify
the color on a chip from the Farnsworth-Munsell disc #39 (Cohen 1978,
1-34). The comment within the parens is Cohen’s).
10A. Green (SH OU TS!). Hold on, the other is too! In the garden
such a green is unlikely. The other is more gardenreal, piecemeal,
oatmeal green, greenreal, filmreal, greenreal.
The patient correctly identifies the disc, but then goes on to add
clearly extraneous material which goes way beyond what is needed to
identify the disc. Moreover, as the response continues it adds on increas
ingly extraneous verbiage.
[10] T h e M axim of R elation : Relevance.

T he maxim of relation could well be termed the maxim of assumed
relation. As part of our making sense of utterances, we assume a rele
vance (Chapters 9 and 10). Our doing this leads to some interesting
implications. For instance, one of the ways that people waffle, is to imply
relevance where none exists.
For instance, Z wishes to take a day out of work for personal reasons,
but has no “personal days” left, so he informs the boss that he is not
coming in Monday. When the boss asks why, he responds, perhaps with
truth, “I ’m having some nasty physical problems I ’d rather not talk
about.” T he boss naturally assumes that the day off is related to the
problems, even if it is not. Moreover, the boss assumes that the problems
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are not self-imposed, like having a hangover from a wild party Sunday.
H ere the m axim of relevance leads to im plications based upon the
hearer’s strategy of assuming relevance.
Perhaps the trait many would consider most characteristic of schizo
phrenic speech,7 is its frequent inappropriateness to whatever task is at
hand, or, rather, the difficulty in uncovering any relevance. Again using
Cohen’s (1978) data elicited from Farn sworth-Munsell disc #39:
10B. T h e eentsy beentsy spider went up his m other’s spot. Out
came the rain the color of green snot.
10C. T h is isn’t such a bad green. Rem inds me of a picnic on the
green. Yes! Picnic green.
One problem with 10B is that the situation called for a direct answer as
the first part of the response. T h e patient nowhere indicates that this is
an answer to the question posed. One supposes it must have been an
answer only by the reference to green snot. Sim ilarly, 10C starts with a
value judgm ent rather than the direct labelling of the color. T h en , in the
reverse order of what the speaker of 10A did, he goes from the extraneous
to the specific. N either the value judgm ent nor the com parison is called
for here, as the conventions of Am erican questioning demand that first
one must answer the question asked as directly and econom ically as
possible.
[ 1 1] T h e M a x im of M a n n e r: O rderliness.

T h e m axim requiring speakers to be orderly results in the im plication
that if actions are presented in a certain order, that is the order in which
they occurred. For instance, to use his exam ple
11A. Taking off his trousers, the King of France went to bed.
11B. T h e King of France took off his trousers and went to bed.
11C. T h e King of France went to bed and took off his trousers.
T h e im plication is clear in the first two that the King took his trousers
off first, but in the third, he went to bed before divesting him self of
trousers. It is, of course, possible to present events out of th eir actual
order, but only by using words indicating the actual order, as in
11D. Before he went to bed, the King of France took off his trousers.
11E. After he went to bed, the King of France took off his trousers.
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Similarly, cause and effect can be implied by order of presentation,
as in
12A. She went skiing and broke her leg.
The implication is that the skiing was the cause of the injury. Notice
the change in meaning of
12B. She broke her leg and went skiing.
So strong is the assumption that the order in which utterances are
given is significant for interpretation that some implications can simply
occur by juxtaposing two comments. Sometimes this itself creates a lie.
For instance, consider this exchange
13A. Max: Bobby’s gas station was robbed last night.
13B. Tony: I saw Melvyn there at midnight.
The implication is that Melvyn must have committed the robbery.
Why else would Tony have made that remark localizing someone’s pres
ence at a time that qualified as being the time of robbery. Note that this
implication can be directly negated
13C. Max: No, dummy. Melvyn noticed the open door and went to
check it out. He was the one who called the police! He couldn’t have
done it.
The very denial in 13C shows the implicated meaning caused by the
juxtaposition. Like the giving of false information, creations of false
implication do not always proceed from the desire to deceive. There can
be many sources of violations. They can be a result of poor judgment of
what the context requires, of cross-cultural differences in communicative
practices, of misexecution of intended speech, or of impaired faculties.
Violation of orderings abound in schizophrenic speech, so much so
that that even simple cause and effect relations are misordered. This
occurs when there is no implication derivable from such misordering, as
in
14A. She . . . leaves the ice cream and eats it.
14B. She ate the ice cream and brought it home.
Insufficient contextualizing also causes problems of interpretation.
Fauconnier (1985) lays the blame for ambiguity on uncertainties in the
discourse situation itself. Context also changes our perception of presup
positions (Gazdar 1978). Carlson (1983, p. 152) claims the contrary situation:
that one can almost always invent a context for any sequence of sentences
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which seems unrelated. This is too strong a claim. First, in order to prove
such a contention even for normal speech, we would have to present
subjects with a potpourri of sentences, possibly taken from widely different
sources, and then see if they could invent contexts for such a conglomerate
of sources. Second, he was speaking of normal linguistic production.
One of the problems with disorganized psychotic speech is that it defies
our ability to provide a context to make it intelligible. A reprise of two
utterances shows the problem:
15A. After John Black has recovered in special neutral form of life
the honest bring back to doctor’s agents must take John Black out
through making up design meaning straight neutral underworld
shadow tunnel (Lorenz 1961)
15B. . . . you have to have a plausity of amendments to go through
for the children’s code and it’s no mental disturbance of puterience,
it is an amorition law. (Laffal 1965)
Finally, even if one can find a context in which those utterances would
fit, one still cannot be sure that the speaker intended the unrelated
sentences to belong to the invented context.
Along with being disorderly, schizophrenics may also appear obscure
and ambiguous, Grice’s term for other violations of maxim of order,8
seen in 15A and B above. If we assume that speech has been purposely
produced in accordance with the maxims, the very terms Grice has
chosen, obscure and ambiguous, carry as part of their semantic load the
“deliberate obfuscating.” Hence, except perhaps in scholarly writing,
these terms comprise negative evaluation.

[12] T h e M axim of Response.

To the above maxims, Grice (1981, p. 189) later added yet another:
Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply.
In other words, cospeakers assume that they are to respond according
to the form and content of each others’ utterances. This is both a social
and a linguistic matter. Obviously, such matters as topic and lexical
choice are constrained by previous utterances in an interaction, by those
of previous interactions or other matters pertinent to the context of
interaction. Constructions are also syntactically formed so that certain
replies are both possible and invited. To illustrate, how, who, what, when,
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and where all are words referring to specific constituents of the sentence
or of the discourse, asking the cospeaker(s) to supply, respectively, a
reason, a person, a thing, a time, and a place. Here, too, one sees that
much speech disordered schizophrenic speech is not formed so that it
controls responses. For instance
16. My mother’s name was B i l l . . . And coo? St. Valentine’s day is
the start of the breedin’ season of the birds.. . .
[13] Violations.

T he maxims which Grice proposed will generate meaning as much by
their being breached as by their being honored (1975, pp. 52-56). Under
standing their role in meaning equips us to explain many implicatures9
in a non-ad hoc manner. For instance, Grice (1982, p. 184) demonstrates
the effect of a speaker’s deliberately violating the maxim of quantity
by damning with faint praise when asked to give a recommendation is
such an example. Consider the situation in which X has applied for a
teaching job in a philosophy department, and his mentor, A, writes as a
recommendation:
Dear Sir, Mr. X ’s handwriting is clear and he is always neatly
dressed.
This strongly implies that X is not a good philosopher. Why else
would A not mention his abilities? It is not that A is uncooperative. If
that were the case, then he or she wouldn’t have written at all. Similarly,
if A is X ’s mentor, then A must know X ’s worth as a philosopher. Since A
knows that the future employer is expecting to hear about a person’s
abilities relevant to the job being applied for, he or she can assume that if
A doesn’t mention those, but instead mentions clearly irrelevant facts,
then the employer would get the implication that speaker doesn’t want to
say that the person has poor capabilities. A failure to mention relevant
information is clearly perceived as evasion, and evasion itself is fre
quently perceived as an unwillingness to give bad news, in this instance
that the candidate is not fit for the job.
What the violations show is that we cannot assume that speakers
always or even usually follow conversational maxims, but that cospeakers
typically assume that the maxims are being followed. In other words,
maxims characterize effects on the hearer. They don’t necessarily charac
terize speaker behavior.
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Sanders cautions that the possibility of an implicature does not guaran
tee that one will be inferred (1987, pp. 67-68). Even when an implicature
can potentially be achieved by a breach of a maxim, H may attend only
to the propositional content of the utterance. This, of course, can also
occur when H realizes that an implicature has been made, but chooses to
ignore it. In this instance, H may decide to comment on or otherwise
respond to an implicature at a later date as if it had actually been
encoded in words.10
[14] Modality.

T he very syntax of a language itself has syntactic forms designed to
express the speaker’s attitude towards what he or she is saying. These are
m o d a l it y markers. T he examples that spring to mind are the m o d a l
AUXILIARIES like ca n , m ay, m ig h t, s h o u ld , c o u ld , w ill, w o u ld , and m ust.
Introductory adverbs like p ro b a b ly , s u rp ris in g ly , d o u b tfu lly , and phrasal
adverbs like it is certa in th at and it is s u p p o s e d that all fill this function.
[15] M itigating.
MITIGATORS are speech forms which background their messages,

lessening the possibility of overt confrontation. They may be used to
deny what one feels. These are directly involved in what is called s a v in g
fa c e (Goffman 1955), and are important determiners of how messages are
given. We have already seen these in the guise of commands or questions
that are couched in apparently ordinary statements. Language abounds
with mitigators, such as
17A. You’ll never believe this, b u t . . .
17B. I know I ’m no expert, b u t . . .
17C. And I haven’t got into that but—I don’t know—I —I ju st—like,
you have your set way of doing things and you’re in con trol. . .
This last, 17C, comes from a conversation between a female schizo
phrenic and a medical student (Chaika 1981, 1983a). T he patient is
speaking, trying to indicate disagreement with the medical student.
Because social and professional power clearly reside in him, she has to
mitigate her expressions of doubt (Chapter 11).
Robin Lakoff (1975) documents such excessive mitigating as being
typical of women, showing that they are actually inferior to men in social
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status even under the best of circumstances.11 O’Barr (1982) amends this
to include males in an inferior position as well, a discovery he made
while investigating weak versus powerful language amongst witnesses in
court trials.
Fowler (1985, p. 73) includes mitigators in the category of modality, a
sound practice since they can often be used interchangeably, so that the
following seem to be equivalent for many contexts
• I might accept his apology.
• Perhaps I will accept his apology.
• It is possible that I will accept his apology.

Fowler also shows that tag questions are mitigators, often used as
expressions of doubt. Robin Lakoff pegged these early on as being
softeners of assertions, as in
• You’re not going, are you?
• Tastes good, doesn’t it?
All of the mitigators in language are so pervasive that we frequently
don’t notice the effect they have on our judgments about the speaker.
Sometimes our “intuitive” feeling that someone is especially uncertain
and ill at ease arises because of the number of mitigators in his or her
speech.12
[16] In d irect M eaning.
We have already seen that meaning can be gained directly from the
semantic features on words. Factorial analysis of features explains some
IMPLICATIONS as well (Chapter 5). Many words in and of themselves
connote opinion: riot or demonstration; invade or land; instigate or encourage,
all can be used to indicate whether or not the speaker approves of what is
being spoken. Such terminology is not confined to the press. We even see
it in putative objective scholarship. In his book on psycholinguistics,
Mowrer speaks of Chomsky as instigating a theory of grammar. T h e verb
alone tells us of Mowrer’s disapproval of Chomsky.
Sometimes word choice can indicate far more reaching implications,
as in:
18A. T he tuna fishermen are still m urdering the dolphins.
18B. T h e tuna fishermen are still killing the dolphins.
T h e word murder literally means that killing was done by a human to
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a human. This is what distinguishes it from kill for instance.13 As part of
the actual meaning of the expressions in 18A, simply by my choice of
murder I have claimed that, in my eyes, what the fishermen are doing is
as bad as killing humans. We assume that this is my belief because I have
chosen that particular verb and it is always presumed that an utterance
reflects the speaker’s point of view. This, of course, has tremendous
implications about my belief systems, my moral codes, and my empathy.
In contrast, although 18B can be used to express my disapproval of
what the tuna fishermen are doing, it does not necessarily entail my
belief that causing dolphins to suffer is as wrong as causing people to.
However, in context it certainly could both mean and imply what 18A
does if, for instance, prior experience with me or overt statements made
before 18B established such feelings.
[17] Im plicature and the Sentence.

Implication can be effected on the level of the sentence by using or not
using certain paraphrases. Thus, one reason for using the passive is to be
able to omit the agent or cause, but all the while implying that one was
there. Even if the agent or cause is omitted, the implication of a passive is
that one or the other was involved, that the proposition is not about
something which just happened. This is the difference between “he
died” and “he was killed.”
Another implication of an agentless sentence is that the agent is not
important enough to mention, or that such mention is beside the point.
In this category, there is what I call the “housewifeless” passive, as in
19A. T he beds got made.
19B. T he dinner is cooked.
19C. T he house was cleaned.
These examples of agency or its lack thereof by no means exhaust all
of the resources of sentence grammars to create implications, but is
sufficient to the task at hand. Kearns (1984, p. 67) maintains that sen
tences are fundamental in imparting inferential meaning, as we have just
seen in the instance of agentless passives [not his example]. T he very use
of a certain grammatical form creates entailment.
My oft-quoted example (from Cohen 1978) is an interesting example
of incompatibility between terms and sentences:
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20. Looks like clay. Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the hay.
Hay day. May day. Help! I need help.
Clay is both a tactile and visual stimulus, so the first simile is fine, but
gray is a color, not a sound, so that the “Sounds like gray” is incompatible.
The subsequent sentences in this uttered passage do not add any information which would modify the oxymoronic construction entailed by the
reference to gray as a sound. Nor do they give any clue as to how
sounding like gray is relevant to looking like clay. T he individual terms
in this utterance cannot be forged into a discourse because of the their
fundamental incompatibility. This is not to say that someone could
never forge such incompatible terms into a coherent structure by adding
other terms to it. That is not the issue. T he issue is that the speaker of 20
above has not done so and has given no clues in the given utterance that
would allow us to make such additions or to normalize the sequence in
any way. Consequently, part of the abnormality of this utterance lies in
its incompatible entailments.
[18] T esting for Im plicature.

Since Grice attempts to distinguish between implicated and direct
meanings, he adopts verification procedures in order to provide criteria
for determining whether or not a meaning is implied at all as well as for
exactly what it is that has been implied. Grice naturally assumes that if
there are two kinds of meaning, one inhering in lexical items and
syntactic form, and another not arising from linguistic constructions per
se, but derivable by implication, then these should be distinguishable by
different modes of analysis (1981, p. 185). His first criterion is that what is
conversationally implicated is not part of the meaning of the expressions
used to convey the implicature. Obviously, if it is part of that meaning,
then it is direct statement, not implication. Grice suggests three salient
criteria to distinguish implicatures. They are:
•

d e n ia b il it y ,

e .g ., th ey can be d e n ie d by d e m u rrin g “b ut not

n ecessarily in th at o r d e r ” o r “b u t n o t in th e u su al m e a n in g of th at
w ord .”
•

n o n d e t a c h a b il it y ,

e .g ., sy n on y m s g iv e sam e im p lica tio n .

• CALCULABILITY, e.g., they constitute a reasonable inference in the

context assuming the cooperative principle; T he first criterion sim
ply means that you can deny an implication. For instance, the
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implicature that the order of encoding is the order of occurrence
can be denied by saying “ . . . but not necessarily in that order,” as in
21. T h e King of France went to bed and divested himself of his
trousers, but not necessarily in that order.
T h e order of narration in “She ate the ice cream and brought it
home” is literally im possible. A dding “but not necessarily in that
order” does fix it, but, in this case, the fix is perceived as a correction
to a slip-of-the-tongue.
G rice’s second test (1981, p. 186) that of synonymy, says that if syno
nyms of the expressions actually used provide the same implicature,
then it is unlikely that the implicature inhered in the original words.
Rather, it occurs because of a conversational situation that calls for the
given semantic message. Nunberg (1981), objects that nondetachability
fails as a necessary test for im plication because semantic entailments of
conventional messages also are preserved if one uses the right synonym.
Thus, a test based upon synonymy does not separate out implicature
from meanings derivable directly from the expressions used.
Both of these opinions presuppose that exact synonyms can usually be
found for all or most expressions. It is important to note that it is actually
extrem ely difficult to find individual words which are truly synonymous
in the sense of complete substitutability. In the first place, it is quite
usual for synonyms to require somewhat different syntactic frames, as
shown below. Furtherm ore, typically, as a perusal of any thesaurus
shows, each word has its own network of meanings, and synonymy is
typically a case of partial matches of meanings. For instance, consider
this set: belief, tenet, thought and conviction. Although one can find con
texts in which any one of these can be selected without changing meaning,
one need not stray far to find contexts in which their synonymy fails.
For instance, I can utilize each of the above nouns in the context of
expressing my belief in God as One. T h e sentence frame m ight have to
be changed in accordance with the syntactic frame the different syno
nyms demand, but I can still say the following are synonymous:
I
I
I
I

abide by a belief in God as One.
hold a tenet that God is One.
hold the thought that God is One.
have a conviction that God is One.

All of these entail an implicature that I am either a Jew, a Unitarian,
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or a Moslem, but not a Christian, because Christians believe that God is
a Trinity. Although synonymy works well for the religious senses attaching
to these words, it certainly doesn’t work if conviction is used in the sense
of a prosecutor getting a conviction, or if belief is used in the sense of my
belief that the color of a tomato I am looking at is red, or if thought is
used in a complaint that I just lost my train of thought.
Grice (1981, pp. 187-191) is very adamant that neither deniability nor
synonymy comprise final tests for implicature. They are but rules of
thumb. T he final test rests on his third criterion, calculability, that one is
able to give a derivation of the implication. For a derivation to be valid,
a principled connection must be constructed between the overtly expressed
proposition, the maxim it breached and the resulting implication (Sanders
1987, p. 61). The major obstacle in applying the test of calculability is the
degree to which one can come up with an apparently consistent and
all-embracing interpretation which impresses by its brilliance and origi
nality but is not verifiable by anything except the analyzers intuitions.
Chomskyan linguistics ultimately failed because of its reliance on intuition.
The same problem occurs in fields as diverse as literary criticism and
psychotherapy.
Nunberg (1981, p. 202) mitigates this danger by offering more precise
guidelines for a “satisfactory pragmatic explanation” of an expression.
• specifying its conventional use
• the use to be explained
• information speaker and hearer presuppose about each others’
intentions
• background knowledge
• physical setting
• . . . a demonstration, usually in the form of a set of inferences,
that the use in question is the best way available to the speaker to the
accomplishing a particular conversational purpose . . . ”
I would amend this last to “ . . . the way that works at the moment
to attain one’s purpose.” If it does not, the cospeaker may indicate
linguistically or not that there is a communicative glitch and the speaker
can take another turn, so to speak and reformulate.
In practice, formal distinctions between implied and overtly encoded
meaning may not always be easily achieved, because linguistic units do
not form an algorithm from which meaning is automatically derivable.
Extracting meaning directly from the expressions used relies on prag-
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matic strategies (Chaika 1976) as well as syntactico-semantic factoring of
meaning. Early on, Gordon and Lakoff (1975, p. 83) showed that im plica
tions have their usual literal meanings as well as their im plied ones. One
of their more amusing examples illustrates this beautifully. If a friend of
mine comes up to me and out of the blue confides, “Your husband is
faithful,” I would take that as m eaning that he is, in fact, being faithful,
but I would also get the im plication that he has not been faithful in the
recent past. If I had earlier voiced doubts about my husband’s faithfulness
to this friend, then her comment would be a reassurance that my suspi
cions are unfounded and no negative im plications would be derived. If I
had not, the friend’s words would be tantamount to letting me know that
I had been deceived.
Sweetser (1987, p. 45) puts it well, pointing out that im plication and
other indirect speech is parasitic on inform ational speech. In other
words, the indirect meaning is based on the actual utterance in oblique
but derivable ways. Some speech inappropriate enough to render usual
decoding strategies inoperable may still be at least partly interpretable
by reference to normal expectations combined with an analysis of what
seems to have gone wrong. We will take this matter up subsequently
(Chapter 11) but first other treatments of the question of maxims and
implicature.
[19] D ecision-theoretic Strategies.

Sanders (1987) declares that there is no objective rule which will tell us
that a maxim is breached. Rather, in conversations, cospeakers subjectively
judge whether or not each others’ contributions are irrelevant, imprecise,
insufficient, or insincere. H e (p. 64) offers the interesting suggestion that
this is done by identifying the cospeaker’s state of mind about whatever
is being communicated. For instance, if an utterance does not seem
relevant, then the hearer assumes that the speaker thinks that something
in the present or past shared context should be bridging the gap between
what has just been said and the general topic.
Sanders (1987, p. 65) offers a sim ilar explanation for what happens if
the maxim of m anner is breached, the maxim which says the speaker
must be clear and precise, “ . . . there is a state of affairs that (the speaker
considers sufficient to prevent or dissuade him/her from being clearer.”
Therefore, in his view, the hearer searches for the im plication that
results from the disparity between utterance and breached maxim.

Pragmatics, Intention, and Implication

177

By way of demonstration, Sanders offers scenarios, such as that in
which a student asks a professor what should be done to prepare for a
forthcoming exam, and the professor replies “Read the book.” Because
the professor clearly knows the content of the exam, this response breaches
the maxim of quantity. Therefore, it may imply at least one of the
following or all three:
• it is up to the student to figure that out
• offering advice would reveal too much
• reading is the best preparation.14
T he student takes the meaning that best fits his or her view of the
professor’s beliefs and attitudes.
Sanders offers an interesting and, I think, important approach to
meaning. This is not to say that this is all there is to it, however. Even in
such a simple scenario, other implicatures can be taken. If the professor
intended to convey the second implication above, the response could
easily have responded, “I ’m sorry, I can’t help you with that without
giving away too much.”
Certain implications arise from a curt, “Read the book.” One implica
tion is that the professor doesn’t like the inquirer, or that the professor
considers him or her stupid.15 This comes about from the very obviousness
of the response. One of the working assumptions of education is that one
must read the assigned book in order to prepare for an exam .16 The
professor’s words can also be construed as being sarcastic, saying, in
effect, “You’ve got to be pretty dumb to ask me that ”
If prior experience warrants it, the student may simply assume that
the professor is in a bad mood that day. This highlights the truism that
the more experience cospeakers share the more accurate they are in
interpreting the other’s implicata. It is for this reason that one feels
another “isn’t so bad” as one gets to know, hence to understand, him or
her. This proposition entails a discussion of relevance and of mutual
knowledge. Before tackling these, we must examine Carlson’s (1983)
game-theoretic model of discourse and compare it to the decision-theoretic
model presented by Sanders (1987). The model of social interaction as a
game is a persistent one. Carlson, for instance, adopts it from Wittgenstein.
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[2 0 ] C onversation as a G am e.

Carlson (1983, p. 102) claims that specific implicatures arise as a result
of DIALOGICAL ENTAILMENT. By this he means that the implication
arises because it is logically binding given the position of the sentence as
a move in the dialogue. T hat is, implication results from the dialogue as
a whole and the position of each sentence within it. As true as this might
be, neither context nor position within the sentence guarantees that any
given implication arises as the singular logically binding one. If it did,
there would be no ambiguity, no misinterpretation, and, probably, no
paranoia.
Carlson’s central metaphor of conversation being a game, leads him to
portray specific utterances as moves in a game in order to achieve one’s
goals, thereby winning. If one wins, then another loses. T h is implies that
one party to an interaction wins to the detrim ent of the other. In his view,
a coherent text is “. . . (well-formed) if it can be extended into a well-formed
dialogue g am e” (p. 146). T h is sounds like a debate or a ju ry trial, not a
dialogue.
Both Carlson’s teleology and metaphor are suspect. H is redefinition
of implication presupposes that participants always have in mind clear
goals and that each sentence is produced deliberately in order to achieve
those goals. It is well known that at least some conversation is produced
PHATICALLY, that is for the purpose of social bonding or to conform to
cultural norms. Conversations about the weather and inquiring after the
health of acquaintances fall into this category, but so may discussions of
the upcoming elections, the dissolution of social values, or how funny a
recently seen movie is. Although there is conversation designed to
achieve goals, much ordinary talking is not so ordered. Patricia Strauss
(personal communication) points out that some games are cooperative,
therefore do not have winners and losers. T h is kind of game might
provide a better metaphor for conversations.
A m ajor problem with viewing conversation as any kind of game is
that speakers can never predict the hearer’s response to any conversa
tional “move.” Even in complex games like bridge or chess, there are
rules which limit, hence help predict, possible actions, and in coopera
tive ones the goals are clear even if they aren’t about winners and losers.
T his is not at all true in conversation. As Sanders (1987, p. 183)
demonstrates, a game-theoretic model “assumes that the competing agents
have to share the same finite pool of resources in pursuing their own
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interests.” Each person’s language stock is dependent upon his or own
personal histories and there is no way to know all of a cospeakers
motives. T he research on language acquisition has shown beyond a
doubt that children figure out language by themselves from what they
hear around them. It has also been known for a long time that no two
people have quite the same grammatical system in their heads even if
they are native adult speakers (Quirk and Svartvik 1966; Gleitman and
Gleitman 1970).17
Then, too, what each cospeaker offers affects what the other will then
say, and each chooses from an array of multiple messages neither known
to nor always guessable by the other, although the messages are usually
immediately interpretable. In any conversation, one never knows for
sure where the entire is going until it has gone there, no matter how
goal-directed the participants were at the outset. Even such goal-directed
activities as lecturing may become derailed by unexpected comments or
questions. Only in the most formal of speaking activities such as sermons
or lectures by invited exalted personages can we be assured of sentences
produced so that the conglomerate achieves a predicted goal. If dialogue
were truly a game, social interaction would become as glacially slow as
an expert chess game, with each participant mulling over possible strate
gies before entering his or her own move. In actual fact, dialogue with
the aim of winning a point or an argument is a special activity, one not
necessarily engaged in by most people much of the time. Scholars and
attorneys do engage in such competition, but this is part of their profes
sional life, and, as such, acknowledged to be a special activity.18
Carlson claims that implications do not arise from violations of maxims.
Rather, he says, “ . . . they play a prominent role only when they are
brought in to account for apparent violations. . . ” (p. 103, italics his).
Therefore, he defines implicature as arising from “ . . . an assumption
that has to be made about a player’s aims or assumptions in order to
construe his choice of strategy as a rational one” (p. 103). T he problem
with this formulation is that it describes all social interaction, not just
those construable as violations of maxims. As we saw in the discussion of
intention earlier on in this chapter, part of the meaning we get from any
utterance depends on the assumptions we make about the person’s inten
tion in saying what he or she did. This holds for even apparently
uncomplicated straightforward messages like “Joey got mud on the floor.”
If I call Scrooge “miserly” but his brother “thrifty” I am certainly
implying quite different things, but in no sense can I be said to be
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violating rules apparent or not. If I say “I always knew Max to be
honorable” I am implying a doubt that is not there in “I always knew that
Max was honorable.” If I say “M ax was m urdered,” I am im plying that
someone did the dastardly deed again without my violating any rules.
T h e overriding fact uncovered in all objective studies is that meanings
are given and gotten in a very great number of ways. What we can do is
chart those ways and interpret in their light, and not resort to nontestable
and nonobservable phenomena. Nor should we be seduced by a meta
phor purporting to explain all interaction. T here are many different
kinds of interactions, each yielding its own set of viable interpretations.
N either game theory nor, as we shall see, Freudian theory explains all.
Each has its verities, but each is incomplete. Intensive work in socio
linguistics (Chaika 1982b, 1989) and related fields has shown us the
m ultiplicity of interactions occurring in any society, each with its own
purpose, its own strategies, and each with its own ego-fulfillm ent for the
individual as well as its social purposes.
Notes
1John Lyons (1972, pp. 725-744) does not approve of the term speech acts for these
phenomena as they don’t actually refer to an act of speech, but to a semantic
phenomenon. He also demonstrates that speech acts can be carried out without
speaking, as in waving someone away. However, he uses the term because, as he says,
that is pretty much what everyone else uses. I agree with him on all counts.
2If the situation is one in which the speaker had agreed to allow someone to stay
in the room on the condition that she be quiet, then “get out of here” is an
appropriate paraphrase. In other circumstances it might simply mean, “be less
noisy” or “be completely quiet.” Similarly this place stinks can mean “get out of here”
or it can also mean “let [all of] us get out of here” or “clean this place up,” or “I have
to clean this place up.”
3Of course, one of the reasons that paranoids can be paranoid is also that people
do lie about their intent.
4There is also purely social speech such as greetings, untruths intended to “butter
people up,” and ritualized complimenting as at a wedding. Such speech has been
extensively studied ever since Malinowski’s insights into phatic communication. We
are indebted to the extensive oeuvre of scholars like Harvey Sacks and Erving
Goffman in delineating such speech (Chaika 1988).
5This is not so farfetched as one would imagine. As the wife of a trial attorney, I
frequently get phone calls late at night, and, in response to questions about
whereabouts, I am often given analogous answers. For instance, “I’m at the airport”
tells me that they are at Greene Airport, Rhode Island’s only commercial one. If
they say, “I’m at North Central,” I assume that they pilot and/or own a plane. If they
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say, I'm in Dallas, I assume that they are likely to be in the airport, at a hotel, or in
someone else’s home, so that their usual home number will not be operative.
6Falsehoods strike at the heart of society. Our actions are predicated upon what we
perceive are the motives of cospeakers as well as upon their representation of facts.
7And, to be sure, general behavior.
8All speakers are sometimes ambiguous, but in pathological cases, it seems as if
the speaker cannot disambiguate. Of course, we could claim that the one who cannot
actually will not, so that it is a matter of cooperation, not pathology. But then we
have to ask why this is so typical of schizophrenics and aphasics, but not of people
adjudged not afflicted with either condition.
9Meaning is not wholly derivable by reference to these maxims, as shown in the
sections in this book devoted to semantics, syntax, and cohesion in sentences as well
as in discourse analysis.
10Although I have no hard data from experimentation on the phenomenon, I
have noticed that people often store in memory an implication heard but not acted
upon, later recalling it as if it had actually been said. Similarly, they will note a
facial expression or kinesic cue, and store its meaning as if it had been said. This
seems to account for the situation in which one is retroactively blamed for saying
something which one has never said. For instance, one may be accused of having
made a negative evaluative comment, when, in fact, the sole “comment” made was
by implication or expression. The idiom “turn up your nose at . . . ” characterizes
such meanings.
11As I write this in 1988, I realize that this may have changed for many women in
the years since Lakoff, although my students claim that this is true in mixed gender
discussions. However, since the interaction in question took place before 1977, we are
dealing with a double whammy: a patient who, by definition, is in inferior status,
and by being a woman as well, was in actuality in an inferior position. Hence, the
extreme mitigation evidenced.
12In speech, mitigation can also be effected by prosody, voice quality, amplitude,
tempo, pausing, or false starts. In general, paralinguistic cues like these also indicate
the speaker’s stance towards what he or she is conveying (Kreckel 1981).
l3Kill itself is distinguished from die in that kill means that someone or some
thing caused something else to die.
14It seems to me that this last is a direct answer not an implicature.
15This is an implication that students are wont to take. They tend to interpret
almost all even remotely negative speech as the professor’s not liking them. Perhaps
this occurs because of the fact that the professor has to judge the student’s worth.
Like the sufferer of paranoia, students seem all too often ready to ascribe dislike
when it isn’t intended.
16The truth of this assumption is not the issue. There are courses in which one
need not read the books; however, it would be the rare professor who admits that.
17For instance, in an investigation of subject-verb agreement in Brown University
undergraduates, I found that people didn’t agree with their own judgments. Follow
ing Quirk and Svartvik, I first administered a written test in which students were
given a test which of the same sentences, but with the verb form already selected.
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They were asked to reject or accept the sentence. To my astonishment, people often
rejected the very forms they had previously selected. This was not random behavior.
In all such cases there were clear disparities between the meaning of the noun and
the correct grammatical form of the verb. For instance, some chose a singular verb
for T h e re has always b een a time to speak a n d a time to be silent, but when given this
identical sentence later on, they rejected it, saying it should be there h a v e ... More
recently, I have discovered a disjunction in acceptability of L et no m an rejoice until he
find life. About half the students in one class no longer would use that subjunctive,
insisting on L et no man rejoice until h e finds life. Those who, like me, can use both get
the meaning in the first that he is not likely to find life, whereas the latter indicates
he has a good chance. Others who only allow the first got no such meaning
differential, and simply found the second wrong.
18Additionally, those persons who treat each dialogue as a game from which they
have to emerge as a victor is highly confrontational, and are often perceived as
having an ego problem, not to mention obnoxious.

Chapter Eight

TH E ICE CREAM STORIES:
A STUDY OF NARRATION
The study of psychotic and normal narratives discussed in Chap
ter 6 demonstrated speech disruptions peculiar to psychotics.
Some occurred only in schizophrenics. Normals produced as
much error, but it was different both in degree and in kind from
the pscyhotic one. Both normals and psychotics had the same
amount of misperceptions, but these were often mutually exclu
sive to each population. This study showed that psychotic devia
tion is neither normal nor creative.
[1] T h e N ature of Schizophrenic Error.

C

lose examination of the narratives in the Ice Cream Story task
discussed in this chapter revealed that Fromkin (1975) was in error
when she claimed that schizophrenics make the same kinds of errors that
normals do. It will be shown here that the former population differs
from the latter both in degree and in kind of error. Psychotic error is
very real and displays a true disintegration of linguistic ability on every
level except, perhaps, the phonemic, but word retrieval, syntactic error,
narrative construction, all the facets of informing and commenting indi
cate a far from intact linguistic ability even in the very simple task
presented to the population discussed here.
More recently Allen (1985) maintains that schizophrenic speech, both
SD and NSD, can be reliably discriminated from normal speech by a
clinician with acumen, but that the ways it is different cannot be specified.
Actually, as we have seen, it has long been known that even laypersons
can discriminate schizophrenic speech from normal. It is no surprise
that a clinician can do so reliably, but to say that this is only because of
acumen, not from specifiable features is a strange conclusion by a scientist.
It is true that people do seem to react intuitively towards language, but it is
still possible to analyze the bases of intuitions by comparison between pop
ulations. True, the average clinician has not studied much linguistics, but
183
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there are linguists of many stripes who study language objectively. As we
saw in Chapter 1, the features of schizophrenic speech can be depicted.
T h e IC S studies described here directly com pare the features of
schizophrenic, manic, and norm al speech elicited by the task discussed
in the previous chapter.
[2 ] R a tin g a n d T estin g o f P a rticip a n ts.

As we have just seen, the differences between normal and psychotic
narrations are not necessarily caused by differences in the num ber of
cohesive ties used by each population. Nor were they caused by differ
ences in the length of narrations between the two populations, nor, as
we shall see here, are they caused by differences in the amount of
m isperception by each group. Rather, as shown below, other features of
the narratives were implicated. T h ere are real differences between the
two populations, psychotics and normals, and these coincide with those
features of speech long known to be pathognom ic of schizophrenia. One
psychotic was judged normal, but he was taped at the tim e of discharge.
Upon his initial selection his speech did show deviation but had improved
by the tim e of his participation.
Two normals were rated as schizophrenic by one judge. A third normal
was rated that way by both judges. T h e normals erroneously judged as
schizophrenic produced features in their narratives which correlated
with the deviations in the psychotic group. W hether or not these normals
were at risk for schizophrenia or whether their deviations could be
attributed to excessive nervousness or the like could not be determ ined
within the confines of this study. T h e procedures for testing were particu
larly nonthreatening. All subjects were even allowed to hold the tape
recorder in their hands to lessen anxiety. All we can say is that there are
definitely features of narration which lead to judgm ents of psychosis and
some ostensible normals may evince these. One conclusion that can’t be
made, however, is that SD schizophrenics speak norm ally during their
psychotic bouts.
It bears repeating that we must test for those skills necessary for daily
speech activities. We must ensure that our explanations take into account
the skills needed for normal speech production because speech readily
labeled “schizophrenic” is evident in ordinary interaction. It is equally
vital to employ a narrative task that can be matched to what the partici
pant is trying to encode so that we can compare the utterance with its
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target. Narration, in itself, also requires the encoding of ongoing events,
which in turn demands temporal sequencing and shifting references,
thus testing for a variety of speaking skills and simulating everyday
speaking situations.
T he narrative task employed here also carries a lighter cognitive load
than did Rochester and Martin’s. Explaining the points of cartoons,
retelling anecdotes, and describing unusual colors are not everyday
activities and would seem to present a greater cognitive load than a mere
retelling of an ordinary sequence of events. As a result, it is sometimes
difficult to correlate utterances with intended meaning. As Maher et al.
(1966) and Maher (1972) noted, the more unconstrained the speech
activity, the more disorganized schizophrenic speech becomes.
Because of the strong constraints put on responses in the task reported
on here, glossomanic chaining, for instance, in its above-shown “classic”
forms did not occur, although a variant of it did. What is perhaps most
surprising is that patients did utter both gibberish and agrammatisms
despite the constraints on the task, and despite claims of researchers that
such aphasia-like symptoms are rare in schizophrenia.
As previously explained, actively psychotic patients frequently have a
short attention span so that the ICS could not be as complex as Chafe’s
Pear Story. Still, some extraneous material was included because one of
the characteristics of the speech of schizophrenics frequently mentioned
in the psychiatric literature in their veering from the topic at hand.
Given hypotheses about the nature of schizophrenic malfunctioning in
attention and filtering, it was expected that the extraneous material
would cause derailment. Actually, when derailment occurred, it was
from the essential plot and appeared to be caused by intrusions from
memory, as is shown below.
Despite its simplicity, the Ice Cream Stories tested for many language
skills and attentional and logical phenomena. For instance, the viewer
had to leap one important gap. T he father is not actually seen giving the
child money, nor does he answer her in words. When one sees her
walking in to buy the ice cream, one might surmise that the father must
have given some money to her. Scenes such as one showing the mother
setting the table were included to see if they would cause the narrator to
be deflected from the major progression of action, perhaps starting off on
something relative to mealtimes or mothers or family incidents (Chaika
1982a; Lecours and Vanier-Clement 1976). However, deflection caused
by these side actions did not happen.
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T he 124-second story proved to be well within the attention span of all par
ticipants. T h e opening shot, panning a shopping center, focusing on a child
wearing a plaid skirt and vest with a long-sleeved jersey peering into the
window of a Baskin Robbins, took 20 seconds. Later, when the child enters
the ice cream store, it takes 23 second for her to be waited on. In terms of
effects on the narrations, these seemed to be the only significant time spans.
O riginally, there was to be a memory task as well, in which I asked
subjects to recall what they had seen the previous week. Unfortunately,
too often patients were discharged before the week was up or received
E C T in the interim which wiped out their recall entirely. Consequently,
although I may allude to the memory task from time to time, no attempt
was made to analyze their relation to the first narrative or to run any
kind of statistical measures on them.
[3] Selecting P articip an ts.

All patients were being treated with antipsychotic m edication as well
as antiparkinsonian m edication designed to mitigate the side effects of
the former. All also were receiving lithium (Alexander, VanKammer,
and Bunney 1979). T h e effect of these is to lessen the effects of psychosis,
so that speech is made more normal. T h is makes even more important
the very real differences found between the norm al and psychotic
narratives. T h e average stay at the hospital during the time of this study
was less than 2 weeks. No participant had been institutionalized or
heavily medicated for long periods. H ence our results could not be
traced to social or cognitive deficits on those grounds.
Twenty-five normal volunteers matched the psychotic population as
closely as possible in age, occupation, and social class. Both groups
consisted of blue-collar workers and college students. As is usual between
psychotic and normal groups, the normals were somewhat higher in achieve
ment. T h is effect was mitigated by including norm al college students
with working-class parents and psychotics with college-educated parents.
As already discussed, social class is not a factor in this study. Patients
were selected solely on the bases of diagnosis and observed speech
dysfunction. However, we still have to contend with Bernstein’s theory of
restricted and elaborated codes. H e assumed, and so have his followers,
that working class is limited in their ability to discuss issues intellectu
ally because they have been socialized to speak of the here and now
rather than of hypothetical and abstract issues. Because both our patient
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and control populations came from mixed social backgrounds, we could
observe any mitigating effect of early socialization on speech performance.
Bernstein’s theory of differential narrative adequacy rests upon a
theory of socialization such that, if it were valid, parental status should
be as important as earned achievement, especially for nonachieving
children of educated parents. One could argue that those who rise from
the working class do so because they somehow learn on their own what
Bernstein calls the elaborated code (Bernstein 1971). However, it is
difficult to claim the reverse, the scions of the middle class sink, as it
were, because they, despite their socialization, only learned a restricted
code, for Bernstein’s claim is that the latter is different in kind from the
former, not just in degree and that this is a product of different communi
cative styles of families who come from different social classes (Chaika
1982b, 1989 for further arguments against Bernstein’s theories). In any
event, the data presented here correlated with diagnosis of psychosis
versus normality, not with social class. There was no effect traceable to
social class, but there certainly was one related to illness or lack of it.
T he three normals judged psychotic by both raters were all college
educated. T h eir narratives showed definite correlates with the psychotic
ones. Rochester and Martin (1979) likened increased use of exophora by
schizophrenics to Bernstein’s theory of restricted code amongst the work
ing classes. No evidence emerged that differential social class member
ship affects reference.
[4] Intentionality and Cooperation.

Intentionality is always an integral part both of speech production and
of meaning itself (Searle 1983. (p. 3). He defines intentionality as
directedness, and shows that meaning is comprised of “ . . . Intentional
content that goes with the form of externalization” (Searle, pp. 28-29).
Thus normal comprehension demands that we derive Intentionality as
well as truth value (Chaika 1982b, p. 71, 1989; Goody 1978). If speech is so
deviant that we cannot do so, then we fault the speaker. If the speaker
does not encode so that his or her Intentionality (or truth value) can be
derived, and, if further, the speaker cannot explain when asked, we fault
the speaker, not the hearer. Hence, we consider the opaque or deviant
speech of psychotics as evidence of a person’s being “out of his/her
mind.” Similarly, as Searle (1983 (p. 43) shows with visual perceptions,
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when people see things that are not objectively there, we say “ . . . it is the
visual experience and not the world which is at fault.”
Searle (1983, p. 147) introduces another com ponent to m eaning, one
especially valuable in this discussion: the Background. H e defines this
as “. . . . capacities and social practices.” H ence, Background includes
“ . . . skills, preintentional assumptions and presuppositions, practices
and habits” (Searle 1983, p. 154). U nder this view, a breakdown in surface
performance is a failure of “ . . . preintentional capacities that under
lie the intentional states in question” (Searle 1983, p. 155). T o treat that
which arises from faulty Background as if it were “ . . . a sort of Intentionality, it im mediately becomes problem atic” (Searle 1983, p. 159).
What this means here is that we assume that narratives which are
deviant arise from impaired skills in narration, not from a separate
language or an attempt to hide taboo desires or an attempt to convey
what it means to be schizophrenic or the like. T h is applies to deviation in
what is reported or in the way that it is reported. T h is is the simplest
explanation that fits the facts; therefore, in accordance with the applica
tion of Occam’s razor, it is the one adopted in the explanations below.
We have already seen that there are five reasons for believing that the
participants in this study understood the task, were cooperating in it,
and intended to fulfill it. T h e following passages from SD narratives
show this. Even those whose narratives were not accurate took as their
point of departure the sequence shown. Moreover, when they digressed
from this, they related stories sim ilar to that on the screen, and kept
returning the events (boldface) actually shown them, as in
1A. What do you want me to say? I say my brother Gene. H e says he
said I buy the things I wanted. I saw a little girl who wanted ice
cream. Today you have to pay for it. Today she paid for i t . . .
T h is starts out with an irrelevant comment about her brother, but
quickly reverts to the business of the video. Actually, since this was about
somebody wanting something, even the bit about her brother Gene
saying that she should buy what she wanted can be seen to have been
triggered by the video.
Second, where someone hallucinated or misperceived action, he or
she indicated an effort to integrate it into the story. In 2A, for instance,
when the patient says, “I don’t know wha t . . . that was about,” he indi
cates that he cannot fit what he perceives into the story. T h e description
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of the cars was also accurate, although he misperceived that the girl was
moving a counter and was looking in a trash can:
2A. I saw a little girl who was moving a counter for some reason
and I don’t know what the heck that was about. She was pressing
against it okay. In the beginning I saw a white car with a red vinyl
top and then this little girl was lookin’ in the store was looking in the
trashcan or something and then she turned around and she went on

she talked to her mother and her father and neither one of them was
listening to h e r . . .
Here, note also the “okay” as indicating that although he didn’t “know
what the heck that was about” he was going forth with the narrative
anyway. Interestingly, the following week, on recall, the same patient
said
2B. . . . I remember seein’ the little girl I don’ know if her head was
in a trash, she was lookin’ in the trash or she was lookin’ in the window
to a store . . .

He did not mention moving a counter, but he had obviously recalled
his misperception about the trashcan. In both narratives, the patient
proceeded to recount the events clearly triggered by the videostory,
although lexical selection was clearly deviant, a matter discussed below.
the first mention of trash either omitted can or or used a instead of the
the. Since trash belongs to the category of m a s s n o u n s , 1 therefore cannot
be used with a.
Third, several made overt comments about their ability to speak or to
remember something on the tape. For instance, one apologized:
3 . . . she just cunna’s cunna get anything home so she’s hafta go out
on her and get it. okay. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I ’m sorry about my
speech. I stutter a lot though. That’s about it.
Another indicated that he had a “memory lapse.” This also shows an
effort to recount what was shown:
4. . . . and I noticed a little girl looking into the window and I guess
he walked back into the store and then a [kif] thing switched where
the girl was at home and I dunno asked her mother for something
and she had a kni- got a little memory lapse there. T hen it switched
again and her father came in . . .
Self-corrections also indicated the patient’s attempts to recount the
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story, thus to cooperate in the task as did expressing happiness that the
girl got her ice cream, both shown in:
5 . . . . so then she went and she went to the candy store by herself or
ice cream shop and bought a double-decker ice cream cone. T hat
actually brought me happiness to see that little girl with a mind of her
own. Okay.
Even the most deviant narratives signalled endings formally, marking
the narrative as an entity. T he “T hat’s about it” in 3 above is one
example, as is the “Okay” in 5. Normals often ended their narratives the
same way.

[5] Visual and Verbal Scanning.

T he parallel between visual scanning and narration made by Chafe
(1980) was borne out in this study. His claim is that the narrative itself
progresses in a fashion similar to the way the eye searches a scene. As we
have already seen, there is a correlation between schizophrenic dysfunc
tion in visual tracking (Holzman et al. 1978; Holzman 1978) with dysfunc
tions in their free speech. Chaika ( 1982a) showed that both the sacades
and the spiky-type movement are analogous to schizophrenic utterances.
T he sacades show lack of focusing ability, a deficit in tracking, what
Holzman terms a failure to turn on the system. T he spiky type move
ment represents perseverations along associative pathways. T he entire
narrative from which 1A above comes illustrates these remarks:
1B. What do you want me to say? I saw my brother Gene. He says
he said I buy the things that I wanted. I saw a little girl who wanted
ice cream. Today you have to pay for it but today she paid for it.I
want Gene to come visit me soon at 1:30 and I saw a little girl with
the baby and her father’s gonna be home and and oh yeah and
[hehe] my mother loves me [aw hehe] I don’t know what I want to
say. Can I stop now?
Note that the first question is entirely appropriate as a narrative
opener. However, the story line is intertwined with her memories and
desires. She “sees” her brother Gene and even gives a sentence to expand
on her mention of him. Except for the fact that the video had nothing
whatsoever to do with Gene, the opening statements are appropriate for
a narrative. It can be seen that the sentences about the brother were
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triggered by the video and were a parallel encoding to the tale about the
girl wanting to buy ice cream. This is analogous to what Holzman found
in visual sacades. T he story is not tracked from start to finish.
In the next sentence, the narrator jumps back to the videostory proper.
Since this does deal with buying which entails paying, she veers off the
narrative track to the cliche, today you have to pay fo r it, then changes the
pronoun to one appropriate to the story, but today she p a id fo r it. Note the
slight mismatch of meaning and the story. Today you have to pay fo r it
implies that yesterday you didn’t which is patently untrue. In its sense as
a cliche, this refers to moral issues, not money.
This patient gives other verbal sacades. She first follows her inner
story about Gene, then jumps to the videostory, then jerks back to Gene,
then jumps to a girl with a baby, then the father who is going to be home
then her mother who loves her.
Another patient encoded a visual pun. He noticed a similarity in
stance between two actions and attributed it to the wrong one despite the
fact that the context itself did not lend itself to this alternate interpretation.
This occurred in the statement “I saw a little girl who was moving a
counter for some reason and I don’t know what the heck that was about.”
The girl’s stance, leaning forward against the ice cream case as she is
waiting to be served, is similar to that when one is moving a heavy
object. Such similarities in body positions are not usually noticed when
the circumstances eliciting them are so very different. Nothing else in
the video lent itself to a theory of “moving a counter,” and one doesn’t
usually even think of moving counters, and one especially would not
think that a child would be moving the counter. Still, the narrator gave
the wrong interpretation to this stance. We can only be reminded of the
wild puns that schizophrenics fall victim to, such as the punning of wise,
whys, noble, and no-bill, connections that most others would not notice.
The opening scene, 20 seconds long, started with almost random shots
of a parking lot: people walking by, cars pulling in. Because of this, there
was a verbal parallel to the visual process upon first seeing a scene and
not having a frame to put it in. Not knowing what is going to be relevant,
the person tries to note everything that is going on until he or she figures
out a frame for the unfolding scenario. Once this frame is constructed for
normals, only matters relevant to the story line get mentioned. Because
all participants, normal and psychotic, were recounting the story imme
diately after seeing it, they didn’t all get the correct frame at first. Those
who displayed this searching behavior spoke as if their initial narration
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was wholly unedited, so that they verbally recounted the visual scanning
upon first seeing a scene. Many of both populations started by describ
ing the cars and the people in the opening scene. Note the sim ilarity of
the normal opener in 6A to the psychotic one in 6B.
6A. First I saw a parking lot with a lot of cars and I noticed an ice
cream shop I think it was a Baskin Robbins store. A woman walked
by and another gentleman came from the opposite direction and he
walked past the screen and then I noticed a little girl standing
outside looking into the ice cream shop . . .
6B. Okay. T here’s a lady who was walking toward the car and I
forget it she was wa—she walked by the car is what it was and they
went past the car and a man walked by a store a Baskin and Robbins
sign it was the scene before so wa let’s see then one once they went
past the man zooming in they they zoomed in on a g i r l . . .
T here is no substantive difference between these narrations up to this
point. T h e psychotic rendering is more detailed than any normal one
was, but still, up to this point, 6B above is well within the bounds of
normal.
T h e differences between populations occurred right after these initial
scannings. Once normals zeroed in on the girl staring in the window,
they related only those points of action that furthered the plot, typically
that the child went home, asked her m other for ice cream, the mother
refused her because it was too near suppertime, the father came home,
the child asked him for ice cream, the child went back to the ice cream
shop and ordered ice cream which she received.
T h is “zeroing-in” tactic, also a finding in Chafe (1980), is easily seen
in the degree of detail in description of characters first seen, such as
noting that “a man with a three-piece suit minus the jacket walked by”
or that a woman with a shopping bag also walked by. However, such
matters were never again m entioned once the narrator got his or her
bearings. T h is was true of norm als and psychotics. Not one person
mentioned the clothing of either parent, although each was on film
far longer than the casual passersby at the outset. Similarly, many care
fully described the opening parking-lot scenario but the kitchen, which
was important to the plot, received only one mention and that, by a
psychotic, commented on color: “T here were cur-blue curtains. It was
kinda brown the room they’re in.”
T h is scanning was not the only initial tactic. Some immediately focused
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on the girl. Again, the two populations made substantially sim ilar
openings. For instance, compare the normal
6C. It began with a girl staring through a window at a Baskin
Robbins store
to the psychotic
6D. I seen a little girl looking in the window and she want some ice
cre a m .. . .
[6] T e m p o ra l O rd erin g.

After the openers just illustrated, differences between the two popula
tions quickly became evident. Once normals got their bearings, so to
speak, they usually followed a strict temporal ordering in narration.
They gave the impression of play-by-play description. First this happened,
then that, and that, and so on to the conclusion. For example, the
following is an exceptionally detailed opening scene by a normal who
seemed to have a bit of a problem knowing what to zero in on. His
narrative was the most detailed one evoked.
7A. When it first came on a car drove by and then we were looking
at the Baskin-Robbins store and another c a r . . . As we closed in
towards the store the [pause] picture started and stopped, stopped
and started2 and we saw a man walk by and then came into a little
girl no it was a lady walked by then we came in to a little girl
standing by a window in a plaid dress and a white, it appeared to be
a white, long sleeved shirt. T h en we went to a home and it was the
same little girl asking her mother if she could have something and
then her mother said no, it was too close to supper. Later, she went
up to her father who had just walked in the door and asked him if
she could have some ice cream which is I guess what she asked her
m other and we didn’t hear her father’s answer but then we return to
Baskin-Robbins and she walked into the door and ordered some
kind of ice it looked like raspberry and um the man she waited for
the ice cream cone at this time her shirt appeared yellow. [heh] and
the man gave her the ice cream cone, she paid for it and left.
In contrast, psychotics often failed to create an orderly progression.
For instance, the following is a psychotic rendering with a detailed
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opening. Despite the fact that it is longer than 7A, it does not provide as
much detail.
7B. All right. T he first thing we see is an ice cream ayuh it could’ve
been a shopping center with two cars parked in front or drives up in
front and waits get the impression that someone goes [au] out of the
car and walks in front and sees in the window of the same one of
these shopping center stores a little girl waiting for some ice cream
or something or other because she goes home to her house asks her
father for ice cream he says well what the heck give it to her
[noowee] Sh-sh- she’s a little daughter so he gets her the coins and
she goes up ice cream stand and stands in line3 and gets a giant sized
cone and she uh is so happy with her ice cream a simple pleasure
but that’s what kids are like these days always have but th- it means
that [shinchuer] her parents that she’s [shuh] so proud of she goes
out leaves the ice cream ’n eats it and on the way ’n we don’t know
what happens [smae] the fact. You can interpolate and say that
she ate the ice cream and brought it home and said thank you daddy
or thank you mummy but she still is her destination is not known in
a few minutes and you say that’s just one pen memory in the brain?
How does that how does that able to reach that conclusion.
Besides the neologisms, the boldfaced segments are narrating completely
impossible temporal sequences. In the second sequence, the action has
been flip-flopped. She would have had to take the ice cream home and
then eat it. T h e first sequence involves mutually exclusive occurrences.
If the ice cream is eaten it can’t be left, and if it is left then it can’t be
eaten if the girl goes out. Notice that the individual items in each phrase
are linguistically correct. T hey just have not been organized correctly
into the narrative. Additionally, for all its verbiage, this telling omits
the entire scene of the child asking the m other for ice cream, but it
does contain matters absolutely underivable from the video, such as
the g irl’s being proud of her parents. With all its length it shows far
less detail of what had transpired than did short normal narratives,
like:
8A. I saw a little girl looking into an ice cream store and she went
home and asked her mother if she could have some ice cream and
her mother said no because it was too close to supper and then she
asked her father and her father gave her the money and she went
back to the ice cream store and bought some ice cream.
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Comparing this with a short narrative from a psychotic, we still see a
sim ilar disparity in reporting of detail and the actual events encoded, as
in
8B. A little girl wanted things and her mother said no and her
father came home and she asked for some ice cream and then she
went back to the store and then she ordered some ice cream and the
man said thank you.
In 8B, there is no introduction at all. It says that the girl wanted
“things” which is not an accurate encoding of the desired commodity. No
reason is given for the m other’s refusal. Although the patient did say
that the girl went back to the store, nowhere previously did it say that she
had been at a store. T here is also a strange gap between the girl’s
ordering ice cream and the man’s thank you. No little gaps like this occur
in normal narratives. In those, the “thank you” might not be mentioned,
but the g irl’s receiving the ice cream was.
Actually, 8B was very accurate and even detailed for a psychotic
narrative. Consider the paucity of:
8C. Well I saw a young lady peekin’ in a win- no lookin’ through the
window an ’uh other men passing by and then she went in there an’
she bought some ice cream for herself. Um I really don’t know what
else to say um because that’s all I saw.
Although the germ of the story is there, that the young lady bought ice
cream, all the other detail is missing. T h e significance of the men, and
what in there refers to are never explained. T h ere’s no plot or purpose to
this.
8D. All about ice cream ’n I coulda really went for a c o n e . . . . I
saw a parked car near an ice cream parlor ’n a little girl wantin’
ice cream her m other refused her but her father gave her the
money for it. And she bought the ice cream ’n she was gonna neat
it.
Often the poverty of the narrative in terms of what is included and the
order of presentation is matched by other disintegrated speech:
9A. A little girl, she’s uh she’s on her own. She’s so [weh] she gets
her [ausoh uh uh ou] after she ask her own father if she can go out for
ice ice cream and he says eh answers her [shi] dunno and get ice
cream for herself ice cream for herself and [ess] pass by [sh wu] and
so it all happened [eh] that they’re all happy . . . She just cunna’s
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cunna get anything home so she’s hafta go out on her and get it.
Okay. I ’m sorry, I’m sorry. I’m sorry about my speech. [me: your
speech is fine]. I stutter a lot though.
9B. Well I saw it divided up into three segments. First segment was
outdoors. It involved automobiles and a small child and it was kind
of disturbing because to me because I don’t like the noises of cars.
T h e camera was quite shaky um that was sort of disturbing but that’s
usually happens with videotape um kinda worried me to see the girl
leaning her head against the glass that’s kinda disturbing um only
because I identify with that um the second segment was filmed in
almost an orange very warm sort of color.
9C. What I saw? Uh, a car waiting in front of an ice cream shop a car
drove by a girl looking through a window into an ice cream shop uh
mmm a man a lady walkin’ by with groceries [uhnu] when she switched
into a family’s house the girl talking to her m other her m other her
mother setting dishes her father came through the door there were
cur- blue curtains ’n it was kinda brown the room they’re in uh ask
girl if she din’t have ice cream ’n the girl went and bought ice cream.
These psychotic narratives supply detail not germane to the plot and
omit essential ones. T h e color of the curtains had no relevance to the
story nor did an orange tone in the second segment. T h e repetitions
about feeling disturbed, the shakiness of the camera, none of these were
made relevant. Even though one narrator said that she identified with
“that,” ostensibly with the girl looking in the window, we are not told
why she identifies with that, what import it had.
Some psychotic narratives did manifest detailed tracking, as in
10A. Okay. T here’s a lady who was ah walking towards a car and uh,
I forget it she walked by the car is what it was okay and then uh it
zoomed in past the car ’n they went past the car a man walked by a
store a Baskin-Robbins sign it was the scene before [laughs] so wa
le’s see. T h en once they went past the man they zoomed in on a girl
and the girl looking in a window so wa- from there they were on that
for a while then they switched to the family scene where ah the
l a dy. . . I guess the girl was asking the mother for ah some money
for ice cream ’n I guess she didn’t give her any ’n her father came in
[shavaw]4 they switched to the front door5 ’n her father came in ’n
the girl ran up and asked for some money. I guess he gave in ’n
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[laughing] he gave her some money. So wa she ran down to the ice
cream store and bought a double scoop of chocolate ice cream.
The difference between this and the normal narratives above, is that
the greatest detail occurs at the outset with extraneous matters. Fully half
of this is concerned with the lady, the man, and the cars. Even so, it does
not encode the opening sequence so that a hearer can form a picture of
what happened. It was impossible for anybody not to walk by or towards
a car in the crowded parking lot portrayed. Neither walked to any
particular car, nor were they shown getting out of cars. We simply see
them walking separately. T his is encoded as if the focus was on the
pedestrians and it wasn’t. For instance, notice that the patient says that
“once they went past the man they zoomed in on a girl.” T his sounds as if
these actions were related and they weren’t. After all opening detail, we
are not told what kind of window the girl is looking in, the phrase
“switched to the family scene” is a vague encoding. T he patient does
mention that the girl requested ice cream from the mother, but she is said
only to ask her father for money without specifying what for. This is
recognizably psychotic, but there is no bizarre imagery; it does pretty
much say what was on the video; it is grammatical. It is the narration itself
that is perceived as abnormal.
In contrast, in all narratives judged normal regardless of length, the
narrator typically tracks the events. Even if undirected visual scanning
occurs at the outset, once the participant gets his or her bearing so to
speak, the events are encoded as they happened with no crucial part of
the story being left out, crucial in the sense of what motivated subsequent
action. One normal narrator adjudged psychotic by both raters failed to
mention that the girl asked the mother for the ice cream and failed to
maintain temporal ordering6:
10B. A young girl getting ice cream at a ice cream parlor. Let’s see
what are the—and there was a scene with her and her parents. She
asked her father if he would give her some money to get the ice
cream and before that she was hanging around outside the ice cream
parlor. Okay, let’s see. How about she had a yellow shirt on. Whatever.
A sort of jumpsuit.
10C was judged psychotic by one of the raters. In part, this may have
been because of his faulty tracking.
10C. What I saw was [uh] a young girl looking through uh an ice
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cream parlor window I saw her go home to her parents, I guess they
were her parents, I saw her go home and ask what I assume to be her
parents if she could have an ice cream. I saw her get rejected by one.
I saw one give in and gave her money to go get an ice cream cone.
She went down she bought it and left.
He starts out correctly saying that first she looked in the window, then
she went home to her parents. T h en he backtracked and said he guessed
they were her parents, and then said he assumed they were. He was the
only normal who perseverated on a point. T his kind of overprecision is
otherwise seen only in psychotics. Like the previous narrator erroneously
judged as psychotic, this one collapses the request to “a scene with her
and her parents.” Notice that neither of these encodes error. “Asking
parents” certainly would be an acceptable paraphrase of a child’s asking
first one parent and then the other, but in this task, hearers apparently
expect certain kinds of orderly encoding of events. As we shall see with
misperceptions, it is not truth p e r se that causes speech to be judged
normal or abnormal, but structure.
All other normals said that the girl wanted ice cream, asked her
m other for some, was refused, asked her father, and then went back to the
store to buy her ice cream. T h e only point of difference in this tracking
of events was whether or not the narrator mentioned that the father must
have given the child money. Apart from the two exceptions mentioned
above, if normals evinced a gap it was that they simply didn’t mention if
the father gave her the money. For instance:
10D. I saw [uh] a young girl enter the kitchen ask her m other if she
could have an ice cream cone and the m other says no it’s too close to
your dinner and she walked out of the room and a moment later her
father walked in from work an’ she says to her father, “Can I have an
ice cream cone?” and the next sequence showed her walkin’ into an
ice cream parlor an’ buying the ice cream cone and walkin’ out.
10E. . . . her father walked in from work and’ she says to her father,
“Can I have an ice cream cone?” an’ the next sequence showed her
walkin’ into the ice cream pa r l o r . . .
10F. . . . she asked her father who she bumped into7 As he walked
through the door same question he didn’t answer [ah ne] it all it
does show her go walking into the ice cream stand . . .
These gaps are exact renderings of the video in which the child asks
for ice cream, but the father’s response is not given. Six normals encoded
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the gap, but since it was a factual tracking of the video, none were judged
psychotic.
Another apparent exception to temporal ordering in a normal seems
to have been a slip of the tongue. One subject said, “H e [her father] stuck
his hand in his pocket and then the film ended,” but then proceeded to
describe the girl going back to the store and buying the ice cream.
Apparently, what this subject was encoding was that the scene in which
the father is seen putting his hand towards his pants pocket is abruptly
cut off. She did not mean that the narrative was through. She was rated
normal by both judges and her narrative conformed to the normal ones
in every other way.
[7 ] N arrative G litches.

Both normals and psychotics produced glitches which interrupted the
flow in the narratives. Fromkin’s (1975) assertion that schizophrenic error
is not different from normal error was not borne out as there were three
categories of glitching produced only by psychotics, and one produced
only by normals. Both populations started a word, broke off, and then
restarted as in
S T A R T -R E S T A R T

11A. f-f-for
11B. she we-went
11C. the way the way they did that either.
but only normals started a phrase, broke it off to insert a prior event or
a comment on their word choice and then resumed the phrase as in
(underlining shows interrupted phrase and its pickup. Boldface is
interruption):
C O M M E N T -C O R R E C T I O N

12A. and then she—her father came home from work, whatever —she
asked her father for money.
12B. and a white—it appeared to be white - long-sleeved shirt
12C. so when her father came hom e—or the man who came in the
door I thought it was her father —came in the door.
In contrast, if psychotics broke off in the middle of a phrase, they
never picked it up, creating strange syntactic gapping.
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Both populations evinced false starts but only the psychotic ones were
unrelated to the ultimate selection of words as in
12D. he ch- told where to go
Some of the neologizing and gibberish below could also be counted as
evidence of such unrelated false starting. In contrast, normal false starts
could be seen to be self-correction, as in
12E. she-we saw
12F. it looked like a chocolate su- a chocolate ice cream cone
T h e first involved a correct pronoun change, and in the second, the
speaker apparently started to say sundae, but corrected it to the proper
word cone. T h e perceptual error of calling the ice cream chocolate was
one made by many normals, none of whom corrected it.
Only psychotics produced words which rhymed with the apparent
target, as in
13A. he twitched through the door.
13B. that’s all I can stew
T h e twitch was probably intended to be switched as it was a reference to
the camera action and the stew was apparently a misretrieval for do as it
ended the narrative.
[8 ] N eologizing an d G ibberish.

Neologizing and gibberish occurred in psychotic narratives, although
one normal also produced a short stretch of gibberish. Given the con
straints on the task this was not wholly expected. Actually, there were no
neologisms comprised of recognizable morphemes, such as puterience or
plausity. All of the examples here could as easily be called neologisms or
gibberish. What occurred is a stretch that sounded like a short word in an
otherwise comprehensible passage or two or three syllable stretches. We
have already seen some of these like k if in 4 above. T h is is unusual in
that there.were few other such errors in that narrative. Typically, nonwords like [ausoh uh uh o u], [shi], [ess], [sh wu] [cunna’s cunna] were
produced by patients who displayed other lexical problems as in
14A. a little girl taking a dit asking for ice cream from her mother
her says says that it’s too close to dinnertim e so she goes to her father
an’ asked if she can have then goes to the ice cream place and orders
a double scoop of something which I didn’t understand just taking

T h e Ic e C rea m Stories: A S tu d y o f N arrations

201

efu taking control away from her mother asking mm asking her
father fsh if her father said no she should’ve gone to her mother.
Besides the obvious neologizing, dit, efu, and fsh, we see nonaccurate
lexical choice or circumlocution as in speaking of the ice cream place,
rather than parlor or shop, and som ething which I d id n ’t understand instead
of a cover term like “ice cream.” (See sec 10 for syntax error.) T he patient
above who said [shinchuer] and [smae] showed other not quite normal
lexical choices such as “she’s a little daughter.”
There was even one normal lapse into gibberish
14B. So therefore she etuh she ed she listened.
Even though this normal produced these apparent neologisms in her
two false starts, she recouped almost immediately finishing the construc
tion she had stumbled on. In all other respects her narrative was normal.
It encoded the events correctly. Given her recouping here, this is more
like the c o m m e n t - c o r r e c t i o n of normals seen above. She starts out
with an error but is able to go back to the target utterance despite the
interruption. There is still control.9
[9] L exical Choices.

There were three other problems with lexical choice. The first involved
selection of words that rhymed with the apparent target word, but bore
no semantic similarity with it, as in 13A—B above. The second was inexact
wording, using a HYPONYM, the general classification under which the
word falls, rather than the exact word for the meaning. T he third
consisted of selecting several words to add up to a target word. These
typically overinflated what was intended.
T he use of hyponyms is illustrated by subjects who said that the girl
wanted things or som ething rather than saying she wanted ice cream fell
into this category. T he one normal who did this, in A above, recouped
later on in the narrative, indicating that he realized his error, by saying
she asked her father for ice cream “which is I guess what she asked her
mother.” In contrast, vague wording by psychotics did not get corrected.
Notice the misencodings of
15A. What I saw. Uh a car waiting in front of an ice cream shop a
car drove by a girl looking through a window into an ice cream shop
uh mmm a man . . . a lady walking by with groceries [uh’n nu] when
she switched into a family’s house the girl talking to her mother her
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mother setting dishes her father came through the door there were
cur- blue curtains ’n it was kinda brown the room they’re in uh ask
girl if she din’t have ice cream ’n the girl went and bought ice cream.
Notice the inexact wording. T he scene changed to “a family’s house.”
It is usually assumed that families reside in houses so that one doesn’t
qualify by specifying that. T he opposite occurrence, a house occupied by
persons other than a family, is the one that has to be specified, even with
today’s current changes in family life. This improper specification is
matched by the fact that the narrator uses the indefinite article a rather
than the specific her in introducing the house. This is as much a syntactic
error as a lexical one as the grammar of English requires that a marker of
old information, such as a personal pronoun or the, introduce an item or
location belonging to some one who has been introduced. Then, the
narrator encodes the girl’s request to her mother as “talking to her
mother.” Nowhere is it mentioned what she is talking about. Another
patient made an analogous error:
15B. He says well what the heck give it to her [nooee] sh-she’s a little
daughter.

Strictly speaking, all girls are little daughters, but usually, when
someone mentions a little daughter they precede it by a possessive, such
as saying that Betty is “Max’s little daughter” or that the girl over there is
“my little daughter.” Other than that, one might say of someone else’s
child, “she’s like a little daughter to me,” but the plain unvarnished
“she’s a little daughter” is not usual.8
Some psychotic lexical choices are reminiscent of mild anomic aphasia.9
For instance, when the child pays for her ice cream, one patient encoded
this as
15C. T he cash register man handled the financial matters.
Calling a clerk a “cash register man,” although readily understandable,
spreads the semantic features adhering to clerk over too many words.
Using such a roundabout phrasing implies that the “cash register man” is
not a normal clerk. In this instance, such special implications were not
appropriate. T he clerk behind the counter who dipped the ice cream was
in every respect an ordinary young male clerk. Similarly, handling
financial matters refers to transactions far more glorious and important
than ringing up the sale of an ice cream cone.
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Another patient, C.T., couched the act of the father’s giving the child
money thusly:
15D. He says “well, what the heck give it to her [nooee] she’s a little
daughter so he gets her the coins . . . ”
To speak of getting the coins implies that one is fetching some coins of
great value or those in a coin collection. T h e father gives her change or
money.

C.T., the patient who uttered both 15B and 15D above also created
several neologisms indicating that he had a general problem in lexical
retrieval. H e frequently used literary words, such as saying
15E. You can interpolate and say that she ate the ice cream and
brought it home and said thank you daddy thank you daddy or
thank you mummy but she still is her destination is not known in a
few minutes.

In such a narrative, one would expect “I ’m not sure she went home.”
both the word destination and the passive voice is not known are the wrong
register for the situation. Although this patient spoke copiously, his
speech was larded with such inappropriate phrasings. A straightforward
misencoding occurred as he was setting the scene
15F. All right. T h e first thing we see is an ice cream [ayuh] it
could’ve been a shopping center with two cars parked in front car
drives up in front and waits get the impression that someone goes
out of the car and walks in front and sees in the window of the same
one of these shopping center stores a little girl waiting for some ice
cream or something or other . . .

T h e girl is looking in the window, but she is not in the window. Notice
also the inappropriate reference to the “same one of these shopping
center stores.” H e has not singled out which store that is. T he sam e one
can only refer back to a previously mentioned item. T his is clearly a
circumlocution, again evidence of his difficulties in lexical selection.
An analysis of these wordings as being evidence of a linguistic deficit
is reinforced by his frequent neologizing and his grossly misordered
sequences. It was also C.T. who said
15G. . . . that’s what kids are like these days always have but th- it
means that [shinchuer] her parents that she’s so proud of she goes
out leaves the ice cream ’n eats it on the way ’n we don’t know what
happens [sme ] the f act. . .
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[10] Syntactic Errors.

However we wish to term it, the undeniable fact that emerged from
this study was that psychotic speakers do show genuine disruption in
syntax. Because, as we have seen, the borders of language tend to be
fuzzy, certain errors can be assigned either to the lexicon or to the
syntactic system. Those mentioned above dealing with choice of indefi
nite or definite noun determiner are cases in point. If a patient uses an a
in lieu of a correct the or my, it is true that he or she selected the wrong
word, but it is equally true that he or she failed to use the proper
syntactic marking for indicating definite versus indefinite mention.
Apart from these fuzzier matters, however, psychotic narratives showed
agrammatisms, hard instances of agrammatisms. For instance, let us
reprise from C.T.’s narrative:
• . . . that’s what kids are like these days always have but th- it
• . . . she still is her destination is not known in a few minutes.
In the first of these, C.T. has not completed the construction started
with have. There is no prior phrase to which this is anaphoric reference.
Similarly, in the second the is requires an adjective, noun or verb to
complete it. Again this is not anaphoric reference. There is no hesitation
or backtracking in either of these to indicate that the speaker has started
to say something and then has changed his mind. T he patient simply
starts the construction and changes to a different one with no warning or
later correction.
T his kind of error, what I call syntactic gapping occurred only in
psychotic patients. This is another category of error not produced by
normals, again proving that Fromkin is in error in her claim that schizo
phrenics evince the same errors as normals. Not surprisingly, the gap
ping occurred in patients who evinced other linguistic disabilities like
neologizing, imprecise lexical retrieval, and misordering of temporal
events. Other examples are
• he was blamed for and I don’t think that was fair the way they did
that either
• what are the and uh there was a scene
• and asks if she can have then goes to the ice cream place.
• Another car pulls and then a little girl is peeking___
It must be emphasized that errors like these were not only exclusive to
psychotics, but the sentences in which they occurred were said as if
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nothing had been omitted. There was no break in intonation or stress,
but a vital word to a syntactic construction was never uttered. In contrast
to this kind of gapping there exist devices for starting a syntactic
construction, then before completion abandoning it and starting anew.
We see the difference in the reprise of:
I saw a movie with a girl and she wanted ice cream and it wasn’t
really ice cream she wanted, it was uh she ordered frozen grape ice, a
double order, and her mother said no and her father said no and it
seemed like she defied them and went for it anyhow.
T he speaker started to say “it was..” This could have been the comment
on the previous sentence, as in “it wasn’t really ice cream she wanted, it
was grape ice.” He indicates that he is breaking off to rephrase the
sentence by the uh followed by a pause. Then he restarted with another
whole sentence which fit the context including the observation that she
didn’t want ice cream. In contrast, in the gapping above, there were no
pauses to indicate a rephrasing and what follows is not a new phrasing. It
just continues as if the prior constructions were complete.
Both normals and psychotics evinced a less disruptive kind of syntactic
error.
16 . . . he charged it for her
1 7 . . . . it’s too close for dinnertime
18. . . . two three minutes for get waited on (see 20 below)
19. There was and when she got home there was too near suppertime.
T he first of these, from a normal, was simple reversal of words. It
should have been “he charged her for it.” T he next two both substitute fo r
for to. This is not so surprising as it might appear at first blush. For—to
together constitute the infinitive after some verbs,10 as in “I would love
for you to come.” In 16 and 17 the fo r is not grammatically correct, but it
is easy to see that this is a typical slip-of-the-tongue error of substituting
one word in a set for another. 16 was said by a normal and 17 by a
psychotic. T he last, 19, was said by a psychotic. Both it and there can
function as dummy subjects as in “it’s raining out” and “there are nap
kins on the table.” Unlike fo r and to, however, they never occur in the
same construction. Complex syntactic rules determine which can be used
in a given instance.
Some patients displayed common errors in pronoun selection of the
kind prevalent in slips of the tongue.11 However, when this occurred in
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psychotic narrative, it typically persevered over a stretch of several
references. The underlining shows the wavering between pronoun choices.
20. I seen a little girl looking in the window ’n ah say wan’ some ice
cream but didn’t have money to get it so she asked her mother ’n her
mother said not now because it’s too near suppertime uh the kid was
put down so he goes to the father ’n the father ch-told where to go ’n
gave him the money so she could buy ice cream. While she was in
the ice cream parlor she was sittin’ there waitin’ for somebody to
get—musta waited two three minutes for get waited on a place like
that should have it all the time soon as she comes in the door. Then
finally she got the ice cream. She was happy ’n that’s the way it is.
Again this passage shows how difficult it is to discuss a level of syntax
separately from one of semantics and lexical choice. T he incorrect pro
noun usage can be viewed as opposite speech which we think of as a
problem of lexical choice. Another example of undeniably opposite
speech in 20 occurs when the speaker said the girl was sitting there. She
was actually standing there. T he boldfaced segments highlight other
deviations here: a syntactic error, and another improper lexical choice.
Unless one is specifically giving directions, usually in response to a
question, telling another where to go usually means you have been
refused roundly.
One patient with speech disintegrated to the point of gibberish also
produced word salads. Underlined words indicate faulty pronoun refer
ence, another semantic-syntactic category:
21. Okay. I was watchin a film of a little girl and um s bring back
memories of things that happened to uh people around me that
affected me durin’ the time when I was livin’ in that area and uh she
jus’ went to the store for candy bar and by the time ooh of course her
brother who was supposed to be watchin’ wasn’t payin’ much atten
tion he was blamed for and I didn’ think that was fair the way the
way they did that either so that’s why I ’m kinda like askin’ yah could
we just get together and try to you know work it out all together for
one big party or something ezz it hey if it we’d all in which is in not
they’ve been here so why you jis now discoverin’ it. You know they
they’ve been men will try to use you every time for everything he
wants so ain’t no need and you tryin’ to get upset for’t that’s all that’s
all.
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This, of course, fails on every level. T he narrative tracking is off.
Personal memories intrude on the narrative. Very little of what was seen
in the film ever gets encoded. There is syntactic gapping (he was blamed
for and I didn’t think . . . ) , gibberish, word salad. Generally, narratives
deviant enough to manifest severe syntactic and lexical retrieval prob
lems are those which manifest about every other evidence of disinte
grated discourse abilities.
[11] M isperceptions.

One unexpected finding was that normals do about the same amount
of misperceiving as do psychotics. T he differences lie both in the order
of scanning the memory which seems to underlie narrative production,
and the kinds of misperceptions which each group had. This last was
partially a result of the first.
T he misperceptions of the two populations were almost mutually
exclusive. Misperceptions by normals arose out of their summing up the
action in order to get a smooth, logical progression of activity, all
subordinated to what was apparently seen as the central theme: the girl’s
desiring and then getting ice cream. Hence, many normals, but not
psychotics, reported that the father as well as the mother refused the
child. T he story could be told either way. Normals ignored the mother’s
affectionate and kind refusal. Rather, it became converted to a flat, even
unpleasant, denial of the girl’s request. It was this scene that caused one
normal to say that the child was “rejected by one [parent].” Another
reported the mother as giving an abrupt “nope.” What is essential for the
overall story line is that the mother refused the request, or else there was
no reason for the girl to ask her father. Therefore, normals not only said
that the mother refused, but they grossly misrepresented the character of
the refusal. One normal even misinterpreted the father’s putting his
hand in his pocket as a specific gesture:
22 . . . she asked her mother if she could have some ice cream and
the mother said not it’s too near supper so then the girl’s father, I
assume it was came home and she asked the father the same ques
tion and he sa— . . . H e didn’t actually say but he gave the gestures
for no and the next scene was the little girl went to an ice cream
store and she ordered a double grape ice and the man gave it to her
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and she paid the man and he said “Thank you come again,” and she
left the store.

Similarly, it made no difference to the story exactly what flavor ice
cream the girl gets, so normals did not seem to process the clearly
enunciated “double grape ice” in the videostory. So far as the central
storyline goes, it makes no difference if the mother is preparing dinner
rather than setting the table. Consequently, a normal misperceived this
sequence as well.
Two normals misperceived the white cases barely visible through
the window which the child was looking into in the opening scene.
One termed the store a deli, and the other thought it was a laun
dromat. Although the cases do look like those in delicatessen’s or laundry
equipment, it was surprising given the entire videostory that they did
not perceive that she was looking at ice cream cases, especially given
the normals’ penchant for fitting the facts to the perceived story. How
ever, even these errors did not mar the storyline. Neither of these mis
perceptions caused a rating of psychotic. In sum, normals do misperceive
even in such a short and simple task as this was, but their misperceptions
fit into the gist of what they assume the story to be about. It is as if
normals first figure what the point of the story is, and then fit facts in
to suit.
Psychotic misperceptions, although no more frequent than normals,
are far more disparate. Sometimes in what appear to be psychotic
misperceptions, we are not sure if the patient is hallucinating, acciden
tally accessing chance associations to the target utterances, or simply is
suffering from difficulties in lexical retrieving. For instance, in 2A, the
manic narrator says that the girl is looking in a trashcan, a statement
repeated the next week on recall. There is no way to know if he was
actually hallucinating this, but it seems unlikely because he says, “This
little girl was looking in the store was looking in a trashcan or something.”
T he “or something” indicates that he was not discussing a hallucinatory
trashcan, but that he could not recall what she was actually looking into
or that he had not registered that information or couldn’t think of the
correct word. This usage of “or something” is frequently used to indicate
that a word just selected is not quite on target. Alternatively, the word
trashcan might have been a syntagmatic association. T he phrasal verb
looking in can be completed by trashcan, although it does seem quite
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farfetched. Although one can look into a trashcan, looking into windows
and stores is far more likely.
T he patient who reported the father’s question as asking the girl if she
had ice cream, was a clear misperception. T he girl did the asking and
she didn’t ask if anyone had any. She asked for ice cream directly.
Another misperception of dialogue seems responsible for
23. Ummm. First one car pulls up near an ice cream parlor. Another
car pulls ’n then a little girl is peeking in a ice cream parlor ’n’ then
later after that the little girl is at home and she asked her mother she
wants to eat supper and her mother says it’s too early. T hen her father
walks in and she says, “H ello Daddy”12 an’ the next thing she goes
back to the ice cream parlor an gets the ice cream and walks out and
meet her friends waitin’ for her.
T he misperception of what the girl asked is especially blatant since it
does not cohere with any of the action at the ice cream parlor. In contrast
to the normal misperceptions, this did not fit in with any overall action.
Indeed, the misperception disrupts the story.
When a psychotic encodes the child’s request to her parents as “She
talked to her mother and father,” we do not know if he actually saw the
child conversing with, but not requesting anything from, her parents.
Whereas requesting is a form of talking, still talking is not a usual
synonym for it. It is as if the patient hit upon a hyponym under which
requesting or asking is categorized, but did not quite get to his goal.
Similarly, some psychotics spoke of the “candy store” rather than the ice
cream store. Interestingly, in Rhode Island, one does not buy ice cream
at a candy store. One purchases it from a dairy, creamery, ice cream
parlor, supermarket, variety store, or spa. Only gourmet candy is bought
at a candy store. Every one of the subjects who substituted candy store for
ice cream parlor came from Rhode Island, as did all but one who said the
girl was going for a candy bar instead of an ice cream cone, and she
seems to have been speaking of a hallucinatory girl with a baby. Whether
those who spoke of a candy store and candy bars misperceived or simply
made lexical errors could not be determined.
[12] Constraints, O rganization and Psychosis.

In sum, although both normals and psychotics were astonishingly
prone to errors even in such a simple task, this study verified that there
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are distinct differences in the kinds of errors each produces. Only psychotics manifested syntactic gapping.13 T hey alone generated word salads
and made slips of the tongue based upon words rhyming with their
targets. With only one exception, it was they who produced neologizing
and only they uttered false starts with elements unlike those that followed.
T hey alone produced narratives with events misordered, cause and
effect reversed, and interpolations of personal memories and conjectures
not germane to the film.
Only psychotics created unusual, almost literary circum locutions as in
“he gets her the coins” and “the cash register man handled the financial
matters.” Unfortunately, these were their only felicities. T h e other fea
tures peculiar to psychotic narratives were disruptive, not creative. Psy
chotic speech was not indicative of exceptional creativity as posited by
Forrest (1976) and Lecours and Vanier-Clement (1976). So infelicitous
were all the other features of psychotic narrating that the few unusual
circumlocutions seem to have been accidental, a result of a general
difficulty in getting the correct word for the situation. These fortuitous
circum locutions were overshadowed by opaque unbeautiful m eaning
lessness of the rest.
In sum, it was found that psychotics produced error at almost every
level of speech: word formation, sentence production, and narrative
production. With the exception of cohesive ties, their errors and those of
normals were almost entirely mutually exclusive. T h e ir speech was
characterized by a general deficit in ability to order and to organize.
T h ere were individual differences among the patients in the levels of
speech that were affected as well as in the severity of disruption, but the
general pattern was the same for all. Those normal narratives judged
psychotic shared one or more of these features, although no normal
failed to complete the telling of the events of the narratives. Normals
always were able to recoup.
Normals organize their narratives far more tightly than do psychotics,
utilizing temporal order and attempting to reproduce the details of what
they have seen. Although they do display linguistic errors, their target is
easily retrieved by hearers. Not surprisingly, normals are both capable
of self-correction and likely to indulge in it. W here they err in reporting
events, they do so because they produce a coherent whole, so that they fit
the facts to what they perceive to be the central issues in the story. They
also suppress personal associations to events depicted. T hey did not
comment on the outcome of the story nor did they “rem em ber” personal
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events. Interestingly, several normals at the end of the taping commented
that they used to play one parent off against the other as did the girl in
the film, but none told me this as part of their narrative.
In contrast, psychotics were often unable to repress internal stimuli,
such as the patient who introduced the narrative with “All about ice
cream ’n I coulda really went for a cone.” Shortly thereafter the patient
said “neat” for eat. Another correctly said the girl got a cone of double
grape ice and then interpolated, “my favorite flavor.” Only psychotics
commented that they were happy that she got her ice cream or even that
she was happy. Only psychotics mentioned that certain things disturbed
them or got them angry. C.T., to use his own word, interpolated all kinds
of comments about what kids are like these days, the girl’s pride in her
parents, and her probable “thank you’s” to “mummy and daddy.”
Typically, the more such extraneous matters intruded, the more
disrupted the entire narrative was. C.T.’s was the one with the bizarre
temporal misorderings as well as neologisms and other disruptions in
lexical retrieval. In the most disrupted narratives, personal memories
blended with the events on the screen, as in the narrative that spoke of
“memories of things that happened to uh people around me that affected
me durin’ the time when I was livin’ in that area and uh she jus’ went. . . ”
Where the area was; who “she” was, indeed, the entire leaping from one
event to another with lapses into word salad and neologizing show a total
lack of organization and of repression of matters extraneous to the matter
at hand. Because of their inability to filter out stimuli not relevant to the
task at hand and to organize, psychotic misperception, unlike that of
normals, does not form a coherent narrative.
T heir deviations were not what Lecours and Vanier-Clement call
“plus deviations.” They were almost all “minus deviations” hindering
comprehension and/or failing to encode the story. Because in a variety
of ways they showed that they were trying to narrate it, one can conclude
that they were not always able to say what they meant. This argues for
disrupted speaking skills. This disruption includes hard instances of
agrammatism. Moreover, such instances were not at all difficult to find
even in a short task given to short-term patients.
We can characterize a general dysfunction caused by a generalized
lowering of constraints in speech activities. It is possible, indeed it does
happen, that in some psychotics, at least some of the time, the lowering
of constraints can be controlled enough to produce artistic endeavors
like the wildly creative poetry of a patient reported on in Hallowell and
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Smith (1983), for instance. In one of those, the patient describes his terror
as being like a plummeting toward acid and spikes, cobra spears, and
tiger-hunting forks, and he says that he is impaled upon a dozen blades.
As vivid and really wild as some of his imagery is, it is all in control, all
subordinated to his description of his feelings. Furthermore, this poem
is appropriately rhymed and was written down by the patient, correctly
spelled and lined up as poetry on the page. However, this certainly is not
the usual psychotic speech. As we have seen in the Ice Cream Stories, the
problem is that the productions are not subordinated to form or to a
coherent meaning. They are not controlled, and control is the essence of
art and of ordinary communication.
Many theories advanced for the oddities of schizophrenic speech have
discussed its strange associational character, including this mix of memo
ries with other verbal output. Terms like “filtering defects,” “faulty
pigeonholing,” “attentional deficits,” and “weakening of constructs” have
all been used both as explanation of the cause of such language and as a
description of it. All of these terms seem to be referring to the same
phenomena. This study indicates that schizophrenic and manic narra
tion is marred by intrusions from personal memory, such that it seems to
be suffering from “faulty filtering” mechanisms. It should be stressed,
however, that other terms might be—and have been—used to label the
same phenomena. In short, the Ice Cream Stories support the model of
disrupted speech with the analogous disruption in visual tracking as
discovered by Holzman.

Notes
1Mass nouns are those which cannot be counted. That is, one cannot say “one
trash,” “two trashes.” Also, if one puts some in front of a mass noun, the noun
remains singular, as in “some trash." With count nouns, if one puts some in front of
them, they become plural, as in “some apples.”
2He was referring to the rather jerky camera action at the outset of the video. It
literally did stop and start.
3There is no line
4This was a neologism
5There was no switch to the front door. The father clearly entered by the kitchen
door clearly visible in the room.
6This subject was exceptionally nervous when recounting the narrative. He
gripped the tape recorder tightly, was flushed, and appeared unsure of himself.
Since he had volunteered for the project, his behavior was inexplicable. Normal
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participants were not asked if they had schizophrenic or otherwise mentally ill
family members, but studies have shown that people genetically at risk for schizo
phrenia do show abnormalities in speech similar to schizophrenics. Whether or not
this person is at risk I do not know. As we saw in the last chapter, Rochester and
Martin also found that they got some highly deviant passages from normals.
7She actually walked up to the father and made body contact with him as she
makes the request.
8A similar phrase is fine, however, as when one says “she’s a little sister” or “she’s a
little lady” when explaining someone’s role behavior.
9Notice that I am not claiming that the patient does have anomic aphasia; only
that his or her wording is like that.
10This is a matter of dialect as well. Some dialects use both the for and the to
where others would be more likely just to use the to. I would be more likely to say,
“I’d love you to go.” Either encoding seems to be equally socially correct and all
English speakers at some times at least would use both for and to.
11We have to exclude here the confusion between the gender marking on English
pronouns by native speakers of languages like Chinese and Filipino. Because these
languages use one pronoun for all genders in the singular, speakers often confuse he.
his, she, and her. Lest the English speaking reader feel superior, I must point out that
English shows no gender marking in the plural.
12The patient’s voice dropped and she adopted a very seductive tone and elon
gated the words “hello Daddy.”
13This is not a claim that psychotics are the only population who ever produce
these. In more open-ended situations, more exciting or fatiguing ones, or amongst
other impaired populations, we might find these as well. In this situation, one which
required narration of a relatively simple and short (124 second) videostory, only
psychotics omitted head words of constructions.

Chapter Nine

RELEVANCE
Schizophrenic speech is notoriously irrelevant, although this
has been called by many other names such as being tangential
or derailed. What is it that causes such evaluation? What exactly
is relevance? How can we determine whether or not speech is
relevant? How is relevance achieved? This chapter will show
that relevance and truth are not the same thing, that utterances
may be untrue, impossible, even fantastic, but still be relevant.
Allied to relevance is the problem of establishing mutual ground,
including the ways that this is done. The factors leading to
judgments of irrelevance can be isolated so that schizophrenic
and other psychotic speech can be analyzed as relevant or not
by objective standards.
[1] R elevance.

or those involved with psychotic speech, the problem of relevance is
especially pressing because the most remarked upon feature of schizo
phrenic speech is its lack of relevance. Labels like incoherent, tangential,
and distracted are all commonly applied to describe schizophrenic speech.
Before discussing these, we need to consider what it is that makes sen
tences relevant to the context so that a topic can be inferred in oral and
written communications. What is it that leads to the judgment that what
has been said is coherent, relevant, and sensible.
Relevance has two faces: first, how speech is connected to the interac
tion under examination; and second how it relates to a topic. It is,
admittedly, difficult to separate the two as they are Siamese twins. One
keeps to a topic by making relevant allusions to it. T he overlap is
unavoidable, but we can still see a difference between them. Relevance is
an ongoing cognitive process. Topic, a m a c r o s t r u c t u r e category, is
more directly concerned with syntax.
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[2] Com m on G round.

In order for successful communication to take place, common ground
has to be established between participants in the interaction. Obviously,
the longer their mutual history, the more that each can assume the other
(or others) know and this will affect what they have to overtly encode
(Kreckel 1981). Beyond these social conditions there are syntactic con
structions which indicate that a constituent in the sentence or the dis
course is C O M M O N g r o u n d . What interests us here is the sorts of devices
speakers use to establish common ground without participants’ overtly
reviewing their m u t u a l or s h a r e d k n o w l e d g e in each interaction.
We typically take anything in the physical environment as being
Common ground, and we encode on that basis. For instance, if we are
sitting at a restaurant table, and there is a candle burning on the table, we
could at first reference say, “T he wax is getting all over the tablecloth.”
One need not mention that there is a candle, it is burning and it is
melting. Indeed, to mention that would be odd since anyone sitting at
the table can see (or, if blind, feel) the flame. It is just such extraneous
mention which we associate with schizophrenicity.
Common ground also comes about by simple mention. If someone
says, “Dam , the books are on the table,” nobody would think that all
books on all tables were meant. Rather a hearer would look for a likely
table nearby or in view. Failing that, if the interactors had just left a place
with a table upon which relevant books could have been left, the state
ment would cause a hearer to think back to that spot or would assume
that the speaker had left the books on some table before meeting up with
the hearer. Mention, then, simply because it has been made indicates
that a certain scenario must have taken place, in this case, leaving books
that the speaker wants or needs. Mention need not be represented as
truth. Within a story or other fiction a character might say, “Drats!
They’ve painted the roses red.” So long as the narrator then mentions
causes or consequences of the painted roses, listeners will consider their
existence common ground in that fictional world. If no prior or further
reference is made to them, then their mention is perceived as odd, not
relevant. In fact, at the end of such a story, someone might say, “But what
about the roses?”
Mention of items that cannot be located by such natural strategies may
be taken as evidence of a wandering or otherwise incapacitated mind,
especially if the mentioner cannot direct the hearer to an appropriate
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scene or object. For instance, if one meets up with a person who sud
denly says, “Darn , the books are on the table!” with nothing in the
environment or present interaction accounting for this exclamation, the
hearer might well ask, “What books?” Presumably, then, the original
speaker might answer, “Some books that are 30 days overdue at the
library.” T hat explains the expletive and the concern. If, however, the
original speaker responded with “Tippecanoe and T yler too,” the hearer
would be justified in thinking something was wrong with that speaker,
unless, of course, the interaction was taking place in an American history
lecture or the hearer knew that the speaker was a specialist in American
elections. We don’t feel an abnormality in the response unless there is no
context, including mutual personal knowledge, that the present item can
be fit into. Given the very wide latitude and longitude that we have in
establishing common ground, the speaker who fails to do so can be seen
to be suffering from a serious, indeed primary, deficit.
Mutual cultural and personal knowledge such as matters pertaining to
a given job or profession are also givens in establishing common ground.
Frequently, at parties when people ask what kind of job I have, and I
respond that I teach, they will say things like “Oh, I better watch how I
talk.” In our society, teachers are the repository of socially correct speech.
Until the past few years if someone told me that they had to prepare
for a Passover Seder I would assume that they were Jewish. Now that
Catholics are having seders on Maundy Thursday, that assumption
cannot be made. However, if the person were preparing for a seder but
not on Maundy Thursday, I would then be justified in still assuming
that the person was Jewish.
T his last example pertains to another facet of establishing common
ground. Peter Seuren (1985, p. 65) reminds us that the lexicon is dynamic.
It is not a simple store of meaningful building blocks for sentences.
Rather, the lexicon is “an extremely rich quarry whose creative prin
ciples are of the highest explanatory value in linguistic theory.” Certainly,
speakers can tap into each other’s lexicons forcing new connections
between elements and adding meaning to preexisting items. Frequently,
this is how common ground is achieved. To give a trivial example, this
sort of thing is frequently done with food. Trying to describe Vindaloo to
a novice in Indian food, I said, “Try to imagine the hottest chili you ever
tasted. Real Tex-M ex. It’s hotter than that.” another party present added,
“Try to imagine food so hot your ears hurt by the second bite. T h at’s
Vindaloo.” My comment then was, “Im agine the smoke coming out of
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your ears. That’s Vindaloo.” Each of these images extended the novice’s
idea of what hot food could be as well as defining Vindaloo. Notice that
both real and imaginary experiences may be blended in order to extend
meanings and relationships between items in the lexicon. People don’t
necessarily associate pain in the ears with spicy food, for instance, and
outside of a Mel Brooks’ movie, smoke doesn’t come out of people’s ears.
No matter how outlandish such images are, they are not taken as evi
dence of insanity or other incapacity. What counts is that they have been
presented skillfully enough so that the hearer can find their relevance to
the topic.
Another technique for establishing mutual ground, one which also
can cause shifts in the lexicon, is to localize something in a known shared
experience and then extend it from there. For instance, “You think Jerry
used to be fat! You should see him now. His stomach looks as if he
swallowed a 20 pound watermelon.” or “You know the gown Liz wore for
her wedding? Well, this looked exactly the same except there were about
double the pearls on the neck—sort of like a turtle neck all with pearls
sewn on.”
Clark and Marshall (1981) maintain “T he world in which a thing is
claimed to exist can be real or imaginary, past, present, or future.” They
give the example of a possible world in which the following can be said:
1. A deer and a unicorn were grazing beside a stream when the
unicorn complimented the deer on his beautiful extra horn.
By virtue of the verb tenses and the adverbials beside a stream and
when, 1 is presented as a factual occurrence. What occurs to me is that we
don’t have to posit a possible world; we start with this one. Except for
very young children, hearers know that unicorns don’t exist and that
animals don’t talk, although herbivorous, animals do graze by streams.
Therefore, hearers know that they have to suspend some reality when
they hear sentences like 1. At the same time they can imagine the event
because of the inclusion of the real. The imaginary is imaginary because
of what we know of this world. It seems to me that hearers don’t maintain
several worlds in their brains. If they did communication would require
longer processing time because a great many extraneous questions would
arise: how much of the “possible worlds” would need constructing;
would we be forced to imagine possible weather systems? Housing forms?
Vegetation? It’s not so much a case of possible worlds which are constructed,
but of this world with some imaginary elements.

218

Understanding Psychotic Speech

Utterances, written or spoken, that do not establish enough common
ground so that we can cycle into a subject matter, are incoherent even if
the individual phrases and sentences used are normal enough. For
instance, part of what is wrong with the following is that we can find no
common ground on which to build up an event or explanation.
2. After John Black has recovered in special neutral form of life the
honest bring back to doctor’s agents must take John Black out
through making up design meaning straight neutral underworld
shadow tunnel. (Lorenz 1961)
We can assume that there is a person named John Black and that
something was wrong with him from which he recovered, but what a
“neutral form of life” is remains a mystery. Similarly, although we can
assume that a person can be brought out of a tunnel, we aren’t given a
clue as to what a “design meaning straight neutral” tunnel can be. This
can be seen as a failure to provide proper syntactic cues, but even if these
were present, common ground as to the kind of tunnel still has not been
established. That is, there may be a syntactic deficiency, but there is also
one in the larger discourse task of providing common ground:
Similarly, despite the syntactic errors, the bizarre quality of 3 comes
about because it fails to establish what should be answered and the
relevance of Paradise to the rest of it.
3. M ill Avenue is a house in between avenues U and avenue T I
live on Mill Avenue for a period of for now a period of maybe
fifteen year for around approximate fifteen years I like it the fam—I
like every family on M ill Avenue I like every family in the world I
like every family in the United State of America I like every family
on on M ill Avenue I like M ill Avenue is a is a block with that is busy
cars always pass by all the time I always look out the window of my
front porch front porch at time when I s- when I ’m not sure if it’s
possible about the way I think I could read people mind about
people’s society attitude plot and spirit so I think I could read their
mind as they drive by in the car sh- will I see Paradise will I not see
Paradise should I answer should I not answer I not answer w- their
thought of how I read think I could read their mind about when
they pass by in the car in the house pass by in the car from my house
I just correct for them for having me feel better about myself not
answer will I should I answer should I not answer will I see paradise
will I not see paradise I just correct them to have me feel better
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about myself about the way I think I can hear their mind r- about
the way I think I could read their mind as they pass by the house . . .
(data courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)1
Interestingly, the matter of reading people’s minds as they drive by
in their cars is established as this is part of a response about what it
is like living in the patient’s neighborhood. After localizing the street,
the patient then comments on people riding by in cars, and expresses
doubt that their minds could be read and that there might be plots in
the minds of the passers-by. Note that this is understandable despite
the syntactic errors in the passage, but the syntactically intact questions
about seeing Paradise and answering are precisely what are incompre
hensible. “Should I answer, should I not answer” and “will I see paradise,
will I not see paradise” are well-formed, but they don’t many any “sense.”
Thus, although they would appear to be contradictory, common ground
can be established in otherwise disrupted speech and syntactically
undisrupted speech can yield a feeling of incoherence. Common ground
and relevance are not wholly a matter of sentence structure.
Whenever someone speaks, in the absence of other evidence, we assume
that at least part of his or her utterance is true. In fiction, we assume that
we are to take it as true. Grice (1981) offers:
4. T he King of France is bald.
In such a sentence, the hearer takes as factual the underlying proposi
tion that there is a king of France. It is not that someone could not deny
that there is a king of France, but, in practice, one is more likely to deny
that he is bald, not that there is a king of France. Grice (1981, p. 190) feels
this is so because both the speaker and hearer usually assume that at least
one conjunct in a sentence is undeniable thus having common ground
status. Even if the hearer has never heard of an existing king of France,
much less whether or not he is bald, still the hearer will assume that the
speaker is correct and that such a person exists.
I find another reason for such an assumption. The article the specifically
has the meaning of mutual knowledge. That is, by prefacing a noun with
the, the speaker is asserting “this noun is one that we both know of.”
Hence, for instance, if one American says to another “T he President,” in
the absence of more restrictive context, both will assume that the speaker
meant the current President of the United States. Additionally, the topic
of the sentence, the first NP, is often taken as given and the predicate is
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taken as the comment on that topic. This is what demagogues or even less
venal politicians bank on. T he hearer assumes that part of the sentence
containing the topic is common knowledge and regards it as common
knowledge.
Grice adds that another way to achieve undeniability is to mention
uncontroversial matters, i.e., “my aunt’s cousin.” Noone would question
that you have an aunt or that she has a cousin. To this, one could add a
whole host of people whose existence you would accept as real: my
husband, my high school English teacher, your nemesis, or his brother.
None of these need any particular introduction as we assume that just
about everyone has or has had such human relationships. Moreover, the
possessive my like the is used to signal something already known to
participants.
Similarly, “my home” used to be taken as a given, because in America
everybody supposedly had a home. Now that has changed, so in a
circumstance in which the speaker is homeless and says to the hearer,
also homeless, “My home is comfortable,” the hearer knowing that the
speaker is homeless, could easily deny that the speaker has a home. For
that matter if someone was laden with overstuffed bags and had a general
ragged look, almost anyone might doubt that he or she really had a
home. It is not necessarily the case that certain utterances or positions in
sentences are automatically taken as true or not.
Both Sanders (1987) and Kreckel (1981) stress that a history of shared
interactions leads to more accurate understandings between parties. There
are more bases upon which to establish common grounds. Shared histories
mean that less needs to be said to indicate what common ground is to be
assumed, and the more accurately implicatures will be achieved. However,
even strangers have ways of establishing common ground.
[3] R elevant Contributions.

Apart from formal cohesive devices like conjunctions, relevance can
be achieved by the meaning of sentences themselves. If I am talking
about rules, for instance, and suddenly mention infractions, relevance is
achieved simply because that word is semantically relevant to our con
cept of rules. All that is necessary for relevance is that the talk of
infractions relates to the rules that were discussed previously, or to ones
that are going to be mentioned. In contrast, the semantic chaining in
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schizophrenia does not refer to other segments of the discourse in ques
tion and does not stand in any logical or real-life relationship to them.
Fauconnier’s (1985) metaphor of mental spaces pertains to relevance as
well as to pragmatics. He says that language forms refer to elements
which are set up and mentally pointed to. Language makes its own
constructions, building up mental spaces, the relations between them
and the relations between elements within them. He portrays language
forms as being plucked out of internal networks and pointing outward,
perceiving speakers as creating mental spaces which are then populated
with language. It seems to me that this view has special explanatory
significance for the analysis of schizophrenic speech. Whereas relevance
is achieved by mental pointing, schizophrenic irrelevancies seem to be
caused by roaming around in internal networks without indications of
connection between exterior or interior relations.
Sanders (1987, p. 186) maintains that relevant entries in a discourse
affirm, deny, add, or seek information about a proposition or combina
tion of propositions already mentioned. I would amend this to include as
well entries which have been suggested laterally, so to speak, by some
thing just said. These are shown to be relevant by further propositions
which develop another aspect of the proposition or even a new proposition.
Thus topics can and do advance and change within one normal discourse
provided that entries are relevant. It is not change of topic p er se, then,
that gives some discourse its schizophrenic flavor, nor is it necessarily the
formal ways of indicating change. It is that schizophrenics do not then
produce subsequent entries which affirm, deny, add, or seek information
about what they have just said. This is one of the things wrong with the
following:
5A. Looks like clay. Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the
hay.. . . (Cohen 1978)
5B. I was watching a film of a girl and um s bring back memories of
things that happened to people around me that affected me during
the time when I was living in the area and she just went to the store
for a candy bar and by the time ooh of course her brother who was
supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much attention he was blamed
for and I didn’t think that was fair the way the way they did that
either so that’s why I ’m just asking yah could we just get together
and try to work it out all together for one big party or something ezz
it hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve been here so why you
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just now discovering it. You know they they’ve been m en will try to
use you every time for everything he wants so ain’t no need and you
trying to get upset for it. T h at’s all. T h at’s all.
5C. You want me to talk about -um- last week experience I had?’n it
was funny, ’is experience seems to sum up all of what’s been goin’ on
because I ’ve been walkin’ around recitin’ things. I ’ve written to
people and people been listening but then when you get down to it
you’ve got to scrub your own dishes or else nobody’s gonna an’ I ’ve
just been so totally against the idea of people feelin’ they have a
ticket to carry them along because it’s a ticket is not an easy trip
along by no means is probably harder if you understand what I
mean.
In 5A the first phrase, looks like clay is accurate, but the next sounds like
tells us nothing about looking like gray, and taking someone for a roll in
the hay advances neither preceding proposition. T h e only way to make
sense out of this is not to try to understand what it means, but to
understand the processes that could have produced it.
5B starts out just fine with a recollection brought about by the film.
T h en the brother is m entioned and the fact that he was supposed to be
watching but didn’t do it. T h en the statements cease to advance the topic.
We never find out what he was blamed for, nor who they are nor what
they did, nor do we find out what relevance the party has to the preceding.
T h e word salad “hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve been
h e r e . . . ” cannot be interpreted in terms of relevance at all, since we
don’t know what it means,2 but the irrelevancy of the entire is not caused
by this lapse.
5C was produced in answer to the question, “Do you remember the
video you saw with me last week?” T h is is acknowledged in the first
statement. Actually, it is possible to give an interpretation of the entire.
It seems as if the patient is commenting on the need for self-reliance, of
not depending on anybody else. T h is assumption is based upon the
passage when you get down to it y o u ’ve gotta scrub your own dishes and the
references to a ticket. In that context, it is reasonable to assume that the
patient is talking about people getting a “free ride.” As with so much of
SD speech, it is interpretable if you tape it and then exam ine it at leisure.
T h e irrelevancies get in the way of ordinary interpretation in face-to-face
interactions. We are not told how the experience “last week” pertains to
his walking around reciting things. T here is no elucidation of things, nor
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are we told what he has written and what people have been listening to.
The but, far from introducing a contrastive statement to what has gone
immediately before simply introduces another statement not made
relevant, nor are we told why having a ticket makes things harder. This
lacks sufficient relevant entries although it is loaded with expressions of
time, place, and cohesion.
Normal discourse does not always shows adherence to one topic. As we
saw earlier, it often doesn’t. In some instances, in normal conversation,
overt topic changing markers are used, such as “ooh, that reminds
me . . . ” or “not to change the subject, b u t. . . ” which are instructions not
to interpret following remarks as belonging in sequence. Stubbs (1983,
p. 183) points out that these are used strategically, but are not required in
the sense that certain syntactic rules are.
Even if such markers are not used in normal discourse, the new topic
itself becomes the source of other entries relevant to it. In glossomania,
often within sentences, our feeling that a topic is not being adhered
results from the lack of affirmations, denials, additions, or questions
about any of the propositions singly or in combination. Our sense that
there is no STRATEGY in schizophrenic passages like 5A and B, our sense
that the sentences seem to be thrown together arises from the absence of
such relevant additions to anything mentioned. That is what makes
people characterize schizophrenic speech as having “loose associations.”3
In order to make entries relevant, one need only formulate in any way
possible structures which can be construed as adding to the macro-topic
or otherwise alluding to it (Chaika 1976). Relevant entries in and of
themselves effect coherence and cohesion aside from any particular
overt syntactic cohesive devices which may be used. vanDijk (1977,
p. 148; 1980, pp. 105, 194) himself frequently confirms that local coherence
is not a matter of connecting facts linearly, but of connecting them to the
topic of the sequence. Sanders says:
For strategic purposes, the disposition to say or do something in
particular is a secondary consideration to the following ones: (1)
whether that utterance . . . can be relevantly entered in the discourse
or dialogue at that juncture, and (2) which outcomes become pos
sible (i.e., relevant) and which do not if contemplated utterances. . . are
entered at that juncture. (Sanders 1987, p. 11)
VanDijk (1980, p. 77) further points out that macrostructures allow us
to “ . . . specify a set of possible inferences . . . ” These are not paraphrases
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of the actual sentences used, but are semantic transformations which reduce
and organize information as well as lim it the conclusions. Well-formed
macrostructures consisting of relevant microstructures allow such trans
formations, but ill-formed ones do not. We often find it impossible to
infer anything from schizophrenic discourse by referring to the macrostructure itself. Similarly, and from the same cause, we have difficulty
coming to conclusions about what the schizophrenic meant. Perhaps
because of this, the history of psychotherapy has largely been a history of
trying to devise extraordinary ways of achieving inferences and conclu
sions (Chaika 1981).
For instance, the preceding paragraph can be summarized by saying
that well-formed macrostructures allow us to make inferences and conclu
sions in a non-ad hoc manner. From that paragraph, one can conclude
that I believe this is one definable difference between normal and schizo
phrenic discourse. One can also infer that I believe that psychotherapeutic
analyses are fallacious.
Note that these observations are not to be construed as saying that
schizophrenic speech never allows inference and conclusions. Some of it
obviously does. Some of it can be summarized. In fact, 5B above can be.
With some justice, one can even infer that the speaker feels that it is
useless for women to complain about being used by men, but the passage
is still recognizably schizophrenic (Chaika and Alexander 1986 and Chap
ter 1).
In contrast, “my m other’s name is B i l l . . . and coo” is not amenable to
summarizing beyond saying something like “T h e speaker talked crazy
about her m other’s name and birds.” We are told that the speaker likes
buzzards and thinks they and parakeets work hard, but what can we infer
from the rest? About all we can do is repeat what she has said.
We cannot suppose, however, that relevance is foreordained by the
macrostructure. We must also allow for the skill of the speaker in creat
ing newly relevant sentences by making connections never before made.
T h is is quite usual in scholarship, for instance. In fact, creating new
relations is inherent in scholarship, but is not at all confined to it.
Anyone who has a different slant on things can make sentences relevant
to a topic that has not previously been conceived of as being relevant.
T his effectively excludes glossomanic chaining as being in any way a
manifestation of intact linguistic ability (Fromkin 1975). Although the
patient is connecting sentences and phrases in wholly new ways, these
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cannot be construed as being relevant. For precisely this reason, such
chaining has always struck observers as being pathological.
[4] T h e Decision-theoretic Model.

Sanders (1987) calls his model of relevance a decision-theoretic model
of meaning because, he says, speakers make decisions about what to
present as the discourse unfolds. They decide what will best achieve
their goals, whether or not a certain utterance is relevant. These deci
sions change as the situation unfolds. T he decision-theoretic model has
the distinct advantage of accounting for the ways that relevance is achieved
in interaction and what happens and why when it does not. It also avoids
the problem of topic-centered theories of discourse in that it shows
how topics do get changed in an ongoing interaction with no overt
announcement.
Despite his theory of macrostructure, Van D ijk (1980, p. 215) implicitly
admits that the construction of relevance is ongoing in a conversation or
other discourse mode. He asserts that a proposition is irrelevant if “ . . . it
is not an interpretation condition of a following proposition in the
sequence.” This claim should be amended to recognize the reversibility
of relevant utterances. Thus we can say that a contribution is relevant if it
influences a subsequent contribution or if a subsequent contribution is
interpretable by reference to a prior one. That is, for any sentence in a
discourse, we can determine relevance either by its influence on a subse
quent sentence or by determining that it has been influenced by a prior
one.
A contribution need not be specifically relevant to its immediate
progenitor, nor to its immediate successor. We have already seen the
samples of glossomania in which phrases are contiguous but nonsensical.
Proximity is no guarantee of relevance. T he requisite condition is just
that some subsequent or prior contribution relate to it. To my knowledge,
nobody has yet computed exactly the degree of proximity requisite for
one sentence to be counted as relevant to another in the discourse. It may
be that there is no such metric, at least not as a hard and fast rule. We
might sensibly expect that there is individual variation in how much
space or time can elapse before entries are too far apart to be perceived as
relevant.
In any event, there are many linguistic devices which serve the pur-
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pose of rem inding a cospeaker or reader that a nonim mediately prior
statement is to be taken as relevant. Typical examples are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

As noted above . . .
T h e reader may recall t h a t . . .
As I was saying before we got off the track . . .
Well, look, to finish what I was telling you about.. . .
Oh, remem ber what I was telling you . . .
To get back to what happened last n i g h t . . .
Do you remember when we went to the Yale game last year?

These last can be used to refer to a discourse prior to the current one.
Relevance can be created when the mutually influential sentences are
not adjacent simply by localizing the time and place being spoken of, or,
in Fauconnier’s terms, by mentally pointing to them. By the use of
HYPOTHETICALS, even im aginary events or events not shared mutually
are made relevant.
Even within the context of one discourse mutually relevant normal
utterances may not be proximate for several reasons, including, but not
necessarily limited to:
• intervening material which elucidates a prior or coming utterance
• reference to a disturbance in the physical atmosphere
• deliberate digression to recount a non-relevant experience or
idea which the speaker has just been reminded of and is afraid of
forgetting
• apology for content or mode of presentation
• correcting a cospeaker’s m isinterpretation of a prior utterance
Sanders (1987, pp. 175-206) shows that any entry in a discourse has
further entries as its consequence, but no single entry must be made.
T h e possibilities of what can be made is constrained but not ordained. At
each juncture, the situation changes, and with it, so do the co-speakers’
options. As it unfolds, the speaking situation allows each participant to
project different consequences of what must be said next. Of course, this
also means that cospeakers cannot predict each other’s reactions with
complete certainty. Besides the obvious problem that each person relates
what is said to his or her personal experiences, there is also the fact that
comprehension is not effected by an algorithm any more than speech is
produced by one. Rarely does an utterance mean only one thing, and
one cannot predict exactly what m eaning a cospeaker may derive from it.
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When it does become evident that the cospeaker has misinterpreted,
correction can be made. This, then, further affects subsequent relevant
contributions. It strikes me that Sanders’ model of relevance explains
one important facet of conversation that no other model does: the ways
that topics change during the course of a conversation.
It cannot be stressed too much that these conditions of interpretation
in the light of the unfolding of meaning in a discourse are based upon
verifiable strategies and canons of comprehension, and that any mean
ings not so derived are suspect.
An integral part of a decision model of discourse is projecting how
one’s contribution will advance the goal of the interaction. The goal
need not be a definite one; it can be nothing more than a desire to
promote self-interest no matter what occurs in the situation (Sanders,
p. 178), or it can be purely phatic such as “shooting the breeze.”
We can even rehearse our contributions as in those conversations we
have with ourselves in which we project what the other person is going to
say and how we will, therefore, answer. Of course, the same can go on
after the fact when we ruefully think of what we should have said and
how it would have affected the outcome. T he latter activity is proof of the
difficulty of responding adequately in the midst of conversation to the
cospeaker, all the while trying to formulate how self-interest is best
served in the situation. This problem is compounded by the necessity of
making our contribution relevant both to our goals, and to what has been
said or implied by each cospeaker in this interaction or prior ones.
For that matter, it is not inconceivable for our goals to change during the
course of an interaction. Perhaps the cospeaker turns out to be far nicer
and more accommodating than originally thought. Perhaps he or she turns
out to have been duplicitous or guilty or suddenly revealed to be quite
stupid and uncomprehending. Whichever, each contribution to the con
versation can change its course all the while remaining relevant in terms of
what has gone before. Sanders himself assumes a steadiness of goal or of selfinterest, but there is nothing in his presentation that denies such changes.
In sum, cospeakers who are perceived as maintaining relevance make
their contributions in light of what has been said. They may change the
subject, but this is done in orderly ways, such as
• Not to change the subject, bu t. . .
• That reminds me . . .
• Before we go on a tangent.. . .
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T hen new entries into the conversation will refer to the new topic.
Topics are continuously being negotiated in the course of an interaction
or in the course of reading. Contributions heard as schizophrenic do not
do that. As we have seen, these utterances are often governed by chance
phonological or semantic features of a prior utterance.
T h is conception of the sequential nature of the consequences of what
has been said illuminates the difference between SD psychotic utterances
and those heard as normal. As we have seen, SD narratives and conversa
tions frequently start out all right, but as they go along they become
progressively more deviant. A sequential model of discourse predicts
such derailing in a group generally acknowledged to suffer from cogni
tive deficits. T h e longer the conversation the more that must be kept in
mind in formulating next entries. T h is is true within one turn. T he
longer the dialogue, the more challenging it is to remem ber all that one
has said.

[5 ] Syntax an d R elev an ce.

T here are syntactic clues which interpreters can look for in determining
the relevance of statements to the time of speaking or writing as well as
for determ ining semantic relevance. T h e syntax of English4 has codified
relevance onto the system of verb tense and aspect. Robin Lakoff (1972)
noted that it is not possible to say
• Shakespeare is a noted drunkard.
but that it is fine to say
• Shakespeare is a noted playwright.
and, if we believe it true
• Shakespeare was a noted drunkard.
T h e reason that we can use the present tense of his being a playwright
is that his literary works are still relevant to his reputation, but that his
being or not being a drunk is not. Sim ilarly, if one says “my uncle had
blue eyes,” the very use of the past tense indicates that my blue-eyed
uncle is dead.
In contrast, if someone says, “My dog died,” one would be surprised
to discover that this occurred 25 years ago. T h e use of the unadorned
past tense here indicates that the death was in the recent past. I suspect
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that the reason for this interpretation is that we usually qualify a change
of state with an adverbial of time, especially if the change was long
ago. That is, if the event is proximate, we signal that by not mentioning
time. If it is distant, then we do mention time.
There is a corollary presumption of relevance when mentioning
locations. The very fact that a place is mentioned5 without a qualifying
locative term often means that it is relevant because it is close by. If
Myrtle tells me, “I found the greatest place to get Liz Claiborne clothes
cheap!” because I live in Rhode Island, I would not expect the store
to be in California. I assume that the store will be within an hour or
so’s drive. Otherwise, Myrtle should append something like, “too bad
it’s 3000 miles away” or “I found the greatest place in L.A.” or the
like.
Presumed relevance is a key ingredient in how we understand. As the
above sections show, we ordinarily assume that speech is relevant to the
topic and, therefore, the context. Such an assumption underlies our
interpretation of when the dog died or where the Liz Claiborne store is.
[6] R elevance and Comprehension.

Part of our ordinary conversational strategy is to figure out how what
has been said can be relevant to the matter at hand. The relevant meaning
is the one we take as having been meant. In instances of ambiguity we
disambiguate, or try to, in terms of what is relevant, ignoring any irrele
vant meanings which may accidentally inhere to the words and grammar
used. For this reason, failure to “get” a pun is not unusual, nor does
it seem easy for most people to create puns. Therefore, it is a true dys
function in schizophrenia that patients are conscious of meanings which
are irrelevant for the context, a circumstance apparently leading to the
glossomanic punning so characteristic of that population. Maher (1983,
P. 8) gives as an example
6. To Wise and Company,
If you think that you are being wise to send me a bill for money I
have already paid I am in nowise going to do so unless I get the
whys and wherefores from you to me. But where fours have been
then fives will be and other numbers and calculations and accounts
to your no-account no-bill, noble, nothing.
Here the name Wise becomes the source of puns on wise meaning
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“wiseguy,” nowise, and whys, just as noble forms a punning relations with
no-bill which is a pun on no-account (in the m eaning of account which
means “bill.” T h e inherent abnorm ality of this is that the puns are not
relevant to anything except their chance resemblances to each other, and
relevance assumes m eaning coherent with the context.

[7 ] A ch ievin g R elev an ce.

Oddly, it is possible to have a highly deviant passage in which one can
find the relevance of the parts to the whole. Consider the entire passage
presented as failure of cohesive ties in Chapter 6:
7. Well I want to work for god in the mission and to work for god in
the mission you have to be able to speak and think in a lord tongue
in my opinion now to speak and think in a lord tongue you have to
have to be able to memory the process memory the p arle—the
process in the bible the thought pattern the brain wave and your
thought process must be healthy enough and your legs must be
healthy enough to when you want to study and and from when you
want to study and progress in the way of the lord you should read
the bible and as you read the bible you should if you are in good
shape physical and mental and mental good shape and physical
good shape you should be able to acquire the memory knowledge
necessary as to study the bible to speak and think in a lord tongue
you should be able to memory all the knowledge down on down on
the page in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the
position I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital
program I am being helped but at the same time that I am being
help with the food and medicate the food and medicate and the the
food and medicate and the and the ah rest I feel that I still do not
have this I still not have the thought pattern and the mental process
and the brain wave necessary to open up a page open up the old
testament and start to memory it the old te- the old new testament
page of the bible start to have me- memory knowledge necessary to
speak to think in the lo- speak and think in the lord’s tongue while
you study while you study the bible while you study the bible the
memory the knowledge necessary to go to work for god in the
mission so when your thought problem your brain wave and your
mental process is quick enough you will be able to memory the
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knowledge in in the old and new testament bible and from memory
knowledge in the old testament and new testament bible you are
able to memory the knowledge necessary necessary to think and
speak in the lord’s tongue and go to work for god in the mission.
(courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)
There are some grammatical errors here, notably the lack of derivational
morphemes like -tion on medicate and -ize on to memory. Even without
these we feel that this is highly deviant. We understand that the speaker
wishes to work in a mission, is concerned with being able to read both
testaments, and needs help for his brain problems before he can do this.
He also acknowledges that the food and the medication are helping him,
but they haven’t yet allowed him to fulfill his goals. Additionally, he
seems to be concerned with his memory which he feels is not up to the
snuff required for biblical study. T he problem with the passage inheres
in the constant repetitions which do not advance any message; indeed,
they get in the way. T he entire does not progress. It has a distinct
circular movement, starting and ending on the same note, with the same
phrases being recycled.
Sanders (1987) concerns himself with the things that can ordinarily go
wrong in a conversation. He does not deal with pathologies of any kind,
although he does account for cross-cultural miscommunication. Still, his
observations bear fruit. Speaking only of normal interactions, Sanders
points out that disordered conversation can result from poor exercise of
what he terms as s t r a t e g i c O P T IO N S . That is, when faced with a juncture
in conversation, cospeakers choose from various options. If the speaker is
not successful in those choices, then disorder can result. Thus Sanders
locates the source of incoherence6 specifically in choices made in accord
ance with the utterances in the developing conversation. Incoherence
results when relevance to the context cannot be ascertained by cospeakers.
However, this is not just a problem on the part of hearers.
Incoherence ultimately rests upon the choices of speakers or, as seems
probable at least some of the time with schizophrenics, the lack of
choices. T he most disrupted speech, glossomania, seems to be choiceless.
The curiously “automatic” flavor of such speech seems to derive from
this sense we have that no choices were made, except perhaps for the first
part of the utterance. Such7 speech seems to derive from distraction so
great that speakers cannot focus on what needs to be said to advance a
discourse coherently. As shown in Chapter 2, SD speech shows the kinds
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of patterns one would expect if automatic language functions took over,
so to speak, precluding direction afforded by choice. T he result is inco
herence and irrelevance.
Sanders’ insights do give us a working definition of what makes schizo
phrenic speech tangential and obscure even when it is not accompanied
by disruptions in word formation and the structure of the individual
sentence. Simply put, it does not seem to contribute to any agenda.
Cospeakers cannot find a connection between the schizophrenic speech
and what has transpired previously in the interaction, nor can they find
an appropriate response. This is because the schizophrenic’s contribution
may not itself set up the condition for possible responses.

[8] Cognitive Strain.
If Sanders account is correct, and I feel that it is substantively so, there
is a great cognitive burden on conversants. They must manage turntaking,
consider the effect of their speech and of their silence on the ongoing
interaction, at the same time divining others’ intentions in order to
understand in the manner intended.
. . . conversants must. . . [identify]. . . transition boundaries within
turns and topics, distinguishing between entries intended to be
contributions and spurious ones, and organizing contributions into
coherent wholes (e.g., episodes). (Sanders 1987, p. 210)
It is no wonder, then, that schizophrenics so often seem to fail in
conversation, even when they are evincing no apparent breakdown in
structuring sentences. Sanders specifically talks about populations with
presumably intact linguistic and cognitive processes, not aphasics or the
mentally ill.
Considering peculiarly schizophrenic speech as emanating from the
cognitive strains of conversation makes explicit the connection between
SD and NSD schizophrenics. Incoherence proceeds on a cline of severity
from structurally well-formed but inappropriate responses to a general
disintegration of sentence structure and word formation that in the worst
cases manifests itself as gibberish and word salads. Dealing with speech
as a competency in itself allows us to formulate a coherent account of
the illness, one that shows us the connection between SD and NSD8
schizophrenics. It also explains why some patients manifest different
degrees of pathology in their speech.
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T he cognitive strains spoken of here are not necessarily limited
to those patients who are so often called thought disordered. They,
of course, show the greatest cognitive disruption. Many patients who
would be termed NTD, whose speech doesn’t consist of word salads or
glossomania, but is considered merely obscure or peculiar can be seen to
be evincing cognitive strain. They are not up to the strains of monitoring
cospeakers, figuring out what words and syntax were used by cospeakers,
figuring out their intent, matching utterances to context, choosing words
and syntax themselves to encode responses relevant to the cospeakers
contributions and to their own goals, figuring out how the cospeakers’
utterances as they unfold are relevant to what has been said previously,
and figuring out to keep their own relevant. Grice (1975, p. 45) points out
that Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of
disconnected remarks and would not be rational if they did.” Of course,
it is just such disconnected utterances which gives us the feeling that
certain speech is “schizophrenic.”
[9] Constrained Verbal Form s: N arratives and Responses.

Relevance is also achieved by conforming to a g e n r e of discourse. A
genre is a speech form such as a joke, a sermon, or a narrative. These can
vary widely in different cultures. Dennis Jarrett (1984) makes an excel
lent case for his proposition that blacks understand the genre of the
blues, but that whites and Hispanics find that the lyrics don’t quite make
sense, but in the black culture they do. T he blues are intended to
describe the singer’s feelings and to satirize aspects of black life, such as
preachers. For this reason, they never mention nature.
The genre typically has an opener which announces which genre it is.
For instance, if someone in mainstream American culture hears, “The
King of Tobolopol proclaimed an edict,” he or she would then expect a
fulfillment of the genre of fairy tales or an opera. The use of the definite
article presupposes that one is to believe that there is a king. That the
king is fictional is established in the predicate “proclaimed an edict.”
This is a typical opener in fantasies like fairy tales and operas. It is not
used in spy stories, so far as I know, or even in historical romances. Real
life knowledge plays a part in this as well. There is no country called
Tobolopal. If the hearer later found out there is, he or she could revise
that judgment. However, fantasy-hood still would not be ruled out because
nowadays only fictional kings proclaim edicts. T he hearer also knows
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that the fairy tale ends when he or she hears the words “and they lived
happily ever after.”
Narratives are a ubiquitous genre, both in the telling of real-life
happenings and in fiction. Deborah Tannen notes that both in written
and spoken language, narrative has distinctive structure. T h e ways that
psychotic speech are not relevant are illuminated by a comparison of a
narrative fragment to a response to an open-ended question, both pro
duced by schizophrenics. T h e narrative is a portion of one of the ICS
(Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8). H ere a subject is describing the
final scene in the videotaped story of a child who has managed to get
some ice cream:
8A. . . . she goes out leaves the ice cream and eats it and on the way
and we don’t know what happens [sme ] the fact you can interpolate
and say that she ate the ice cream and brought it h o m e . . . .
Here, with the exception of the [sme ] all words and phrases are normal,
but still the entire is not. Its failure resides in the two temporal misorderings of the encoded events, both impossible according to what we
know of the real world. T h e first error lies in the statement that the
girl leaves the ice cream, but then eats it after she has left the store. T he
second impossible sequence relates that she has eaten the ice cream, but
brings it home. T h e events themselves are correctly encoded. T hey fail
at the level of the macrostructure, the discourse itself.
T h e phrase “and on the way” in 8A is misplaced. T h is is one of a class
of phrases I call n a r r a t i v e d e i c t i c s . These are employed to help
hearers/readers keep their mental places. This one is proper to narratives.
It just has not been placed properly.
Because of the general constraint on narration which demands that
correct temporal ordering be followed, 8A is erroneous. Real life con
straints apply here. We know that certain events have to follow certain
temporal orderings. T his may be done in two ways. First, one may
simply relate the events in the narrative in the order in which they
occurred or are imagined to occur. Second, one may indicate the correct
ordering lexically or syntactically without necessarily presenting events
in the order in which they occurred. For instance, 8A could have been
correctly phrased as
8B. She eats the ice cream on the way [home], after she goes out [of
the store]. [Actually], we don’t know what happens but you can
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interpolate and say that she ate the ice cream [before] bringing it
home
T he words in brackets represent words not actually used by the narrator.
I am not claim ing that he intended to say 8B, just showing how it could
have been said nondeviantly employing syntactic devices to indicate
ordering. Notice that I have not added to the meaning of the information
given. All I have done is to make it cohere.9

Another sort of ill-form ed speech on the level of discourse is seen in
examples in 9 and 7 above.10 Forgetting for now the obvious errors in
syntax, these are deviant because of their lack of relevant progression.
T h eir “schizophrenic” flavor inheres prim arily in their repetitions. T h e
sheer number of them makes each passage very difficult to understand,
and contributes to our feeling that they are inherently abnormal. As we
have seen, in order to achieve coherence in discourse, speakers must not
repeat words, phrases, or sentences. Rather, appropriate anaphoric words
or ellipsis must be used. For instance, perfectly prosaic and reasonable
information is imparted in
9 Mill Avenue is also a place where people gather in back yards to
have people gather in back yards to have a barbecue in the back yard
to have relative over to have friend over to talk in the back yard to

be merry with each other.”
What makes it wrong is the repetition to no apparent purpose of
“people gather” and “in the back yard.” As we have already seen, such
repetition is a hallm ark of schizophrenic speech, evincing itself on every
level. It is also what causes us to feel that such speech lacks relevance.
The repetition creates circularity as it fails to advance topics.
T here is another problem with the responses in the examples in 3 and
7 as well. T hey do not adhere to the requirements of the macrostructure
which was elicited, that of the answer. Answers require that one encode
only that information which is relevant to the question asked, and when
that information is given, it is proper either to stop speaking or to ask the
equivalent of “Is that sufficient?” or “Did that tell you what you want to
know?” When one is asked what one’s neighborhood is like, it is not
appropriate to interject over and over again one’s inner doubts about
going to heaven or about one’s ability to read people’s minds or one’s
need to speak in a lord tongue.
People who are bores or nags do repeat the same information cyclically
over and over, but the repeating in 3 and 7 above are clearly not the work

236

Understanding Psychotic Speech

of sane bores or nags. For instance, one of the oddities in each are their
respective r e f r a i n s . Let’s consider one11 of those in 3:
1 0 . . . will I see paradise will I not see paradise should I answer
should I not answer.
T h is is a direct repetition of the same words and syntax such as one
gets in songs or poems. In songs and poems, the refrain reinforces the
topic and is clearly related to it. In contrast, the refrains here does
neither. At no time in the discourse of which 10 is a part does the speaker
say what it is he should or should not be answering. In normal refrains,
the entire is sung or said at stated intervals. In the schizophrenic refrains,
the repetition does not come at such regular intervals, after a verse, for
instance. Moreover, this refrain frequently starts in the middle of a word,
as in
sh —will I see Paradise will I not see paradise should I answer
should I not answer I not answer w- their mind
It seems to be randomly accessed both in terms of where it falls in the
entire discourse and even at what point in the refrain the patient picked
it up. In context it seems as if the “sh-will” started out to be the “should”
of “should I answer” and the “w-their” started out to be the “will” of “will
I see... ”
In contrast, the repetitions of bores and nags are tied to their topics,
often with a dreadful relentlessness. Moreover, the repetitions of bores
and nags repeat the information, but not the actual phrasing as is done
in a refrain. Nags may also preface their repeated remarks by complaints
like “I told y o u . . . , ” “How many times do I have to tell y o u . . . ,"and
“You never listen. . . ” Such remarks indicate that the nag is in control
and is aware of the repetitions. Sim ilarly, bores may ask rhetorically,
“Did I tell you about. . . ” and “T h at reminds me of. . . . ” T h e point here
is not that bores and nags always preface their remarks this way, but that
they may. T h e fact of their being bores or nags rests ultimately upon
their propensity for repeating information beyond necessity to inform,
the nags combining this overinformation with complaints about the
hearer.
Most importantly, the criterion of relevance demarcates the repetition
of bores and nags from the psychotic repetition above. T o be relevant, an
answer should contain the information requested. T h e response should
have been confined to information about the physical properties of
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M ill Street and its inhabitants. Some digression or added explanation is
always allowable in an answer, but only insofar as it advances the topic
requested. Bores are guilty of overinformation, of adding too much, but
their “too much” is of the nature of providing excessive information
which is, however, connected to the question asked. For instance, a bore
might tell you that his grandparents first bought their house on such a
street and that he grew up with his uncle Teddy, and he had certain
neighbors who always did certain things, and changes that were wrought
when so-and-so moved away.
In contrast, in num ber some of the overinformation above is not
relevant to the questions asked. In our culture one’s religious beliefs and
deepest doubts are not appropriate responses to a question about one’s
neighborhood. Far from reaching a conclusion or advancing a topic, the
profusion of verbiage is simply circular, a jum bling of words and phrases
in an almost random ordering. What eventually does get said in sample
above, that the neighborhood is one in which people get together to have
a good time, is an appropriate enough response. It gets drowned in a sea
of verbosity not subordinated to the question asked.

Notes
1Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these data, however.
2This doesn’t mean that people won’t try to assign an interpretation to it, but there
is no way to verify what it actually means because of its syntactic deviance.
3Actually, the problem is more of “tight” associations, not loose ones. Each word
is glued to the next by associations that nonschizophrenics usually don’t notice, and
if they do notice, they still refrain from saying unless they can worm it into the
conversation as an apropos bit of wit or topic change.
4It is not possible to say whether such relevancy marking operates in all languages,
but it does operate in many others. However, it may not inhere so closely to verb
tense selection as it does in English. In other words, one cannot expect it to be
encoded exactly as it is in English. One has to find the equivalent construction.
5Time and space frequently are governed by the same words and conventions of
usage. For instance, both time and space may behind us. One event can take place
after another, just as one person can be after us. Notice that an event “takes place” in
time, just as one event follows the other. It is as if we perceive.
6Sanders (pp. 220-228) also speaks of conversational disorder, by which he means
people’s interrupting others, controlling the topic, and other such “disorderly”
behavior. This is quite different from the kinds of disorder we are discussing here.
Typically, there is no problem understanding what is meant, what the speaker’s
agenda is, etc. Furthermore, such behavior varies greatly with different social
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groups, so that it is perceived as disorderly by some, but simply normal warmth and
interest by others (Tannen 1984; Chaika 1989, pp. 100-106)
7This is possibly true for other kinds of incoherence as well, such as that proceed
ing from alchohol, drugs, and brain injuries. Since I have made no in-depth study of
such populations, I do not make any claims for the provenance of incoherence in
them, but I suspect they have a great similarity.
8Traditionally called TD and NTD patients. In my view, the latter terminology is
oxymoronic.
9It is necessary to make this point as so many have attempted to “explain”
schizophrenic speech by adding elements that change its meaning or by interpreting
as if it had had such meaning (see Chapter 11).
10In the original transcript furnished to me, there was no capitalization of street
addresses or of recognized terms for nationalities like Italian. I have added those
capitals so that the written form of the data looks no more deviant than it actually is.
That is, we are used to the convention of seeing capitals on proper names and to
omit them is likely to be interpreted as evidence of an even greater deviance than
it is.
11There are actually many refrains in both passages, but whatever theoretical
point can be made of one can be made about the others.

Chapter Ten

TOPIC
The literature on schizophrenic speech teems with reference
to the lack of discernible topic. This chapter demonstrates what
a topic is and how it is signalled by the syntax of the language.
There are two kinds of topic: that of the sentence and that of the
discourse as a whole. These are determined in different ways as
each is expressed in somewhat different ways. Fortunately, there
are tests which can be applied to determine what the topic is.
The difference between normal changes of topic and schizo
phrenic ones is elaborated. The ways that topic is used to
express the speaker's empathy towards the topic being expressed
are also explored here.
[1] T opic.

he word topic refers to two distinctly different entities: the topic of
the discourse, and the topic of the sentence. T he discourse topic is
at the heart of relevance because all entries in a discourse are relevant by
reference to their topics. The discourse topic need not be overtly expressed.
It derives from the text as a whole, “ . . . what the upshot is..
” (VanDijk
1980) of the information provided by the discourse as a whole. It pro
vides the linguistic context. The topic of the discourse works to constrain
meaning by making individual sentences relevant to it. Thus, the topic is
the prime disambiguating force in language. In other words, each sen
tence is interpreted as if it is relevant to the topic, which is why topic is so
strong a determiner of meaning. If a global topic cannot be ascertained
for any group of sentences, then the language used is perceived as
obscure, strange, vague, or incoherent, and we are baffled.
The topic of the sentence, also known as the s u b j e c t of the sentence,
differs from the discourse topic by adding information to it. VanDijk
explains that the subject of a sentence is

T

. . . the semantic-pragmatic function that selects which concept of
the contextual information will be extended with new information.
(1980. P.97)
239
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In the previous chapter we considered such selection in terms of
relevance. In this chapter first we examine the factors leading to the
choice of the subject itself, and how it pertains to the speaker’s point of
view. Then the topic of the discourse and its relation to our understand
ing of psychotic speech will be analyzed.
[2] Subject of a Sentence.

Traditionally, it has been assumed that the basic structure in language
is the sentence, and that the sentence is composed of the subject and
predicate. We intuitively recognize that the subject-predicate relation
ship gives a c o m p l e t e S T R U C T U R E ; hence the common misconception
that sentences are complete thoughts. Case grammars (Chapter 4) have
shown us the many kinds of relations subsumed under the rubric of
“subject of the sentence.” As we have already seen, these deeper relations
explain aspects of meaning, implication, and even permissible para
phrases of a given proposition. More recently, relationships have been
found between the noun chosen for the subject and the empathy and
general perspective of the speaker.
[3] Em pathy and Syntax.

Kuno (1987, pp. 203-267) develops the interesting proposition that the
syntax chosen for a given sentence corresponds to the perspective of the
speaker. Kuno (p. 204) explains that
. . . speakers unconsciously make the same kind of decisions that
film directors make about where to place themselves with respect to
the events and states that their sentences are intended to describe . . .
Such decisions are describable in terms of empathy. Kuno shows, for
instance, that 1A is an unmarked empathy condition. It projects an
objective view. In this encoding, no particular empathy is being shown
either to John or to Bill. It merely states that John initiated the blow and
that Bill has received it:
LA. John hit Bill.
However, if the same speaker says
1B. John’s brother hit him.
he or she has identified more with John than with his brother. Kuno
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observes that it “seems commonsensical” that the possessive chosen, here
Joh n ’s brother, would be used to refer to Bill only “ . . . when the speaker
has placed himself1 closer to John than his brother.” This is because the
brother is seen in this construction only through his relationship with
John, not as an independent person. In other words, John’s relationship
is more important than the independent characterization of calling him
Bill.
Yet another empathy condition occurs in passives:
1C. Bill was hit by his brother.
1D. Bill was hit by John.
Kuno says that passives always indicate empathy, because they show
that the speaker has identified with the subject of the passive verb, in this
instance, Bill. Kuno observes (p. 205) that the subject of the passive is
“new” because the passive is formed by placing the object in what is
usually the subject position. Doing this is more unusual so that hearers
perceive the extra effort, so to speak, as a signal of empathy. If a speaker
creates a m a r k e d construction, hearers will suspect that some special
message is being implied. Actually, each of these has done something
unusual, thereby creating empathy for Bill.
In 1C, the very fact that the brother’s name is not mentioned is an
overriding empathy condition on two grounds. First, use of a possessive
ordinarily indicates the point of view of the possessor. T he second is that
failure to directly name someone whose name you presumably know,
shows empathy for the one whose name you did use. Using a person’s
name indicates familiarity. Identifying another person simply by an
anaphoric possessive like his again shows that one is telling this from the
point of view of the named person. We shall see clear instances of this in
the Ice Cream story narratives discussed below.
In 1D, the message indicating empathy for Bill works because passives
with one word agents like John are rarely made (Svartvik 1966). Even if
the passive were selected, ordinarily the agent wouldn’t be mentioned. If the
agent must be named, then the sentence usually would be in the active
voice as in 1A above. T he passive is used most habitually to enable the
speaker to omit the agent or cause. There are two reasons for keeping the
agent in at the end of the sentence. The first holds if the agent is heavily
modified as in 1E and F. 1F is awkward. One expects that the sentence
stopped too short as one would expect the object to be at least as long as
the subject.
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1E. B ill was hit by the short, skinny guy with curly red hair.
1F. T h e short, skinny guy with the curly red hair hit B ill.
T here is a strong tendency in English to throw heavy constituents to
the end of the sentence. A heavy constituent is one with a great deal of
modification: adjective, relative clauses, and the like. These are either
newly introduced items, hence the modification, or they are being espe
cially emphasized. In 1D, since there is no heavily modified agent,
choosing the object, Bill, to be subject indicates that there is some
out-of-the way connotation. Hence, the reason for putting the agent at
the end must be because the speaker wishes to emphasize who did it. A
m ajor reason for emphasizing the agent is that he or she is blameworthy.
Kuno uses empathy and perspective almost interchangeably as in his
discussion of the choice between com es/cam e up to and goes/went up to.
He says that this indicates the speaker’s “camera angle” and empathy
(p. 225)
2A. So Mary comes up to M ax and says___
2B. So Mary goes up to M ax and says___
In 2A, the action is being seen from M ax’s angle, whereas in 2B, it is
seen from M ary’s.
Kuno’s approach to sentence analysis has a great deal to offer. He
points out that certain verbs demand certain kinds of subjects. For
instance, the agent of assassinate (example mine) has to be reprehensible
and the object has to be a victim, which im plies “not reprehensible.” It is
difficult to express empathy for an assassin. If we wish to we have to use
other terminology, such as freedom fighter. O ther verbs, like hit and go
can be designed (Kuno’s term) in terms of perspective; hence, they can
be manipulated to imply empathy or its lack.
T h e reader must beware, however. Although Kuno formalizes his
rules (p. 206), thus lending them a scientific air, he relies largely on his
own intuitions. As with the judgments of other linguists2 who have done
the same, the reader too often finds that his or her intuitions don’t match
those of the author’s. H e does mention that “many speakers” find a
sentence acceptable or not (p. 209), but does not show how he verified
this. Consequently, we run into the same problem with him as we do with
other intuitive linguists. Using myself as a point of reference, I find that
some of the sentences he uses as proof for his interpretations don’t mean
to me what they do to him. Some of those he stars (*) are fine with me,
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and some which he doesn’t star I would. These data cry out for verifica
tion by careful investigation like that pioneered by Quirk and Svartvik.
Still, Kuno’s work has a great deal of appeal. He is right often enough
to be exciting. It certainly makes sense that empathy is a condition on
syntax. After all, language did evolve so that we may inform others of
our feelings and to express the world from our perspective. Just as
concepts like agency and negativity occur in all languages because of the
need for all humans to express them, so is empathy a linguistic universal.
Recognizing this possibility when interpreting another’s speech can enrich
understanding. Kuno gives us another place to look, so to speak, in the
analysis of discourse making us more sensitive to the possibilities for
empathy and perspective. These can be used along with an understand
ing of semantic feature analysis to enrich our insights.
[4] Subjecthood and Perspective.

Nomi Erteschik-Schir (1981) establishes the pragmatic basis of syntac
tic transformations. She suggests that a constituent in a sentence is
dominant if the speaker intends to direct the hearers’ attention to its
intension, i.e., its full potential meaning. Dominance of a constituent,
then, is what the sentence is about, and has ramifications for what kinds
of transformations can apply. For instance, she shows that the kinds of
questions that can be formed from a statement depends upon whether or
not the NP is the dominant one. Consider the simple statement
3A. Jack eats candy.
One can form a question by using the wh-word that stands for Jack,
which is who or the wh-word that stands for candy, which is what. Two
questions, therefore, are possible,
3B. Who eats candy?
3C. What does Jack eat?
In essence, a wh -question is a kind of “fill-in-the-blanks” device. The
who says fill in the blank in “X eats candy.” T he what says fill in the blank
in “Jack eats X.” In each instance, the X is the constituent the question is
about. Therefore, in 3B, the question is about Jack, and in 3C it is about
candy (or foodstuffs). One can ask 3B if one assumes that the corresponding
declarative sentence would be about Jack. In contrast, one can ask 3C if it
can be assumed that the declarative counterpart would be about candy.
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Another pair even more graphically illustrates,
4A.
4B.
4C.
4D.

I like the gears in that car.
Which car do you like the gears in?
I like the girl in that car.
Which car do you like the girl in?

Erteschek-Schir contends that the unacceptability of 4D arises from
the fact that the phrase “in the car” in 4C cannot be dominant in that
sentence, therefore it cannot be the topic, but “in that car” in 4A can be
dominant, hence 4B can be asked. She demonstrates that the reason that
in the car in 4A can not be dominant, hence cannot be extracted to ask a
question about, is that girls are not equipment on cars. She speculates
that 4D would be fine in a society in which every car came with a girl so
that choice of car also involved choice of girl.
T he selection of the subject depends on such things as cultural facts
and other pragmatic concerns. This is well illustrated by another fact.
For instance, I can think of a setting in which 4D might very well be
asked and would not be starred. Many young American males think that
they will have an easier time getting a girlfriend if they have the right
kind of car (with right kind referring to a much admired sports or luxury
car). They also assume that different girls will be attracted by different
cars. Imagine, then, a typical American high school parking lot with
girls sitting in several cars waiting to be driven home by their boyfriends.
In that cultural climate, a boy about to buy a new car could properly ask
another, “Which car do you like the girl in?”, the object being to match a
car to the particular girl.
Erteschik-Schir gives another test for determining potential topics of
sentences, the which is a lie test. In this, the topic of a sentence can be
referred to by which is a lie. This phrase cannot be applied to an NP
which is not dominant. For instance,
5A. Sam said John wrote a book about Nixon.
5B. Which is a lie —it was about a rhinoceros.
Here we know that people write about presidents so that focussing on
the prepositional phrase “about Nixon” is fine. She opposes 5A and B to
6A. Sam said John destroyed a book about Nixon.
6B. Which is a lie —it was about a rhinoceros.
Here Erteschik-Schir posits that 6B would be possible if we know that
John habitually destroyed books. Otherwise one would assume that the
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focus of 6A is on the act of destruction. If the topic of the discourse had
been about Nixon or the Republican party, then John’s choice of book to
destroy becomes relevant. For instance, as my proof that John is not a
loyal Republican, it would be natural for me to produce 6A, and for
another person defending John to produce
6C. Which is a lie, it was about Johnson.
6B is odd because we expect the name of another president or of
a well-known politician or statesman as a response to 6A. We do not
expect another mammal, especially one so far removed from American
presidencies. Note the acceptability of 6C as a response to 6A
6C. Which is a lie. It was about his dog.
Here the relevance is twofold. It is primarily signaled by the possessive.
Americans do have dogs and they are important to them. T he “which is a
lie” test is useful for picking out topics, but, still, pragmatic conditions
prevail. We can negate a statement but only if our negation is related in
some obvious way to the prior statement, the one we are negating. My
judgments about negation rest upon the very criteria Erteschek-Schir
offers: a given paraphrase of a sentence may be determined as grammati
cal or not on the basis of pragmatic and discourse possibilities.
Kuno (1987, p. 16) explains that the concept of topichood has ramifica
tions in the syntax, or perhaps more accurately that hearers assume
topichood in the presence of certain constructions. For instance, a sub
ject is typically taken to be the topic. If it is not the topic but there is a
possessive, the latter is taken to be the topic.
7A. The man bought the woman’s portrait of the clowns.
In an “out-of-the-blue” situation, the hearer will assume that this is
about the man. Kuno says that this is the “easiest” interpretation. If
subsequent conversation shows that the man is not the topic, then it is
next taken to be about the woman. It is most difficult, although possible,
to take it as being about the clowns.
There are ways to check whether or not a constituent is or can be the
topic. Besides the kind of questioning Erteschek-Schir offers, there are
regular rules of grammar which can be called upon as well as lexical
items which exist specifically to announce a topic, that is to t o p ic a l iz e
constituents, usually nouns. These are called upon when the speaker
wishes to ensure that hearers assign topichood to the intended constituent.
One syntactic mode of topicalizing is a process called c l e f t i n g . This
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puts a dummy subject like it or this before the noun which is the topic
and its puts its verb into a relative clause, as in 7B and C (clefting
elements boldfaced):
7B. This is the man who bought the woman’s portrait of the clown.
7C. This is the woman whose portrait of the clowns was bought
by the man.
In 7B the subject is the man. T his corresponds to the reading of 7A in
which one assumed that the sentence is about the man. T h e second
reading of 7A, that the woman in the possessive is the subject, is
paraphrasable by 7C.3

[5] Beyond the Sentence.

We have already seen that both the syntax and m eaning of a sentence
are dependent upon the discourse or text in which it appears, what
VanDijk (1977, 1980, pp. 94-106)) calls macrostructures. He claims
(1980 131, 229-242) that these differ from phenomena variously known as
FRAMES, SCHEMATA, SCRIPTS and STRUCTURES OF EXPECTATION (Chaika
1989, pp. 11-114). Since they have been variously defined and studied,
calling upon those terms can constitute serious ambiguities. For these
reasons VanD ijk’s term is preferable when discussing such matters as
relevance and topic. However, it must be borne in mind throughout that
we are discussing speech produced in interactions with schizophrenics.
We are not discussing problems arising from schizophrenic failure to
behave as expected in certain social frames. We are discussing why their
discourse fails as discourse linguistically. T h is may entail the giving of
socially inappropriate responses, but it also entails linguistic aberrations
definable by linguistic analysis apart from failures in interaction.
Macrostructures are g l o b a l structures to which individual sentences
are subordinated. T hey determine what kinds of sentences are to be
produced, what sequencing is allowable, even what kinds of vocabulary
may be used. Macrostructures are as various as poems, novels, sermons,
classroom lectures, conversations, and dissertations, and even this listing
is far from exhaustive. Moreover, all of these can be further subdivided.
Conversations, for instance, may range from arguing to kidding to
informing, and each of these range from serious to nastiness to frivolity.
Although we think of both written and oral communication as ways of
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communicating ideas, some macrostructures have no such purpose. For
instance in conversation of the “shmoozing” or “shooting the breeze”
type, the content of what is said is of little or no importance at all. What
is important is its having been said. This is phatic communication, which
is also seen in such matters as greetings, congratulating, complimenting,
and even ritual insulting.4
Each kind of macrostructure demands its own forms. T he kinds of
words and grammatical forms demanded of casual phatic conversation
are quite different from those demanded in a sermon. “Hi guys, whatcha
doin’ ” is appropriate for quite different social situations than “Sirs,
mesdames, may we proceed to the lecture hall.” Similarly, both the
syntax and vocabulary of formal written language are different from
spoken in many respects. These comments may seem to be so selfevident that they hardly bear mentioning, but they must be kept in mind
because breaches in the selection of vocabulary and sentence types are
deviations as much as inappropriate neologisms are.
Although each evokes different kinds of speech activities, each with its
own particular form, all macrostructures are similar in that they proceed
from old to new information. That way the hearer/reader is oriented.
The explicitness of the orienting segments ranges from the obligatory
review of the literature or a summary of experiments in a scholarly
publication to a brief phrase or sentence which plugs a cospeaker into
the implicit assumptions of personal mutual knowledge in ordinary
conversation. T he purpose of the speech act and its locus of delivery also
influence its form. A sermon in a cathedral is obligatorily more structured
and limited in subject matter and form than is an informal chat in the
party room of the same edifice.
The macrostructure itself entails or presupposes certain meanings as
well as certain forms, and, by so doing, creates coherence. VanDijk (1980)
explicitly argues that coherence is effected simply by producing what
belongs in the given macrostructure. It seems to me that this position is
an entirely expected result of the fact that all utterances bear meaning in
reference to their context. A macrostructure forms a context, just as it
itself is formed by the locale and purpose of a speaking activity (Chaika
1989, pp. 182-184).
Brown and Yule (1983, p. 83) advance the interesting concept that the
communication source activates a pool of presupposition in the receiver,
a pool including both personal and cultural knowledge. As we shall see,
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there are ways of introducing information which can not be presupposed
to be shared.
Constructs like “topic of conversation” or “topic of discourse” refer to
semantic properties beyond those of individual sentences within the
discourse. Implicata, for instance, are influenced by what we perceive to
be the topic of the macrostructure (Chapter 7) strongly influencing our
interpretation of what we hear. For instance, consider
8A. Ms. Jones cheats all the time.
8B. She loses all the time anyway.
On the one hand, if we think we are overhearing a conversation about
dieting, then 8A gives us no reason to make a negative moral judgm ent
about Ms. Jones. Moreover, in such a context 8B may be an adm iring or
jealous comment or both. On the other hand, if we think the speaker is
talking about an exam, then we do have reason to make such a negative
judgment, and 8B becomes a triumphant or vindictive comment. In a
sermon, the same sequence would not only be interpreted as a moral
discussion, but an example of a greater theological belief, namely that
sinners get punished not rewarded for their sins.
Our dependence on perceived topic explains some jokes, like
9A. Z: (coming out of movie): T here’s nothing better than a good
love story.
Too bad this wasn’t one of them.
Here, the humor lies in Z’s apparently setting up the topic of how
good the movie is, so that the negative evaluation contradicts the topic.

[6] T h e Discourse T o p ic.

Topics, especially in open-ended oral communications, unfold, with
exchanges potentially opening up new topics. Even in volatile conversa
tions with a great many topic switches, comments referring to previous
contributions can be charted, just as the topic-producing ones can be. If
no such linkages can be ascertained, then we judge the speaker as rambling,
drunk, or crazy.
VanDijk (1980, p. 43) contends that we infer a MACROPROPOSITION
from the sequence of propositions in discourse. H e was actually talking
of texts here, but the principle is the same in speech. H e offers as a test
for macropopositions the fact that they can be summarized. However, in
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spoken interactions, it is frequently not so easy to find a single global
proposition. Typically, there are many topics in a conversation. This is
true of extended pieces of writing as in books or even lengthy articles.
Therefore, it is usually more accurate to say that one requires a series of
summaries which account for changing of topics (Brown and Yule 1983).
It must be stressed that these changes are not chaotic. They are intro
duced in orderly ways.
No one constituent of the discourse or even of a sentence within it
need overtly encode what the topic is. A statement of topic should be
able to complete the phrase “This is about.. . . ” Outside of grammar
handbooks, topic sentences are not always overtly encoded in speech or
in writing. However, coherent discourse can somehow be summarized as
having what Carlson (1983) calls “aboutness.”
This does not mean that all parties to an interaction or all readers of a
book agree on what the topic is, or, for that matter, what is being said
about it. The speaker may think he or she is speaking on one topic,
whereas the hearer may perceive it to be on another. This is usually not
fatal to the communication process, however, because participants, when
made aware of misunderstandings, can say or write, “You misunderstand.
By X, I did not mean Y. I meant Z.”7

[7] Topic and Schizophrenic Speech.

In one way or another, many who would explain schizophrenic speech
comment on its lack of topic. Such vague—and traditional—terms as
loose associations or flight o f ideas were clearly an attempt to describe such
a situation. In order to remedy this imprecision, Andreasen ( 1979a,b)
devised an apparently more precise set of criteria for schizophrenic
speech, carefully defining them. Among them, she presents the follow
ing as separate diagnostic criteria5 defining them as follows:
•

d is t r a c t ib il it y ,

w h en a p atie n t breaks off re p e a te d ly “ in the

m id d le of a sen ten ce o r id e a an d ch an g es th e su b ject in resp o n se to
a n e a rb y stim u lu s.”
•

t a n g e n t ia l it y ,

•

d e r a il m e n t ,

irre le v a n tly an sw erin g a q u estio n .

w hen “id eas slip off th e track o n to a n o th e r o n e ”

w hich m ay be o b liq u ely o r co m p letely u n rela te d .
•

in c o h e r e n c e ,

in co m p reh en sib le sp eech in w hich a “series of

w ords o r p h rases seem to be jo in ed to g e th e r a rb itra rily an d at
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random,6 speech lacking “cementing words” such as subordinating
and specifically coordinating conjunctions, and “adjectival pronouns”
[terminology hers]7 such as the and a(n).
Andreasen’s careful definitions were an important step towards much
needed precision in the psychiatric discussion of language data. How
ever, as she defines them, the above four terms are all actually instances
of straying off a topic, whether that topic is introduced by a co-conver
sationalist who asks a question, or is one brought up by speakers themselves.
Andreasen’s definition of incoherence above specifically mentions
some of the syntactic categories which are designed to indicate the relation
ship between phrases and sentences to an overriding topic: the conjunc
tions and the noun d e t e r m in e r s (articles) the and a(n). Determiners
have the function of announcing whether or not nouns are encoding
NEW INFORMATION or OLD in f o r m a t io n . T he latter is called GIVEN
INFORMATION by some. By indicating whether or not a noun is one that
has been mentioned before, noun determiners tell us whether topic is the
same or whether a new one is being introduced. That is how these work
as “cementing words.”
T he indefinite article signals new information, that not previously
mentioned, and the definite one signals old information as in the inter
play between a and the below:
10A. A dog walked in the room.
10B. The dog was carrying a bone.
10C. The bone was messy.
Names8 typically do not appear with articles because they are speci
fied by the use of the proper noun itself. Often the name introduces a
specific individual or location. Thereafter, pronouns or omissions indi
cate that the same person is being talked about.
Topicalizers, TOPIC m a r k e r s , also serve to mark out new information.
Typically, they set up the hearer’s expectations that a stretch of discourse
will be following. Unlike the clefting and passive transformations they
usually operate on more than a subject of a sentence. T he nominal which
comes after expressions like the following are taken as the topic:
•
•
•
•

About last n ig h t. . .
As I was saying
Speaking of [nam e]. . .
Do you remember [nam e]. . .
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• You’d never believe it, b u t. . .
• T he subsequent sections deal with . . .
• Today we take as our verse . . .
Some of the most basic rules of grammar have as their raison d ’etre the
signalling of new and old information. The deployment of such simple
devices as the and an in English has such a function. So do such mun
dane matters as the dummy it and there, which allow the topic to be
thrown to the end of the sentence. This is the part of the sentence which
typically takes the strongest stress in English.
11A. It is nice that Bob asked you to the prom.
11B. There’s milk in the fridge.
[8] Titles.
Brown and Yule (1983, p. 71-73) discuss the function of a title as a way
of announcing topic. In writing and in certain kinds of formal speech
these function as topicalizers. People typically assign meaning according
to an announced title. Hearers may even complain if they feel that the
title did not fairly represent what was actually said. T he title functions as
a guide to understanding. One of the schizophrenic participants in my
study of narration complained that she could not complete the task
because she didn’t know what the title of the videostory was. This
conversation ensued:
12A. I don’t know what the title was. [pause] How can I tell you?
(Me: What do you think a good title for it is?)
A pleasant day at the ice cream store. uh [pause] ’n fek [pause].
That’s all ike I have to say. [long pause]. A pleasant walk to and from
[pause] home to the ice cream store. That still isn’t right. I should
be . . . It should say that it should say that they went in and bought
the ice cream and they came out and that’s it.
[to me, clearly ex cathedra] You wait a minute. I ha e to get my
lig h ter. . . ]
What? Did they sell everything? I didn’t observe because I kept
fiddling around.
Actually, the patient did summarize the story correctly if you allow for
her use of they rather than she. T he girl did go in and buy ice cream and
did come out, and that is the end of the story. The patient became
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derailed over the question of the title, apparently feeling that a video
presentation should have one.
Another patient ascribed a title to the video with quite different
results
12B. [enunciates clearly with equal stress on each word indicating
this is a title] Everyday Life in America.
Little girl in candy store. Runnin’ free.
H er parents don’t really care. So she gets up and takes to the
a ir . . .
T his was said as if it was intended to be a poem with regular recurring
strong beats and pauses at the end of each rhyming word. Before announc
ing the title, he had created another rhyme
12C. Little girl in candy store. Mommy and Daddy away.
[pause] That day.
[9] U tte ra n ce Pairs.

Across speakers, perhaps the most extreme instance in which topic
constrains what may be said is seen in u t t e r a n c e p a i r s , variably
known as a d ja c e n c y p a ir s (Sacks 1964-1972; Chaika 1989 pp. 119-131).
T h e former term is preferable because such pairs may not always be
adjacent in the conversation. Specifically, utterance pairs occur when
one utterance elicits another of a specific form and content. These
include phenomena like
greetings —> greeting
questions —> answers
compliments —> acknowledgements
complaints —> excuse, apology, or denial
request/command-acceptance or rejection.
Whoever receives the first part of the utterance pair has to somehow
respond with the other. T h e first part of the utterance pair constrains
both the form of the response and the possible subject matter, that is, the
topic. If someone says “hello,” the other has to give a greeting. T h e only
way to get out of it is to pretend not to see the greeter, or to be drunk,
stoned, or otherwise mentally incapacitated.
It is no accident that so many greetings take the form of questions
since in mainstream society, at least, the norm is that questions must be
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answered. Moreover, the question must be answered according to the
form used by the questioner. A question preceded by what demands a
noun, one preceded by a why demands a reason, and a who demands that
a person be designated. A yes-no question of the “Are you going?” type
must be answered by a yes, no or “I don’t know. T he squiggles discribed in
Chapter 11 are utterance pairs. Hallowell and Smith (1983), as part of
therapy for a schizophrenic patient, offered the patient a line, typically
only part of a sentence and the patient completed the sentence. This
worked like questions and answers because responses were directly
governed by the immediately preceding phrase and left little room for
wandering on to other matters.
An answer to a genuine question can often be deferred, as in, “I ’m not
sure. Let me get back to you later.” The degree to which we are con
strained by the topic of a question is beautifully illustrated by INSERTION
SEQUENCES (Schegloff 1971). In these, a question is asked as a response to
another question, as in
12A. Wanna come to a party?
B. Can I bring a friend?
A. Male or female?
B. Female.
A. Sure.
B. Yeah, I’d like to come.
The responses are severely constrained here both as to order and to
kind of response. B starts the insertion sequence by asking if he can
bring a friend. Then A asks about the gender. Then, in the reverse of the
order in which they were asked, all three questions get answered. Some
times when such sequences become derailed, later on in the conversation
or even in a subsequent one, one person will answer it, prefacing his or
her remarks so that the original question will be recalled or the asker
will remind the other to answer:
13A. Oh, gee, I never got around to answering your question . . .
13B. You asked about the party and I meant to tell you . . .
13C. We got so sidetracked that you never told me if you . . .
Such verbal placemarkers seem rarely to be used when psychotics
become derailed. Whereas normal conversation loops back to an earlier
exchange and then builds on it, schizophrenic ones sometimes just keep
going linearly, so to speak (Chapter 8). Normal looping adds new mate-
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rial to the topic. In contrast, schizophrenic perseveration is characterized
by not adding new information. Schizophrenics have two difficulties
with topic: progression away from it or repetition of phrases without
advancing it at all.
[10] Patient X and U tterance Pair Analysis.

Because of the strong constraints on responses, we would not expect
such exchanges to be deviant, but in patients who evince a great deal of
disintegration this does occur. Even so, Laffal (1965) reports that his
patient, Dean, whose speech was so disrupted that he uttered both
gibberish and opposite speech, still attempted to answer questions, as did
Robertson and Shamsie’s (1958) patient who apparently produced copi
ous amounts of gibberish. T he following exchange transpired between
X, reported on in Chaika (1974), and an unidentified woman poking her
head into the room and asking
14. W: Hello. Anybody here want some coffee?
[pause]
X: Head, heart, hands, health.
T he [h]’s in W’s pronunciation of “H ello” and “here” were aspirated
with unusual strength and held longer9 than usually, sounding on the
tape almost like slight short-term hissing. What is noteworthy about X ’s
response is that it was clearly motivated by the sound [h], not by the form
or content of the question. This, of course, is never normal. One has to
respond to both the syntactic form and semantic content of a question.
Sometimes schizophrenics do respond correctly to questions and other
utterance pairs. X herself did “answer” the question, bizarrely to be sure,
but still recognizably an answer. She just responded to the wrong part of
the message. Laffal (1965) reports that his patient, Dean, whose speech
was highly disrupted, also attempted to answer questions, as did Robertson
and Shamsie’s (1958) patient who produced gibberish. They interpreted
his gibberish as real language, volitionally produced, explaining that his
gibberish responses arose from his not being “prepared” to answer any
inquiries about what it meant. T he validity of such an assertion aside,
even so severely disordered a patient as they describe still attempted to
answer questions, that is, to obey this essentially social requirement. It
was his linguistic ability which was not up to the task. If people are being
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uncooperative, they do not answer at all or evade the issue by trying to
initiate a new topic.
[11] T h e m e Versus Subject.

An added complication to the notion of subject o f a sentence is the
relationship between the subject and the t h e m e of the sentence as
opposed to what is being said about it, the r h e m e . These are often
referred to as the t o p i c versus the c o m m e n t and coincide with what
traditional grammars call the subject and the predicate.
Halliday (1965, p. 37) explains that the first constituent of the sentence
is the theme, “ . . . [the] speaker’s point of departure for the clause. He
believes that the theme and the subject are not necessarily the same
constituent of the sentence, a position independently arrived at by Jeng
(1982) from his studies of Mandarin Chinese. According to Halliday, in
15A, the theme and the subject do coincide, but in 15B they do not since
the theme is yesterday but the subject is they:
15A. They freed the whales yesterday.
15B. Yesterday, they freed the whales.
There are difficulties with the absoluteness of Halliday’s analysis
(Lyons 1977, p. 508), not the least of which is that considering the first
element as the theme no matter what that element is, is circular. The
theme is the first element and the first element is the theme. In addition,
the first element in the sentence may be a topicalizer. What follows that is
the theme, but the first element is not itself the theme.
The theme in the sense of aboutness can be expressed also by such
devices as anaphora and deixis. Undoubtedly the reason that it is so
common for sentences to start with pronouns is that they signal that the
speaker is still talking about the same person or thing. In such a case, the
first element is the theme. Another objection to the equation of theme
with sentence position is that often, introductory adverbs and adverbial
clauses like yesterday or because o f you serve the purpose of orienting one
to the discourse following. That is, these provide a context, but the actual
theme of the discourse is about someone or something else. Where there
is a choice of subject, as in a trivalent verb that allows a subject, object or
dative, the particular noun chosen is often the theme, although, as we have
seen at other times the choice of subject is dictated by a desire to waffle or
to avoid repetition.
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Carlson (1983, pp. 242-246) demonstrates that one can make a case for
all or at least more than one of the constituents in a sentence being what
the sentence is about, showing that
16A. Mr. Morgan is a careful researcher and a knowledgeable
semiticist, but his originality leaves something to be desired. (Carlson,
p. 243)
can be construed as being about Mr. Morgan or about his scholarly
abilities. Similarly, in an ordinary spoken sentence like
16B. Max gave G riselda a diamond ring.
we can say that the sentence is about Max, Griselda, the diamond ring,
or the act of giving which, in itself, implies that M ax intended to become
engaged to Griselda by his offering.
So long as we are hung up on the notion of the sentence as the bearer
of topic and theme, we will continue to face such uncertainty. T h e
problem disappears when we consider that the sentence is part of a
larger construct: the discourse and its context of utterance or text. Con
sidered this way, theme is what the entire discourse is about, which each
constituent in the sentence “may pick out, refer to, or stand for” (Carlson,
p. 244). T h is requires one m odification: the theme is what a stretch of
discourse is about, for topics do change in discourses.
Lyons neatly explains how the theme may influence at least some
passives. H e (1977, pp. 510-511) asserts that humans naturally are more
interested in humans than in other entities, and that this interest explains
which constituent was chosen as the subject. In turn, this can lead to the
passive if the object was made subject. For instance, he gives as examples:
17A. A man was stung by a bee in the H igh Street today.
17B. A bee stung a man in the H igh Street today.
Lyons contends that 17A is more usual than 17B because humans are
more interested in men than in bees. H ence, in Hallidayan terms, it is
more natural to select man as the theme as in 17A, than it is to use the
active as in 17B. Kuno would say that the perspective is from the human’s
point of view. In other words, the selection of the object as subject here
arises from a natural tendency to thematize human perspectives.
T h e role that theme, subject, and empathy play in actual narrative is
illustrated in the following collected as part of the Ice Cream Stories.
Both were produced by patients with the discharge diagnosis of schizo-
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phrenia, but the first was not an SD schizophrenic and the second was.
T he boldface in each indicates each topic and theme encoded:
17C. A little girl was looking in a window of a Baskin-Robbins ice
cream shop ’n she wanted some ice cream and uh she went home
and asked her m other if she could have some ice cream and her
mother said it’s too close to supper an’ she asked her father for some
ice cream an’ her father gave her some money an she went down to

the ice cream parlor and bought a double scoop of ice cream.
17D. One was about I think a little girl or boy having a ball and
having to be real careful about crossin’ the street an’ I might be
mistaken. I was just thinking of movies I ’ve watched . . . It seems like
what children do in their actions just exem plify what grown-ups are
like an’ it just gives grown-ups a better idea to think that they are
necessarily better than children y’know an’ I think it’s time to really
talk now approaching 1980’s,10 And peop’—kids goin’ to college and
things like that. I haven’t even finished ya know it’s ridiculous.
T h e first is well formed discourse as well as consisting of well formed
sentences. T h e very first sentence thematizes girl by m entioning it first.
The anaphoric reference she ties the next three predicates together to
this first mention. T h en the anaphoric reference her links the mention of
her parents to the preceding. T h e parents are seen only in reference to
the girl’s wishes, which is as it should be. T h e anaphoric reference in the
last sentence ties it all up. Moreover, it consistently encodes the action
from the perspective of the little girl, showing empathy for her.
In contrast, although 17B like 17A shows no disruption in sentential
syntax or word choice p e r se, it is deviant. It is only when one examines it
from the point of view of the theme and subject of the sentences that we
see what is wrong. T h e sequence opens with a recognized and correctly
used topicalizer, “one was ab out . . . ” which introduces the little girl or
boy. First the speaker correctly topicalizes with [was about + mention of
NP], here, the child. Both the facts that the child was “having a ball” and
“crossing the street” are possible and logical, and ellipsis is used correctly
in not repeating the subject before both verbs.11 Given the clearly marked
topic the next sentence should deal with the child and crossing the street.
Instead, a second topic is announced, the movies the narrator had seen. I
think o f is often used as a topicalizer, so is it seems, the opener of the very
next sentence. T h e reference to kids’ going to college is completely
unprepared. Being careful about crossing the street and kids’ emulation
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of adults are tenuous threads to the remark about the 1980s and higher
education. So far, we have seen three topicalizers and not one theme.
None of the topicalizing sentences are followed by any expansion of the
topic, although it is not hard to explain why the speaker introduced
these three topics together:
• the video was of a child
• videos remind people of movies
• children do imitate adults
T he semantic content of each sentence is fine, but our feeling that the
speaker is flitting from topic to topic is explained by the successive
topicalizing with no elaboration. T he speaker is flitting from topic to
topic. At the third, it seems as if the speaker has finally settled on
children as his theme, but the conjoined mention of grown-ups’ thinking
that they are superior to children is a jolt because now the theme has
become g r o w n - u p s just when we thought it was children. There is also no
consistency of perspective. It, too, flits from the narrator to the child to
the narrator.12
[12] Given and New Inform ation.

After its introduction, the theme is given information, referring to
something already present in the verbal and nonverbal context (Lyons
1977, p. 508; Halliday 1985, p. 275). The sentence is composed of a theme
and a r h e m e or c o m m e n t . Some scholars speak of the t h e m e versus
r h e m e of the sentence, and other refer to the to p ic v e rs u s c o m m e n t of the
sentence. For the most part, these are simply different terms for the same
thing, although the pairs are not interchangeable. If one decides upon
t h e m e , then it must be opposed to r h e m e , and to p ic has to co-occur with
c o m m e n t . Often, in fact, usually, these coincide with the traditional
c o m p le t e s u b je c t and c o m p le t e p re d ic a te . All of these actually refer to the
flow from old to new information that sentences within a discourse
ideally have. Such notational variants using different terms for the same
entity and the same terms for different ones afflicts all scholarly fields.
No matter what they call them, discourse analysts agree that many
naturally occurring sentences have a given and a new component (Lyons
1977, pp. 508-510; Brown and Yule, 1983 pp. 153-189). Van Dijk (1980, p. 94)
elaborates, saying that the subject (a.k.a. topic, t h e m e ) the part of the
sentence is “information that is already i n t r o d u c e d ( . . . ) already s u p p o s e d
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to be known . . . , or otherwise given or started from” and the predicate
(a.k.a. comment, rhem e) expresses “new, unknown, unpredictable,... infor
mation” about the topic (all italics his).12 For this reason, such markers of
old information as pronouns or deictics usually occur in subject position.
As already shown in discussing cohesion, given information can also
refer to information known by previous interactions, the physical context
or cultural knowledge. T h is leads to the optimal flow of old to new
information with heavily modified constituents at the end of the sentence.
When new information can fill the subject position, there is a very
strong tendency to throw it to the end of the sentence leaving a dummy it
or there as the subject, as in
18A.
18B.
18C.
18D.

Roses are on the table.
There are roses on the table
T hat you came was nice.
It was nice that you came.

As valid as these examples are, and as accurate as the observation is
that sentences tend to flow from old to new information, it is still a
dubious claim to say that is how all sentences progress. Sentences in
isolation do travel from old to new information, as do many sentences in
a discourse but, again within the discourse, many sentences in their
entirety simply repeat the information or messages given before although
not necessarily in the same words and syntax. Culturally known items
might be mentioned. This can be done very effectively—or annoyingly—to
emphasize a point or to mark out for the hearer that something prior is
being brought up again. T h e flow from old to new information is also a
feature of skillful rhetoric, but not all rhetoric is skillful and that which is
not is not necessarily psychotic or deranged. In a psychotic population we
would expect that flow to be interrupted more than it is in normals since,
as a byproduct of psychosis, a speaker may not be in control. T h e defining
difference between normals and psychotics is the way that distinctly
psychotic speech does not flow. It is blocked by perseverations of all sorts
(Chapters 1 and 2). In contrast, normal speech which is faulty in presen
tation of new and old information is clumsy or boring (e.g., Williams 1981).
L o o k in g a g a in a t th e fo llo w in g re s p o n se to th e q u e stio n a b o u t w h e re
th e p a tie n t liv e d a n d w h a t it was like liv in g in th a t p la c e , we see th e
e x te n t o f d e v ia tio n p o ssib le in s c h iz o p h re n ic p e rs e v e ra tio n s .

19. Mill Avenue is a house in between avenues U and avenue T I
live on Mill Avenue for a period of for now a period of maybe
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fifteen y e a r for a ro u n d a p p ro x im a te fifteen y ears I like it the fam—I
like every family on Mill Avenue I like every family in the world I like
every family in The United State of America I like every family on on
Mill Avenue I like Mill Avenue is a is a b lock w ith th a t is busy cars
always pass by all th e tim e I always look o u t th e w indow of m y fro n t
p o rch fro n t p o rch at tim e w h en I s- when I ’m not sure if it’s possible
about the way I think I could read people mind about people’s society
attitude plot and spirit so I think I could read their mind as they drive
by in the car sh- will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise should I
answer should I not answer I not answer wth e ir th o u g h t of how
I read think I could read their mind about when they pass by in the
car in th e h ou se pass by in the car fro m m y h ou se I just correct for
them for having me feel better about myself not answer will I should I
answer should I not answer will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise I
just correct them to have me feel better about myself about the way I
think I can hear their mind r- about the way I think I could read their
mind as they pass by the house Mill Avenue is also Mill Avenue is also
a p la ce of g re a t ev e n t fo r all the families th a t live on Mill Avenue
always eh t- receive world wide attention an d I a m o - I a m ju st o n e of
the families live o n M ill A v en u e th a t always receive world wide
attention so th e re fo re [u n in tellig ib le] to receive world wide attention
is receive world wide attention is so m e so m e y ou sh o u ld b e p ro u d of
y o u sh o u ld be p ro u d of world wide attention [u n in te llig ib le ] th e re ’s
th e fam ily a re ju st too o u t in th e o p e n n o t to h ave world wide
attention so th ey all h ave world wide attention by the cars pa—that
pass in th e fro n t cars that pass by all the time so th e re fo re Mill
Avenue is also a a I like a quiet residential n - block like a quiet
residential block w ith a Ita lia n p e o p le talk o u tsid e by th e fence
d iscu ss th e ir feelin g s th e ir attitu d es th e ir o p in io n s o p in io n about
an y sto ry feelin g co n ce p t id e a o r sen ten ce th a t th e y m a y h ave and
o n ce ag ain w hen I look o u tsid e th e w indow b ecau se I think I could
read people’s minds about people’s society attitude plot and spirit
w-should I answer should I not answer will I see Paradise will I not see
Paradise I not answer c o rre c t th em h ave m e feel ab o u t b e tte r about
m yself like I said before I ’m not sure if it’s possible about the way I
think I could read people mind about people’s society attitude plot
and spirit so I not answer them I ju st c o rre c t th e m h ave m e feel
b e tte r ab ou t m yself Mill Avenue is also a place w h ere people gather
in back yards to h ave people gather in back yards to h ave a b arb ecu e
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in the back yard to have relative over to have friend over to talk in
the back yard to be merry with each other. (data courtesy of Dr.
Bonnie Spring)13
There is neither a flow from given to new information, nor is there
any relevance achieved. Rather the same phrases are repeated cyclically
and no connections are made between the problem of seeing Paradise
and the street where he lives. Perhaps he is reminded of death, hence
Paradise because of the connection between people’s plotting and death. It
is possible to make some sense of this, at least from the written transcript
which gives us the luxury of slowly analyzing what was said. Spoken, as in
the original tape recording, one makes no sense out of it at all. The lack of
pronouns seriously impedes our understanding. Even in writing, our
usual means of comprehending do not work. As with glossomania, we can
only seek an explanation of why these phrases are juxtaposed.

[ 13] New and Brand New Information.

Prince (1981), with much justice, complains that different scholars
have used the concept of given versus new information in three some
what different ways, thus rendering the concept imprecise. Given infor
mation has been considered to be information which is predictable,
shared, or salient. If the information is predictable, then it is recoverable
from the context if it is not fully expressed. We have already seen the
importance of anaphora in showing whether or not a constituent has
been already introduced.
Prince (1981), discriminates between two kinds of new information:
salient and brand new information. Givenness in the sense of being
salient refers to information that the speaker assumes to be in the con
sciousness of the hearer (Chafe quoted by Prince, p. 228). In this sense,
for an NP to be properly signalled as a given entity, it must have been
mentioned in the discourse, or be in the same category of something
which has been mentioned. A third possibility is that the NP can refer
to something in the physical context of the interaction. For instance,
in the Ice Cream Stories (Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8), many
people spoke of a little girl asking her mother for ice cream, with
out introducing the mother as new information. The fact of having
mentioned the child was sufficient for the existence of the mother, as
in:
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20A. A little girl was looking in a window of a Baskin Robins ice
cream shop ’n she wanted some ice cream and uh she went home
and asked her mother if she could have some ice cream. . . .
20B. Um —in an ice cream store she was lookin’ in to see if she could
get any she went home her mother said. . . .
In both of these the mention of the mother is the first mention in the
discourse. Mothers are salient because children are presumed to have
them and it is also presumed that they are the ones to give permission to
eat ice cream.
Prince suggests that the term shared knowledge be replaced by assumed
familiarity, since all anyone can do is assume what another knows. She
suggests that there are two different kinds of new information. If the
hearer already knows about the entity being introduced, it is simply new.
In contrast, if the speaker introduces something the hearer doesn’t know
about, then that entity is brand new. Brand new information has to be
created in the hearer’s mind. This, of course, puts a greater burden on
the speaker in presenting enough information so that the hearer can
create what was intended.
To see the difference between these two types of new information,
consider the following (examples and analysis mine):
2 1A. Freud certainly shook up the world of medicine.
21B. Jerry Jones certainly shook up the world of medicine.
2 1A is fine. I have invoked mention of someone my readers have
knowledge of. They know he lived. They know he was a physician, and
that he had radical ideas about the human mind. They also know that he
has had a great influence on 20th century thought. I am introducing him
as new to this discussion, but I don’t have to create him in the reader s
mind. In fact, I can say many things about him without very much
preparation because I assume familiarity. 21 A works very well as an
utterance bringing up new information.
In contrast, 21B doesn’t work well at all for introducing new information,
unless fortuitously some reader knows a Jerry Jones who had a strong
effect on the world of medicine. Here, Jerry Jones has to be created (in
Prince’s sense) in the reader’s mind by syntactic and lexical choices, as in
21C. I used to know this guy who was named Jerry Jones and he
sure shook up the world of medicine when he . . .
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21D. A man named Jerry Jones had a profound effect on the medi
cal community because h e . . . .
Mechanisms for introducing brand new information abound in both
speech and writing. In 21C, the expression this guy is a colloquialism
indicating “I ’m going to tell you about someone you don’t know of.” The
indefinite a in 21D can be used for salient and brand new information,
but the clincher for brand new information in this sentence is the phrase
named Jerry Jones. T his always indicates that nonsalient new information
is being introduced. Relative clauses and participles both are frequent
markers of brand new information, as in 21C and D respectively. For
instance, note the disparity in
21E. *Our mother named Tessie Dorgan gave you this note, dear.
The distinction between the two kinds of new information appears
to be useful in analyzing schizophrenic discourse. When discussing exophora, I noted that using a she for first mention of a girl shown in a
video was not deviant if the patient had viewed the video with the experi
menter. The child in the video was in the patient’s consciousness and,
presumably, mine since we had both watched the video together. Hence
the patient could assume that the reference was salient.
However, in the following, failing to introduce something as brand
new information contributes to the deviation of the passages. In 22A,
brand new information is presented as if it were simply new salient
information. This narrative also contains gibberish, so that the failures
in presenting information as brand new or not is matched by a general
disruption in linguistic ability.
22A. Okay. I was watching a film of a girl and um s bring back
memories of things that happened to people around me that affected
me during the time when I was living in that area and she just went
to the store for a candy bar and by the time oooh of course her
brother who was supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much
attention he was blamed for and I didn’t think that was fair the way
the way they did that either so that’s why I ’m just asking yah could
we just get together and try to work it out all together for one big
party or something ezz it hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve
been here___
In 22B, we see typical schizophrenic repetition about his sleeping for
11 weeks. T hen the the patient erroneously signals the man as if it were
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given information, but this is the first mention of the man and he is
nowhere introduced. Then the narrator fails to tell us why his father told
him to call the police. Here, the why is the essential brand new informa
tion to ground the events of the narrative. Since she was not dealing with
the kinds of data presented here, Ellen Prince (1981) claimed that her
formulation of new and brand new information always falls on nouns,
but examples like this show that adverbials also may be involved. In
the following, an adverbial clause is required in order to explain the
reason.
22B. I was sleeping in bed on top of my bed from the last time I got
out of the hospital which was about 11 weeks that I was released I
was lying top of bed for the 11 weeks that I was released and and my
father told to call the police car and the police car enter over my
house the man stepped out of the police car and he w—entered my
house with two patrolmen and they patrolman cherry and patrol
man alcolino. . .
One problem in trying to use distinctions such as Prince’s in the
disordered speech of schizophrenics is that some might say that neolo
gisms and even outright gibberish are brand new information that hasn’t
been introduced correctly. I would put limits on any analysis of new and
old information, such that we presume an error only if we can recognize
the words and the markers themselves such as articles, pronouns, adjectives,
relative clauses, or any other recognizable construction that is used to
identify new information or refer to old.14
[14] Em pathy and Point of View.

Kuno (1987, p. 17) coins the term HYPER-TOPIC to indicate “a para
graph topic or a conversation topic” as distinct from the subject of a
sentence. He offers an important insight, that there is a LATENT TOPIC as
well, and this usually is the speaker, the first person, the ego, the I. That
is, it is assumed that whatever we say we are talking about our own
perspective and experiences. He shows how the hyper-topic interacts
with the latent first person topic, as in the following example, which for
brevity’s sake I have here paraphrased.
23A. I have been collecting pictures of movie stars, and I can show
them to you, but I cannot show you my picture of Marilyn Monroe.
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Kuno points out that such a discourse is, indeed, on one level about
the first person. This constitutes the latent or hyper-topic, but the picture
of Marilyn Monroe is what Kuno terms the p r o m in e n t topic. Notice
here that the actress mentioned can be isolated with clefting,14
23B. It is Marilyn Monroe’s picture which I cannot show you.
But it is odd to topicalize I or even my,
23C. ?It is I who cannot show you my picture of Marilyn Monroe.
23D. ?Regarding me, I cannot show you my picture of Marilyn
Monroe.
23E. S: I took aerobic dancing until I broke a toe.
H: Oh, how is it?
S: I don’t know. It wasn’t my toe.
I suggest that 23C and D are strange because it is rarely the case that
speakers have to emphasize that the discourse is about themselves. That
is presumed, hence latent. If it is already presumed to be a topic, then
there is no reason for topicalizing it. We topicalize only new or brandnew information. Similarly, the humor of 23E resides in the expectation
that S is talking about herself, the latent topic being I. Notice that none
of these violate syntactic rules. There is no grammar rule which would
exclude them. By themselves, they are perfectly good English, question
able only in terms of requirements of discourse.
Notes
1Here and elsewhere in actual quotes, this sexist choice of pronoun is Kuno’s.
2Although they might prefer to have their tongues cut out with burning pincers
rather than admit it, the transformationalists did the same thing that traditional
grammarians had always done: they invented sentences and rules based upon their
own notion of their own speech.
3Kuno says that all NP’s in a sentence cannot be topicalized. He finds it impos
sible to topicalize clowns as in *These are the clowns who the man bought the
woman’s portrait of. Kuno claims that the strangeness of this is caused by the
possessive. I suspect that another reason this paraphrase seems queer is the very
complexity of the sentence which entails one’s keeping track both of the noun that
goes with the preposition and even the distance of the clowns from its preposition.
4Typically, these are insults clearly given in jest. Socially, they relieve hostilities
safely in tense situations. In some cultures they are readily used to test verbal
prowess, as in adolescent male “your mother” jibes. These originated in black male
verbal contests called variously sounding, chopping, cutting, ranking, and ragging.
5These are only some of the criteria on which she diagnoses schizophrenia.
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6Andreasen also includes under this term such phenomena as word salads and
schizophasia.
7The determiners the and an are not pronouns. They do not replace nouns or any
consitutent of a sentence. Nor do they function as adjectives. Adjectives come
between the determiner and the noun; moreover, they can take a word indicating
degree as in “very happy” or “most generous.” There is no category of “adjective
pronouns” in syntax.
8Actually, in English, names for animate creatures, most countries, states, cities,
and towns do not have articles before them, but rivers, oceans, and mountain ranges
do, as in The Mississippi, The Atlantic, or The Rockies. Lakes and individual moun
tains do not take the article, but they are typically preceded or followed by the words
Lake and Mount(ain), respectively. Such variation clearly serves the function of
building up redundancy in the message, while still specifying exactly.
9When speaking about duration and strength of an individual sound, it should be
realized that we are talking about milliseconds. The human ear is able to recognize
as distinct differences between sounds that are almost imperceptible on a spectograph,
and sounds that differ in length so slightly that special equipment is needed to
record them.
10These data were collected from 1978-1980.
11However, it is inaccurate. The video did not show a child having a ball in any
sense of those words, nor was there anything about crossing the street. These
inaccuracies aren’t linguistic ones, just perceptual ones. Additionally, this was
elicited one week after viewing the video. He wasn’t sure how many videos he had
seen; hence, the use of one rather than it.
12Notice that these findings, that the flow of information in the sentence should
go from old to new information, therefore the unstressed to the stressed, from short
structures to long is diametrically opposed to what students learn in school. They
are told to put the important information first. This is always the new information.
One of the reasons for the denseness of scholarly and bureaucratic writing is that it
violates the flow from old to new information.
13Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these data, however.
14All of these examples and topic tests are mine, not Kuno’s

Chapter Eleven

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: BEYOND FREUD
Ever since Freud, the question has arisen of how a discourse
should be understood. How do we interpret discourse? What
can be assumed and what are the bounds on derived meaning?
The fragmented nature of normal discourse is presented. Then,
four modes of interpretation of patients' speech are offered
along with a discussion of elicitation and its effect on speech.
This includes such matters as resistance to therapy.
[1] Justifiable Interpretation.

he stunning force of Freudian interpretation burst upon the 20th
century revolutionizing our perception of human behavior. Ulti
mately, it affected psychiatry, psychology, literature, the graphic arts,
and, eventually, society itself by forcing reexamination of family structure,
including the child’s obligations to the parent and the blaming of the
parent for the child’s insecurities, obsessions, and transgressions. All of
this occurred because of Freud’s mode of interpretation of discourse.
It is not too much to say, for instance, that Bateson’s double bind
theory could not have been formulated without a prior belief in Freud
ian analysis, nor, of course, would we have the interpretive methodologies
of H arry Stack Sullivan, Harold Searle, Silvano Arieti, Ernest Jones,1 or
the now popular Lacan. All such interpreters depend upon the basic
Freudian assumption that language at no level necessarily means what it
says. Interpretation derives not from the actual words and grammar as
used by nonpsychotic patients, but from reference to beliefs about Oedipal bonds, castration fears, homosexual panic, and even paranoia induced
by feelings of inadequacy. Lacan roots his interpretations in the linguis
tics of de Saussure, but still employs a Freudian model of the uncon
scious to which the psychiatrist is supposed to be talking. He envisions a
dialogue between the Other, the analyst, and the Other, the patient’s
subconscious (Holloway 1977, 1978; Haskell 1978). Psychosis is believed
to stem from avoidance of intolerable feelings.
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Analysts differ considerably in their treatment of schizophrenia, rang
ing from Rosen’s belief in uncovering “vivid and shocking interpreta
tions of a primarily oedipal nature,. . . [he] bypass[es] the ego and . . .
communicate[s] with the unconscious id material” (pp. 149-150). Analysts
were trained by other highly respected senior analysts, so to speak, who
offered interpretations of the patient’s speech based upon his or her view
of what caused the neurotic or psychotic illness. Although all such
analysis emanated from Freudian theory, individual analysts departed
from this theory to a greater or lesser degree (Hallowell and Smith 1983).
One issue has been the mode of analysis to follow in treating schizo
phrenics. Analysts perceive themselves as teachers and their mode of
analysis is aimed at teaching the patient to cope. Hallowell and Smith
(1983, pp. 149-156) summarize some of these methods and the rationale
behind them. Some analysts believe that their task is to restore defective
ego boundaries. This resulted in an “intrusive, even persecutory style [of
analysis] (p. 150). Others believe in entering the patient’s psychotic
world and then by building trust, help the patients to reintegrate them
selves into the world left behind by the psychosis.
T he relative validity of any and ad of these beliefs about therapy is not
the issue here. The issue here is solely the differences in orientation of
various analysts and analyzers of discourse, because these lead to very
different kinds of interpretations of what a patient has said. It is the
relationship between analysis and theoretical positions that have to be
examined. We have already seen that interpretation is based upon various
strategies, and that these strategies include our ascribing intention to the
speaker. We also consider mutual histories of interactors. T he influence
of theory and of being in a therapeutic setting, then, are important
determinants in analysis.
All Freudian or post-Freudian theories rest upon a view of the dynam
ics of mind and speech that cannot be verified by overt observation or by
experimentation. One either believes them or one does not. This doesn’t
mean that they are valid or not valid. It is just that they are not provable
by the usual scientific procedures. There is no way to disprove Freud or
his followers, including Lacan, but there is no way to prove that they are
correct either. Ultimately, one believes or not according to one’s intuitive
sense that psychoanalysis strikes a responsive chord. Those who do not
intuit this may be, as the analysts claim, simply denying what is true,
burying it, even perhaps resisting treatment.
Linguistics itself did not offer many guides to interpreting even nor-
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mal discourse to Freud or his contemporaries. In fact, psychoanalysis
predated linguistics by decades in realizing that language must have
some kind of deep structure as well as surface forms. Psychoanalysis also
predated linguistics by decades in realizing that the encoding of a mes
sage is dictated partly by the speaker’s intent, and the m eaning a hearer
derives depends on the intent that he or she ascribes to the speaker in
formulating that message. Until relatively recently, linguists rested seman
tics upon the flimsy undergirding of sentence grammars and the doc
trines of separation of linguistic levels, and that was when m eaning was
considered at all.
Under the aegis of philosophers of language like Austin and Searle
and linguists themselves like Lyons, Fillmore, and Halliday, the contextsensitive view of language finally offered some alternate procedures for
analysis. We can make a case nowadays that matters of justifiable
interpretation, even of metaphor, seem to be bounded by rules and
strategies, so that we are justified in speaking of the grammar of the
discourse. It is time to reexamine Freudian inspired modes of psychoana
lytic interpretation in the light of our new understandings, not with the
view of invalidating psychoanalysis, but to enhance its insights by pro
viding a firm er base upon which to ground interpretations, and, in some
cases, to provide alternate interpretations.
[2] Psychology, P sychiatry, and Linguistics.

Psychiatry and its sister disciplines generally downplay the public
and social nature of language. Rather, language is treated as a private
system which each person can and does use pretty much as he or she
wishes. Typically, m eaning of a discourse is taken to be holistic with little
or no attempt to justify it on the basis of actual syntax or lexicon used.
Meaning is assigned to the discourse as a whole according to the analyst’s
perception of the patient’s intent; thus, discourse is taken as a strategy, a
cryptic rendering of a person’s real, hidden m eaning.2 Im aginative
exegesis, as in literary analysis, is admired, and certain analysts, such as
Freud or Searles, are often used as guides to interpretation of given
utterances because of their acknowledged superior ability to see into the
true m eaning of discourses. T h e Seeman and Cole analysis of Carrie’s
speech, presented below, is an example.
Linguistics also acknowledges that each person’s language is, to some
degree, unique. It has long been said that, ultimately, we each speak an
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idiolect, as well as a dialect of a language. However, the idiolect arises
because individuals may have learned a few rules of language somewhat
differently from others, and because words and even syntax can change
over a person’s lifetime. Still, idiolectal variation refers to language
being used to convey messages to others. For instance, several of my
students say and write “concern to” rather than “concern with.” T his use
of to seems to be spreading virtually person by person and students even
from the same region differ, some keeping the older with, and some not.
At this point in time, we can only say that there is idiolectal variation of
the particle used with the verb concern.
We must not assume that the flow of linguistic understanding always
proceeds from linguistics to psychiatry. Sometimes the reverse is true.
Long after psychiatry, for instance, linguistics has finally begun to con
sider the roles of motivation and presupposition in meaning, as well as
implication derived from both roles.
Still, there are definable differences in orientation between psycho
analytical and linguistic analyses of discourse. It bears repeating that
linguistic analyses proceed from actual words combined with actual
syntax, and their relation to social context. Implicitly or explicitly,
utterances are judged as normal or deviant, idiolectal or dialectal. Lin
guists are primarily concerned with uncovering regular rules and strate
gies for conveying meaning; why, for instance, “It’s cold in here” may be
construed as a command to close a window, or “You live on 56th Street”
may be heard as a question (e.g., Ervin-Tripp 1972; Labov and Fanshel
1977; Goody 1978). Such a concern with rules and strategies entails
another assumption, that we are all using language, or trying to, in
pretty much the same ways (e.g., Searle 1975, pp. 63, 73; Austin 1962;
Lyons 1977, p. 735.) Problems naturally arise when language is clearly
not being used correctly, when it deviates from linguistic norms. Such
speech often cannot be understood by usual decoding strategies. Typically,
linguists have treated such error by comparing it to normal production,
assuming that the speaker intended to use language so that it could be
understood, but that normal production processes have been disrupted
(e.g., Fromkin 1973; Clark and Clark, 1977, pp. 211-215; Buckingham
and Kertesz 1974; Chaika 1974a, 1977). In such instances, extraordinary
measures are employed to gain understanding, but these are based upon
normal decoding practices.
Four separate discourses will be presented here, each resulting from
data collected in different ways and upon different assumptions, and
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each interpreting those data according to somewhat different constructs.
The first is based upon poetry as a mode of communication between
therapist and patient (Hallowell and Smith 1983). T he second, Labov
and Fanshel (1977), analyzed five therapeutic episodes between a thera
pist and her patient in the light of strategies of ordinary conversation,
developing what they call a p r i n c i p l e d e l a b o r a t io n of meaning.
In what is perhaps its most shaky premise, classic psychoanalysis
guarantees that the analyst can never be successfully proven wrong.
According to this theory, the more one denies that one meant what the
therapist says one meant, the more one really meant it. For instance, if an
analyst tells a woman that she is consumed by penis envy, the more she
says she isn’t, the stronger her envy is presumed to be. H er denial
constitutes proof of her neurosis. The same is true of the man who denies
that he is consumed by Oedipal desires. As a concommitant of this
premise, analysts speak of the period of resistance, a period of time
during which the patient evinces resistance to the therapeutic situation.
There is, undeniably, a period that can be called resistance, but I suspect
that there are many reasons for resistance, and, in some instances, it is
not real resistance at all.
We now examine interpretations of speech data from three patients.
These data were elicited in three different ways: squiggles, an ordinary
therapeutic interview, and unbounded conversation.
[3] Squiggles and Therapy.

Hallowell and Smith, being highly influenced by Arieti’s compassion
ate view of the psychotic’s unbearable sadness and loss, developed a
mode of analysis in which they adapted a game of squiggles as a way of
offering the patient the therapist’s ego as a bridge, but one which also
allows the therapist to “enter the metaphor of the patient’s world.” The
squiggles game consisted of the therapist or patient providing a verbal
opener, and the other responding with a short line. Some of these
rhymed, some did not, but the result in each instance presented formed a
joint dialogue cast into poetic form, as in:
1A. T h.:
Pt.:
T h.:
Pt.:
T h.:

They said I am a hopeless case
Not I, a member of the human race, in disgrace
I wish they wouldn’t say that
In a nonjoking way
It makes me
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Pt.:
T h .:
Pt.:
T h.:
Pt.:
T h.:
Pt.:
T h.:
P t.:
T h .:
P t.:

Suspicious
And angry and sad
Which aren’t the strongest emotions I ’ve had
T he strongest are
Composed of these
Combined into
Something I don’t want to feel
Something like
Rage, but not quite
Also like
An intense feeling
(p. 142)

T he patient’s rhyming here is controlled, fits the meaning of the
entire squiggle. This patient had unusual facility with language, writing
superb poetry. He fits the pattern of the negative symptom psychotic,
speaking little. He presented poems both on the day of admission and the
next day, but did not talk (Edward Hallowell, personal communication).
What is noteworthy about these squiggles is that they provide a structured
enough frame so that a dialogue can proceed without the patient’s
becoming derailed. T he therapist is able to constrain the topic, and, at
the same time, to allow the patient free expression. T his constituted an
opening for therapy itself “ . . . the more personal, affective part of it,
especially in the beginning, was contained in the squiggles” (Hallowell
and Smith 1983, p. 143). Hallowed’s skid in presenting the right kinds of
openers for the patient himself must not be overlooked.
Hallowed and Smith do not give any extraordinary interpretations of
what the patient has said in these squiggles. They take 1A as a straightfor
ward expression of his feelings. Similarly, he expresses his need to cut off
feeling, in
1B. Pt.:
T h.:
Pt.:
T h .:

Nothing lasts forever
No one lives that long
Not on earth
Sometimes I want to get away
Pt.: Into the body of a robot
T h .: No feelings there. Just safe steel
Pt.: No way to get hurt or die
T h .: Sometimes I want to die
Pt.: To live in heaven forever
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Pt.:
T h .:
Pt.:
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Where people stay with you
And never leave
Leave, leave, leave
I wish my feelings would leave sometimes
But they stay
And haunt
(pp. 143-144)

T he degree to which squiggles could be applied to all patients has not
been determined, but, given the results in this case, it certainly seems
promising.

[4] Schizophrenic Chaining: T h ree Interpretations.

In Chapter 5 we saw that Forrest interpreted the following as being a
metaphorical way to express what it is like to be schizophrenic:
2. Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and wonder if my box
is broken and heart is beaten . . . (Maher 1968 cited in Forrest 1986)
Forrest believes that all language is metaphor (1976, p. 296), that
schizophrenic speech is especially poetic and that associational chaining
is a way of affirming the “right of choice which exists in thought and
language,” of “look [ing] for extra connections in words . . . to firm up the
connection between ideas we feel are related” (Forrest 1965).
Such an explanation ignores the fact that normal speakers do not firm
up connections between ideas by uttering glossomanic chains. Rather,
the many modes of effecting cohesion firm up those connections as do
the ways that sentences are made to fit to a topic.
Another example of chaining, here a response to a question, is here
reprised:
3. Looks like clay. Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the hay.
Hay day. Help! I just can’t. Need help. May day. (Cohen 1978, p. 29)
As explained earlier, several patients named the disc in question as
being either clay-colored or salmon-colored. Cohen, a psychologist
oriented towards behaviorism, explains chaining responses as in 3 as
resulting from “anticipation of social punishment contingent upon the
emission of a sampled response (1978, p. 21). He says that schizophrenics
cannot effectively reject punishable responses to referents, they .. . break
the perseverative cycle by shifting to different referents. One way to do
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this is via chaining.” He admits that “ultimately” their responses become
“remote from the original referents and from the listener’s standpoint,
seriously tangential to the conversational context.” Given such an expla
nation for the cause of schizophrenic speech, there is, of course, no
reason to search for meaning in sequences of chaining, and, indeed,
Cohen does not.
In terms of behavioral theory, however, it is puzzling how the chaining
can proceed from a need to avoid punishment, since the first sentence is
the most correct, and, indeed, the only correct one. It is the phenomenon
of chaining itself which is incorrect. Furthermore, as Cohen himself
admits, the chaining always moves further away from a correct response.
Hence, according to behavioral psychology, no chaining should ever
occur because it leads to the very punishment that Cohen says the
patient is trying to avoid by chaining.
Also, Cohen’s explanation rests upon a belief that the patient has
actively chosen this means to avoid punishment. Since other examples of
chaining do appear in the literature, and appear as examples of speech
especially pathognomic of schizophrenia, his explanation assumes that
schizophrenics as a group are very likely to choose this behavior for
avoiding punishment.
T he problem is that the chaining is bizarre precisely because there
seems to be no normal speech behavior like it. Certainly, this is not the
kind of speech behavior one calls upon to avoid punishment. Thus there
is no possibility it has been learned, except, perhaps those unfortunates
who have been hospitalized for long periods with SD schizophrenics.
Cohen offers no proof that his patients have “learned” to speak this way.
Although I have heard anecdotal evidence that some psychotics have
learned to “speak schizophrenic” as a result of hospitalization, I have yet
to find hard data to support such a possibility. Even if someone does
present such data, it would still beg the question of why only schizo
phrenics seem to speak this way whether through learning from other
schizophrenics or from internal speech difficulties.
If it were an isolated instance, or if it were reported only of members
of one social group, however defined, we can explain it as a learned
response. Rather, it is reported only of schizophrenics,4 and of schizo
phrenics who come from all social classes and nations, and who speak a
great many different languages. Since there is no evidence that it is or
even can be learned,5 the natural assumption is that it is caused by the
disease. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that schizophrenics
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typically create glossomanic chains only when they are being schizophrenic.
If they chain deliberately to avoid punishment, why don’t they do this
when they are in remission? It seems to me that the schizophrenic
condition itself is responsible for the chaining.
[5] R h od a: T h e Jo in t History of the Participants.

Labov and Fanshel (1977) provide an exceptionally detailed and per
ceptive analysis of a therapeutic situation involving a girl named Rhoda,
an anorexic in conflict with her mother. The mother is a clever manipulator
of discourse and Rhoda has to learn to deal with her by some means
other than starving herself to death. In the segment described here, the
mother has left Rhoda to take care of their shared home while she, the
mother, is taking care of Rhoda’s sister’s children, staying away too long,
thus interfering with Rhoda’s schooling. Rhoda cannot cope, but to
admit this overtly to her mother would be yielding to her mother’s
opinion that Rhoda is not capable, an opinion fatal to Rhoda’s desire to
prove her worth by proving she can cope. This power struggle between
Rhoda and her mother is complicated by Rhoda’s anorexia. It is this last
which is being directly treated, with the therapist trying to allow Rhoda
to see that her refusal to eat is, indeed, a power play.
Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 53) demonstrate that one of the specific
characteristics of the therapeutic situation is that both patient and thera
pist are presumably working towards making explicit those propositions
which underly the problem leading to the therapy. As we have seen, in any
situation, part of the meaning derived comes from the personal history
of the interactors. Labov and Fanshel, Kreckel (1981), and Sanders (1987)
all stress the relationship between the richness and accuracy of interpreta
tions and extensive mutual interaction. Labov and Fanshel (1977,
pp. 351-352) stress that one cannot interpret individual texts by themselves,
noting that they collected many conversations in which one interpretation
seemed correct, but that somebody who knew the interactors better than
they was able to show that it was not. For example, a seminar was shown a
video of a married couple conversing. At one point, the wife remarked
that blood was thicker than water, whereupon the husband turned his
head away. T he members of the seminar assumed that the husband was
angry because the wife had implied that her relatives were more important
than he. One viewer knew the parties in question, however; consequently,
he was able to give quite a different interpretation of this scene. Knowing
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the family dynamics, he demonstrated that the wife was complimenting
the husband, indicating that he was as much blood to her family as she
was because he shared her concern for them. When the husband turned
away, far from being in anger, he was being modest, turning aside when
complimented.
[6] R h od a: Propositions as Reference Points.

As a working guide towards establishing what a given patient is refer
ring to, Labov and Fanshel isolated potential conflicts between Rhoda
and her mother. They operated under the assumption that anorexics
stop eating as a way of defying authority, in this instance, the mother. As
they emphasize, nobody knows how to make someone eat if they don’t
want to. Whether or not all anorexics become that way as a defiance of
authority, such as may be embodied in a mother, I do not know, but that
Rhoda had a severe problem dealing with her mother is undeniable. As
the section shows, one evidence of that is her strategies for mitigating
requests to her mother.
Labov and Fanshel isolated several topics that Rhoda refers to which
clearly are causing conflict. One way one can tell that these are central to
Rhoda’s conflict is her direct mention accompanied with the implied
request for approval,
4. I don’t . . . know, whether . . . I —I think I did—the right thing,
jistalittle situation came up___an’ I tried to u hm . . . well, try t o . . . use
what I —what I’ve learned here, see if it worked” (p. 363)
She goes on to explain that her mother, as in the past, has gone to her
sister Phyllis’s house to babysit, leaving Rhoda at home to care for the
house, a task which Rhoda finds too difficult as she is also attending
school. T he opener, “I don’t know whether I did the right thing,” means
“did I do the right thing?” It is a way of asking for confirmation,
otherwise why mention it at all, much less mention it with a disclaimer
that shows doubt? She does understand clearly that the sessions are to
teach her to deal more effectively with her mother.
Labov and Fanshel isolate several recurring propositions in Rhoda’s
therapeutic session, a partial list of which is (not their words):
•
•
•
•

T he patient should gain insight into his or her own emotions.
One should express one’s needs and emotions to relevant others.
Rhoda’s6 obligations are greater than her capacities.
Rhoda is a student who has a primary responsibility to study.
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Labov and Fanshel term these, respectively, the propositions of
{INSIGHT},{S}, {STRN}, and {STU D -X } (notation theirs). By isolating
these propositions, they often can relate comments in the therapeutic
interview to these, showing how frequently they are alluded to as well as
justifying their interpretation of what she meant. For instance, 4 above
refers to the propositions of {IN SIG H T}, {S}, and {STRN} as the situation
that came up was her mother’s remaining at Phyllis’s house too long,
leaving Rhoda to cope at home and what Rhoda did was call her mother.
She had the dual task of letting her mother know that the mother was
shirking her responsibility and that Rhoda herself could not cope. What
made this especially difficult is that Rhoda did not want to mention that
she couldn’t cope because part of the conflict with her mother was that
the mother felt that Rhoda was not competent.
Clearly, the propositions become identified through a series of inter
views Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 149) insist that any abstract structures
that the therapist claims should be equally available to a native speaker.
What they are saying is that the strategies for interpretation in a clinical
setting are not different from those in ordinary interactions. T he differ
ence is that, in daily interacting, much of what is said is evanescent,
simply reacted to. Certainly, interactors do remember prior dealings
with each other and judge others’ motives or worth on that basis. In the
therapeutic situation, participants ruminate on the entire history of the
sessions themselves, correlating them with the patient’s personal history
and present situation as revealed in the course of therapy. Still, normal
modes of analyzing speech are not abandoned even in psychotherapy.
These normal modes do include such matters as taking into account
the ways that preconditions for making statements lead us to interpret.
We have already seen that a statement will evoke a response of an answer
to a question if the conditions for questioning are met. Labov and
Fanshel demonstrate that elaboration of comments must be principled,
verifiable by appeal to ordinary language behaviors. They provide detailed
arguments for their interpretations and stress that to expand the full
meaning of an utterance, including what was not overtly stated, one must
draw upon the whole body of shared knowledge that can be recovered
from all the therapeutic interviews. These should include conversations
between the therapist and client. This, of course, mirrors the meaning
that we get in ordinary daily interactions. If we presume different strate
gies in the therapeutic situation, we are in the strange position of asserting
that once one retreats behind the therapist’s door, all normal speech
practices are subject to idiosyncratic change.
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As we have seen, part of the meaning of any linguistic production is
constrained by the intent or motive we attribute to the producer. Truly,
the purpose of the therapeutic interview certainly helps determine the
topics of conversation and what is made of them, but the strategies for
understanding what is meant from what is said are quite ordinary. As we
saw in Chapter 6, it is rarely appropriate for somebody to say absolutely
everything he or she means. Because so much meaning is hinted at
rather than directly encoded we usually have to expand on what is said
to get the actual meaning. This expansion constitutes a derivation of
meaning. As such, it includes the kinds of “filling-in” of omissions of
repetitions already seen, knowledge of utterance pairs and other discourse
devices, reference to topic at hand, all of the modes of inference we have
seen, references to context, even kinesics and paralinguistics.
Labov and Fanshel maintain that expansion can be open-ended, but
their own explanations remain quite close to the bone. If we confine our
interpretation to what can be expanded from given utterances, we do
find natural bounds. What does happen—and should—is that subse
quent interviews might call for reinterpretation of previous ones. The
important thing is that expansions derive from the ordinary meanings of
what has been said, not from a preexisting theory of what someone must
be meaning.
[7] T h e M any Faces of Resistance.

In traditional psychoanalysis, we frequently saw the antithesis of the
the give and take we call conversation. There was no negotiation of
meaning. Rather, the therapist told the analysand what the latter meant.
If the analysand objected or misunderstood, then he or she was consid
ered to be in a stage of resistance. This ended when the analysand finally
accepted the therapist’s interpretations and learned to utilize the same
terminology as the analyst.
Labov and Fanshel (1977, pp. 34, 306) depict a patient as resisting
therapy by denying the strength of her emotions as well as by not
following the therapist’s advice. Thus, for instance, they assume that when
Rhoda says she was bothered she was using a euphemism for the truth,
that she was angry. They consider such euphemizing to be a mitigation
of her real feelings, hence, to be a way of resisting therapy. T his conclu
sion is reinforced because she precedes bothered by just, a further mitigator.
T he patient, Rhoda is being treated for anorexia, a result apparently of
the power play between her and her mother.
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They also claim that an even more extreme form of resistance is for a
patient to resort to saying nothing at all, something which Rhoda also
does at certain times, admitting that in a therapeutic situation, unlike
ordinary conversations, the therapist is “ . . . sometimes able to say more
definitely what another person feels than that person can say himself.”
This can be extremely threatening of course. Traditionally it has been
assumed that the patient cannot yet admit the truth because his or her
feelings would be too intolerably intense if he or she did. This is
undeniable, but there may be other reasons for such resistance as well.
The operative term here is as well. It seems to me that there can be
several reasons for apparent resistance and that they may operate
concurrently, serially, or singly.
It seems to me that an alternate reason that patients may resist is that
they do not agree with the analyst’s interpretation of their feelings,
feelings which patients certainly must know since only they can feel
them. Labov and Fanshel (pp. 62-64) term these a- e v e n t s , events known
to the speaker but not necessarily to another. At times, a patient might
refuse to talk because the analyst persists in attributing feelings that are
A-events to the analysand. Then, the analysand, not being believed,
simply doesn’t talk. Notice that this is not necessarily the cause of
resistance. It is only possibly the cause. On the one hand, the analysand
may be seen as simply not being ready for such truths, thereby resisting
the analyst. On the other hand, the analyst may be wrong.
Labov and Fanshel (p. 36) also comment on the fact that psychoana
lytic terms like
“interpretation,” “relationship,” “guilt,” “to present oneself,” “working
relationship,” and so on
are used primarily by the analyst in this situation because the patient
they are studying is not as “mature” as many analysands. This lends
credence to a suspicion I have long harbored that some of what is called
resistance is unfamiliarity with the discourse rules of the therapeutic
interview.
Another possibility is that the patient has not yet learned the jargon of
analysis. Clearly, one goal of analysis is to teach the analysand to label
his or her feelings with the distancing terms of analysis. There is no a
p riori reason to label one’s relationship with one’s mother as a “working
relationship” or to say of one’s persona that one “presents oneself as . . . ”
Language is eminently paraphrasable, as we have seen.
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There are other ways that patients have to learn how to have therapy.
Wooton (1975, p. 70) cites a good example
5. Patient: I’m a nurse but my husband won’t let me work.
Therapist: How old are you?
Patient: Thirty-one this December.
Therapist: What do you mean, he won’t let you work?
Here, the patient answers the psychiatrist’s first question as if it were
bona fide, a real-world question. T he psychiatrist was not really asking
her age, however. He was trying to lead her to see that she should be
making up her own mind, that she is old enough to do so. T he patient
did not yet realize that the goal of the therapist’s questions are rarely
factual information. Rather, they are intended to aid in a process of
self-discovery.
In sum, resistance—or what appears to be resistance—is not necessar
ily a unitary phenomenon. T h e patient may not yet be able to handle the
power of emotions that would surface if he or she admitted something, or
the patient genuinely does not feel what the analyst says he or she should
be feeling, the patient may be uneasy in the situation having been made
to feel that he or she is a fool in prior sessions, or that the patient either
hasn’t yet figured out what the analytic jargon is or has not yet figured
out the modus operandi of the therapeutic session.

[8] M itigating.

T he traditional explanation for resistance, that it would prove too
painful for the patient if he or she got too close to the truth, is probably
also valid. There are truths too painful for many of us to acknowledge
even outside of the therapeutic situation. It is well-known that many
social routines are couched in a mitigating fashion. For instance, rather
than saying, “Shut the door!” to one of our colleagues, we would more
likely couch the command as a request, even a pleading one, like “Please
shut the door” or, “Would you please shut the door?” Similarly, language
abounds in other kinds of mitigating words and phrases commonly used
to soften assertions, such as “I may be wrong, b u t. . . ”; “This might
sound silly, b u t. . . ”7
Labov and Fanshel are very aware of mitigation used both in softening
assertions, as above and in reporting one’s feelings as well. They give an
exceptionally apt example (p. 96) while demonstrating that a rule of
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interaction could be called the “rule of overdue obligations.” This is
alluded to whenever one reminds another of something that should or
should not have been done. Therefore, Rhoda phones her mother and
asks, “When do you plan to come home?” rather than, “When are you
coming home?” If she had not used the word plan (p. 50), her question to
her mother could have been taken as a challenge, meaning, in effect,
“You belong at home and you’ve been staying at my sister’s long enough.”
T he word plan makes it sound as if the mother not only has full author
ity to do as she wishes, but that it is she, not Rhoda, who is determining
the length of the stay (Labov and Fanshel p. 50, 96.) Not only has Rhoda
avoided challenging her mother by mitigating with plan, but she has also
downplayed her own need to have her mother home. That is, Rhoda
tries to mitigate the fact that she cannot indeed cope without her mother.
[9] How Shall a Discourse Be U nderstood: T h e Case of C arrie.

T he therapeutic situation does provide its own special contexts, includ
ing an uncovering of personal histories that do impinge on meaning. As
we have seen, all utterances are abbreviations for meaning in that they
assume certain cultural and personal shared knowledge, as well. The
question arises of when extraordinary measures are justified in interpreting
a discourse. Remember that only some schizophrenics display structurally
abnormal speech, and of those, most use structurally normal speech
when not in the throes of a schizophrenic bout. We are entitled to adopt
extraordinary measures only when speech is clearly deviant in structure.
Then exegesis must proceed on the basis of similarity of sentence structure
to normal possible productions and only to the extent that such matchings
can be made. If the speech is nondeviant in structure, then, in the
absence of strong case history or contextual clues, it should be interpreted
in the same way as a nonschizophrenic person’s would.
If the context simply does not fit what has been said, then one is
justified in searching further for special meanings. If what is said is
structurally abnormal, then one must try to compare it with the closest
linguistic structure that seems to fit the situation. One can be guided by
the voluminous research on the forms of slips of the tongue and speech
produced by those with known injuries to the brain. If it still cannot be
understood, we must admit simply that we don’t know what the subject
was trying to say. If the utterance appears to be structurally normal, but
is highly obscure, we might still suspect disruption in communicative
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ability, including such problems as lapses in the ability to monitor
another’s reactions, to paraphrase what one has just said so that the
hearer can understand, or to judge what is necessary to provide in order
to allow the co-conversationalist to hone in on what one is trying to
communicate. None of these skills in inconsiderable, and all are requi
site to successful comprehension.
As an illustration of the above points, it is fruitful to consider a
virtually classic case of psychoanalytical interpretation, in this instance
guided by the tenets of Harold Searles. This particular case was chosen
for illustration because the authors of the study discussed below, Mary
Seeman and Howard Cole (1977), were unusually explicit in delineating
why they interpreted as they did (Chaika 1981). They presented the
discourse of Carrie, a twenty-nine-year-old diagnosed schizophrenic,
along with their gloss of that discourse. It must be emphasized that their
interpretations are quite solidly in the tradition in which they were
trained and, within that tradition, their analysis was both sensitive and
sound.
It must be emphasized that, at the time of Seeman and Cole’s investi
gation,8 there was little reason to delve into the linguistic literature on
discourse analysis. With the exception of Labov and Fanshel’s groundbreaking study which was published the same year as Seeman and Cole s,
the linguistic literature was largely hobbled by sentence grammars. Dis
course considerations were still being labeled pragmatics. Linguistics at
that point was just beginning to show its efficacy and relevance to
psychiatric research. There are psychiatrists and clinical psychologists
who still doubt the value of an interloping researcher from the field
of linguistics. If nothing else, however, the comparison presented here
at least shows how far one’s assumptions can take one in what one
comprehends.
Seeman and Cole’s (1977) analysis was chosen because the authors were
unusually explicit in showing exactly what they were interpreting, how
they interpreted it, and why. Also, felicitously, they provided compara
tive data which examined the speech of one patient produced under the
same conditions within the same experimental context. T his provided a
sharpness of focus so that the central issue of how a discourse should be
interpreted would not be lost.
They used as their authority the analyst Harold Searles, a practice
dating from Freud. That is, they applied Harold Searles’ guide to what a
schizophrenic means given the nature of the illness to what Carrie
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actually said in the interviews. In contrast, Carrie’s utterances are here
compared with those gathered from ostensible normals in naturalistic
settings. This comparison suggests that Carrie’s speech, for the most
part, is nondeviant, therefore, in my judgment, not amenable to extraor
dinary interpretation.
We have already seen that there is high interjudge reliability as to the
schizophrenicity of some discourse (Maher, McKeon, and McLaughlin
1966). Nancy Andreasen’s widely used diagnostic criteria rest primarily
on such shared perceptions of speech.
Seeman and Cole apparently address themselves to the well-known
fluctuation of schizophrenic speech disability. They (p. 283) explain that
“interpersonal intimacy” is threatening to schizophrenics. T he purpose
of their study was to “illustrate with verbatim speech samples the daily
progression of change” showing that the patient becomes more and more
disorganized in her speech as intimacy increases. To this end, they
devised an ingenious study in which they had Carrie meet with a firstyear medical student, John, for daily discussion of neutral topics such as
fashions and learning a foreign language (Seeman and Cole 1977, p. 284).
In their article, the authors present excerpted samples from the corpus
they obtained. T he capital letters represent Seeman and Cole’s own
numbering of the speech samples.
They judge this monologue as being inscrutable, saying that she
[Carrie] switches topic constantly, talks in riddles and ambiguities, aban
dons the rules of grammar so that it is impossible to know what she is
referring to (Seeman and Cole 1977, p. 289).
(A )[Carrie’s discourse]

[Seeman and C ole’s commentary]

You know what the experiment is
geared to find is how vulnerable, I
guess, and you know, if you get close
to this person and how you feel about
it and some pretty basic questions
like it may have something to do
with psychiatry, I don’t. I’m begin
ning to think psychiatry is rather oldfashioned, you know there are young
people on Yonge Street selling books
about, I don’t even how to label them,
but there are new ways for man cop
ing with the environment and the

The whole segment can be taken to
mean: Do you like me, and if you
do, that puts me in an intolerable
position. And if you don’t, that’s
unbearable. There seems to be no
solution.
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people in it. And I haven’t got into
that but, I don’t know I, I just, like,
you have your set ways of doing things
and you’re in control. You know and
you’re talking about yourself person
ally yesterday, you know, and I walked
out of here yesterday and I didn’t
really have any feeling at all. It was
kind of like a release. I like people
to confide in me, but, like, where is
it going? What, it must serve some
purpose, I don’t have any theories
about it. All I know is what I do get
involved with people and it usually
ends the same way I, I become very
angry and you know something, well
not always, but I always get taken, I
get sucked in, you know, and I, I was
just immobilized last night I didn’t
accomplish anything and here again
today I, I haven’t accomplished any
thing and I thin it’s a hang-up I have
got with you but I, I don’t think I’m
alone maybe maybe it’s your hang-up
too, I, I really don’t know. But I do
get involved in, with and when some
one tells me I want to help out, and I
want also to give something of myself
like I’m older than you like I would
like to give you some of my own
insights and I, I don’t know if it’s
appropriate what are we talking about
what is it we’re talking about? We’re
just talking about relationships and
they’re different, you’re a man and
I’m a woman and I guess I identified
a bit with your girlfriend because
I ’ve done that with my boyfriend.
(B) Yeah, I don’t like this book, uhm, This means: I could be like the dic
there’s a dictionary that I was think tionary bright, compact and precise,
ing of buying. It’s 75 cents. I might but why should I put out such an
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buy it just for my own use but it’s
very compact and it’s just it’s yellow
and red, you know, it’s very compact
and precise. It’s too bad in a way. I
was, I was thinking of buying it but
you know, I kind of resented having
to pay out money you know.

effort? I don’t know if you’re worth
it. The displacement and identifica
tion with an inanimate object is char
acteristic of Carrie (cf Searles p. 122)
“ . . . it is nonhuman roles which pre
dominate, more than any . . . human
ones in the life of the child who even
tually develops schizophrenia.”

(C ) . . . time when I first moved into
the house, my landlord and land
lady had me down to dinner and I
was using the living language course
which is different and I was using
the words of (Italian) and going along
with it. But that was when I first
moved in. They haven’t invited me
down for dinner for a while so, and I
when I get angry at someone I just
shut their language out the way I
shut them out, you know, and it’s
reflected in the way I shut them out,
you know, and it’s reflected in the
way I’m learning it.
(D) I think I became jealous of the
relationship the landlady has with the
lady on the second floor. They seem
to be really good friends, you know,
and I feel kind of out of it. Some
times I get awfully mad in my room
listening to them talk, you know, and
I was sure she, they were talking about
me one day, that much I know, I can
pick up when I’m being talked about10

Both passages (C) and (D) seemed
out of context to John and he could
not comprehend the vehemence with
which they were spoken. Carrie seems
preoccupied by the question of how
important John is to her. As in the
dictionary segment she seems to be
wondering whether he is worth the
effort. This makes the suspiciousness
of the last two segments understand
able. To quote Searles again (p. 125)
‘‘That the paranoid individual expe
riences the p lo t. . . as centering on
himself is in part a reaction to his
being most deeply threatened lest he
be as insignificant as outside every
one else’s awareness, as he himself,
with his severe repression of his own
dependent feelings, tends to regard
other individuals as being (1977,
pp. 287-288).

[10] T h e Bounds of M eaning.

Carrie’s words seem to mean something quite different from Seeman and
Cole’s translation of them. This, in itself, does not necessarily invalidate
the interpretations, however. It is well-known that the force or meaning of
an utterance may be quite different from the literal meaning of the words
used, but when this occurs, we can point to general discourse practices.
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In contrast, the Freudian theory of communication assumes that virtu
ally anything a patient says is subject to special interpretation and that
this interpretation can be given only by those with specialized training.
These interpretations differ greatly from whatever the ordinary meaning
would be. Moreover, there is no check on what the analyst says the
utterance means. In such a system, yes can mean “no,” good can mean
“bad,” boy can mean “girl,” and “there’s a dictionary I was thinking of
buying. . . ” can mean “I could be like the dictionary.. . . ” Certainly,
what people say is not always what they mean. Certainly, much of what
people say means something quite different from what it literally says.
However, the problem still remains of what constitutes a normal and
usual decoding of someone else’s speech, what constitutes a justifiable
construing and what does not. Examination of discourse under a wide
variety of conditions has provided us with some guidelines for determin
ing what is and what is not a justifiable rendering of another’s meaning.
Before considering these, however, let us look at the properties of nor
mal spoken discourse as this impacts on the question of is and what is not
deviant.
[11] D eviance in Discourse.

Discourse analysis by linguists or philosophers is based upon the
speech of normals. By normal, I mean usual, unremarkable, not apparently
deviant because of drugs, illness, injury, or other incapacitation. Notice
that normal can also refer to the deaf10 or those who stutter or lisp, as
these populations may still both give and get meaning by usual strategies.
The question is, what constitutes normal speech? We have already seen
that laypersons mistake written language as being real language, not
being aware that normal oral language is loaded with hesitations, false
starts, and errors. T he ear somehow smooths these out in ordinary
conversations, so that when written transcripts are produced of actual
speech, the effect on many people is that they think the speech is
abnormally disjointed or defective.
Seeman and Cole overtly claim (p. 288) that they interpret her speech
as they do because she is a schizophrenic. T h eir reasoning seems to be
“Since Carrie is diagnosed as a schizophrenic, her speech is schizophrenic,
and should be interpreted according to special rules of schizophrenic
discourse as explicated by interpreters like Searles. “Such a belief regards
all the speech produced by a diagnosed schizophrenic to be deviant, and,
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therefore, to necessitate interpretation by other than normal means. T he
reason for my assumption that Seeman and Cole would consider any
thing said by a diagnosed schizophrenic to be aberrant, therefore liable
to exceptional interpretation, is that all the samples they present of
Carrie’s speech are quite normal and easily interpreted by normal decoding
strategies. That is, there is no other a priori reason to assume that Carrie
is saying anything more of less or different than what her sentences
would mean if produced by a normal.
Compared to spontaneous speech at, say, an academic seminar, Carrie’s
speech, as reported in Seeman and Cole (1977), is remarkably lucid and
well-formed. “Spontaneous speech in the raw can be very raw indeed”
(Clark and Clark 1977, p. 260). T he more difficult the ideas to encode,
the rawer the speech” the more false starts, filled and unfilled pauses,
erroneous lexical choices, and assorted slips of the tongue. If each
phrase, so far as it goes, is of normal structure, if each slip of the tongue
is explicable in terms of that structure, and all is subordinated to an
inferable topic appropriate to the occasion, then the speech is most likely
normal (Chaika 1974, 1976, 1977; VanDijk, 1977: 121, 134.) Language is so
constructed that encoding of ideas need only be exact enough so that
hearers can infer what is meant. There are many kinds of difficulty
which can lead to raw speech: complex ideas, embarrassing, exciting, or
controversial issues.
For instance, consider this passage from a speaker who is embarrassed
or uneasy speaking to the police
6. P: Do you know the names of any of these boys?
C: Ahh, gee, I hate—I do? One of them, but I don’t like to say
anything, you know. (Sharrock & Turner 1978)
C apparently starts to say that he hates to finger any of the boys. Before
completing the construction, however, speaker breaks off to ask “I do?” as
if he didn’t know any of the offenders. Then, apparently realizing that
the “I hate” implied an admission of knowledge that could not be
counteracted by the innocent sounding “I do?” he answers the policeman’s
question admitting that he does know one of them, finishing with the
statement he started with, that he hates to give evidence.
The pause-laden speech in 7 arises from what appears to be happy
excitement from two males talking about an exciting subject, racing
cars:
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7.
’N challenge Voodoo to a race. I mean the hell with drag strips
you gotta have ten thous’n bucks ready t’spec—hh I wanna build a
street machine . . . It’s a 55 Chevy. It’s bright orange, and it has it
had hhu lemme tell y’about this car. Hh a three twunny seven Vet in
it uhyih an’ if wiz, uh, hh dual quads, hh hadda full roller cam
[pause] four speeds hydrostick.. . . (Jefferson, 1978, p. 237-238)
In 7, an intrusive thought disrupts the speaker’s sentence “ . . . ready
t’spe—hh I wanna build a street machine.” Here the break was right in
the middle of a word. Later, he stops after has, changes its tense to had,
then still doesn’t tell us what it has or had. Instead he starts all over with
“lemme tell y’about this car.” T he if in “ . . . an if wuz uh . . . ” seems to be
a normal slip of the tongue explicable by the phonetic similarity between
it and if.
Raw speech is not hard to find even from brilliant academics who
make their living by talking. In 8, we see a sample of spontaneous speech
about a complex subject (slashes indicate false starts):
8. As far as I know, noone has yet done the/ in a way obvious now
and interesting problem of [pause] doing a/in a sense of structural
frequency study of the alternative [pause] syntactical uh/ in a given
language, say, like English, and how/what their hierarchical [pause]
probability of occurrence structure is. (Reported in Clark 8c Clark
1977, p. 260) (from Maclay 8c Osgood 1959, p. 25)
Twice here the speaker starts to utter a noun phrase and twice changes
his mind after selecting the article, first the and then a.
T he literature on discourse analysis abounds with samples of normal
speech like the three above. Here they are discussed only as a yardstick
by which to measure Carrie’s speech. Unfortunately, Seeman and Cole
did not indicate in their data information about pausing or false starts. If
that information were deleted from the above segments, or, alternatively,
if slashes or [pause] were inserted in Carrie’s speeches, then the similar
ity of her speech to the normal samples would be evident. A closer
examination of where these occur in the normal speech, along with a
more detailed analysis of Carrie’s, might further indicate the essential
normalcy of her discourse.
If we assume11 that Carrie’s speech did contain pauses such as those in
the three samples of normal discourse above, then we see her speech is
quite normal. One reason we might assume this is that the researchers
made no reference to her evincing pressured speech, the term used for
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manic and schizophrenic speech that has no pausing and no false starts,
nor is there evidence of glossomania, which is typically produced with
no pausing before the chained segments. Since pausing and false starts
indicate planning stages in speech, that which does not contain them
appears to be essentially unplanned speech, speech on automatic pilot,
so to speak.
Pausing during encoding of thoughts (i.e., putting them into words)
with or without pause fillers like uhh, hu, mmm, you know, and the like is
normal as is making false starts and slips of the tongue (Fromkin 1973).
Pausing occurs at the beginning of major constituents in sentences (e.g.,
Boomer 1965; Goldman-Eisler 1958; Rochester, Thurston, and Rupp
1977) and represents a planning of what is to come next. It is easy to see
why such pauses might increase as encoding difficulty increases. It is also
easy to see why speakers disrupt their own sentences. They start to say
one thing, preplanning to the end of, say, a clause, then realize that their
wording is not felicitous. Thus they pause, replan, and start over.
Evidence for such planning stages comes from such phenomena as
slips of the tongue. These most often are an anticipation of a word
selected during the planning stage (Lashley 1951) or selection of another
word that belongs in a set with the intended word (Fromkin 1973; Chaika
1977) or a normal intrusion (Dell and Reich 1977) caused by disruption
in the context. Like pausing, slips seem related to planning and increase
with excitement and embarrassment.12
[12] W h a t Does C arrie M ean?

One thing to note in the samples of normal speech above is that each
of the fragments can be restored by English speaking hearers. That is,
based upon what they know about English and the American culture,
hearers can with a good degree of certainty, fill in what has been left out
or correct what has been mis-said. No one needs training in this skill
(Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley 1972). It comes from being a human
being who has learned a language. This is what is meant by normal
decoding strategy. It is the tacit understanding that people can do this
which leads to testing procedures such as the Cloze test which has been
used to analyze schizophrenic speech (e.g., Salzinger, Portnoy, and Feldman
1978) . Being able to decode imperfect speech allows people to under
stand young children, those with foreign accents or speech impediments,
as well as speech produced under noisy conditions. A second thing is
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that all the speech in the above discourses, including errors and false
starts is subordinated to a general topic, an important feature of normal
discourse (VanDijk 1977, p. 122; Chaika 1974, p. 275).
Carrie, in common with many younger speakers today, uses “you
know” as a pause filler. Goldman-Eisler (1961) says that fillers increase
with heightened emotions. We can see why her emotions may be
heightened when we consider her situation. Examining Carrie’s speech
in the light of the well-known fact of the imperfect nature of ordinary
conversation, it does not seem so incoherent. Indeed, applying the twin
tests of reconstructability and subordination of utterance to topic to
Carrie’s speech reveals it to be quite normal. Assuming that it is, it is
possible to come up with an unstrained gloss of what she meant. Carrie
appears excited and embarrassed in (A) above when she says
You know what the experiment is geared to find is how vulnerable, I
guess, and you know, if you get close to this person and how you feel
about it and some pretty basic questions like it may have something to
do with psychiatry, I don’t. I’m beginning to think psychiatry is rather
old-fashioned, you know there are young people on Yonge Street
selling books about, I don’t even how to label them, but there are new
ways for man coping with the environment and the people in i t . . .
H er embarrassment is quite justified since she is telling a medical
student in a psychiatric hospital that she doubts the efficacy of psychiatry.
This constitutes a challenge (Labov and Fanshel 1977, pp. 96-98), which
they define as
. . . a speech act that asserts or implies a state of affairs that, if true,
would weaken a person’s claim to be competent in filling the role
associated with a valued status.
They stress that this does not necessarily mean that the person chal
lenged will suffer an actual loss of status. T he challenge is to the claim
alone.12
To tell people who have authority by virtue of position and education
that they do not know what they are talking about is supremely difficult
for those of lower status, normal or not. It seems to me that the operative
words in Labov and Fanshel’s definition are valued status. By virtue of
such status, one should be immune from criticism from subordinates.
One decides how one fulfills the higher role. That is part of what it
means to have valued status. Parents, for instance, are considered to have
the right to rear their children as they see fit. T he child has no right to
tell the parent how the parent should behave. Only “spoiled brats” do
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that. Often adolescents, as part of their ascent into adulthood, do chal
lenge their parents and other adults in authority. This marks their
imminent entry into adulthood, a valued status.
Labov and Fanshel (1977, pp. 124-125) analyze Rhoda’s challenge to
authority. Like Carrie’s challenge, hers was very indirect, but still heard
as a challenge. As part of her complaint that her mother has stayed too
long at her sister’s home, she says “Look—uh —I mean y’been there long
enough.” Labov and Fanshel interpret the look as a way of calling her
mother’s attention to the fact that Rhoda’s needs aren’t being met. It
seems more overt a challenge to me. Saying “look” warns the other that
one’s patience has worn thin. This always signals a challenge. The
correctness of this interpretation is demonstrated by the especially softened
language following the look. First there is the weakening pause. This is
followed by the hesitation marker uh. T hen comes the softened phrase “I
mean,” and then the rest of the challenge. It is a challenge because a
child ordinarily has no right to tell her mother how long to stay anywhere.
A major goal of Rhoda’s therapy has been to teach her to stand up to her
mother. Even so, she challenges by indirection.
Comparing Rhoda’s challenge with Carrie’s, we see a great deal of
similarity. Rhoda has been taught through therapy to stand up to her
mother. Carrie has not been taught to stand up to her therapist. To the
contrary, she is expected to respect his authority. Not surprisingly, her
challenge to his superior status, shows even more indirection and hedg
ing than Rhoda’s did. There has been a great deal of evidence amassed
which demonstrates that women have more difficulty than men in
criticizing or challenging, especially in male-female situations; therefore,
they hedge their remarks more than men (Lakoff 1975; Eakins and
Eakins 1978, pp. 23-52, 66-72). Considering these factors, we are reason
able in expecting Carrie to have many hesitations, false starts, and filled
or unfilled pauses in the situation eliciting her speech.
Actually, the comparison of her speech with that of normal males above
shows she is no less fluent than they are (as has been already noted).
As with the normal speech presented above, Carrie’s false starts are
readily retrievable. Although she appears to be switching topics constantly,
her adherence to a general topic and the movement within it seem
normal in every instance especially when we add dashes to indicate
probable false starts, and repunctuating to indicate new sentences when
ever they occur, using the usual convention of periods followed by
capitals.
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. . . I’m beginning to think psychiatry is rather old-fashioned.
You know, there are new —there are young people on Yonge St.
selling books about—I don’t even know how to label them, but there
are new ways for man coping with the environment and the people
in it. And I haven’t go into that but —I don’t know —I- I just like, you
have your set ways of doing things and you’re in control.
As she starts to explain why psychiatry is old-fashioned, Carrie stops
after new. Apparently, a word like ideas was intended, or, as appears later,
ways. T h e reason for the hesitation seems straightforward enough. She is
not sure of the label, and, when she does get the notion coded, it is with a
whole sentence, “there are new ways for man coping with the environ
ment and the people in it.” However, she cannot get all this out until she
has invested these ways with the authority of other people, young people
and books. In a society which values both youth and newness, to claim
that youths have new ways, and in a society which values the printed
word over the spoken, to note that youths and books are promulgating
new ways, gives the new ways more sanction than if they were something
that Carrie, a woman and a mental patient, dreamed up. To have just
continued talking about the new ideas or ways would have placed too
much of the blame on Carrie herself. Besides, the appeal to authority is
always more convincing. Just look at th e references in scholarly articles
even for quite mundane and self-evident notions. If someone else said it
or wrote it, it makes it better than if we have stated it all by ourselves.
Carrie herself explains why she stopped after about. She doesn’t have a
ready label for the concepts which in her opinion are rendering psychia
try old-fashioned. What is important is that the discourse strategy she
employs, a false start, followed by “I don’t even know how to label them ,”
is entirely usual, one we have all probably used at one time or another.
Common paraphrases are “I forget it/his/her/ name.” “I don’t know the
word for it,” “you know what I m ean,” or even “whatchamacallit.”
T h e next set of false starts is especially interesting.
And I haven’t got into that b u t , - I don’t know I , - I ju s t,- lik e ,
—you have your set ways of doing things and you’re in control. You
know—and you’re talking about yourself personally yesterday, —you
know, —and I walked out of here yesterday and I didn’t really have
any feeling at all. It was kind of like a release. I like people to
confide in me, —but, —like,—where is it going?
These, as a set, imply that she disagrees with the student and the
psychiatrists that he is representing. Again, this is a normal strategy, a
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way of letting the other person know that you disagree without your
actually doing so in overt words. The passage may look disjointed,
appearing as it does in an orthography which normally admits of no
false starting, but when read aloud, it does not sound particularly
disjointed.
It is significant that the hesitations and false starts cluster at the point
at which one would expect Carrie to be stating that she is disillusioned
with psychiatry. “I haven’t got into that b u t . . . ” seems like a normal
entry into “the new approaches that might be better than psychiatry,” or
some such paraphrase thereof. Instead, Carrie stops after the but, the
word which leads one to expect a disclaimer. Then she demurs with the
feminine “I don’t know” (Lakoff 1975, pp. 15-17) which has the effect of
softening any assertion. She starts giving her opinion again, saying “I,”
then starting all over again with “I just.” This just is similar in force to
the preceding but which initiated this string of false starts. It announces
that she holds an opinion different from the establishment’s as if she
were trying to say “I just don’t believe in you anymore.” This is not to say
that those were necessarily the next words she intended, but that the just
in the given context does have the force of a disclaimer, and she has
previously voiced doubt about the efficacy of psychiatry. She stops short
of having to put herself overtly on the line, although she has signaled
enough for us to infer what she is getting at.
T he like following the false start “I just” is often used in precisely the
way Carrie uses it to mean “what follows is not a direct expression of
what I mean, but I ’m finding it difficult to say exactly what I mean.” In
one afternoon’s office hours, I collected these samples, all from female
students, all in far less socially precarious positions than Carrie.
9. I don’t know, but—like, I can’t get my act together ever since I got
back from Spain.
10. Yeah, like —like —it’s interesting, y’know
11. . . . -like,—now I got rid of him, like—I dunno I just feel —I
found myself.
What Carrie does is most interesting, and most skillful. She has set her
hearer up for criticism of psychiatry; then, without really giving that
criticism, she tells John, “You have your set ways of doing things.” That
is, even if other things are better, you’d not be likely to change your
mind. “And you’re in control” seems to mean just that. He is in control of
the situation and himself. Interestingly, the authors themselves stress the

294

Understanding Psychotic Speech

businesslike air of the student (p. 284) confirming Carrie’s perceptions.
T he thesis of the Seeman and Cole paper is to show how Carrie’s
speech becomes more disorganized as she feels the “intimacy of the daily
meetings” (p. 289). In a large sense, this is undoubtedly true. Intimacy
makes Carrie dare to question her therapists, but the daring does not
extend to her speaking her mind openly. Surely, there is veiled meaning
in her words, but the kinds of veiled meaning and the ways she expresses
it seem wholly usual and normal, conforming to regular discourse
strategies. She is cognizant of social situation, and, contrary to expecta
tion (Rochester and Martin 1977; Rochester, Martin, and Thurston 1977)
gives the listener ample information to know what she is referring to.
Unlike the passages just discussed, the rest of Carrie’s speech is straight
forward if one decodes it as one would normal speech. H er topic at the
outset of (A) is the experiment in which she is a participant. She is
correct that this experiment is to see if her speech becomes disorganized
as the topic become more personal. Seeman and Cole (p. 284) had told
her this. In other words, as Carrie says, the experiment is to see how
vulnerable she is. She is also correct in assuming the experiment has
something to do with psychiatry. This is the lead-in to the indirect, but
recoverable critique of psychiatry that we just saw. As part of this critique,
she complains that the previous day’s session left her devoid of feeling,
like a release of tension, a common enough aftermath of a talk session,
but she still doesn’t see the purpose of the sessions.
She continues the monologue with the unfortunately common human
plaint that she is always the loser in human relations. This does not seem
to be an inappropriate switch as she is talking about the relations with
John. T he previous night after the, to her, pointless gab fest, she could
not get anything done, nor does she feel that her talking that day has any
purpose. She wants to help the experimenters out by participating. Also,
being older than John, she feels that she should be giving him insights,
but does not know if that would be appropriate, nor, actually, what she
and John are talking about. Here I must point out that Carrie is not
being particularly obtuse. Nowhere in the transcription is there any
indication that John has responded to anything she has said. Apparently,
he just lets her rattle on. This constitutes a highly abnormal situation.
Normal conversation consists of turn taking (Sacks 1967-71; Jefferson
1978). Even very normal confident people find it upsetting to be in a
situation where they are supposed to be carrying on a conversation and
the other person doesn’t carry the ball. If one adds to this normal
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discomfort, the social convention that it is up to the female to draw the
male out and to keep the ball rolling in social situations, especially in
one-on-one occasions like dates, Carries’ speech is all the more normal.
T he situation she finds herself in with John is the same as if she were his
girlfriend. In short, John’s failure to take his rightful turns in the conver
sation such as answering Carrie’s questions forces her to fill up the
silence with a monologue. She is obeying normal everyday conventions
of our society13 when she does so.
Carrie’s comments about the dictionary are also amenable to quite
ordinary meaning rather ordinarily phrased. These occur in the context
of her attempts to teach John a foreign language (Seeman and Cole 1977,
p. 287) Many people have ambivalent feelings about buying books and
her wording about this ambivalence seems unremarkable.
Carrie’s feeling that the landlady and the other tenant are talking
about her (passages C and D) may be paranoid, but the structure of the
language she uses to express that feeling is perfectly normal. It is
puzzling, however, that John could not comprehend the vehemence with
which Carrie’s complaint was spoken (p. 287). Even normal people get
angry if they feel that they are being snubbed for no good reason, and
even normals are jealous of friendships between people who exclude
them.
Many might object that as a schizophrenic, Carrie’s speech must be
interpreted differently from that of normals. In other words, the diagnosis
determines the meaning. If she had not been diagnosed as schizophrenic,
then her words could be taken to mean something entirely different from
what they mean in light of a diagnosis. In essence, those who feel that the
prior diagnosis determines the mode of interpretation claim that they
are among those with a key to it, a key supplied by Freud, Sullivan,
Searles, or another analyst.
In contrast, my interpretations of Carrie’s speech depend on the assump
tion that anyone using English is using it in the same way as normals do
provided it has normal structure. There may be deviant schizophrenic
speech just as there is deviant aphasic speech or heavily accented speech
or imperfect toddler speech. However, all such speech, if interpretable at
all, is interpretable only if the hearer can match the deviation with the
nearest possible rules which produces an utterance appropriate to the
given context (Clark and Clark 1977, pp. 211-215).
John Searle (1975, p. 63, 73) says that one assumes that someone
speaking to us is cooperating in the conversation so that his/her remarks
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are intended to be relevant. T h is does not mean that speakers don’t
lie, do not use language metaphorically, or do not use one utterance
to im ply som ething different from, what is said. Speakers do all of
these things but lying, metaphor, and implicature are all rooted in
normal uses of language and the shared conventions of speakers of a
particular language. For instance, when someone lies, he or she depends
on the hearer’s understanding of the lie to mean what it norm ally does.
T hat is, the lie does not consist of unusual uses of the words in the
utterance. To the contrary, it depends upon a normal reading of the
words. If Max says, “I didn’t cut the meat with a cleaver” when in
fact he did, the lie is not in the negative -n’t. T h e lie works only if
the hearer interprets -n’t as usual, as a denial.
To assume that some conversations must be interpreted by extraordi
nary means is to assume that the incredibly com plex sets of rules which
enable us to handle human language, both as a system in itself and as a
social system, can be wholly altered by one class of persons, the mentally
ill. As John Searle (1975, p. 67) said in a somewhat different content,
“ . . . an ordinary application of Occam’s razor places the onus of proof
on those who wish to claim these sentences are ambiguous. One does not
m ultiply meanings beyond necessity.” Nor, I hasten to add, does one
claim idiosyncratic meaning when conventional meaning is retrievable
by conventional means and fits the social context.
T h en , too, to assume that schizophrenics abandon the usual meanings
of words without clear evidence such as semantic anomaly raises some
very sticky questions. If the schizophrenic’s m eaning can be so very
far removed from normals, how does anyone know what the schizo
phrenic means? At what point in a patient’s illness does one suspend
the normal rules of decoding and substitute the schizophrenic ones? At
what point in remission does one abandon the schizophrenic interpreta
tions and go back to the ones shared by other speakers? O r is the schizo
phrenic’s speech always governed by the rules of schizophrenia? If
so, should these rules be applied retroactively, say, perhaps, to five
years before the visible onset of illness? O r does one start interpret
ing differently at the precise moment when schizophrenic illness is
diagnosed?
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Notes
1Jones also had a great impact on literary criticism by psychoanalysis of such
figures as Hamlet, claiming, for instance, that Hamlet was suffering from a severe
Oedipus complex.
2A major problem with this view of language is that it seems improbable that
language could have evolved as a means of an intensely personal system of communi
cation to be utilized to express cryptically one’s unconscious thoughts. Language
had to have been developed as communication in social relations, and there is no
actual evidence that it has evolved further to act as Freud and his followers assert.
3A major problem with this view of language is that it seems improbable that
language could have evolved as a means of an intensely personal system of communi
cation to be utilized to express cryptically one’s unconscious thoughts. Language
had to have been developed as communication in social relations, and there is no
actual evidence that it has evolved further to act as Freud and his followers assert.
4The literature on aphasias and normal speech errors report errors made because
of intrusions of related words. In normals, however, these never take the form of
chaining of related words, and in aphasia, if chaining does happen, it is rare. It is
not a usual occurrence as it is in speech disordered schizophrenics.
5I am aware of studies by Singer and Wynne and others that tendencies towards
glossomania can be found in close relatives of schizophrenics and in those at risk for
the disease, but this means that whatever causes schizophrenia causes the glossomania.
Not all schizophrenics can be shown to come from such families, however, nor has it
been shown that all members of schizogenic families create associational chains. The
enormous literature on language acquisition does not offer any parallels to children
learning to speak in such a deviant fashion. Rather, it has been shown that they
speak like their peers. Children from families of foreign speakers do not themselves
speak with a foreign accent.
6They actually couch these as “X’s obligations. . . ” and use the masculine pro
noun as in “his capacities.” It is very obvious that they are speaking of Rhoda. In
general, however, Labov almost always uses the masculine pronoun as generic to
include a female even when he is speaking of a female.
7Such mitigators seem to be used more by women than by men, although men in
the weaker position in an interaction may use them as much as women (O’Barr 1982;
Lakoff 1972, 1975).
8Actually, their investigation and subsequent articles about it must have taken
place well before the publication date.
10The manual languages of the deaf have been shown to be structured remarkably
like oral languages and they make slips-of-the-hand in a manner parallel to slips-ofthe-tongue. Likewise, the deaf may suffer from aphasia in which case they make
analogous errors to the speech errors of hearing aphasics. I know of one bit of
anecdotal evidence that schizophrenic deaf patients may produce the counterpart to
oral gibberish in their sign language.
11Perhaps it should be noted that I have had personal correspondence with Dr.
Seeman about her studies of Carrie and she did not contradict my assumption that
Carrie’s speech had pausing and false starts.
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12The reader should be aware that Labov and Fanshel provide a detailed and
precise anatomy of what constitutes a challenge and why, along with precise mathe
matically precise rules to characterize challenges and the other speech events that
they explain. It must be remembered that their book is not so broad in its presenta
tion as this one is, but their work makes up for breadth in depth. In this work, space
does not permit a full a rendering of their rules. Nor would a nonlinguist necessar
ily find these of practical help. However, and this cannot be stressed enough, their
careful attention to proving what something can reasonably be assumed to mean is
invaluable, and this can be understood without re-creation of their meticulous set of
rules. In this book, I present their methods and conclusions only, but I urge the
reader to dip into their work.
13Societies vary greatly in this matter. Americans and Canadians typically feel
that one must “keep the ball rolling” with chitchat, but in other societies, such as
many Native American ones and the working-class Irish in Belfast, long silences are
perfectly companionable (Chaika 1989, p. 107).
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Y o r k : C a m b r id g e U n iv e r s ity P re ss .
W e rn e r, O ., G . L e w is - M a tic h e k , M . E v a n s , a n d B . L ito w itz . 1 9 7 5 . A n e t h n o s c ie n c e
v iew o f s c h iz o p h r e n ic s p e e c h . I n M . S a n c h e s a n d B . B lo u n t , e d s. Sociocultural

Dimensions o f Language Use. N ew Y o r k : A c a d e m ic P re s s .
W illia m s , J . M . 1 9 8 1 . Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. O a k la n d , N .J .: S c o tt.
F o resm an .
Z im m e r m a n , D .H . a n d C . W est. 1 9 7 5 . S e x r o le s , in t e r r u p t io n s , a n d s ile n c e s in
c o n v e r s a t io n . I n B . T h o r n e a n d N . H e n le y , e d s . Language and S ex: Difference and

Dominance. R o w le y , M a s s .: N e w b u ry H o u s e P u b l i s h e r s . p p . 1 0 5 - 1 2 9 .

NAME INDEX

A lexa n d er 89

Chafe 86, 102, 134, 185, 190, 192, 261

A lexander, VanKam mer, and B u nn ey 138, 186
A llen 52, 183

C haika 5, 6, 8, 11, 20, 50, 126, 133, 141, 150,
151, 153, 159, 170, 176, 180, 185, 187, 190,
224, 246, 247, 254, 262, 270, 290
C haika and A lexan d er 6, 126, 133, 224
Chaika and Lam be 18, 50, 137, 255, 258
Chapm an 7, 30, 63, 133, 142

A llen and A lle n 46
A ndreasen 7, 10, 33, 50, 249, 251, 252, 253, 283
A ndreasen and G rove 54
A rieti 267, 273
A ustin 153, 155, 269, 270

Chapm an, C hapm an, and D aut 32, 96
C hapm an, C hapm an, and M ille r 32
Chom sky 63, 80, 81, 84, 99, 104, 107, 175
C lark
37, 69

B ach and H a rn ish 153, 157
B a n n iste r 96

C lark and C lark 20, 34, 137, 270, 287, 288, 295
C lark and Lucy 113, 114
C ohen 5, 14, 41, 172, 274

Bateson 4, 267
B e n d ix 21
B en so n 7

C o le 294

B eren b au m , O ltm an ns and G ottesm an 65
B e rn ste in 124, 140, 186, 187

C ook-G um perz and G reen 70

B erw ick and W einberg 84
B ick erto n, 57

Cozzolino 46, 51
C u m m ins 57
C urtiss 56

B ick h a rd 54
B le u le r 50, 96, 266
B lo o m 69
B o lin g e r 84

Davis 47
de Saussure 62, 263, 267
D eB eau g ran d e and D ressier 158
D eese 37

B o o m er 290
B ra d ley 40
B resn an 102

D ell and R eich 291

Brow n 45
Brow n 70

D onald son and W ales 69
Dowty 102

Brow n and Y ule 247, 249, 251, 258
Brow n, 57
Brow n, Ja so n 7, 31
B u ckingh am 7
B u ckingh am and Kertesz 270

Eakins 293
Edelson 98, 99
E h lich 124
E nkvist 130, 131
E rtesch ek-Schir 243, 244, 245

C aplan 3

E rv in -T rip p 270

C arlson 85, 101, 164, 167, 177, 178, 179, 249,
256
311
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Fahn estock 130, 141

H e rb e r t and W alten sp erg er 5, 9

F anshel 277, 280

H ick m a n 66

F a u co n n ie r 84, 120, 131, 150, 151, 221, 226

H o ffm an and S led g e 11

F e rra ra 85

H o llo w ay 267

F illm o re 85, 101, 102, 104, 105, 150, 161, 162,

H o lzm an 55, 190, 191, 212

269

H o lzm an and N ew m an 66

F o d o r and B e v e r 76

H o lzm an , Levy and P ro cto r 43, 190

F orrest 4, 7, 8, 10, 33, 107, 110, 111, 142, 159,

H o lzm an , S h e n to n , and So lov ay 51, 89, 255

210, 273
F o rster 37
Foss and H akes 37

Ja r r e tt 86, 233

Fow ler 171

Je ffe rso n 288, 294

F raser 114

J e n g 255

Fraser, K in g , T h o m a s and K en d ell 53

Jo h n sto n 155

F reu d 33

Jo n e s 267

From kin 5, 10, 12, 33, 58, 79, 150, 183, 199, 224,
270, 289

Jo y c e , Ja m e s 10, 33
J u lia 99

G azd ar 167

K ay and K em p to n 54

G le itm a n 57

K ean 31, 150, 151, 153, 172

G le itm a n and G le itm a n 179

K ertesz 52

G le itm a n , G le itm a n , and S h ip ley 52, 269, 289

K ozu lin 66, 267, 268

G o ffm a n 86, 170

K reck el 55, 82, 85, 125, 126, 215, 220, 275

G o ld m a n -E is le r 289, 290

Kuczaj 56, 270

G o o d y 187, 270

K u n o 240, 241, 242, 245, 256, 264, 265

G o rd o n and L ako ff 150, 153, 164, 176

K u rt G o ld stein 68

G re e n 45
G ric e 39, 114, 163, 168, 169, 173, 174, 175, 219,
220, 233
G ro v e and A n d reasen 52

L abov 86, 140
Labov and Fanshel 160, 270, 272, 275, 276, 277,

G ru m e t 67

278, 280, 281, 283, 291
L acan 267
L a F e r rie re 10, 39, 142

H a llid a y 85, 102, 121, 122, 124, 1 2 5 , 129, 255,
258, 269
H a llid a y and H a sa n 121, 122, 123, 124, 125,
130, 131, 132
H a llo w e ll and Sm ith 110, 212, 253, 268, 272,
273, 274
H arrow 64

L affal 4, 19, 56, 89, 168, 254
Lakoff 109, 291, 293
L ako ff an d Jo h n s o n 111, 113
Lakoff, G . 111, 112
Lakoff, R . 170, 171, 228
L am b e 60, 61, 137, 262
L a n in -K e tte rin g and H arrow 48, 50, 255, 260,

H arrow , L a n in -K etterin g , P rosen . and M ille r
18
H a r t and Payne 93

262, 265
L ash ley 79, 291
L eco u rs and V a n ie r-C le m e n t 5, 13, 130, 141,

H a rv e y and N ea le 50, 254
H arv ey , B oyer, and W ielgu s 53

185, 210, 211
L ee 59

H arv ey , E a rle -B o y e r, and W ielgu s 53

L ee, B . 66

H asan 124, 133

L e h r e r 110

H a sk ell 267

L ev in 109, 111

Name Index
L evinson 125, 141, 150, 164
L ieb erm a n 37, 96, 156
Lorenz 24, 168
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R adford 100
R agin and O ltm an ns 130
Reilly, Harrow, Tucker, Quinlan, and Siegel 40

Lucy and W ertsch 66, 268

R obertson and Sham sie 9, 89, 254

Lyons 85, 101, 102, 159, 255, 256, 258, 269, 270

R och ester and M artin 5, 31, 53, 121, 124, 127,
132, 133, 135, 137, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145,
146, 187, 254, 294

M acC orm ac 109
M aclay and Osgood 290
M acnam ara 54
M a h er 5, 16, 30, 75, 76, 78, 107, 110, 130, 132,
141, 145, 146, 185, 229, 273
M aher, M cK eon and M cL au g h lin 41, 52, 185,
283
M anschrek, M aher, H oover, and A m es 6
M artin 82, 131, 133
M atthysse 47
M cCaw ley 105

Rochester, M artin and T h u rsto n 38, 52, 133,
294
Rochester, T h u rsto n , and R u p p 289
R osch 54, 109
R u m elh art 113
R u tter 26, 66, 155

Sachar, G ru en , A ltm an, Langer, and H alp ern
47
Sacks 151, 294

M cN eill 54

Salzinger, Portnoy, and F eld er 39

M cN eill and Levy 102
M enyuk 57, 270
M ille r 37, 107, 112

Salzinger, Portnoy, and Feldm an 80, 289

M ontague 100, 102
M orton 37
M ow rer 80, 171

Sanders 83, 84, 85, 120, 125, 156, 158, 159, 170,
175, 176, 1 7 7 , 178, 220, 221, 223, 225, 226,
227, 231, 232, 275
Sanders and W irth 85
Schatzm an and Strauss 124, 140
Scollon and Scollon 71, 86
S crib n er 54, 267

N eale, O ltm an ns, and H arvey 50
N eisser 60

Searle 153, 155, 156, 157, 164, 187, 188, 267,
269, 270, 296, 297

N ida 48
N u nberg 159, 174, 175

Searles 159, 283, 284, 297

O ’B a rr 171

Sh arrock and T u rn e r 288
Shim ku nas 42, 146
Silverm an 38

Seem an and C ole 269, 283, 284, 285, 288, 290,
295, 297
Seuren 85, 101, 102, 216

O chs 71
O rton y 109

Silverstein 154, 155, 157
Paprotte and Sin h a 66
P iaget 71
Polanyi 85
P rin ce 261, 262, 264
P rin ce , G erald 85
P u llu m 100

Q u in lan 66, 267
Q u irk and Svartvik 8, 179, 243

Sim pson and Davis 53, 254
Slo bin 69
Sn y d er 47
S p rin g 26
Sternberg, T oran g eau , and N igro 112
S tillin g , Feinstein, G a rfield , R issland ,
R osenbau m , W eisler, and Baker-W ard 43
Stubbs 223
Su llivan 7, 267, 296
Svartvik 241
Sweetser 176
Szasz 115
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T a n n e n 86, 140, 234

W anner 57

V achek 83

W einberg 100
W einreich 106
W erner, Lew is-M atichek, Evans and Litowitz

V an D ijk 39, 119, 157, 223, 225, 239, 246, 247,
248, 258, 290
V etter 9
V o n n e g u t 15
Vygotsky 66, 67, 69, 267, 268, 270,

13, 36, 130, 141
W illiam s 259
W ittgenstein 177
W ooton 281

271
Yule 125

SUBJECT INDEX
aboutness 249

B ackgrou nd 188

abstract speech
no rm al vs. schizophrenic 6

beat 74
behaviorism 65, 74, 80, 104, 117, 266
and ch ain in g 274

acad em ic train in g , effect on analysis 48
a d h o c exp lan atio n s 61
ad verbials 87, 217, 255
A -events 280

and p ercep tio n in language 91
bores 2 36-237
brain 74

agent 103, 104, 172

brand new in form ation 26 2 -2 6 4

agram m atism 5, 24, 54, 185, 211, 140, 204
allitera tio n 15, 16, 24, 40, 74, 136
a llo p h on es 116

C a rrie 2 8 3 -2 8 5 , 2 9 0 -2 9 1 , 2 9 2 -2 9 5

am biguity 84, 117, 1 5 9 , 167, 178, 229, 257
analysis (psycho-) (see psychoanalysis)

case gram m ar 101, 103
and analysis o f SD data 104
castration fears 267

anaphora 123, 124, 128, 132, 144, 145, 255, 257,
261

cataphora 123

schizoph ren ic use o f 144
and, tem poral and ad ditive 141

cause and effect 210
om ission of 172
ch ain in g

ang er 85
an ticip atory slip 12

ph on etics 13, 24, 32, 36, 79, 136, 140
associational 274

antonym s 1 5 , 19, 20, 22, 23, 269
and glossom ania 23

sem antico-syn tactic 37
synonym ic sets 24

aphasia and schizophrenia 7, 52
aph orism 79
apology 154

also see glossom ania
ch allen g e by p atien t 29 1 -2 9 2

appeal to au th ority 294

ch ild , as active investigator 70
ch oices, effects on language 41

a rticles, d e fin ite vs in d efin ite 121, 250
articu latio n 88

Chom skyan paradigm 9 9 -1 0 0

assertion, soften in g 295

circu la r reason in g 55, 62

associational ch a in in g 13, 32, 64, 66 (also see

circu m lo cu tio n 21
clan g response 17

glossom ania o r ch ain in g )
associative networks

cleftin g 245, 250
cliches 40

and eye pu rsu it m ovem ent 44
assonance 74

Cloze pro ced u re 39, 291

assum ed fam iliarity 262

codes, restricted vs elaborated 186-187

a tten tio n al d eficits 16, 45, 147, 185, 212
autism 155

co gn ition and speech 5 5 -5 7 , 59, 69,
260

autom atic processes 14

co gn itiv e load 232

in terferen ce from 43
avoidance 267 (also see therapeutic situation)

co gn itive skills, testing for 67
co gn itiv e tasks, language-less 59
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co h eren ce 120, 125, 131, 139, 147, 173, 214,
223, 247
cre atin g 235
vs cohesion 119
and in co h eren ce of lexical ties 129, 141
cohesion 94, 119-125, 130-132, 135, 141,
144-145, 147, 164, 220, 223, 273

co u n tin g cohesive ties, dangers o f 127
creativity 10, 133-134, 139
and re-em p loy m en t 33
and ru les 87
criticism and social status 290
cu ltu ral o rig in s o f learn in g 71

lexical 16, 123
refrain s 36
co llocation s 13
com m on ground 2 1 5 -2 1 9
com m on know ledge 120, 123, 126, 220
com m u n ication failu re 120
com m un icative ability 283

data, accou n tin g for 65, 98 (also see
psychoanalysis, v erfiabilitv o f ans
exp lan atio n )
dative 103

com paratives 121

d ecision -th eo retic m od el 225
d eclaratives as question s 152
d ecod in g strategies 1 1-12, 32, 87, 270

com peten ce vs perform an ce 63, 81, 26 2 -2 6 4
co m p o n en tial analysis and E nglish verbs 21
com p rehen sion 83, 284

d eep stru cture 9 9 -1 0 1 , 269
deficits, co gn itiv e 131, 186
d efin ite on e 250

conclusions 224
concrete language and m etaph or 115
co ncrete th in k in g 67

d eix is 112, 121, 124, 255
d elu sion s 51, 164

co n ju n ctio n s 121, 122
conn otation 115, 171
constitu ents o f a sentence 77

d enials 223
d erailm en t 147, 185, 266
d erivatio n o f m eaning , validity o f 175

constraints, low ering of 211

d etails, cru cial 197

constru cts 65, 96 (also see words)
context 9 -1 1 , 13, 22, 8 4 -8 5 , 100, 107, 132, 139,

deviance, ju d g m en ts o f 86
and speech dysfunction 56, 116 (also see SD

151-152, 159, 161-162, 174, 176, 178, 191,
216, 226, 247, 281, 293

d em onstratives 121

productions)
d iagnosis 7, 52, 53, 135, 254

and intend ed m eaning 96
in v en tin g for sentences 101, 167

d ialect differences in d iscou rse ru les 85

m atch ing utterance to 96, 101, 164, 270
co n text-free gram m ars 84, 85, 161
contrastive situation 106

d ialog ical en tailm en t 178
d ialog u e 179, 273
and the O th e r 267

co n trol o f lin g u istic processes 29, 130, 212
conversation 247, 271, 279, 295
co gn itive load 232

T D vs N T D 53, 254

co op eratin g in 297

d iction aries, u n reliab ility of 93
digression 49, 145, 237
d irect statem ents 161
d isclaim er 295

gam e-theo retic m odel 179
goal-directed 179

d iscourse 25, 83, 8 5 -8 6 , 88, 100, 110, 119-120,
125, 151, 221, 227, 223-224, 246, 250, 257,

in therapy 279
m any topics in 249
new en tries in 2 2 5 -2 2 8
co nversatio nal m axim s 163
co -o ccu rren ce restriction s 13

265, 281
ad vancing goal in 227
analysis o f 243
circu la r m ovem ent 231

co op eration 127, 138-139, 188, 190
coop erative p rin cip le 163

as cry p tic 269
and d ecision -th eo retic m od el 177, 227
d evian ce in 8 5 -8 6 , 88, 138, 159, 224, 231,

cospeakers 83, 179, 226

246, 2 56-257, 259, 261, 286, 289

co u n terexam p le 99, 100

elicitin g 121, 132
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Subject Index
d isco u rse (c o n tin u e d )
flow o f 259, 261
g a m e -th e o re tic m od el o f 177

false starts 200, 210, 287, 288, 291. 292.
293
fantasy 164

g en res 86

faulty p ig e o n h o lin g 212

g oal ch a n g in g 227

fe licity c o n d itio n s 159

g ra m m a r ru le s 265

filte rin g d efect 185, 212

m e a n in g 247, 269, 286

first lan g u ag e acq u isitio n 57

n o rm a l e r r o r in 289

fix ed n ess in lan g u age, lack o f 65 (also see
w ords)

p sy ch o tic 101
sen ten ces in , o ld to new in fo rm a tio n in

fram es 101, 1 0 3 -1 0 4 , 246

259

fram e sem an tics (see case g ram m ar)

se q u e n tia l m o d el o f 2 2 5 -2 2 8
d isco u rse strateg y 292
d isgu st 85

F reu d ian th eo ry 2 6 7 -2 6 8 , 286, 295
fu n ctio n w ords 95
fuzzy b o rd ers 88, 94, 108, 150

d iso rd e re d co n v ersa tio n 231
d iso rd e re d sp e ech (see sp eech d iso rd e r)
d isru p tio n s, sch iz o p h ren ic 127

g ib b e rish 5, 8 - 1 2 , 8 7 -8 9 , 91, 116, 133, 135,
1 4 0 ,1 8 5 ,2 0 0 -2 0 1 ,2 0 6 -2 0 7 ,2 5 4 ,2 6 4 ,1 4 0 ,

d istracted 214
d o u b le b in d th e o ry 4, 267
d ysflu e n cie s (IC S ) 140

259
re-em p lo y m en t o f 6
c o n fo rm in g to p h o n o tactics 43
g iven in fo rm a tio n 250, 258

ego 268
eg o b o u n d a rie s, d efectiv e 268
e g o ce n tric sp e ech 67
cu ltu ra l v a ria tio n in 71

e rro n e o u s sig n a llin g o f 264
g lob al stru ctu res (see m acro stru ctu res)
g lo sso lalia 59
g lo sso m a n ia 1 3 -1 4 , 1 6 -1 7 , 125, 127, 130, 132,
134-136, 141, 148, 2 2 2-225, 233, 261, 266,

e llip s is 122, 126, 127, 257

289

sch iz o p h re n ic 127
em p ath y, how show n 2 4 1 -2 4 3 , 256
in IC S 257
e n co d in g d ifficu ltie s, n o rm a l 65

and le x ica l co h esio n as in co h e re n ce 129,
141
as u n co n tro lle d p rocess 43

e n co d in g th o u g h ts, p re v erb al stage 71

F o rrest’s view o f 273

e n d o p h o ra 123

p u n n in g in 32

e n ta ilm e n t 172

rela tio n to m en tal le x ico n 108

error, n o rm a l and sch izo p h ren ic 58, 83, 164,
183, 210, 2 1 8 -2 1 9 , 270
and c o m p re h e n sib ility 219 (also see slips
o f th e ton gu e)
eu p h e m ism 278
e x c ite m e n t and stress, effect o f 42
exeg esis 281

from sch iz o p h ren ic co n d itio n 275
g ram m ars 85, 100, 102
and e n ta ilm e n t 1 7 2 -1 7 3
as au to m atic process 125 (also see
d iscou rse)
g ra m m a tica lity 127
ju d g m e n ts o f 84, 103

e x o p h o ra 123, 1 2 4 , 132, 133, 1 4 4-146, 187, 263
e x p a n sio n , p rin cip le d 277
e x p e rie n c e and m e a n in g 151

h a llu c in a tio n s 46, 251, 259

e x p la n a tio n , v alid 28, 41, 46, 65

h e d g in g and h e sita tio n 2 9 1 -2 9 3

and im p u tin g o f m otiv e 41

h o m o sex u al p an ic 267

e x te rn a l sp e ech , ch ild re n ’s 67

h y p er-to p ic 264

ey e p u rsu it m ovem en ts 4 4 -4 5 , 1 9 0 -1 9 1 (see
sacades)

h y p o n y m 201, 209
h y p o th eticals 226
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Ice C ream Sto ries (IC S ) 6, 17, 131. 134,
1 4 5 -1 4 6 , 1 8 3 -1 8 5 , 197, 234
in te rra te r re lia b ility 137
and p a tie n t se le ctio n 135
id 268

and m u tu al h isto ry 277
p rag m a tic and tru th -co n d itio n a l 161
and p re co n d itio n s 277
ru les for 269
on u n testable, u n o b serv ab le th e o ry 180

idea (see th o u g h t)
id io le ct 269
illo cu tio n 1 5 3 -1 5 4 , 1 5 7 -1 58
and SD sch iz o p h ren ic sp eech 155
relev an t know led ge 159
im ag ery 74, 131

p sy ch o an aly tic 269
in te rra te r r e lia b ility o f SD sp eech 52, 84,
283
in tim acy , effect o f 283, 294
in tru sio n s 1 6 -1 7 , 185, 21 2 , 138
in tu itio n and lan g u ag e 3, 175, 242

im a g in a ry w orlds 217

in v itatio n , force o f 154

im p lica tio n 101, 103, 151, 161, 1 6 6-167,

in v o lu n tary atten tio n 44
IP A 9

1 7 3 -1 7 8 , 220, 270, 290, 296
by ov erstatin g 151

iro n y 108

and p erceiv ed topic 248

iso m o rp h ism 87, 88

request for a p p roval 277
in co h eren ce 41, 66, 131, 214, 219, 23 1 -2 3 2 (also
see C o h e re n ce , L e x ica l ties)
in d ire ctio n 291

ju d g m e n t o f d ev ia n ce 183, 270

in d ire ct requests
and social ru le s 151

k in esics 279

p ro cessin g tim e 113

know led ge, m u tu al (see co m m on know led ge)

in fe re n ce 164, 224, 278
vs ob serv atio n 62
in fo rm a tio n
taken as g iven 219
o ld and new 247
in h ib ito ry d ysfu n ction 4 1 -4 2 , 45

langu age
au to m atio n o f 156
co m p eten ce in 80
co m p lex ity o f 41

in n e r co n flicts, assu m p tio n s o f 48

co n te x t-d e p e n d e n ce o f 51, 84

in n e r sp eech 66, 267, 269

d ifferen ces in p h o n e tic system s 87, 89

in su lt 154

and lack o f iso m o rp h ism 33, 7 3 -7 4

in te llig e n t a ctiv ity 8 3 -8 4

o b je ctiv e study o f 184

in ten d ed word (see in ten t)

o ra lity o f 74, 75

in ten sio n 243

p ro cessin g 52

in te n t(io n ) 1 0 -1 1 , 139, 1 5 6-159, 179, 232, 243,
269, 278

vs sp eech 51, 252

so cial ch a ra cte r o f 155

a scrib in g to speaker 268

lan g u ag e a cq u isitio n 4, 69

c h a lle n g in g o f 157

lan g u age and th o u g h t (see sp eech , syn tax,

and ly in g 164, 297
and m e a n in g 156, 159, 187

and th o u g h t)
lan g u age ch an g e 4, 264

in te rm in g lin g o f ideas 48, 147

langu age data (see d ata, a cco u n tin g for)

in te rn a l d ia lo g u es 66, 267

lan g u age and in te rn a l netw orks 221

in te rn a l stim u li, p sy ch otic resp on se to 46,

lan g u ag e h iera rch y (see su b o rd in a tin g
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in te rp re ta tio n 159, 162, 269, 273

stru ctu res)
laten t top ic 264

and d iag n osis 295

letters re la tio n to sou n d s 93

g lob al vs w ord-based 110

levels in lan g u age

ju s tifia b le 2 8 1 -2 8 3

co rre la tio n w ith S D d ev iatio n s 116

Subject Index
levels in language (con tin u ed )
d isin tegratio n o f 89, 116
d isru p tion in 31
sep aration o f 269
and Chom sky 104
lexical ch o ice 83, 168, 2 0 1 -2 0 2 , 206
lexicon 64, 84, 91, 204, 2 1 6 -2 1 7 , 269 (also see
m ental lexicon )
lin g u istic a b ility 183
lin g u istic analysis o f speech 3, 53
lin g u istic processes, in tern alization o f 156

319

m edication 47, 138, 186
m elody 74
m ental lexicon 12, 54, 107, 141
com p lexity o f associations 37
co m p lexity o f netw orks in 108
likened to en cy clo p ed ia 108
organization of 108
m ental spaces 131, 221
m ention 278
messages 85
m etaphor 75, 96, 108-115, 269, 271, 273

listener, needs o f 66
literacy 7 4 -7 5 , 140
localizing 219, 226

m etonym y 108

loo p in g in conversation 253
loss of set 147

m icrostructure 85, 224, 139
m isin terp retation 178

as norm al 296
psych oan alytical exegeses o f 109

m isju dgm ents in ratin g narrativ es 137
m isp ercep tion s, no rm al vs psych otic 207
m acro m ean in g 120
m acrop roposition 248
m acrostructures 8 5 -8 6 , 119, 123, 139, 214, 224,
235, 2 4 6 -2 4 7
lack o f in S D patients 39

m itig ating 170-171, 276, 278, 280, 292
m nem on ic d evices 74
m od ality 170, 171
m orph em es 9, 22, 25, 9 1 -9 2 , 134, 138, 231

m anics 53, 138, 144, 147

m otivation, lack o f (see invo lu ntary attention
44)

m an ip u lation of p recon d itio ns 161
m axim s o f conversation 164-168

m otivation see in ten t(io n )
m otive 179, 279

breach in g o f 176, 179
and sch izoph ren ic speech 165
violations o f and im plicatures 164, 169
m eaning 1 0 -1 1 , 17, 87, 180, 217, 227, 27 7 -2 7 8
(also see context)
changes 64
and co n text 161
co nven tio nal 296
cu ltu ral base o f 105

and m ean in g 152
m u ltilin g u al produ ction 9
m utual g round , estab lish in g 215, 217
m utual know ledge 177, 215-216, 219-220, 247

nag g ing vs psychotic rep etitio n 236
narrative 6, 70, 86, 128, 140, 147, 183, 203, 234,
256

d iscourse, h o listic 269
figu rative 109, 113

co rrelatio n with d iagnosis 187
d eictics 234

and in ten t(io n ) 156-157, 2 6 9 -2 7 0
and m utual interaction 277
force vs literal 109, 153-154

d eviant vs no rm al 132, 184, 188, 190,
194-197, 2 0 6 -2 0 7 , 210-211
e licitin g of 134

from dissection of words 151

glitch es 199

p rin cip le d elabo ratio n o f 271, 286

introd u ctions to 146
scan nin g 190, 192, 197

ration al d erivation o f 116
as response to stim u li 117
req u esting 157
and shared history 275
in social interaction 161
tru th -co n d ition al 162
therap eu tic situation

sch izoph ren ic and m an ic 212
sh iftin g referen ces in 185
skills 188
tem poral o rd e rin g 185, 1 9 3-194, 199, 234
person al m em ories in 43
stru cture, gram m ar o f 85
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n a tiv e sp eakers and in te rp reta tio n 277

pauses 287, 288

n e g a tio n 105, 245

p ercep tu a l error, n o rm a l 200

n e o lo g ism s 8 - 1 1 , 87, 116, 133, 135, 140, 194,
200, 210, 264, 266

p erfo rm a n ce vs co m p e te n ce 6 2 - 6 3 , 81
p erfo rm a tiv e 1 5 3 -1 5 5

netw orks 64

p ersev eratio n 6, 25, 129, 1 3 4 -1 3 6 , 140, 254

new in fo rm a tio n 242, 250, 259, 264

p h a tic co m m u n ic a tio n 178, 247
p h o n em es 8 9 -9 0

sa lie n t and b rand new 261
n o n d e co d a b ility 11, 133

p h o n etics 64, 8 8 -8 9 , 156

n o n sen se w ords, n o rm a l 58

sound c o m b in a tio n s p o ssib le, un u sed 87
p ig e o n h o lin g 147, 261

n o n -se q u ito r resp on ses 66
n o n -th o u g h t d iso rd e re d (N T D ) 53, 60
n on-w ord s 9

p o etic d ev ices 7, 75

n o rm a l sp e ech , e rro rs in 54, 133, 144

po ly sem y and p a ra n o ia 1 5 4 -1 5 5

p o la rity 1 0 5 -1 0 6

n o ta tio n a l v a ria tio n s 87

p o p u la tio n s tested, p sy ch o tic vs n o rm a l 186

n o u n p o sitio n s in se n te n ce 102

p rag m atics 150, 161, 221, 250, 282

n o u n d e te rm in e rs 250

lin k ag es 131, 151
in h u m o r 157
p re co n d itio n s 1 5 9 -1 6 0 , 277

o b je c t 103
O cca m ’s razor 188, 296

p re d icta b ility in d isco u rse 226
p ressu red sp eech 288

O e d ip a l bond s 267, 268

p re su p p o sitio n 247

o ld in fo rm a tio n 202, 250

p rin cip le d e la b o ra tio n o f sp eech 277 (also see
m ean in g )

o ld w ords, m e a n in g ch a n g e 87
om issio n s 1 2 6 -1 2 7

p ro b le m -so lv in g sk ills 59

op p o site sp e ech 19, 20, 135, 206, 254

p ro m in e n t in fo rm a tio n 265

o ra l vs w ritten lan g u age 93, 247, 286

p ro n o u n s 121, 123, 127, 128, 206

o r d e r in g , v io la tio n o f 167
o rd in a ry in te ra ctio n s 277
o r ie n tin g seg m en ts 247
o rth o g ra p h y 75, 78
and in to n a tio n 76
co m m as and v o ice in 76
u n re lia b ility o f 94
o v e rin fo rm a tio n and in c o m p re h e n sib ility 39
o v e rp re c isio n 198

and w ord co u n t 94
p ro n u n cia tio n d ifferen ces cro ss-lin g u istic 90
p ro p o sitio n s 219, 276
p ro -v erb 128
p sy ch oan alysis 224, 271, 278
as tea ch in g 268, 279
v erifiab ility o f 10, 5 3 -5 5 , 5 7 -5 8 , 63, 98, 250,
2 6 8 -2 6 9 , 2 7 8 -2 7 9
and C h om sk y an th e o ry 98

o x y m o ro n 173

p sy ch o lin g u istics 88, 150
psych osis 147

p a ra d ig m a tic asso ciatio n s 20
p a ra lin g u istics 279

psych otic sp eech as so cial d ysfu n ction 26 (also

and sy n tactic e r r o r 204

p a ra lle l e n co d in g 191

s e e sch iz o p h ren ic sp eech )
P uluw at 60

p a ra n o ia 154, 178, 267, 295

p u n ish a b le resp on ses 41, 275

p arap hrase 6, 21, 65, 73, 74, 106, 125, 153, 159,

p u n n in g 7 9 , 135, 131, 140, 229
visu al 191

172, 223, 257, 265, 279, 282, 293
and im p lica tio n 103, 172

p u rp o se 39 (also see in te n t(io n )

p a rticip le s 263
passive 172, 241, 250
p ath co n tro l 46 (also se e S D p ro d u ctio n s)
p a tie n t se le ctio n (IC S ) 1 3 5 -1 3 7

q u estio n s 88, 159, 223, 166
in an aly sis 281

Subject Index
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question s (co n tin u ed )

clin icia n ’s acu m en in d eterm in in g 52 (see

as d eclaratives 152

in terrater reliab ility )
conversation, co gn itiv e strain in 232, 233
cy clicity in 3, 1 3 1 , 140, 261

random trig g erin g in sem antic netw orks 48

d eviant vs no rm al 297

recip rocal verbs 21

failu res to su bordin ate 38
faulty topicalizers 258

reconstru ctability 290
refrain s 36, 236

flo u ting m axim s 163

relativ e clauses 263
relevance 177, 196, 214, 217-227, 223, 228-229,
230, 233, 2 3 5 -2 3 6 , 239, 261

in ap p rop riaten ess o f 166
and in n er speech 68
in term itten t natu re of 31, 281

rep a ir 120

in terp retatio n of 3, 10, 11, 222, 2 8 1 -2 8 3 ,
295-297

rep etitio n , no rm al vs psychotic 236
rep lacem en t words as cohesive 128

lack o f co n trol 16, 34

resistance 271, 279
retrieval 18, 58, 136, 138, 143, 183, 204, 207

lack o f d evelop m ent in 34
lea rn in g o f 276

rh eto ric 147, 259
R h od a 160, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 291

lexical ties in 129, 130, 132, 141

rhym e 15, 24, 36, 7 4 -7 5 , 135, 140, 200, 273
ru le of overdu e ob lig ation s 282
rules o f language 80-83, 87-89, 91-92, 156, 162,

and m orp h op h on em ic ru les 92
and no rm al word flex ib ility 97
and N SD d isru p tion 232

270, 296

loose associations 223

as poetry 41, 273

context-sensitive 85
discou rse 8 0 -8 3 , 88, 92

refrain s 236
rep eatin g 235

d o-supp ort (in English) 82

structural abnorm alities in 41, 51, 104, 172,

v aria b ility o f 83
w ritin g vs speech 156

281
stru ctu rally no rm al 4, 5
selection al restriction s 107

sacades (see eyetracking)
salien t in form ation 261
sam pling
com p arison o f unlike p o p u latio n s 4
random vs non-random passages 132
saving face 170
schem ata 246
schizoaffective d isord ers 3

selection of co n trols (IC S ) 139
self-correctio n 189, 200
self-in terest 227
self-m on ito rin g 58
sem antic ch a in in g 220
sem antic co n n ectio n (see lexical ties,
inco h eren ce, co h eren ce)
sem antic features 19, 21, 22, 106, 107, 243
in antonym s 69

sch izoph ren ic speech, features o f 3 -1 6 , 51,

appropriateness to co n text 107

184
schizophrenic, negative sym ptom 273

choices, autom atic 125
d ifferences in synonym s 13, 22

schizophrenics vs m anics 53

and netw orks 64

scripts 246
SD patients, self-aw areness 30
SD sp e ech 3 - 5 ,7 ,1 0 ,1 8 ,3 0 - 3 1 ,4 0 ,4 2 ,8 1 ,

sim ilarity , p artial and glossom ania 15, 20
transfer o f 106

88-89, 92, 97, 1 2 5 , 128, 129, 133, 138-139,
142, 146, 1 5 1 , 158, 166, 184, 221, 223, 228,
246, 2 5 0 -2 5 2 , 256, 258, 2 6 5 -2 6 6 , 281,
287
circu m lo cu tio n in 6

SD errors in 107

violatio n of 106
sem antics 102, 150, 161, 269
fram e 101
level o f 162
relation to syntax 102, 150
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sem a n tics (c o n tin u e d )
trig g e r in g re trie v a ls 16, 21, 23
se m a n tico -sy n ta ctic categ ory 206

and im p a ire d co g n itio n 59
lan g u ag e 51
lap se in m o n ito r in g 282

se m a n tic tra n sfo rm a tio n s 224

m a n ic 184

se m io tics 150, 161

n o rm a l 183, 291

se n te n ce stru ctu re 21, 79, 240
a g e n t as su b je ct o f 241

n o rm a l vs d ev ia n t e r r o r 287
as o v ert b e h a v io r 60

a p p ro p ria te n e ss 85

p la n n in g 291

d o m in a n t c o n stitu e n t in 243

sch iz o p h ren ic 183, 185, 214

d u m m y su b je ct in 246
m e a n in g o f 85

and ap h asia 185
sk ills, testin g for 184

o ld to new in fo rm a tio n 241, 258

so cial b o n d in g by 153

p ersp ectiv e 242

sp o n tan eo u s 287, 288

to p ica liz in g o f 245
se n te n ce g ra m m a rs 269
se n te n ce su b je ct
and d e v ia n t n a rra tiv e 257
e m p a th y and p e rsp e ctiv e 240
sen ten ces

as statin g p ro p o sitio n s 153
and g oals 83
sp eech act 153, 158, 292
and in te n tio n 157
p re co n d itio n s for in te rp re ta tio n 160
and p rin c ip le d c o rre c tio n o f S D sp eech

as co m p le te th o u g h ts 240

155

in te rp re ta tio n o f 120

p u rp o se an d form 247

and sp e a k er’s “ca m era a n g le " 242

sp e ech vs lan g u ag e 51

to p ic an d co m m en t 220

sp ik y -ty p e ey e m o v em en t (see ey e p u rsu it

se n te n ce su b je ct
re la tio n s to v erb 240
and p ra g m a tics 244
se p a ra tio n o f se lf from o th ers 70

m ovem ents)
sq u ig g les 271, 272, 273
stim u lu s an d resp o n se (see b e h a v io rism 91)
sto ry te llin g 85

se rm o n s 86

strateg ic o p tio n s and S D sp e ech 231

sh ared k n o w led g e 215, 2 79

strateg ies 83, 87, 227, 294

sim ile 108

and d e riv a tio n o f m e a n in g 269, 270

sin c e rity p rin c ip le 164

and relev a n ce 215

slips o f th e tongu e 1 2 , 120, 78, 79, 8 3 , 174, 283,
289, 265, 269, 287
n o rm a l vs sch iz o p h re n ic 12
so cia l ru le s and m e a n in g 152

fo r c o m p re h e n d in g 116
for co m p re h e n sio n 113
for u n d e rsta n d in g 278
in d e riv in g m e a n in g 268

so cia liz a tio n and sp e ech 187

p rag m atic and m e a n in g 176

so cio lin g u istics 150, 180

sem an tic 161

so u n d s and letters 75
sp ace b u ild e rs 131

strateg ies fo r in te rp re ta tio n
and th era p ist 277

speakers, lay and a b ility to ju d g e d ev ian ce
52

strateg y

sp e a k in g in ton gu es (see g lo sso lalia 59)
sp e e ch 74, 75

stru ctu ral g ra m m a r 100

for d e riv in g m e a n in g 159
stru ctu ra l g ram m ars 104

d e v ia n t an d d e riv in g in te n tio n 187, 295

stru ctu re 101

e q u iv a le n ce to th o u g h t 31, 50, 55, 57, 61,

stru ctu res o f ex p e cta tio n 246

67, 251, 257, 259 (also see thought and

su b je ct 256

lan g u ag e)

su b je ct o f sen ten ce

e rro rs n o rm a l 40, 52
fig u ra tiv e 75

and em p h asis 242
su b je ct-p re d ica te re la tio n s h ip 240

Subject Index
su bject vs predicate 255

texts

com plete 258
su bo rd in atin g structures 38

m any topics in 249
them e 255, 256, 257

su rp rise 85

and d iscourse d evian ce 257

syn ecdoche 108
synonym s 13, 24

and hum an interest 256

as cause o f glossom ania 13
non-su bstitutability betw een 13
synonym y 174
and m eaning netw orks 174
synonym y of have and be 21
syntactic boun d aries 76
syntactic constru ction
leaving ou t elem e n t in 127
syntactic erro r 202, 205, 207
syntactic form ,
ov errid in g of 160
as ru le-g ov erned 152
syntactic gapping 199, 204, 210
syntactico-sem antic ru les 103
syntactic structures 79
com p lexity in psychotics 132
p rocessin g o f 77
p u nctu ation in 77
syntagm atic associations 34
syntax 78, 84, 214, 269

and given in form ation 258
vs rh em e 255, 258
theo ries
accoun tin g for data 28, 131, 140, 100,
103
and in terp retation s 268
T h e P rague School 83
therap eu tic interview 271, 275, 278
avoidance of 19
as context 281
therapist 277, 278
therapy, goal o f 276
thought 31, 50, 5 6 -5 7 , 62, 251, 259
intru sive in norm als 288
as n o n -visible process 6 0 -6 2
w ithout v erbalizin g 60
relative to syntax 54, 255 (see also speech,
equ ivalence to thought)
thought d isord er (T D ) 31, 5 3 -5 4 , 56, 59, 251,
253, 255, 256, 260, 266
correlation with speech (see speech, equiva

discourse-based 100 (also see context-free)

lence to thought)
in m anics 53

exp lan ato ry power of 98, 100
in terp retation of 152

n o n-sp ecificity in d iagnosis 54
thoughts, kinds of 60

co rrect, in co m p reh en sible 219

and le x ica l ch o ice 83
and thoughts 54, 255
system atic delu sions 46

tan g en tiality 147, 214
targets 151
T D vs N T D schizophrenics 132, 137
tem poral m iso rd erin g 86, 204, 210, 234
term in olog y 123, 254
aphasia 52

title
and IC S task 252
and m ean in g 251
T L C 54
topic 16, 17, 133, 138, 168, 214, 217, 221, 223,
237, 239, 245, 249, 240, 290, 294
advancem ent of 130, 136, 222
agreem ent on 249
ch an g in g o f 18, 223, 225, 228, 239, 248,
291

d escrip tion vs exp lan atio n 147

co n strain in g o f 272
as d eterm in an t of m ean in g 39, 239

non-sp eech d isord ered (N SD ) 4

d iscourse and sentence 248

psych oan alytic 279
speech d isord ered (SD ) 4

extran eou s m atters 39

term in olog y (see thought d isord ered o r n o n thought d isord ered 53)
testing 34, 289
text-as-product 125
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exp an sion of 258
global 239
id en tify in g conflict 277
and new in form ation 239
and poin t of view 240

324

Understanding Psychotic Speech

top ic (c o n tin u ed )
re n e g o tia tin g o f 228

v e rify in g F reu d ian th eo ry
im p o ssib ility o f 268

as so u rce o f re le v a n ce 223
sch iz o p h re n ic p ro b lem s w ith 254
show n by le x ic a l item s 245, 250

w eakening o f co n stru cts 212

statem en t o f 249

w ell-form ed n ess

su b o rd in a tio n to 290
and su m m a ries 249
and w hich is a lie test 244

ju d g m e n ts o f 85
w ord
bo rro w in g 87

to p ica liz er 257

cre a tin g new 87

topic, te rm in o lo g y for 2 4 9 -2 5 0

o rth o g ra p h ic d e fin itio n o f 93

top ic vs co m m en t 255, 258
tra d itio n a l g ra m m a r 100
tra n sfo rm a tio n a l g ra m m a r 84, 85, 99, 100,
263
trig g e rs 151
tru th 131, 215, 219
tu rn ta k in g 295
T y p e -T o k e n R a tio ( T T R ) fallacy o f 94

w ord associatio n s 78, 137, 266
and sch izo p h ren ic sp eech 78
testin g 79
w ord associatio n testin g
v alid ity o f 61
w ord ch o ices
n o rm a l vs. sch iz o p h ren ic 6, 10
w ord co u n tin g 93
fallacy in 93
w ord, d e fin itio n o f 93

u n con scio u s, th e 267

w ord fin d in g d ifficu ltie s 5, 6 , 10, 1 3 0 , 133

u n d e rsta n d in g task (IC S ) 139

w ord retriev a l

u ttera n ce p a ir 252, 254, 278

d ifficu lty in 11, 2 3 , 116
w ords, ch a n g ea b le m e a n in g in 9 6 -9 7
e lic ita tio n p ro b lem s 93

v a len cy 102

p ro b lem s in co u n tin g 93

v erb 1 2 6 -1 2 7

R u ssian 96

p e rfo rm a tiv e 156
stative 87
tra n sitiv e 79
v erb ch o ice
and co n te x t 100

S w ah ili-E n g lish eq u iv a le n ce 95
w ord salad 5, 11, 24, 127, 1 3 5 , 1 4 0 , 146, 206,
207, 210, 233, 254, 266
w ords,
co m p o u n d , stress p a tte rn o f 94

and sen ten ce stru ctu re 102

and g ram m atical m o rp h em es 95

tense and m e a n in g 105, 217

fu n ctio n 95

v erb a l c h a in in g (see g lossom ania)
v erb al p lacem a rk ers 253

w ritin g 74, 75
co n v en tio n s o f (also see o rth o g rap h y ) 75

v erb a l p ro d u ctiv ity
m a n ic vs sch iz o p h ren ic 53
v erb a u x ilia rie s, ca ten a tiv e 94

“zero in g -in ” tactic 192

